The opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-2848-23
LINDA K. HIRD, f/k/a
LINDA K. HIRST,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
JONATHAN A. HIRST,
Defendant-Appellant.
_______________________
Submitted March 17, 2025 – Decided July 1, 2025
Before Judges Gummer, Berdote Byrne, and Jacobs.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,
Chancery Division, Family Part, Union County, Docket
No. FM-20-0941-22.
Jonathan A. Hirst, appellant pro se.
Fox Rothschild LLP, attorneys for respondent (Lindsay
A. Heller, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM
In this post-judgment matrimonial action, defendant Jonathan A. Hirst
appeals an April 5, 2024 order, denying his motion based on the court's
interpretation of the terms of a Binding Term Sheet ("BTS") and a Marital
Settlement Agreement ("MSA") and awarding attorney's fees to plaintiff. We
affirm the order substantially for the reasons outlined in Judge Marc R. Brown's
cogent oral opinion.
I.
The parties were married in 2013. No children were born of the marriage,
though each had emancipated children from prior marriages. On November 12,
2021, plaintiff obtained a temporary restraining order against defendant. Five
days later, she filed for divorce.
On June 21, 2022, defendant moved for pendente lite spousal support,
seeking monthly payments of $7,961.90. On August 26, 2022, the parties
entered into a consent order that incorporated civil restraints and directed
plaintiff to pay spousal support of $1,000 per month, retroactive to June 21, the
date defendant filed his notice of motion.
No modifications to the pendente lite order were sought by the parties or
issued by the court during the pendency of the action. After months of
mediation, the parties executed a BTS on October 19, 2023. The BTS resolved
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several financial issues, including future alimony, but did not address pendente
lite support. On execution of the BTS, plaintiff discontinued monthly pendente
lite payments after making a final payment in October 2023.
On January 8, 2024, both parties executed a MSA. Its terms were
incorporated by reference into a Judgment of Divorce ("JOD") entered that same
day. Reviewing his records thereafter, defendant discovered plaintiff had ceased
making pendente lite support payments as of November 1, 2023. Defendant
requested payment for the months of November 2023, December 2023, and
January 2024.1 Plaintiff declined, citing various provisions in the BTS by which
the parties had waived all claims to alimony.
On March 6, 2024, defendant moved to compel payment of pendente lite
arrears for November 2023 through January 2024. Plaintiff opposed the motion
and cross-moved for sanctions and attorney's fees pursuant to Rule 1:4-8,
contending the JOD and MSA superseded any claim for pendente lite obligations
and that defendant's motion was frivolous. After oral argument on April 5, 2024,
the judge denied defendant's motion and granted plaintiff's request for counsel
1
As noted by the judge, defendant requested a full $1,000 payment for January,
instead of a pro-rated sum, even though the parties' divorce was finalized on
January 8 th.
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3
fees in the amount of $3,500, although it did not find defendant's filing to be
frivolous under Rule 1:4-8.
In his oral decision, Judge Brown cited those provisions of the BTS he
found controlling. The judge stated:
[Paragraph] 1.27 says that, for the promises and
covenants set forth herein and in satisfaction of any and
all claims between the parties, including, without
limitation, support . . . equitable distribution of assets,
and liabilities . . . [c]ounsel fees, expert fees, and any
other claims -- any other credits claimed to be due and
owing by either party, wife agrees to pay to the husband
the sum of $1,200,000, which shall be tax free. That,
again, clearly indicates that that includes all claims.
I then would go to [p]aragraph 2.1 of the BTS
. . . . "The parties further acknowledge that they waive
any and all claims against the other with respect to any
issues related to their divorce . . . ." All claims. There's
no reservation of right[s] in that provision.
Paragraph 2.1. "For the promises and covenants
set forth herein above, the parties each specifically
waive any and all rights to alimony and support, both
now and in the future, from the other and state that they
are self-sufficient and capable of supporting themselves
now and in the future," which presupposes the idea that
if anything was owed at that point in time, it is no longer
collectible. It's waived. There is no reservation [of
rights] in that language.
. . . Paragraph 7.4, "subject to the provisions of
this agreement, each party . . . releases and discharges
the other from any and all causes of action, claims,
rights, or demands . . . which either of the parties ever
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had now has against the other except for any and all
causes of action for dissolution of the marriage or any
cause of action to effectuate the terms of and conditions
of this agreement." Operative words being "which
either of the parties ever had or now has." Presumably,
that would have been any claim which preceded their
execution of this agreement.
Finally, the judge observed:
Paragraph 7.8, again, "the parties have
incorporated into this agreement their entire
understanding and no oral statement or prior written
material extrinsic to this agreement shall have force or
effect. This agreement supersedes all contracts,
arrangements, commitments, and offers of every kind
or nature, oral or written, at any time heretofore made
by the parties. The purpose of this agreement is to
clarify the legal relations of the parties and there are no
representations, warranties, covenants, or undertakings
other than those expressly set forth in the framework of
this agreement." There is nothing in this -- when this
paragraph said, "this agreement supersedes all
contracts, arrangements, commitments, and offers of
every kind," it does not exclude the binding term sheet.
The agreement supersedes that.
