WRETMAN v. THE UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA SYSTEM

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

CHRISTOPHER J. WRETMAN, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. )

)

THE UNIVERSITY OF NORTH )

CAROLINA SYSTEM; THE UNIVERSITY )

OF NORTH CAROLINA AT CHAPEL )

HILL; THE UNIVERSITY OF NORTH )

CAROLINA BOARD OF TRUSTEES; )

BOARD OF GOVERNORS THE )

UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA )

AT CHAPEL HILL; LEE ROBERTS, in )

his official capacity; KEVIN ) 1:24-cv-233

M. GUSKIEWICZ, individually; )

JEFFREY CAMPBELL, individually )

and in his official capacity; )

J. CHRISTOPHER CLEMENS, )

individually and in his official)

capacity; JEREMY ENLOW, )

individually and in his official)

capacity; C. ELIZABETH HALL, )

individually and in her official)

capacity; G. MARK HOLMES, )

individually and in his official)

capacity; DONNA JAMES-WHIDBEE, )

individually and in her official)

capacity; T. ADELE MAYFIELD, )

individually and in her official)

capacity; ANGENETTE MCADOO, )

individually and in her official)

capacity; LORA WICAL, )

individually and in her official)

capacity; MARGARET BARRETT, )

individually and in her official)

capacity; MIMI V. CHAPMAN, )

individually and in her official)

capacity; and RAMONA )

DENBY-BRINSON, individually and )

in her official capacity; )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

OSTEEN, JR., District Judge

Plaintiff filed a complaint asserting claims for relief

arising from his discharge for-cause in May 2022 against the

University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (“UNC-CH”) and its

constituent institutions and various UNC-CH employees. (See

generally Compl. (Doc. 4).) Before this court are motions to

dismiss filed by the UNC Defendants, (Doc. 13), and the

Individual Defendants, (Doc. 15). The motions are fully briefed

and ripe. A hearing is not necessary to resolve the motion. For

the reasons that follow, both motions will be granted in part

and denied in part.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On a motion to dismiss, a court must “accept as true all of

the factual allegations contained in the complaint and draw all

reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.” Ray v. Roane,

948 F.3d 222, 226 (4th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted). The facts,

as provided in the complaint, are as follows.

A. Plaintiff’s Employment at UNC-CH

In August 2017, Plaintiff Christopher James Wretman

(“Plaintiff” or “Wretman”) was hired as a “Senior Data Analyst”

for the Sheps Center at UNC-CH. (Compl. (Doc. 4) ¶ 25.) His

position was “designated as permanent Exempt from the North

Carolina Human Resources Act (EHRA) Non-Faculty Research Staff.”

(Id. ¶ 28.) The position was “funded at 75% ‘full time

equivalent’” and Plaintiff was encouraged to “fill his remaining

25% . . . by seeking additional duties at UNC-CH.” (Id. ¶ 30.)

Plaintiff’s additional duties included “work[ing] with other

UNC-CH faculty on research projects.” (Id. ¶ 31.)

Plaintiff joined a collaborative, but informal, research

team comprised of himself, Dr. Rebecca Macy and Dr. Cynthia

Rizo, UNC-CH faculty members, Dr. Jeongsuk Kim, a postdoctoral

scholar, and Ms. Jia Luo, a Research Program Manager. (Id. ¶¶

36, 44, 50, 53.) The research team collaborated with other

faculty and students in the UNC-CH School of Social Work

(“SSW”), including Ms. Sarah Godoy, a doctoral student, and Ms.

Erin Meehan, a master’s student. (Id. ¶ 54.)

B. Reports of Plaintiff’s Misconduct

Between April and June of 2021, both Godoy and Luo

expressed concerns about the dynamics of the informal research

team. First, on April 1, 2021, Godoy met with Mimi Chapman, the

Associate Dean for Doctoral Education in the SSW, and “expressed

concerns about communication with her informal research team,

led by Macy, Rizo, and [Plaintiff].” (Id. ¶¶ 19, 82.) Chapman

“initiated follow-up conversations . . . about Godoy’s concerns”

and thereafter “made a Report to the EOC/Title IX Office.” (Id.

¶¶ 83, 85.)1 Chapman also arranged meetings with Macy and Rizo,

on May 10, and Plaintiff, on May 13. (Id. ¶¶ 86, 94.) During the

meeting with Macy and Rizo, Chapman relayed that Godoy “reported

that the team dynamics, particularly the team’s close

relationships, made her uncomfortable” and that “Wretman made

inappropriate comments.” (Id. ¶ 95.)

Second, on June 3, 2021, Luo “met with Macy to raise

concerns about the research team and its functioning.” (Id. ¶

116.) Luo “made allegations against the team and Wretman

concerning anti-Asian hate, harassment, and a toxic work

environment” and “declared that Wretman’s communication style

was particularly a problem for her.” (Id. ¶ 117.) Additionally,

Luo “indicated to Macy that she knew of others with concerns

about Wretman.” (Id. ¶ 118.) Following this meeting, on June 4,

2021, Macy “reported Luo’s concerns about herself, Rizo, and

Wretman to EOC.” (Id. ¶ 121.) Macy also informed Plaintiff “that

1 “The UNC-CH Equal Opportunity and Compliance Office (EOC)

is the sole formal entity at UNC-CH charged with investigating

Reports of Discrimination and Harassment under its policies,

which include the Policy Prohibiting Discrimination, Harassment,

and Related Misconduct (hereafter PPDHRM).” (Compl. (Doc. 4) ¶

75.)

Luo was raising concerns” and “indicated to him that others may

have concerns too.” (Id. ¶ 124.)

Also on June 4, 2021, Plaintiff sent an email to Meehan –

who had recently completed an internship with Macy – with the

subject line “Rescinding Offer of Help.” (Id. ¶¶ 141–142.) In

its entirety, the email stated: “I am writing to formally

rescind any offer I have made to help you at PCANC [Prevent

Child Abuse North Carolina], offer you a job reference, help you

apply to a PhD program, help you with any written work, or to

help you in any other manner. Please do not contact me going

forwards.” (Id. ¶ 143.) Following this email, Meehan reported

Plaintiff to the EOC “on or about November 11, 2021.” (Id. ¶

146.)

C. Assessment of Reports and Notices of Investigation

After Godoy, Luo, and Meehan reported misconduct in April,

June, and November of 2021, respectively, the EOC’s first step

was “to conduct an Initial Assessment of such Reports to

determine whether the alleged conduct would present a violation

of [UNC-CH] Policy and whether further action [was] warranted

based on the alleged conduct.” (Id. ¶ 154.) The EOC conducted

its initial assessment of the reports between April 2021 and

March 2022. (Id. at 27.)2

After the EOC completed its initial assessment, it issued a

Notice of Investigation (“NOI”) to Plaintiff on November 23,

2021, regarding Luo’s report, an NOI to Plaintiff on December

13, 2021, regarding Meehan’s report, and an NOI to Plaintiff on

March 9, 2022, regarding Godoy’s report. (Id. ¶¶ 155, 188, 193.)

