Hollis v. Hughes

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

LUKAS O. HOLLIS, )

B03076, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. )

) Case No. 25-cv-747-DWD

LATOYA HUGHES, )

DANIEL MONTI, )

CHASE WILHELM, )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

DUGAN, District Judge:

Plaintiff Lukas O. Hollis, an inmate of the Illinois Department of Corrections

(IDOC) currently detained at Centralia Correctional Center (Centralia), brings this civil

rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and RLUIPA (Religious Land Use and

Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a), et al.) for alleged deprivations of

his rights related to his religious exercise in prison. Plaintiff’s Complaint (Doc. 1) is now

before the Court for preliminary review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Under Section

1915A, the Court is required to screen prisoner complaints to filter out non-meritorious

claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a)-(b). Any portion of a complaint that is legally frivolous,

malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or asks for money

damages from a defendant who by law is immune from such relief must be dismissed.

28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). At this juncture, the factual allegations of the pro se complaint are

to be liberally construed. Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d 816, 821 (7th

Cir. 2009).

THE COMPLAINT

Plaintiff is a Wiccan-Druid, who seeks to possess a leatherbound Book of Shadows

journal as part of his religious exercise. A Book of Shadows is a book that Wiccans use to

keep personal thoughts and reflections. (Doc. 1 at 2). Plaintiff sought to purchase such a

book from Amazon, and he explains although it is just a journal, the book he sought to

purchase does still have an associated ISBN. Plaintiff explains that he believes possession

of this book is allowed by reference to an excerpt of an Administrative Directive, which

states that Wicca is an oral tradition and that practitioners “often have a personal

notebook, listing their rituals and working notes called a “Book of Shadows.”” (Doc. 1 at

10). The Directive goes on to state that IDOC inmates are permitted to have a Book of

Shadows. (Id.). Plaintiff states that the book is part of the way he expresses himself, and

that recording thoughts in the journal is a “religious exercise.”

Plaintiff explains by way of background that in 2022 Defendant Chase Wilhelm

(Chief Chaplain) and Rob Jeffreys (former director of IDOC) allowed him to receive a

copy of this book. By contrast, when he attempted to receive a new copy of the Book of

Shadows at Centralia, he was informed that he could not possess it because it was

leatherbound. He supplied two correspondence slips from the Chaplain explaining that

he cannot have the book because it is leatherbound. (Doc. 1 at 9). By contrast, it was

explained that inmates are allowed a leatherbound book that contains writing like a Bible

or Koran. Plaintiff also attached a grievance concerning the issue wherein the grievance

officer indicated that leatherbound books are not allowed, but that Plaintiff was offered

and accepted a composition notebook. (Doc. 1 at 7).

Plaintiff argues in his complaint that the Administrative Directives have not

changed, and he should still be allowed to receive this book. He faults Defendant Hughes

for concurring on the grievance denying the book, because she “concurred” without

observing the rules that govern the grievance. (Doc. 1 at 3). Plaintiff also alleges that

allowing others who practice religions to have leatherbound books, while disallowing

the Wiccan book, is clear discrimination. He claims that the prison relies on “safety” to

excuse the offering of a composition book versus a leatherbound journal, which he claims

is unfair given that the book has an ISBN number and can be delivered like other

publications.

As relief, Plaintiff seeks to be provided with the leatherbound Ancient Earth

Scrolls book that he wishes to use as his Book of Shadows, he seeks punitive damages,

and he seeks that any Pagan in IDOC who requests the book be provided with the book.

(Doc. 1 at 4).

Based on the allegations in the Complaint, the Court designates the following

counts:

Claim 1: First Amendment or RLUIPA claim against Defendants

Hughes, Monti and Wilhelm for denying Plaintiff access to

a leatherbound Book of Shadows from 2024-present;

Claim 2: Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection claim against

Defendants Hughes, Monti, and Wilhelm for denying

Plaintiff’s leatherbound book while allowing inmates of

other religious denominations to possess leatherbound

books.