. . . The agreement in [p]aragraph 7.22 says, "the
parties acknowledge that he and she has carefully read
and both understand the agreement and warrant and
represent that it is fair and equitable to each." At no
point in this agreement is there an indication that there
was a reservation by Mr. Hirst of his right to recoup
premarital money, pendente lite money based upon the
August . . . of 2022 order and not only is the agreement
dispositive in each of the . . . paragraphs I just cited,
but there is also no doubt that . . . what Mr. Hirst is
asking the [c]ourt to do in some respect is he's asking
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the [c]ourt to add a term to this agreement. He's asking
the [c]ourt to . . . revive . . . the pendente lite claim,
which were specifically excluded in the document
itself. He's asking that the [c]ourt rewrite this
agreement, and that's not the province of this [c]ourt.
The agreement is not ambiguous in this sense. He can
argue that the binding term sheet, there was ambiguity
there, but the agreement is as clear as day. All of these
other claims are waived. The [c]ourt is not going to
rewrite the agreement. I'm not going to insert a claim,
which says that the -- all claims are waived with the
exception of the $3,000 that was owed between
November of 2023 and January of 2024. I'm not having
that, and that's what he's essentially asking that I do.
The judge concluded its decision by citing the landmark case of Mallamo
v. Mallamo, 280 N.J. Super. 8, 12 (App. Div. 1995), which held that any arrears
incurred relative to a pendente lite order must be preserved in a final judgment
or they are extinguished.
Regarding attorney's fees, Judge Brown reviewed the criteria set forth in
RPC 1.5(a), Rule 4:42-9(b), and Rule 5:3-5(c), finding that defendant's
submission of "about 600 pages . . . was over the top" and "unreasonable[,] given
the fact that the issues that we're dealing with here were neither novel nor
difficult." The judge also found the $7,700 in fees incurred by plaintiff, as a
result of defendant's voluminous filing, to be excessive. To rectify this
circumstance and for reasons in the record, the judge concluded that defendant
should "contribute $3,500 to [plaintiff's] fees."
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On appeal, defendant argues the judge erred in extinguishing arrears
because inter alia "the vitality of the pendente lite award continued until the
judgment of divorce and such sums are vested," in not recognizing the pendente
lite award acted as a final judgment each month, and in awarding counsel fees
without sufficiently analyzing Rule 5:3-5(c), Rule 4:42-9, and RPC 1.5(a), and
in an amount that exceeded the value of the sum at issue ($3,000 in missed
payments).
II.
This court reviews the trial court's factual findings under a deferential
standard. Balducci v. Cige, 240 N.J. 574, 595 (2020). Findings "by a trial court
are binding on appeal when supported by adequate, substantial, credible
evidence." Gnall v. Gnall, 222 N.J. 414, 428 (2015). By contrast, a "trial court's
interpretation of the law and the legal consequences that flow from established
facts are not entitled to any special deference." Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp.
Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995). Interpretation of contracts,
including settlement agreements, is reviewed de novo. Serico v. Rothberg, 234
N.J. 168, 178 (2018); Gold Tree Spa, Inc. v. PD Nail Corp., 475 N.J. Super. 240,
245 (App. Div. 2023).
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"Settlement of disputes, including matrimonial disputes, is encouraged
and highly valued in our system." Quinn v. Quinn, 225 N.J. 34, 44 (2016). The
strong public policy favoring settlements "rests on the recognition that 'parties
to a dispute are in the best position to determine how to resolve a contested
matter in a way which is least disadvantageous to everyone.'" Gere v. Louis,
209 N.J. 486, 500 (2012) (quoting Impink ex rel. Baldi v. Reynes, 396 N.J.
Super. 553, 563 (App. Div. 2007)). A settlement "spares the parties the risk of
an adverse outcome and the time and expense—both monetary and emotional—
of protracted litigation." Kernahan v. Home Warranty Adm'r of Fla., Inc., 236
N.J. 301, 323 (2019) (quoting Willingboro Mall, Ltd. v. 240/242 Franklin Ave.,
L.L.C., 215 N.J. 242, 253-54 (2013)).
Matrimonial agreements "are essentially consensual and voluntary in
character and therefore entitled to" a predisposition in favor of "their validity
and enforceability." Petersen v. Petersen, 85 N.J. 638, 642 (1981). It is
"shortsighted and unwise for courts to reject out of hand consensual solutions to
vexatious personal matrimonial problems that have been advanced by the parties
themselves." Quinn, 225 N.J. at 44 (quoting Petersen, 85 N.J. at 645).
Accordingly, our courts will "strain to give effect to the terms of a settlement
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wherever possible." Capparelli v. Lopatin, 459 N.J. Super. 584, 603 (App. Div.
2019) (quoting Brundage v. Est. of Carambio, 195 N.J. 575, 601 (2008)).
"The basic contractual nature of matrimonial agreements has long been
recognized." Pacifico v. Pacifico, 190 N.J. 258, 265 (2007) (citing Harrington
v. Harrington, 281 N.J. Super. 39, 46 (App. Div. 1995)). That is, a "settlement
agreement is governed by basic contract principles." Quinn, 225 N.J. at 45. As
with any contract, "the parties cannot expect a court to present to them a contract
better than or different from the agreement they struck between themselves."
Ibid. When "the intent of the parties is plain and the language is clear and
unambiguous, a court must enforce the agreement . . . ." Ibid.
Here, we are satisfied Judge Brown appropriately applied the foregoing
legal principles of contract law to the BTS and MSA. By referencing key
provisions of the BTS—which includes a waiver of all claims and no reservation
of rights—and case law establishing that claims for pendente lite support not
specifically preserved in the final judgment are extinguished, the trial court did
not err. It ruled soundly. The judge properly assessed the pertinent court rules
in deciding the attorney fee award and reached a balanced and just decision.
Affirmed.
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