With respect to the Luo and Godoy reports, the NOIs informed

Plaintiff that he was under investigation for possible

violations of UNC-CH’s “Hostile Environment Harassment” policy

and UNC-CH’s “Bullying policy under its Workplace Violence

Policy.” (Id. ¶¶ 175, 179, 204–05, 209.) With respect to the

Meehan report, the NOI informed Plaintiff he was under

investigation for possible violations of UNC-CH’s “PPDHRM

Retaliation Policy.” (Id. ¶ 189.) The NOIs also detailed the

allegations made by Godoy, Luo, and Meehan that gave rise to

each of the investigations. (See id. ¶¶ 176, 180, 191, 206,

210.)

2 Citations in this Memorandum Opinion and Order to

documents filed within the court refer to the page numbers

located at the bottom right-hand corner of the documents as they

appear on CM/ECF.

D. Investigation and Findings

The EOC conducted its formal investigations into the

bullying, harassment, and retaliation charges between November

2021 and May 2022. (Id. at 37.) The investigations were led by

Jeremy Enlow and Donna James-Whidbee. (Id. ¶¶ 11, 14, 214.) The

investigators interviewed Plaintiff, (id. ¶¶ 233–35), the

reporting parties, (id. ¶¶ 220, 222), and various witnesses,

(id. ¶ 237).

UNC-CH’s PPDHRM Procedures Policy provides that “upon

completion of an Investigation, an initial version of an

Investigation Reports [sic] is sent to the Administrative

Adviser for review. Following such a review, an Outcome Team is

then gathered to determine a course of actions based on the

Findings as well as other relevant information.” (Id. ¶ 238.)

“Sometime in April 2022, Enlow and James-Whidbee finalized their

Investigation Report concerning [Plaintiff] and submitted it to

[(Ramona)] Denby-Brinson for review.” (Id. ¶¶ 10, 240.)

Plaintiff alleges, upon information and belief, that the Outcome

Team met in late April 2022. (Id. ¶ 243.) On May 6, 2022,

Plaintiff received an email notification detailing the Outcome

Team’s findings. (Id. ¶ 247.)

The Outcome Team “determined there was insufficient

evidence to conclude that [Plaintiff] had violated the

University’s policies concerning Harassment and Bullying.” (Id.)

However, the Outcome Team found “there was a preponderance of

evidence indicating that [Plaintiff] had violated the

University’s policy against Retaliation per Meehan’s allegations

and Report.” (Id. ¶ 248.)

E. Outcome Process and Discharge

After the EOC announced its findings, G. Mark Holmes,

Director of the Sheps Center at UNC-CH, contacted Plaintiff by

email and indicated “that he was initiating a process to

discharge [Plaintiff] from his employment at UNC-CH for cause

based on the EOC Investigation Report and the finding that

[Plaintiff] violated the UNC-CH Retaliation policy.” (Id. ¶¶ 13,

273.) As part of Plaintiff’s “outcome resolution process,” (id.

¶ 274), he attended a “Pre-Discharge Conference” with Holmes and

Ms. Angenette McAdoo, Senior Director in Employee Management

Relations at UNC-CH, (id. ¶ 275). This conference consisted of

two, 45-minute meetings held on May 9 and May 12, 2022,

respectively, during which “Holmes and McAdoo ask[ed]

[Plaintiff] questions about his email to Meehan, Meehan herself,

and [Plaintiff’s] relationship with Meehan.” (Id. ¶¶ 275, 278.)

Holmes also sought “review and approval” of his decision to

discharge Plaintiff from UNC-CH’s Provost, J. Christopher

Clemens. (Id. ¶ 281.)

On May 23, 2022, Plaintiff met with Holmes again via Zoom,

during which time Holmes informed Plaintiff “verbally that he

had made the decision to Discharge Wretman.” (Id. ¶ 282.) Holmes

followed up by “deliver[ing] his Discharge for Cause decision to

[Plaintiff] in a letter.” (Id. ¶ 283.) Plaintiff alleges that he

was “not given an opportunity to respond and offer any

explanation, verbally and/or in writing as to why he believed

that he should not be discharged.” (Id. ¶ 289.) Plaintiff

further contends that the decision to discharge contained

“factual errors about the EOC Investigations,” (id. ¶ 290), and

no “support[] [for] how and why Holmes arrived at his rationale

for Discharge,” (id. ¶ 292).

F. Post-Discharge Appeal

After Plaintiff was discharged on May 23, 2022, he began an

appeal process “which entailed four phases and lasted nearly a

full calendar year.” (Id. ¶ 295.) First, Plaintiff submitted a

written grievance on June 6, 2022, (id. ¶¶ 297–98), in which he

challenged the EOC’s determination that he violated UNC-CH’s

retaliation policy when he emailed Meehan and rescinded his

offer to help her, (id. ¶¶ 299–300), as well as Holmes’ decision

to discharge him for cause, (id. ¶ 301). Elizabeth Hall, Vice

Chancellor of the EOC, responded on July 18, 2022, denying

Plaintiff’s written grievance and “reiterat[ing] the . . .

analysis presented by Enlow and James-Whidbee in their

Investigation Report.” (Id. ¶¶ 12, 303–04.)

Second, Plaintiff was afforded a hearing on August 30,

2022, before a three-person panel of UNC-CH employees. (Id. ¶

311.) Plaintiff and his attorney were provided 90 minutes to

present his case, and the hearing lasted four hours in total.

(Id. ¶¶ 315, 319.) Plaintiff’s presentation included an opening

statement, interviews with witnesses, Plaintiff’s testimony, and

a closing statement. (Id. ¶ 319.) Plaintiff additionally sought

to submit twelve letters of support from colleagues, but his

request was denied. (Id. ¶ 317.) After the hearing, the panel

deliberated, consulted with a UNC-CH attorney, and announced

their initial determination that Plaintiff had not “made an

initial case for his [a]ppeal.” (Id. ¶¶ 320–21.) The panel

provided Plaintiff with a written report on September 27, 2022,

confirming their decision. (Id. ¶¶ 323–24.)

Third, on October 7, 2022, Plaintiff submitted an appeal to

UNC-CH’s Chancellor, Kevin Guskiewicz. (Id. ¶ 329.) Guskiewicz

denied Plaintiff’s appeal in December 2022. (Id. ¶ 336.)

Fourth, Plaintiff submitted his appeal to the UNC-CH Board

of Trustees (“BOT”) on December 23, 2022. (Id. ¶ 340.) A three-

member panel of the BOT reviewed Plaintiff’s appeal, (id. ¶

342), and in an 2-1 vote, delivered on May 13, 2023, “upheld the

University’s decision to Discharge” Plaintiff, (id. ¶ 350).

G. Exhaustion of Administrative Avenues

After exhausting his administrative remedies “within UNC-

CH,” Plaintiff filed a complaint with the Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) and the U.S. Department of

Education’s Office of Civil Rights (“OCR”). (Id. ¶ 361.) The

EEOC and OCR ruled that they would not pursue an investigation

against UNC-CH, “thus providing [Plaintiff] the right to pursue

individual legal action against UNC-CH within [a] 90-day

timeline.” (Id. ¶¶ 362–63.)

Additional facts will be raised and addressed as necessary

in the analysis to follow.

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff filed a complaint in the Orange County Superior

Court on February 15, 2024, and Defendants removed the case to

this court on March 15, 2024. (See Notice of Removal (Doc. 1);

Compl. (Doc. 4).) Plaintiff asserts federal claims under Title

IX and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, (Compl. (Doc. 4) at 61, 65), which are

before this court pursuant to federal question jurisdiction, 28

U.S.C. § 1331, (Notice of Removal (Doc. 1) at 3). Plaintiff

additionally asserts several state law claims, (Compl. (Doc. 4)

at 70, 73, 75, 77, 78, 80), which are before this court pursuant

to supplemental jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), (Notice of

Removal (Doc. 1) at 3 n.2).

