Jones v. United States Department Of Justice

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

WESTERN DIVISION

)

RONALD JONES, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. 2:23-cv-02219-SHM-cgc

)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF )

JUSTICE, ET AL., )

)

Defendants. )

)

ORDER DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT WITH PREJUDICE; DENYING LEAVE TO

AMEND; CERTIFYING THAT AN APPEAL WOULD NOT BE TAKEN IN GOOD

FAITH; NOTIFYING JONES OF THE APPELLATE FILING FEE;

AND CLOSING THE CASE

_____________________________________________________________________________

On April 14, 2023, Plaintiff Ronald Jones1, Federal Bureau of Prisons register number

20083-076, filed a pro se complaint pursuant to The Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 552a, et seq. (ECF

No. 2). On July 5, 2023, Jones paid the civil filing fee. (ECF No. 5.) When Jones filed the

complaint, he was incarcerated at FCI Terminal Island in San Pedro, California. (ECF No. 2 at

PageID 1.)

The complaint is based on claims that Jones’ presentence report contains inaccurate

information that Jones seeks to have Defendants correct. (Id. at PageID 4-6.) Jones names three

Defendants: the United States Department of Justice (the “DOJ”); the United States Probation

Office (the “USPO”); and the United States Federal Bureau of Prisons (the “BOP”). (Id. at PageID

1 On July 5, 2022, Jones filed a § 2255 motion in this Court in which he asserts that he is

entitled to relief because of the new fact of the dismissal of his prior California conviction in

2021. See Jones v. USA, 22-cv-02439-SHM-tmp, ECF No. 1. That matter is pending.

1.) Jones seeks to have Defendants amend the alleged inaccurate information in their files, and

requests thirty million dollars ($30,000,000.00) in monetary damages. (Id. at PageID 5-6.)

The complaint (ECF No. 2) is before the Court. For the reasons explained below, the Court:

(1) DISMISSES Jones’ complaint WITH PREJUDICE for failure to state a claim to relief

against Defendants; and (2) DENIES leave to amend.

I. BACKGROUND

The Court assumes Jones’ allegations are true for the purpose of screening the complaint.

Jones alleges that the USPO “has given [Jones] a leadership role. . . in the Presentence

Investigation Report. . .” and that information is inaccurate. (ECF No 2 at PageID 4.) Jones alleges

that the “probation officer inaccurately stated in the Presentence Investigation Report. . . the

incorrect amount of drugs.” (Id. at PageID 5.) Jones alleges that the inaccurate information caused

the USPO to “deny [Jones] any benefit of new laws (FSA and the 2014 Drug-Minus-2

Amendment), and violating [Jones’] rights under the 5th, 6th, 14th, and 15th Amendments.” (Id.)

Jones alleges Defendants’ failure to maintain accurate records in Jones’ files and the failure to

amend those records violates 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(5) and a(g)(1)(A). (Id.) Jones alleges he has

“exercised his due process rights (appeal) in accord with U.S. Federal Bureau Program Statement

5800.17c regarding this matter, but to no avail.” (Id.) Jones alleges Defendants “refuse” to amend

the inaccurate information in his “prison files and presentence report.” (Id.)

II. SCREENING

A. LEGAL STANDARD

The Court must screen prisoner complaints and dismiss any complaint, or any portion of it, if

the complaint — (1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A(b). In assessing whether the complaint states a claim on which relief may be granted, the

Court applies the standards under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), as stated in Ashcroft

v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677–79 (2009), in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555–57

(2007), and in Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010). Under those standards, the

Court accepts the complaint’s “well-pleaded” factual allegations as true and then determines

whether the allegations “plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief.” Williams v. Curtin, 631 F.3d

380, 383 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681). The Court does not assume that

conclusory allegations are true, because they are not “factual,” and all legal conclusions in a

complaint “must be supported by factual allegations.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 8 provides guidance on this issue. Rule 8 requires a complaint to contain “a short

and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” It also requires

factual allegations to make a “‘showing,’ rather than a blanket assertion, of entitlement to relief.”