The parties and the Court will use these designations in all future pleadings and orders

unless otherwise directed by a judicial officer of this Court. Any claim that is mentioned

in the Complaint but not addressed in this Order is considered dismissed without

prejudice as inadequately pled under Twombly. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.

544, 570 (2007) (an action fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted if it does

not plead “enough facts to state a claim that is plausible on its face”).

Analysis

As an initial matter, Plaintiff has expressed a desire to name Defendants Hughes,

Monti and Wilhelm solely in their official capacities. (Doc. 1 at 3). This is appropriate to

the extent that the sole form of relief that he seeks is injunctive relief, because state actors

implement injunctive relief in their official capacities. However, Plaintiff also seeks

money damages. An inmate cannot secure money damages from a prison official in his

or her official capacity, because that is akin to a suit directly against the state for money

damages, which is not allowed. See e.g., Wynn v. Southward, 251 F.3d 588, 592 (7th Cir.

2001) (a citizen cannot sue a state or a state official in their official capacity for money

damages). Thus, to the extent that Plaintiff seeks money damages, his complaint is not

adequately pled.

Turning to the possible grounds for injunctive relief, an inmate’s right to practice

his religion is protected under the First Amendment, and the Religious Land Use and

Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a). RLUIPA offers broader

protections than the First Amendment by prohibiting substantial burdens on an inmate's

religious exercise unless that burden serves a “compelling governmental interest” and is

“the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.” 42

U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a); see also Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709 (2005). However, RLUIPA

does not allow money damages against state officials, and instead allows for only

injunctive relief. Sossamon v. Texas, 563 U.S. 277, 285 (2011).

Here, Plaintiff alleges that his rights under RLUIPA have been violated because

the prison will not allow him to receive a leatherbound journal to be used as his Book of

Shadows. He contends that the leather bound version of the journal is central to his

religious practice. Ultimately a more detailed assessment will be needed of the necessity

of this leatherbound book as compared to other journals like the composition book the

prison provided, and an assessment will be needed of if the government has a compelling

interest to impose this particular restriction. At this preliminary juncture, the allegations

are sufficient to proceed.

Likewise, Plaintiff may proceed on his Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection

claim against the prison officials to the extent that he seeks injunctive relief. Plaintiff

argues that inmates of other denominations are allowed to possess leatherbound books,

while he is not being allowed to possess his leatherbound Book of Shadows. The Equal

Protection Clause and the Establishment Clause prohibit the defendant from treating

members of some religious faiths more favorably than others without a secular reason.

See Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322-23 (1972); Nelson v. Miller, 570 F.3d 868, 880-82 (7th Cir.

2009); Kaufman v. McCaughtry, 419 F.3d 678, 683-84 (7th Cir. 2005). “The rights of inmates

belonging to minority or non-traditional religions must be respected to the same degree

as the rights of those belonging to larger and more traditional denominations.” Al-Alamin

v. Gramley, 926 F.2d 680, 686 (7th Cir. 1991). To state an equal protection claim, a plaintiff

must allege that he was treated differently from others based on membership in a suspect

class (such as race, gender, alien status, or national origin) or based upon the denial of a

fundamental right (freedom of speech or religion). See, e.g., Srail v. Village of Lisle, Ill., 588

F.3d 940, 943 (7th Cir. 2009). Here, Plaintiff clearly meets the basic standards to

demonstrate differential treatment from religious groups, so he may also proceed on his

Fourteenth Amendment claim solely as it relates to potential injunctive relief.

For now, Plaintiff may proceed against all three defendants in their official

capacities because it is not clear if who amongst Hughes, Monti, or Wilhelm will be the

best party to implement the injunctive relief sought. The Defendants may seek to clarify

this issue and to narrow it to just one defendant as they see fit. See e.g., Clay v. Indiana

Dept. of Corr., 2020 WL 3791595 at *2 (N.D. Ind. July 7, 2020) (allowing an inmate to

proceed on a RLUIPA claim against a Warden and dismissing all other defendants).

DISPOSITION

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT Claims 1 and 2 of the Complaint survive initial

screening as described above against Defendants Hughes, Monti, and Wilhelm in their

official capacities only. By contrast, any claim for monetary damages is dismissed

because Plaintiff cannot seek monetary damages from a state official in their official

capacity. Plaintiff’s Motion for Service (Doc. 3) is GRANTED.

The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to prepare for Defendants Latoya Hughes,

Daniel Monti, and Chase Wilhelm: (1) Form 5 (Notice of a Lawsuit and Request to Waive

Service of a Summons), and (2) Form 6 (Waiver of Service of Summons). The Clerk is

DIRECTED to mail these forms, a copy of the Complaint (Doc. 1), and a copy of this

Order. If a Defendant fails to sign and return the Waiver of Service of Summons (Form

6) to the Clerk within 30 days from the date the forms were sent, the Clerk shall take

appropriate steps to effect formal service on that Defendant, and the Court will require

the Defendant to pay the full costs of formal service, to the extent authorized by the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

If a Defendant cannot be found at the work address provided by Plaintiff, the

employer shall furnish the Clerk with the Defendant’s current work address, or, if not

known, the Defendant’s last-known address. This information shall be used only for

sending the forms as directed above or for formally effecting service. Any documentation

of the address shall be retained only by the Clerk. Address information shall not be

maintained in the court file or disclosed by the Clerk.

Defendants are ORDERED to timely file an appropriate responsive pleading to

the Complaint and shall not waive filing a reply pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g).

Pursuant to Administrative Order No. 244, Defendants need only respond to the issues

stated in this Merits Review Order.

If judgment is rendered against Plaintiff, and the judgment includes the payment

of costs under Section 1915, Plaintiff will be required to pay the full amount of the costs,

regardless of whether his application to proceed in forma pauperis was granted. See 28

U.S.C. § 1915(f)(2)(A).

Plaintiff is ADVISED that he is under a continuing obligation to inform the Clerk

of Court and each opposing party of any address changes; the Court will not

independently investigate his whereabouts. This shall be done in writing and not later

than 14 days after a transfer or other change of address occurs. Failure to comply with

this order will cause a delay in the transmission of court documents and may result in

dismissal of this action for failure to prosecute. Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 30, 2025 /s David W. Dugan

__________________________

DAVID W. DUGAN

United States District Judge

Notice to Plaintiff

The Court will take the necessary steps to notify the appropriate defendants of your

lawsuit and serve them with a copy of your complaint. After service has been achieved,

the defendants will enter their appearance and file an Answer to the complaint. It will

likely take at least 60 days from the date of this Order to receive the defendants’ Answers,

but it is entirely possible that it will take 90 days or more. When all of the defendants

have filed Answers, the Court will enter a Scheduling Order containing important

information on deadlines, discovery, and procedures. Plaintiff is advised to wait until

counsel has appeared for the defendants before filing any motions, to give the defendants

notice and an opportunity to respond to those motions. Motions filed before defendants’

counsel has filed an appearance will generally be denied as premature. Plaintiff need not

submit any evidence to the Court at his time, unless otherwise directed by the Court.

The Court wishes to remind the Plaintiff that litigation is often viewed a series of hurdles

that the Plaintiff must clear to get to another hurdle. Initial screening is such a hurdle, but

it is a very low one for the Plaintiff to clear. As noted above, surviving initial screening

only requires the bare statement of a claim that, if proven, could entitle Plaintiff to some

relief. At trial, he will need to prove by a preponderance of evidence that the facts alleged

actually occurred and that those facts satisfy the legal requirements for recovery. Trial is

the highest and most difficult of hurdles for any Plaintiff to clear.