On June 3, 2024, the University of North Carolina at Chapel

Hill (“UNC-CH”), the University of North Carolina System (“UNC

System”), and the improperly named3 UNC System Board of Trustees

and UNC-CH Board of Governors (collectively, the “UNC

Defendants”) filed UNC Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, (Doc. 13),4

seeking to dismiss all claims alleged against them, (id. at 1).

The UNC Defendants filed a memorandum in support of their

motion. (UNC Defs.’ Br. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss (“UNC Defs.’

3 Defendants explain: “The UNC System does not have a Board

of Trustees; it has a Board of Governors. N.C. Gen. Stat. §116-

2. UNC-CH does not have a Board of Governors; it has a Board of

Trustees. Id.” (Doc. 13 at 1 n.1.)

4 The UNC Defendants publicly filed their Motion to Dismiss,

(Doc. 13), with redacted exhibits, (see Docs. 13-1 through 13-

12). The UNC Defendants also filed a copy of their Motion to

Dismiss, as well as unredacted exhibits, under seal. (See Doc.

18; Docs. 18-1 through 18-12.) This court issued an Order on

March 31, 2025, granting UNC Defendants’ motion to seal Document

18 and its unredacted exhibits.

The UNC Defendants argue that this court may consider these

exhibits in deciding the operative motion, citing to caselaw

from the Middle District of North Carolina and from the Fourth

Circuit. (See Doc. 13 at 5–7; Doc. 18 at 5-7.) As discussed

later in this memorandum opinion, Plaintiff has failed to state

a plausible claim for relief as to his federal claims even

without consideration of Defendants’ exhibits, and thus, this

court need not decide whether it has the authority to do so.

Br.”) (Doc. 20).)5 On July 24, 2024, Plaintiff responded in

opposition, (Pl. Christopher Wretman’s Mem. of Law in Opp’n to

the UNC Defs. Mot. to Dismiss (“Pl.’s Resp. to UNC Defs.”) (Doc.

23)), and on August 22, 2024, the UNC Defendants replied, (UNC

Defs.’ Reply Br. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss (“UNC Defs.’

Reply”) (Doc. 26)).

On June 3, 2024, Defendants Lee H. Roberts, Kevin M.

Guskiewicz, Jeffrey Campbell, J. Christopher Clemens, Ramona

Denby-Brinson, Jeremy Enlow, C. Elizabeth Hall, G. Mark Holmes,

Donna James-Whidbee, T. Adele Mayfield, Angenette McAdoo, Lora

Wical, Margaret Barrett, and Mimi V. Chapman (collectively, the

“Individual Defendants”) filed Individual Defendants’ Motion to

Dismiss, (Doc. 15), seeking to dismiss all claims alleged

against them, (id. at 1). On the same date, the Individual

Defendants filed a memorandum in support of their motion.

(Individual Defs.’ Mem. of Law in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss

(“Individual Defs.’ Br.”) (Doc. 16).) On July 24, 2024,

Plaintiff responded in opposition, (Pl. Christopher Wretman’s

Mem. of Law in Opp’n to the Individual Defs. Mot. to Dismiss

(“Pl’s Resp. to Individual Defs.”) (Doc. 24)), and on August 22,

5 Throughout this Memorandum Opinion and Order, this court

cites to the UNC Defendants’ sealed brief in support of their

motion to dismiss. (UNC Defs.’ Br. (Doc. 20).) The public,

unsealed brief can be found at CM/ECF Docket Entry 14.

2024, the Individual Defendants replied, (Individual Defs.’

Reply Br. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss (“Individual Defs.’

Reply”) (Doc. 27)).

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, “a complaint

must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to

‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl.

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is

plausible on its face if the plaintiff pleads “factual content

that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

defendant is liable” and demonstrates “more than a sheer

possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (citing

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556–57).

When ruling on a motion to dismiss, this court accepts the

complaint’s factual allegations as true. Id. Further, in

construing the complaint, this court “draw[s] all reasonable

inferences in favor of the plaintiff.” See M.P. by & through

Pinckney v. Meta Platforms Inc., 127 F.4th 516, 522–23 (4th Cir.

2025). This court does not, however, accept legal conclusions as

true, and “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of

action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not

suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

IV. ANALYSIS

A. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

As a threshold matter, all Defendants contend that

Plaintiff failed to “file a petition for judicial review under

the North Carolina Administrative Procedures Act (‘APA’)” after

he completed his four-step appeals process within UNC-CH. (See

UNC Defs.’ Br. (Doc. 20) at 4; see also Individual Defs.’ Br.

(Doc. 16) at 13.) The North Carolina Administrative Procedure

Act provides: “Any party or person aggrieved by the final

decision in a contested case, and who has exhausted all

administrative remedies made available to the party or person

aggrieved by statute or agency rule, is entitled to judicial

review of the decision under this Article.” See N.C. Gen. Stat.

§ 150B-43. Thereafter, Section 150B-45 provides:

[T]he person seeking review must file a petition in

superior court within 30 days after the person is served

with a written copy of the decision. A person that fails

to file a petition within the required time waives the

right to judicial review under this Article. For good

cause shown, however, the superior court may accept an

untimely petition.

Id. § 150B-45(a).

After the Board of Trustees denied Plaintiff’s appeal,

which was Plaintiff’s final administrative remedy “within UNC-

CH,” (see Compl. (Doc. 4) ¶¶ 350, 361), Defendants argue that

Plaintiff “did not file a petition for judicial review” as

prescribed by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 150B-45(a), (UNC Defs.’ Br.

(Doc. 20) at 4, 13; Individual Defs.’ Br. (Doc. 16) at 13).

Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s failure to file a petition

for judicial review means: (1) he is barred from pursuing his

state law claims in this court due to failure to exhaust

administrative remedies; and (2) collateral estoppel precludes

Plaintiff from relitigating the issues underlying his Title IX

and § 1983 claims because UNC-CH’s administrative decision

stands as a final decision on the merits. (See UNC Defs.’ Br.

(Doc. 20) at 15–19; Individual Defs.’ Br. (Doc. 16) at 12–13.)

In response, Plaintiff argues that collateral estoppel does

not preclude his Title IX and § 1983 claims because the elements

of those claims “are not identical” to the issues decided by

UNC-CH through the administrative appeals process. (Pl.’s Resp.

to UNC Defs. (Doc. 23) at 12.) He additionally argues that,

after the BOT denied his appeal, he “filed a timely Complaint

with the Equal Opportunity and Employment Commission (EEOC) and

Office of Civil Rights (OCR)” and “the EEOC and OCR provided

[him] the right to pursue legal action against the Defendants

which he did in a timely fashion.” (Id. at 11–12.) Finally, he

argues that this court “has the authority to find that good

cause exists to allow for Judicial Review at this point.” (Id.

at 17.)

This court need not resolve these arguments. Assuming,

without deciding, that Plaintiff’s Title IX and § 1983 claims

are not precluded by collateral estoppel, Plaintiff has

nonetheless failed to state a plausible claim for relief as to

either claim. As discussed below, Plaintiff’s Title IX and §

1983 claims will be dismissed with prejudice. This court will

decline supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law

claims, remanding those claims to the Orange County Superior

Court for further proceedings therein.

B. Title IX Claim (UNC Defendants)

Plaintiff brings a Title IX claim against UNC-CH, alleging

that “Defendant [UNC-CH] discriminated against Plaintiff . . .

because of his sex by applying an unfair, unreliable, and

partial process against him in resolving the complaints against

him.” (Compl. (Doc. 4) ¶ 376.)

“Title IX prohibits federally-supported educational

institutions from practicing discrimination on the basis of sex

. . . [and] is enforceable through an implied private right of

action.” Sheppard v. Visitors of Va. State Univ., 993 F.3d 230,

234–35 (4th Cir. 2021) (citations omitted). The inquiry before

this court is whether “the alleged facts, if true, raise a

plausible inference that [UNC] discriminated against [Plaintiff]

on the basis of sex.” Id. at 235 (citation omitted). To raise a

plausible inference of discrimination “on the basis of sex,”

Plaintiff must allege “but-for” causation between his sex and

the university’s disciplinary proceeding. See id. at 236.

The UNC Defendants offer several arguments why Plaintiff’s

complaint fails to establish a plausible “but-for” causal link

between his sex and the disciplinary proceeding, among them that

Plaintiff’s “conclusory allegations of gender bias are

insufficient” and that “many of the policy violations

[Plaintiff] alleges are not, in fact, policy violations or

reflect a fundamental misunderstanding of UNC-CH’s policies and

Title IX.” (See UNC Defs.’ Br. (Doc. 20) at 21–23.) Plaintiff

responds by citing to a sole allegation in his complaint: his

allegation that Mr. Eric Quimbaya-Winship, a Deputy Title IX

Coordinator at UNC-CH, “explicated that Wretman needed to

comport himself more appropriately as a straight White male.”

(Compl. (Doc. 4) ¶¶ 100–01.) Plaintiff argues that “[t]his

allegation alone and Wretman’s subsequent discharge are

significantly plausible allegations that support his Title IX

claim.” (Pl.’s Resp. to UNC Defs. (Doc. 23) at 13–14). This

court disagrees.

Plaintiff alleges that Quimbaya-Winship made this comment

during a meeting on May 13, 2021, (see Compl. (Doc. 4) ¶¶ 94,

100–01), one and a half months after Godoy first reported

concerns about Wretman’s behavior to Chapman, (id. ¶ 82), but

roughly six months before the commencement of “EOC’s formal

Investigations of Wretman,” (id. ¶ 214). The EOC investigations

that commenced six months after this meeting “were largely

conducted by Enlow and James-Whidbee,” not by Quimbaya-Winship.

(Id. ¶¶ 214, 220.) In fact, Plaintiff does not allege that

Quimbaya-Winship played any role in the investigation of

Plaintiff, (id. ¶¶ 214–37), in reviewing the investigation

reports, (id. ¶¶ 238–46), in determining findings and outcomes,

(id. ¶¶ 247–72), in conducting Plaintiff’s discharge

proceedings, (id. ¶¶ 273–94), or in adjudicating his appeals,

(id. ¶¶ 295-352).

The Fourth Circuit cautions that “[d]etermining the actual

decisionmaker responsible for the adverse employment action can

be paramount to determining whether the protected trait played a

role in the decision.” Ousley v. McDonald, 648 F. App’x 346, 348

(4th Cir. 2016).6 Even drawing inferences in Plaintiff’s favor

6 Although Ousley is a Title VII employment discrimination

case, “generally speaking, Title IX employment discrimination

claims are subject to the same analysis as employment

discrimination claims brought under Title VII of the Civil

Rights Act of 1964.” Reid v. James Madison Univ., 90 F.4th 311,

319 (4th Cir. 2024) (analyzing the issue of accrual); see also

Preston v. Commonwealth of Va. ex rel. New River Cmty. Coll., 31

F.3d 203, 207 (4th Cir. 1994) (“We agree that Title VII, and the

judicial interpretations of it, provide a persuasive body of

standards to which we may look in shaping the contours of a

private right of action under Title IX.”).

that Quimbaya-Winship’s comment evinced his own sex-based bias

toward Plaintiff, there is no plausible linkage between this

isolated comment – asserted by a UNC employee who took no part

in the investigation or adjudication of the claims against

Plaintiff, six months before the investigation commenced – to

“the university’s challenged disciplinary proceeding.” See

Sheppard, 993 F.3d at 236. At bottom, Plaintiff’s allegation

about Quimbaya-Winship’s comment does not support the plausible

inference that he was discharged on the basis of his sex in

violation of Title IX.

Although Plaintiff advances no other argument in his

response brief to support his contention that gender was a “but-

for” cause of his discharge, (see Pl.’s Resp. to UNC Defs. (Doc.

23) at 13–14)), elsewhere in his brief he notes that his

complaint raised gender “on no fewer than five occasions,” (id.

at 13 (citing Compl. (Doc. 4) ¶¶ 101, 105, 183, 213, 328)). One

of these “occasions” is the Quimbaya-Winship comment discussed

supra. In three of the other paragraphs that Plaintiff cites, he

repeats allegations that Godoy and Luo, two of the reporting

parties, had concerns about the research team’s “communications

and dynamics” and yet Plaintiff, “the only male on the team,”

was the one “investigated for Bullying and Harassment” by the

EOC, which “indicat[es] that EOC discriminated against [him]

based on his sex.” (Pl.’s Resp. to UNC Defs. (Doc. 23) at 13;

Compl. (Doc. 4) ¶¶ 105, 182–83, 213.)

These allegations do not plausibly allege discrimination on

the basis of sex for several reasons. One, even accepting as

true Plaintiff’s allegation that Godoy and Luo expressed

concerns about the “communications and dynamics” of the research

team as a whole, (see Compl. (Doc. 4) ¶¶ 105, 182–83, 213),

there is no basis for this court to reasonably infer that

generalized concerns about a team’s “communications and

dynamics” warranted an EOC investigation against every member of

the team.7 This is especially true where, as here, according to

Plaintiff’s allegations, Godoy and Luo reported a number of

additional grievances particularized to Plaintiff, alongside

their generalized concerns about the team.

For example, Plaintiff alleges that “Godoy reported that

the team dynamics, particularly the team’s close relationships,

made her uncomfortable” but that it was Wretman who “made

inappropriate comments.” (Id. ¶ 95.) Plaintiff acknowledges that

he “had seemingly been the focus” of Godoy’s report to the EOC.

(Id. ¶ 90.) Likewise, although Plaintiff alleges that Luo “made

7 Plaintiff does not explain in his complaint or briefing

how generalized concerns about a team’s interpersonal dynamics

amount to a possible violation of UNC-CH’s PPDHRM. See supra

n.1.

allegations against the team and Wretman concerning anti-Asian

hate, harassment, and a toxic work environment,” she

specifically “declared that Wretman’s communication style was

particularly a problem for her.” (Id. ¶ 117 (emphasis added).)

Luo also communicated “that she knew of others with concerns

about Wretman.” (Id. ¶ 118 (emphasis added).) The presence of

these particularized accusations levied against Plaintiff,

alongside generalized concerns about the team, undercuts any

reasonable inference that Plaintiff was “similarly situated” to

his team members and singled out by the EOC because of his sex.

See Sheppard, 993 F.3d at 237.

Two, notwithstanding Plaintiff’s contention that he was

singled out for investigation as “the only male member on the

team,” he alleges in the complaint that at least one other

member of the research team – Dr. Rebecca Macy – was

investigated by the EOC. After Godoy reported “concerns about

communication with her informal research team” to Chapman on

April 1, 2021, (id. ¶ 82), Chapman organized an initial meeting

with Plaintiff on May 13, 2021, and with Macy on May 10, 2021,

(see id. ¶ 94). Plaintiff’s complaint asserts few details about

what became of the probe into Macy’s conduct but acknowledges

that the EOC “was conducting” an investigation of Macy, and that

this investigation was eventually combined with the

investigation against Plaintiff. (See id. ¶ 219.) These

allegations further undermine any inference that Plaintiff was

singled out for investigation as the only male member of the

team.

In the fifth paragraph Plaintiff cites in his response

brief, Plaintiff alleges that G. Mark Holmes, the Director of

the Sheps Center at UNC-CH, made comments “replete with sex-

based stereotypes” while explaining his decision to discharge

Plaintiff. (Compl. (Doc. 4) ¶ 328.) Specifically, Plaintiff

alleges:

[I]n his Hearing testimony, Holmes indicated that he

made his decision to Discharge Wretman based on sex-

based stereotypes. Specifically, Holmes stated that,

when considering how to discipline Wretman, Holmes

considered that based on Wretman’s adjudicated conduct,

he believed that Wretman would need to be monitored

around colleagues and students, most of whom were

female. The idea that males are dangerous and must be

monitored around females is replete with sex-based

stereotypes, thus making Wretman’s Discharge decision

highly subjective. Holmes went on to state that because

[sic] ensuring that Wretman would be monitored would be

logistically difficult. Thus, Holmes, continued that he

felt that he had no choice but to choose Discharge over

a lesser punishment. In sum, Holmes [sic] perceptions of

Wretman vis-à-vis the need for monitoring around

colleagues and students, who were mostly female, was the

deciding factor for his selection of Discharge.

(Id.)

This court is required to accept well-pleaded facts as

true, but mere conclusions “are not entitled to the assumption

of truth.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. This court accepts as a well-

pleaded fact that Holmes expressed: “[B]ased on Wretman’s

adjudicated conduct, he believed that Wretman would need to be

monitored around colleagues and students, most of whom were

women.” (Compl. (Doc. 4) ¶ 328 (emphasis added).) It further

accepts that Holmes expressed: “[B]ecause ensuring that Wretman

would be monitored would be logistically difficult . . . he felt

that he had no choice but to choose Discharge over a lesser

punishment.” (Id. (emphasis added).) However, Plaintiff’s

allegation that Holmes “indicated that he made his decision to

Discharge Wretman based on sex-based stereotypes,” that is,

“[t]he idea that males are dangerous and must be monitored

around females,” (id.), appears to be an editorialized

conclusion, and is not plausibly supported by well-pleaded

facts, see Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Plaintiff’s well-pleaded

facts suggest, instead, that Holmes considered Plaintiff’s

adjudicated conduct - not the stereotypical conduct of all males

- and decided that Plaintiff needed to be monitored. Plaintiff

may disagree with Holmes’ conclusion that Plaintiff required

monitoring, as well as Holmes’ rationale that Plaintiff’s

adjudicated conduct required discharge,8 but this court detects

no plausible inference of sex-based bias in those decisions.

Finally, none of Plaintiff’s other allegations, beyond

those he cites in his brief, (see Pl.’s Resp. to UNC Defs. (Doc.

23) at 13-14), support a reasonable inference that he faced sex-

based discrimination during his EOC investigation, outcome

8 As Plaintiff points out in his complaint, one member of

the Board of Trustees’ panel did disagree with Holmes’

conclusion and rationale. That trustee, unlike the other two

members of the panel, voted against upholding Plaintiff's

discharge, because “he did not believe the record evidence

showed that in reaching the decision to discharge Dr. Wretman,

the University adequately considered the effectiveness of the

other potential disciplinary options available under University

policy.” (Compl. (Doc. 4) ¶ 352.) This allegation demonstrates

that there are multiple reasonable viewpoints as to the

propriety of a university administrator’s discretion-laden

decision to discharge an employee for cause, but it does not

demonstrate that the decision to discharge Plaintiff was because

of his sex.

process, or post-discharge appeal.9 Accordingly, Plaintiff has

failed to state a plausible claim for relief and the UNC

Defendants’ motion to dismiss will be granted as to the Title IX

claim.

C. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 - Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Claim

(UNC Defendants and Individual Defendants)

9 In one section of his complaint, Plaintiff describes UNC-

CH’s “school of social work climate from 2020 forward.” (Compl.

(Doc. 4) at 11.) Plaintiff alleges facts about the racial

justice climate on UNC-CH’s campus, as well as UNC-CH’s

formation of a “Racial Reconciliation Committee, whose charges

included creating a forum where faculty, staff, and students

could raise concerns of discrimination.” (Id. ¶¶ 61–74.)

Elsewhere in his complaint, Plaintiff alleges that

“[c]ircumstances suggest that Defendant UNC-CH adopted PPDHRM in

an effort to lower the protections for males accused of sexual

misconduct . . . .” (Id. ¶ 383.)

The Fourth Circuit instructs that a plaintiff’s allegations

about external pressures on a university can be “relevant” to a

Title IX claim but cautions that the plaintiff must “connect

these generalized pressures to his case in a way that creates a

reasonable inference [of] anti-male bias.” Kashdan v. George

Mason Univ., 70 F.4th 694, 701 (4th Cir. 2023) (emphasis added).

Neither Plaintiff’s allegations regarding the racial justice

climate nor UNC-CH’s adoption of the PPDHRM are tethered to his

case and thus do not create a reasonable inference that he

experienced anti-male bias.

Next, Plaintiff brings a due process claim against all

Defendants pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983,10 alleging that

Defendants “failed to afford Plaintiff the minimum procedural

safeguards required by due process, before discharge,” which

“resulted in the improper discharge of the Plaintiff.” (Compl.

(Doc. 4) ¶¶ 397, 414). Plaintiff seeks “prospective relief” and

“compensatory and punitive damages.” (Id. ¶¶ 417–18.)

1. Due Process Claim against UNC Defendants

UNC and its constituent institutions are entitled to the

protections of sovereign immunity guaranteed to the state of

North Carolina by the Eleventh Amendment. See Huang v. Bd. of

Governors of the Univ. of N. Carolina, 902 F.2d 1134, 1139 (4th

Cir. 1990). Accordingly, the university as well as “the employee

defendants sued in their official capacities are protected from

a damages action by the same immunity.” Doe v. Univ. of N.

Carolina Sys., 133 F.4th 305, 318 (4th Cir. 2025) (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted). A limited exception to

state sovereign immunity exists in the Ex parte Young doctrine,

10 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides that “[e]very person, who under

color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage,

of any State . . . , subjects, or causes to be subjected, any

citizen of the United States or other person within the

jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,

privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,

shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit

in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.” 42 U.S.C. §

1983.

which “allows suits against state officers for prospective

equitable relief from ongoing violations of federal law.” Id.

(citation omitted).

Plaintiff has sued several UNC-CH officers in their

official capacities, including Chancellor Lee H. Roberts, and

seeks “prospective relief” for “the injury, damage, and loss”

that he “continues to suffer.” (Compl. (Doc. 4) at 1; id. at ¶¶

416–17.) However, his complaint does not meaningfully expand on

what type of “prospective relief” he seeks, and his briefing

advances no argument that the due process violation he alleges

is “an ongoing violation” in the context of the Ex parte Young

doctrine. See Univ. of N. Carolina Sys, 133 F.4th at 318; (see

generally Pl.’s Resp. to UNC Defs. (Doc. 23)). Rather, Plaintiff

concedes that his “42 USC § 1983 Claim Against the UNC

Defendants Should be Dismissed.” (Pl.’s Resp. to UNC Defs. (Doc.

23) at 14.)

Having abandoned his § 1983 due process claim against the

UNC Defendants, Plaintiff’s claim will be dismissed against the

UNC Defendants as well as against the UNC-CH employees sued in

their official capacities.11

2. Due Process Claim Against Individual Defendants

Plaintiff argues that his § 1983 due process claim should

survive against the Individual Defendants in their individual

capacities. (Pl’s Resp. to Individual Defs. (Doc. 24) at 12–14.)

“To plead a viable [Due Process] claim . . . [Plaintiff] must

allege: (1) that he had a constitutionally cognizable life,

liberty, or property interest; (2) that he was deprived of that

interest by some form of state action; and (3) that the

procedures employed were constitutionally inadequate.” Doe v.

Va. Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 77 F.4th 231, 236 (4th Cir.

2023) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The

Individual Defendants argue that Plaintiff has not plausibly

alleged a constitutionally cognizable interest (Element 1), and

that even if he has, he has not plausibly alleged that the

procedures employed by the Individual Defendants were

constitutionally inadequate (Element 3). (Individual Defs.’ Br.

(Doc. 16) at 15–19.) The Individual Defendants additionally

11 As discussed infra Section IV.C.2., Plaintiff has

likewise failed to plausibly allege (1) that he was deprived of

a constitutionally cognizable interest and (2) that the process

he received was constitutionally deficient. Accordingly, because

he has failed to plausibly allege a due process violation, even

if Plaintiff had not abandoned this claim against the UNC

Defendants, he would not be entitled to Ex parte Young relief.

argue that they are protected by qualified immunity.12 (Id. at

19–21.)

This court agrees. For each of the reasons argued by the

Individual Defendants, Plaintiff’s due process claim must be

dismissed.

i. Property Interest

Plaintiff contends that he has plausibly alleged a

constitutionally cognizable property interest “in continued

employment” at UNC-CH. (Pl’s Resp. to Individual Defs. (Doc. 24)

at 13.) The Supreme Court instructs that for an employee to

possess a property interest in his continued employment, he

“clearly must have more than an abstract need or desire for it.

He must have more than a unilateral expectation of it. He must,

instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it.” Bd. of

Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).

This court looks to state law to determine whether

Plaintiff has a legitimate claim of entitlement to his

employment at UNC-CH. See Knight v. Vernon, 214 F.3d 544, 553

(4th Cir. 2000). “North Carolina is an at-will employment

12 Qualified immunity “shields government officials

performing discretionary functions from personal-capacity

liability for civil damages under § 1983, insofar as their

conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or

constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have

known.” Univ. of N. Carolina Sys., 133 F.4th at 315 (internal

quotation marks and citations omitted).

state,” id., meaning that the employment relationship “is

presumed to be terminable at the will of either party without

regard to the quality of performance of either party,” absent a

delineated exception, such as one created by statute. See

Kurtzman v. Applied Analytical Indus., Inc., 347 N.C. 329, 331,

493 S.E.2d 420, 422 (1997), reh’g denied, 347 N.C. 586, 502

S.E.2d 594 (1998).

In his complaint, Plaintiff alleges that his position at

UNC-CH “was designated as permanent Exempt from the North

Carolina Human Resources Act (EHRA) Non-Faculty Research Staff.”

(Compl. (Doc. 4) ¶ 28.) The North Carolina Human Resources Act

provides for-cause discharge protection to career State

employees covered by the Act, see N.C. Gen. Stat. § 126-35(a),

but as Plaintiff alleges, his position was expressly exempt from

the Act. Nowhere does Plaintiff allege that his position at UNC-

CH was entitled to for-cause discharge protection, (see

generally Compl. (Doc. 4)).

In his response to Defendants’ motion to dismiss, Plaintiff

asserts, without citing to the record, that “the UNC-CH Policies

and Procedures that governed his termination . . . entitled him

to termination ‘for cause’ and beyond at-will.” (Pl’s Resp. to

Individual Defs. (Doc. 24) at 13.) Plaintiff’s assertion appears

to be founded on his allegation that, after the EOC concluded

its investigation, Holmes emailed Plaintiff “indicating that he

was initiating a process to discharge Wretman from his

employment at UNC-CH for cause based on the EOC Investigation

Report and the finding that Wretman violated the UNC-CH

Retaliation policy.” (Compl. (Doc. 4) ¶ 273 (emphasis added).)

Plaintiff alleges that his discharge proceeding was governed by

UNC-CH’s PPDHRM policies, (id. ¶¶ 280, 286–94), and that these

“policies created a property right in Plaintiff’s continued

employment with the University,” (id. ¶¶ 401–403). However, “in

North Carolina ‘an employer’s personnel manual or policies are

not part of an employee’s contract of employment unless

expressly included in that contract.’” Knight, 214 F.3d at 553

(citation omitted). Plaintiff has not alleged in his complaint

that the UNC-CH PPDHRM and related policies are expressly

included in his employment contract with UNC-CH. (See generally

Compl. (Doc. 4); see also id. ¶¶ 383, 401.) Thus, he has not

plausibly alleged that he possesses a constitutionally

cognizable property interest in his continued employment by way

of UNC-CH’s PPDHRM and related policies.13 Cf. Knight, 214 F.3d

13 Defendants explain: “Plaintiff was an at-will employee.

While he was separated for cause, he was not entitled to

separation for cause; he could have been separated at-will. The

mere possibility of a for-cause separation does not by itself

create a property interest because an at-will separation was

always permitted.” (Individual Defs.’ Br. (Doc. 16) at 17

(citations omitted).)

at 553 (finding no property interest at summary judgment where a

county employee did not contend that the county’s employee

handbook, which contained grievance procedures, “was expressly

incorporated into any employment contract”).

ii. Liberty Interest

Plaintiff additionally contends that he “has a

constitutionally protected liberty interest in his

[r]eputation.” (Pl’s Resp. to Individual Defs. (Doc. 24) at 13.)

Specifically, he alleges that he possesses a liberty interest

“because the allegations brought against [him] ultimately

resulted in a discharge from University of North Carolina at

Chapel Hill, a sanction that will have significant and lifelong

ramifications with respect to his education, employment, and

reputation.” (Compl. (Doc. 4) ¶ 404.) He alleges that his

discharge was “wrongful[]”and that it “will remain a part of

[his] permanent record . . . [and] will impair his ability to

seek further employment.” (Id. ¶ 406.)

The Fourth Circuit instructs:

Where a person’s good name, reputation, honor, or

integrity is at stake because of what the government is

doing to him, the due process requirements of notice and

opportunity to be heard are essential. Accordingly, as

to public employees, a Fourteenth Amendment liberty

interest is implicated by public announcement of reasons

for an employee’s discharge.