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 n.3. Courts screening cases accord more deference to pro se complaints

than to those drafted by lawyers. “Pro se complaints are to be held ‘to less stringent standards than

formal pleadings drafted by lawyers,’ and should therefore be liberally construed.” Williams, 631

F.3d at 383 (quoting Martin v. Overton, 391 F.3d 710, 712 (6th Cir. 2004)). Pro se litigants are

not exempt from the requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Wells v. Brown, 891

F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989); see also Brown v. Matauszak, 415 F. App’x 608, 612, 613 (6th Cir.

2011) (affirming dismissal of pro se complaint for failure to comply with “unique pleading

requirements” and stating “a court cannot ‘create a claim which [a plaintiff] has not spelled out in

his pleading’” (quoting Clark v. Nat’l Travelers Life Ins. Co., 518 F.2d 1167, 1169 (6th Cir.

1975))).

B. REQUIREMENTS TO STATE A CLAIM UNDER § 552a

Jones sues under 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(5), 552a(g)(1)(A) and (C), and 552a(g)(4). (See ECF

No. 1 at PageID 1, 5.) To state a claim under § 552a, a plaintiff must show that:

1. He has been aggrieved by an adverse determination;

2. The agency failed to maintain its records with the degree of accuracy necessary to

assure fairness in the determination;

3. The agency's reliance on the inaccurate records was the proximate cause of the adverse

determination; and

4. The agency acted intentionally or willfully in failing to maintain accurate records.

Feldman v. C.I.A., 797 F. Supp. 2d 29 (D.D.C. 2011); Ashbourne v. Hansberry, 302 F.

Supp. 3d 338 (D.D.C. 2018). A plaintiff seeking damages must also prove that the

agency acted intentionally or willfully in failing to maintain accurate records. That

element requires showing that the agency's actions were not merely negligent, but were

more culpable. Feldman, 797 F.Supp.2d 29.

III. ANALYSIS

A. Claims Against DOJ and BOP

Jones sues the DOJ and the BOP for their alleged failure to amend the inaccurate

information in Jones’ presentence report (the “PSR”). (See ECF No. 2 at PageID 2-6.) Jones fails

to state a claim to relief against the DOJ or the BOP.

The Privacy Act permits agencies to exempt certain of their records from many of the

obligations the Act imposes. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(j); Skinner v. U.S. Dep't of Justice & Bureau of

Prisons, 584 F.3d 1093, 1094 (D.C. Cir. 2009); Register v. Lappin, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48909,

at *8 (E.D. Ky. July 6, 2007). The BOP has issued a regulation exempting its records from §

552a(e)(5) and (g). See 28 C.F.R. § 16.97(j); Skinner, 584 F.3d at 1097. The DOJ has exempted

its records from § 552a(e)(5) and (g). See 28 C.F.R. § 16.130(a). The Privacy Act permits a suit

for damages if an agency's violation of § 552a(e)(5) results in a determination adverse to the

individual. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 552a(g)(1)(C), (g)(4). Presentence reports and BOP inmate records

systems are exempt from subsections (d), (e)(5), and (g) of the Privacy Act. See 28 C.F.R. §§

16.46(i)(4), 16.51(c), 16.97(a); Lappin, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48909, at *8; see White v. U.S.

Prob. Office, 148 F.3d 1124, 1125 (D.C. Cir. 1998).

For the reasons explained above, Jones’ § 552a claims against the DOJ and the BOP are

DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE for failure to state a claim to relief.

B. Claims Against the USPO

Jones sues the USPO for its alleged failure to amend the inaccurate information in Jones’

PSR. (See ECF No. 2 at PageID 2-6.) Jones fails to state a claim to relief against the USPO. The

USPO is an administrative unit of the court. It is not subject to the Privacy Act. Bowles v. Fed.

Bureau of Prisons, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 470, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 4, 2010); Boyd v. United

States Prob. Dep't, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4244, at *1 (D.D.C. Mar. 16, 2005); see Jamison v.

Knight, No. 1:19-CV-790, 2019 WL 5059990, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 9, 2019), report and

recommendation adopted, 2020 WL 5757156 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 28, 2020).

For the reasons explained above, Jones’ § 552a claims against the USPO are DISMISSED

WITH PREJUDICE for failure to state a claim to relief.