Cannon v. Vill. of Bald Head Island, N. Carolina, 891 F.3d 489,

501 (4th Cir. 2018) (cleaned up). “To state this type of liberty

interest claim under the Due Process Clause, a plaintiff must

allege that the charges against him: (1) placed a stigma on his

reputation; (2) were made public by the employer; (3) were made

in conjunction with his termination or demotion; and (4) were

false.” Sciolino v. City of Newport News, Va., 480 F.3d 642, 646

(4th Cir. 2007). Even assuming without deciding that Plaintiff

has alleged facts sufficient to satisfy the first, third, and

fourth elements, he has not plausibly alleged that the charges

against him “were made public” by UNC-CH. See id.

To satisfy this element, absent allegations that the

employer has already made the charges public,14 “an employee must

allege (and ultimately prove) a likelihood that prospective

employers (i.e., employers to whom he will apply) or the public

at large will inspect the [stigmatizing] file.” Id. at 650.

14 For example, in Cannon, a suit brought by discharged

Public Safety Officers against their former employer, the

employer “made public the charges against the Officers in

several ways, including by sending the Officers’ termination

letters to the news media and sending the email to all full-time

Bald Head employees and part-time Department personnel stating

that the Officers were terminated for ‘harassment,’ ‘sexual

harassment,’ and ‘detrimental personal conduct.’” See Cannon,

891 F.3d at 503. Here, Plaintiff does not allege that UNC-CH has

already made public the charges associated with his discharge.

Rather, he alleges the charges will “remain a part of [his]

permanent record,” (Compl. (Doc. 4) ¶ 406), and therefore could

be made public in the future.

A plaintiff can meet this standard in two ways. First,

the employee could allege (and ultimately prove) that

his former employer has a practice of releasing

personnel files to all inquiring employers. Second, the

employee could allege that although his former employer

releases personnel files only to certain inquiring

employers, that he intends to apply to at least one of

these employers. In either case, he must allege that the

prospective employer is likely to request the file from

his former employer.

Id. (footnote omitted). By contrast, it is not enough for a

plaintiff to merely allege “that his file with the charges ‘may

be available to prospective employers.’” Id.

Here, Plaintiff has alleged that his “discharge will remain

a part of [his] permanent record” and “[a]bsent the relief

sought through this matter, other individuals will inevitably

come to learn of [his] wrongful discharge.” (Compl. (Doc. 4) ¶

406.) However, Plaintiff does not allege (1) that UNC-CH “has a

practice of releasing personnel files to all inquiring

employers” or (2) that UNC-CH “releases personnel files only to

certain inquiring employers” and that “he intends to apply to at

least one of these employers.” See Sciolino, 480 F.3d at 650.

Rather, Plaintiff offers only speculation that “other

individuals will inevitably come to learn of [his] wrongful

discharge,” which, under the standard set forth by the Fourth

Circuit in Sciolino, is insufficient to satisfy the requirement

that the charge against him was made public by his employer and

thus Plaintiff has failed to plausibly allege a liberty

interest. See id.; see also Strickland v. United States, 32

F.4th 311, 354 (4th Cir. 2022) (holding that a plaintiff failed

to plausibly allege a liberty interest where her complaint

relied only on speculation that her former employer disseminated

her file to a prospective employer).

iii. Process Received

Finally, even if Plaintiff had plausibly alleged a

constitutionally cognizable property or liberty interest, he has

not plausibly alleged that the process he was afforded by UNC-CH

fell short of that required by the Fourteenth Amendment to

protect those interests. “The essence of due process is the

requirement that ‘a person in jeopardy of serious loss [be

given] notice of the case against him and opportunity to meet

it.’” Todman v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 104 F.4th

479, 488 (4th Cir. 2024) (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S.

319, 348 (1976)).15

Process Required for Property Interest

When an employee possesses “a constitutionally protected

property interest in his employment,” the Supreme Court

instructs that “some kind of a hearing” is required “prior to

the discharge of [that] employee.” Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v.

Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542 (1985). That employee “is entitled

to oral or written notice of the charges against him, an

explanation of the employer’s evidence, and an opportunity to

present his side of the story.” Id. at 546.

15 Plaintiff summarizes his alleged due process violations

as “including but not limited to” the following: (a) he received

“[i]nsufficient notice of the allegations against him”; (b) he

was “never able to cross-examine any of his accusers”; and (c)

“[t]he investigators . . . refused to interview witnesses

provided to them by Plaintiff.” (Compl. (Doc. 4) ¶ 408.)

Plaintiff does not expound upon these allegations in his brief

or cite case law to support his position. (See Pl’s Resp. to

Individual Defs. (Doc. 24) at 13.) Plaintiff’s allegation of

“insufficient notice” is a conclusion not supported by the well-

pleaded facts of his complaint. See generally supra Sections

I.C., I.E. As for his allegations about cross-examination and

interviewing witnesses, he cites no caselaw supporting the idea

that he, as a university employee, had a clearly established

right to cross-examine accusers or demand interviews of specific

witnesses at the time of his disciplinary proceedings, nor has

this court been able to identify any. Accordingly, with respect

to a claim for damages, the Individual Defendants are protected

by qualified immunity, see supra n.12, even if Plaintiff had

plausibly alleged the other elements of his due process claim.

Applying Loudermill, the Fourth Circuit instructs:

“[W]hen posttermination administrative procedures are

afforded, . . . pretermination procedure functions only

as ‘an initial check against mistaken decisions—

essentially, a determination of whether there are

reasonable grounds to believe that the charges against

the employee are true and support the proposed action.’”

[Linton v. Frederick Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs,] 964 F.2d

[1436,] 1439 [(4th Cir. 1992)] (quoting Loudermill, 470

U.S. at 545–46, 105 S.Ct. at 1495). Such a hearing “need

not be elaborate” and “need not definitively resolve the

propriety of the discharge.” Buschi[ v. Kirven], 775

F.2d [1240,] 1255 [(4th Cir. 1985)] (phone call offering

an interview sufficient even though not accepted by

employees). Therefore, a pretermination opportunity to

respond, coupled with posttermination administrative

procedures provides “all the process that is due.”

Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 547–48, 105 S.Ct. at 1496. To

require more “would intrude to an unwarranted extent on

the government’s interest in quickly removing an

unsatisfactory employee.” Id. at 546, 105 S.Ct. at 1495.

Holland v. Rimmer, 25 F.3d 1251, 1258 (4th Cir. 1994).

Here, Plaintiff was afforded posttermination administrative

procedures. That is, after discharge, he was afforded

opportunity to (1) file a written grievance, (Compl. (Doc. 4) ¶¶

297–305), (2) attend a four-hour hearing and spend 90 minutes

presenting his side of the case, (id. ¶¶ 306–28), (3) submit an

appeal to the UNC-CH Chancellor, (id. ¶¶ 329–39), and (4) submit

a second appeal to the UNC-CH Board of Trustees, (id. ¶¶ 340–

52).16 Because Plaintiff was afforded posttermination

administrative procedures, he was entitled to pretermination

16 Plaintiff also had the right to petition for judicial

review of UNC-CH’s decision. See supra Section IV.A.

procedure functioning only as “an initial check against mistaken

decisions.” See Holland, 25 F.3d at 1258 (citations omitted).

His pretermination procedure “need[ed] not be elaborate,”

“need[ed] not definitively resolve the propriety of the

discharge,” and needed only provide an “opportunity to respond.”

Id.

Plaintiff received pretermination procedure sufficient to

satisfy these requirements. In summary, Plaintiff received (1)

NOIs alerting him to each of the charges levied against him

(including notification of the retaliation charge for which he

was ultimately found responsible), (2) an interview with EOC

investigators, (3) notification of the Outcome Team’s findings,

and (4) the opportunity to attend a “Pre-Discharge Conference,”

during which Plaintiff answered questions related to the

retaliation determination. See supra Sections I.B.–I.E.

Accordingly, even if Plaintiff had plausibly alleged a

constitutionally cognizable property interest in his continued

employment, he has failed to plausibly allege that he was denied

due process. See Holland, 25 F.3d at 1258.

Process Required for Liberty Interest

Regarding a liberty interest, “when a governmental employer

places an employee’s reputation at stake by publicly disclosing

defamatory charges, the employee is entitled to a hearing to

clear [his] name against [the] unfounded charges.” Cannon, 891

F.3d at 505 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see

also Codd v. Velger, 429 U.S. 624, 627–28 (1977). This name-

clearing hearing “must be granted at a meaningful time,” which

means sometime before the employee’s name “has been ruined by

dissemination of false, stigmatizing charges.” Sciolino, 480

F.3d at 653. “In situations like that at hand, the

constitutional harm is not the defamation itself; rather it is

the denial of a hearing at which the dismissed employee has an

opportunity to refute the public charge.” Id. at 649 (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted).

As explained above, Plaintiff has not alleged any past

disseminations of his EOC charges by UNC-CH, nor has he alleged

that his personnel files are likely to be disseminated by UNC-CH

in the future. See supra Section IV.C.2.ii. And even if he had

plausibly alleged that UNC-CH has a practice of releasing

personnel files to inquiring employers, making it likely that

his files will be disseminated in the future, see Sciolino, 480

F.3d at 650, UNC-CH provided Plaintiff a four-hour name-clearing

hearing during his appeals process, (Compl. (Doc. 4) ¶¶ 311–19),

which afforded him fair opportunity to refute his discharge

prior to any future dissemination to a prospective employer, see

Sciolino, 480 F.3d at 649–50. “‘Due process obviously does not

require more than a fair opportunity’ even if the former

employee’s efforts to refute and clear his name are ultimately

unsuccessful.” See Harrell v. City of Gastonia, 392 F. App’x

197, 203 (4th Cir. 2010) (quoting Boston v. Webb, 783 F.2d 1163,

1166 (4th Cir. 1986)).

As discussed throughout this section, see Section IV.C.,

Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged a constitutionally

cognizable property or liberty interest, and even if he had, he

has not plausibly alleged that he was denied constitutionally

adequate process. Finally, throughout his complaint, Plaintiff

asserts a number of other grievances about UNC-CH’s

investigation, the credibility of its findings, and the logic of

its decision to discharge him. But in those grievances, he has

not plausibly alleged a violation of the Due Process Clause of

the Fourteenth Amendment. As the Supreme Court instructs:

The federal court is not the appropriate forum in which

to review the multitude of personnel decisions that are

made daily by public agencies. We must accept the harsh

fact that numerous individual mistakes are inevitable in

the day-to-day administration of our affairs. The United

States Constitution cannot feasibly be construed to

require federal judicial review for every such error. In

the absence of any claim that the public employer was

motivated by a desire to curtail or to penalize the

exercise of an employee’s constitutionally protected

rights, we must presume that official action was regular

and, if erroneous, can best be corrected in other ways.

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is

not a guarantee against incorrect or ill-advised

personnel decisions.

Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 349–50 (1976) (footnote omitted).

The Individual Defendants’ motion will be granted, and

Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment due process claim will be

dismissed.

D. State Law Claims

Plaintiff also brings state law claims for breach of

contract, (Compl. (Doc. 4) at 70), negligent hiring,

supervision, and retention, (id. at 73), negligent infliction of

emotional distress, (id. at 75), intentional infliction of

emotional distress, (id. at 77), violation of the state

constitution, (id. at 78), civil conspiracy, (id. at 80), and

punitive damages, (id.).

After the removal of this case, (see Notice of Removal

(Doc. 1)), these claims are before this court pursuant to

supplemental jurisdiction, as they arose from the same “case or

controversy” as Plaintiff’s Title IX and § 1983 claims, see 28

U.S.C. § 1367(a), and “derive from a common nucleus of operative

fact,” see United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715,

725 (1966).

“The district courts may decline to exercise supplemental

jurisdiction over a claim” if “the district court has dismissed

all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. §

1367(c).

Ordinarily, when the federal claims are dismissed before

trial, even though not insubstantial in a jurisdictional

sense, the state claims should be dismissed [without

prejudice] as well. However, when an action has been

removed from state court and the district court

subsequently loses its basis for original jurisdiction,

in most instances the action must be remanded to the

state court.

Darcangelo v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., 292 F.3d 181, 196 (4th

Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)

(instructing the district court to “consider the propriety of

continuing to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction” after

plaintiff’s federal claim was dismissed and “only state law

claims remain”).

This court has dismissed Plaintiff’s federal claims and,

after considering factors such as judicial economy, convenience,

fairness, and comity, it now declines to exercise supplemental

jurisdiction. See Henderson v. Harmon, 102 F.4th 242, 251 (4th

Cir. 2024). Especially in light of the parties’ arguments as to

the exhaustion of administrative remedies, see supra Section

IV.A., which involves the interpretation of state statutes and

possibly a discretionary determination of whether Plaintiff can

show “good cause” to file a late petition for judicial review,

see N.C. Gen. Stat. § 150B-45(a), this court finds the comity

factor particularly persuasive. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s state

law claims will be remanded to Orange County Superior Court.

V. CONCLUSION

The UNC Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, (Doc. 13), and the

Individual Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, (Doc. 15), are both

granted in part. Plaintiff has failed to state a plausible claim

for relief as to his Title IX claim, asserted against the UNC

Defendants, as well as to his § 1983 due process claim, asserted

against both the UNC Defendants and the Individual Defendants.

Those claims are dismissed with prejudice.

As this court has granted Defendants’ motions to dismiss

Plaintiff’s two federal law claims, it declines to exercise

supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claims.

Those claims will be remanded to state court.

For the foregoing reasons,

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that UNC Defendants’ Motion to

Dismiss, (Doc. 13), is GRANTED IN PART as to Plaintiff’s federal

claims asserted under Title IX and § 1983. These federal claims

are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Individual Defendants’ Motion to

Dismiss, (Doc. 15), is GRANTED IN PART as to Plaintiff’s federal

claim asserted under § 1983. This federal claim is DISMISSED

WITH PREJUDICE.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED the UNC Defendants’ motion, (Doc.

13), and the Individual Defendants’ motion, (Doc. 15), are

DENIED IN PART as to Plaintiff’s state law claims. These state

law claims are REMANDED to the Orange County Superior Court in

the State of North Carolina.

A judgment dismissing Plaintiff’s federal claims and

remanding all remaining state law claims to state court is filed

contemporaneously herewith.

This the 30th day of June, 2025.

Wie tien Me

United States District Judge

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