IV. AMENDMENT UNDER THE PLRA

The Sixth Circuit has held that a district court may allow a prisoner to amend his complaint

to avoid a sua sponte dismissal under the PLRA. Lucas v. Chalk, 785 F. App’x 288, 291 (6th Cir.

2019) (citing LaFountain v. Harry, 716 F.3d 944, 951 (6th Cir. 2013) (“[W]e hold, like every other

circuit to have reached the issue, that under Rule 15(a) a district court can allow a plaintiff to

amend his complaint even when the complaint is subject to dismissal under the PLRA”)); see also

Brown v. R.I., 511 F. App’x 4, 5 (1st Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (“Ordinarily, before dismissal for

failure to state a claim is ordered, some form of notice and an opportunity to cure the deficiencies

in the complaint must be afforded”). Leave to amend is not required where a deficiency cannot be

cured. Gonzalez-Gonzalez v. United States, 257 F.3d 31, 37 (1st Cir. 2001) (“This does not mean,

of course, that every sua sponte dismissal entered without prior notice to the plaintiff automatically

must be reversed. If it is crystal clear that ... amending the complaint would be futile, then a sua

sponte dismissal may stand.”); Curley v. Perry, 246 F.3d 1278, 1284 (10th Cir. 2001) (“We agree

with the majority view that sua sponte dismissal of a meritless complaint that cannot be salvaged

by amendment comports with due process and does not infringe the right of access to the courts”).

Jones cannot cure the deficiencies in the complaint by amendment because Defendants are

exempt from his claims. The Court DENIES leave to amend.

V. APPELLATE ISSUES

The Court also considers whether to grant leave to appeal in forma pauperis. To proceed

on appeal in forma pauperis, a non-prisoner must obtain pauper status under Federal Rule of

Appellate Procedure 24(a). See Callihan v. Schneider, 178 F.3d 800, 803–04 (6th Cir. 1999). Rule

24(a) provides that, if the district court permits a party to proceed in forma pauperis at the trial

level, that party may also proceed on appeal in forma pauperis without further authorization, unless

the district court “certifies that the appeal is not taken in good faith or finds that the party is not

otherwise entitled to proceed in forma pauperis.” If the district court denies pauper status, the

party may move to proceed in forma pauperis in the court of appeals. Fed. R. App. P. 24(a)(4)–

(5).

The good faith standard is an objective one. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 445

(1962). The test for whether a party appeals in good faith is whether the litigant seeks appellate

review of any issue that is not frivolous. Id. It would be inconsistent for a district court to

determine that a complaint should be dismissed before service on the defendants but has sufficient

merit to support an appeal in forma pauperis. See Williams v. Kullman, 722 F.2d 1048, 1050 n.1

(2d Cir. 1983). The same considerations that lead the Court to dismiss this case for failure to state

a claim support the conclusion that an appeal by Jones would not be taken in good faith.

The Court CERTIFIES, under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(a), that any appeal

in this matter by Jones would not be taken in good faith. The Court DENIES leave to proceed on

appeal in forma pauperis. If Jones appeals, he must pay the full $605 appellate filing fee or move

for leave to appeal in forma pauperis with a supporting affidavit in the Sixth Circuit Court of

Appeals. See Fed. R. App. P. 24(a)(5).

VI. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above:

A. The Court DISMISSES WITH PREJUDICE Jones’ § 552a claims against the

DOJ, the BOP, and the USPO for failure to allege facts stating a claim to relief. See

28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1);

B. Leave to amend the complaint is DENIED;

C. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3),

it is CERTIFIED that any appeal in this matter by Jones would not be taken in

good faith. If Jones nevertheless chooses to file a notice of appeal, Jones must

either pay the entire six hundred and five dollar ($605.00) appellate filing fee or

submit a new in forma pauperis affidavit and a current, certified copy of his inmate

trust account statement for the last six (6) months, in compliance with 28 U.S.C. §§

1915(a)-(b);

D. After judgment is entered in accordance with this Order, see supra, the Clerk is

directed to mark this case CLOSED.

IT IS SO ORDERED, this 30th day of June, 2025.

/s/ Samuel H. Mays, Jr.

SAMUEL H. MAYS, JR.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE