NICHOLAS v. CAMUSO

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF MAINE

JB NICHOLAS, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) 1:23-cv-00015-JAW

)

JUDY A. CAMUSO, Commissioner, Maine )

Department of Inland Fisheries & Wildlife, )

)

Defendant. )

ORDER ON MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT

A plaintiff moves for relief from a court’s prior order granting a defendant’s

motion to dismiss his case, arguing the defendant perpetrated fraud on the court

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(d)(3) by omitting reference to a potentially

relevant statute and that application of the alternate statute would have led the court

to reach a different result. Concluding the plaintiff failed to present evidence that

the defendant knowingly and intentionally defrauded the court, and further that his

case is unavailing even if his proposed alternative statute is applied, the court denies

plaintiff’s motion for relief from judgment.

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On January 9, 2023, JB Nicholas,1 proceeding pro se, filed a complaint against

Judy A. Camuso, in her official capacity as Commissioner of the Maine Department

1 In the complaint, Plaintiff introduces himself by the name JB Nicholas. Compl. (ECF No. 1)

at 1-2. The Court has used this nomenclature on the ECF docket and in prior orders. See, e.g., Order

on Mot. to Dismiss at 2 (ECF No. 18). Mr. Nicholas’s present motion, however, introduces himself and

signs his filing as Jason B. Nicholas. See Not. of Mot. for Relief from J. Pursuant to F[.]R[.]C[.]P[.]

of Inland Fisheries and Wildlife (the Commissioner), alleging that the State’s guide

licensing regime violated his constitutional rights pursuant to the First, Fifth, and

Fourteenth Amendments and Article IV’s Privileges and Immunities Clause by

denying his application for a Maine guide license based on his prior felony conviction.

Compl. at 1 (ECF No. 1). That same day, he also filed a motion for a preliminary

injunction to enjoin the Commissioner from penalizing him for working as an

unlicensed guide. Mot. for a Prelim. Inj. (ECF No. 4).

The Commissioner moved to dismiss his complaint on April 10, 2023, asserting

Mr. Nicholas lacked standing because his claim was unripe for federal resolution

based on pending state proceedings in Maine Superior Court and because of her

sovereign immunity. [Def.’s] Mot. to Dismiss (ECF No. 10). She also responded to the

motion for preliminary injunction on April 11, 2023. Def.’s Opp’n to Pl.’s Mot. for

Prelim. Inj. (ECF No. 11). Mr. Nicholas opposed the Commissioner’s motion to

dismiss and added further support for his motion for injunctive relief on April 13,

2023, Pl.’s Mem. of Law in Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss & in Further Supp. of Pl.’s

Mot. for a Prelim. Inj. (ECF No. 12); Mem. by JB Nicholas in Support of Mot. for

Prelim. Inj. (ECF No. 13), and filed additional attachments in support of his

opposition to dismissal on April 24, 2023. Supp. Citation Letter (ECF No. 14);

Additional Attachs. (ECF No. 15). The Commissioner replied in support of her motion

60([d])(3) at 1-2 (ECF No. 28). In the interests of consistency within the docket, the Court continues

to apply the name in the complaint of JB Nicholas for the purposes of this order.

to dismiss on April 27, 2023. Def.’s Reply to Pl.’s Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss (ECF

No. 16).

On May 12, 2023, the Court granted the Commissioner’s motion and dismissed

all Mr. Nicholas’s as-applied challenges without prejudice and all facial challenges

with prejudice, as well as ordering the dismissal of his motion for preliminary

injunction. Order on Mot. to Dismiss (ECF No. 18). That same day, Mr. Nicholas

timely appealed the Court’s judgment to the First Circuit Court of Appeals. Not. of

Appeal (ECF No. 20). The First Circuit affirmed this Court’s decision on February

20, 2024, J. (ECF No. 26) (First Cir. J.), and returned jurisdiction to this Court on

March 29, 2024. Mandate (ECF No. 27). The United States Supreme Court denied

Mr. Nicholas’s petition for a writ of certiorari on October 7, 2024. Nicholas v. Camuso,

145 S. Ct. 181 (2024).

On October 12, 2024, Mr. Nicholas moved for relief from judgment pursuant to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(d)(3), asserting the Commissioner repeatedly

misrepresented Maine law throughout the pendency of the lawsuit. Not. of Mot. for

Relief from J. Pursuant to F[.]R[.]C[.]P[.] 60([d])(3) (ECF No. 28) (Pl.’s Mot.); id.,

Attach 1, Mem. of Law in Support of Mot. for Relief from J. Pursuant to F[.]R[.]C[.]P[.]

60([d])(3) (Def.’s Mem.). The Commissioner responded in opposition on November 4,

2024. Def.’s Opp’n to Pl.’s Mot. for Relief from J. (ECF No. 29) (Def.’s Opp’n). Mr.

Nicholas filed a reply and related attachments in support of his motion on November

15, 2024.2 Mem. of Law in Reply on Mot. for Relief from J. (ECF No. 33) (Pl.’s Reply);

Additional Attachs. (ECF No. 34) (Pl.’s Reply Attachs.).

II. THE PARTIES’ POSITIONS

A. JB Nicholas’s Motion and Memorandum

1. The Motion

Mr. Nicholas moves for relief from the Court’s judgment dismissing his

complaint, alleging “the Court effectively converted Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss

into a Motion for Summary Judgment--over Plaintiff’s explicit objection--and

dismissed Plaintiff’s Complaint, denying Plaintiff the opportunity to conduct

discovery.” Pl.’s Mot. at 6. Without an opportunity for discovery, Mr. Nicholas says,

“the Court ruled Maine’s guide licensing regime survived intermediate First

Amendment scrutiny and was constitutional on its face.” Id. (citing Order on Mot. to

Dismiss at 9-14). Plaintiff alleges the Court further considered his complaint as an

as-applied challenge to Defendant’s decision to deny him a guide license and “issued

an unconstitutional advisory opinion” by deciding to abstain from resolving the as-

applied challenge based on a pending state proceeding pursuant to Burford v Sun Oil

Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943). Id. at 6-7 (citing Order on Mot. to Dismiss at 18-23).

Plaintiff continues that the Commissioner represented to the Court that her

consideration of guide license applications is controlled solely by 12 M.R.S. §

2 Mr. Nicholas originally filed his reply and related attachments on November 14, 2024. See

Mem. of Law in Reply on Mot. for Relief from J. (ECF No. 30); Additional Attachs. (ECF No. 31).

However, he noted an error in the original filings and asked the Court Clerk to mark these documents

as filed in error. See Not. (ECF No. 32). He subsequently filed revised versions of his reply and

attachment on November 15, 2024, which are the pending motion’s operative documents. See Mem. of

Law in Reply on Mot. for Relief from J. (ECF No. 33) (Def.’s Reply); Additional Attachs. (ECF No. 34).

10908(1)(D), the Maine state statute entitled “Guide license revocation.” Id. at 7

(citing [Def.’s] Mot. to Dismiss at 9-10; [Def.’s] Mot. to Dismiss, Attach. 1, Aff. of

Christopher Cloutier (Cloutier Aff.)). However, Plaintiff argues, 12 M.R.S. §

10908(1)(D) does not by itself control Maine guide licensing decisions; “[i]n truth, 5

M[.]R[.]S[.] § 5303 also controlled Defendant’s decision whether to grant Plaintiff a

Maine guide license.” Id. at 8. Mr. Nicholas explains that 5 M.R.S. § 5303 “is one

part of a larger group of laws Maine appears to have first enacted in 1975 to give

former one-time felons a second chance at life,” adding that these laws restrict the

power of Maine administrative agencies to deny occupational licenses to applicants

with felony records. Id.

Detailing the statutory scheme, Mr. Nicholas informs the Court that 5 M.R.S.

§ 5301(1) provides “the appropriate State licensing agency may take into

consideration criminal history record information” subject to the limitations

described in 5 M.R.S. §§ 5301(2), 5302, and 5303. Id. at 8-9. After explaining the

types of criminal history which may be considered under 5 M.R.S. § 5301(2), which

includes, inter alia, felony convictions, Mr. Nicholas submits that § 5302 “allows

Maine administrative agencies to deny applications for occupational licenses by

former felons but only if the agency determines the applicant ‘has not been

sufficiently rehabilitated to warrant the public trust.’” Id. at 10 (quoting 5 M.R.S. §

5302). This statute, Mr. Nicholas says, places the burden on the license applicant to

prove sufficient rehabilitation, but requires the relevant agency to explain the

reasons for its decision in writing. Id. at 10-11 (citing 5 M.R.S. § 5302).

Continuing to 5 M.R.S. § 5303, Mr. Nicholas emphasizes that this statutory

section “imposes time limits on all Maine administrative agencies restricting their

power to consider the criminal records of all occupational license applicants.” Id. at

11-12 (Plaintiff’s emphasis). Plaintiff argues the 5 M.R.S. § 5303’s three-year

restriction on considering criminal histories applies to the Commissioner’s guide

licensing decisions, and that after such period, “ex-offender applicants or licensees

with no additional convictions are to be considered in the same manner as applicants

or licensees possessing no prior criminal record for the purposes of licensing

decisions.” Id. at 12 (quoting 5 M.R.S. § 5303(1)). He adds that, while 5 M.R.S. §

5303(2) provides a ten-year limit for specified state agencies and licensing boards, the

Department of Inland Fisheries and Wildlife is not included in this list. Id. at 13

(citing 5 M.R.S. § 5303(2)). Finally, Mr. Nicholas submits that 5 M.R.S. § 5304

requires all lawsuits challenging the denial of an occupational license to be filed in

the District Court for the District of Maine. Id. at 14 (citing 5 M.R.S. § 5304). Mr.

Nicholas avers Maine courts have not interpreted 5 M.R.S. § 5303 but directs the

Court to a 1976 guidance opinion from the Maine Attorney General’s Office

explaining “5 M.R.S.[] § 5303 provides for a 3-year time limit on consideration of prior

criminal convictions, if there are no additional convictions.” Id. at 15 (quoting 1976

Me. AG LEXIS 311, at *3).

Returning to the instant case, Mr. Nicholas insists the protections of 5 M.R.S.

§ 5301 et seq. apply to all applications to Maine administrative agencies for

occupational licenses other than the enumerated exceptions, such that “12

M[.]R[.]S[.] § 10908 must be interpreted and applied in conjunction with that regime.”

Id. at 15. He points out that he was paroled from prison in 2003 and, at the time of

his application for guide license in December 2022, “had been free from prison for

more than 19 years and free from parole for more than 13 years.” Id. Thus, Plaintiff

says, “according to 5 M.R.S. § 5303,” the Commissioner should not have considered

his felony conviction. Id. He claims Defendant’s counsel “continued to lie” and

“continued to misrepresent” Maine law by asserting in response to his appeal that 12

M.R.S. § 10908 applied to the Plaintiff despite the three-year time limit of 5 M.R.S. §

5303, an alleged misrepresentation that Mr. Nicholas did not realize until pro bono

assistance “uncovered Maine’s second chance occupational licensing laws, 5 MRS §§

5301-04, including § 5303(1).” Id. at 16-17.

Mr. Nicholas asks the Court to grant his motion for relief from judgment based

on this alleged “fraud on the court.” Id. at 17.

2. The Memorandum

In a memorandum of law attached to his motion, Mr. Nicholas reiterates his

position that the Defendant’s counsel perpetrated “fraud on the court,” which he

asserts warrants setting aside the Court’s judgment dismissing his complaint

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(d)(3). Pl.’s Mem. at 1 (capitalization

altered). He argues the Defendant “falsely represented to 13 federal judges in three

federal courts that Maine law allowed Defendant to deny Plaintiff and anyone else

ever convicted of a felony,” despite “application of 12 M[.]R[.]S[.] § 10908 to Plaintiff

is time-limited to three years following ‘final discharge, if any, from the correctional

system’ by another Maine law, 5 MRS § 5303(1).” Id. at 2. Mr. Nicholas claims the

Court relied on these misrepresentations to uphold the constitutionality of 12 M.R.S.

§ 10908 on his facial and as-applied challenges to Maine’s guide licensing regime and

asserts this error makes the Court’s decision to dismiss “poisoned fruit of her lawyers’

misconduct” and justifies his requested relief. Id.

Plaintiff cites federal appellate caselaw interpreting “fraud on the court”

broadly as any conduct affecting the integrity of the judicial process, including

material misrepresentations by a party’s lawyer. Id. at 3-4 (citing, e.g., Aoude v.

Mobil Oil Corp., 892 F.2d 1115, 1118 (1st Cir. 1989); In re Goff, 652 F.3d 806, 809

(7th Cir. 2011)). He asserts that lies by counsel are especially fraudulent because

perjury by witnesses is a known risk accounted for through cross-examination and

discovery, while representations of counsel do not face similar guardrails. Id. at 4-5

(citing In re Goff, 652 F.3d at 809). Plaintiff seeks to hold the Defendant, represented

by the Office of the Maine Attorney General, to a “higher ethical standard” as counsel

for the public, and asserts Defendant’s counsel “failed to mention, at any time, 5

M[.]R[.]S[.] § 5301(1) or the material fact that 5 MRS § 5303(1) limits application of

12 MRS § 10908 to ‘within 3 years of the applicant’s or licensee’s final discharge, if

any, from the correctional system.’” Id. at 5-6 (quoting 5 MRS § 5303(1)).

Plaintiff insists 12 M.R.S. § 10908 should not apply to him based on the timing

of his release from prison and the time limit of 5 M.R.S. § 5303, adding that, “[e]ven

if Maine’s Attorney General believed 5 M[.]R[.]S[.] § 5303 does not limit 12 M[.]R[.]S[.]

§ 10908, the public office’s ethical obligations required it to disclose the existence of

5 M[.]R[.]S[.] § 5303 because it[’]s at least arguable it applies to Plaintiff by limiting

12 M[.]R[.]S[.] § 10908.” Id. at 8. Mr. Nicholas alleges this failure to disclose the

existence of 5 M.R.S. § 5303 amounted to “fraud on the court” under First Circuit

precedent. Id. at 9 (citing Aoude, 892 F.2d at 1118 (finding “fraud on the court” where

material misrepresentations by counsel “(1) “interfere with the judicial system’s

ability impartially to adjudicate a matter by improperly influencing the trier” or (2)

“unfairly hamper the presentation of the opposing party’s claim or defense”)).

Defendant’s counsel’s failure to disclose the existence of 5 M.R.S. § 5303, Mr.

Nicholas alleges, compromised the integrity of the Court’s decision-making and

unfairly constrained Plaintiff’s ability to present his case, citing in support portions

of the Court’s order dismissing the complaint analyzing the requirements of 12 M.R.S.

§ 10908, which Plaintiff asserts “do not accurately reflect what Maine law actually

is.” Id. at 9-10. He claims the Commissioner’s alleged misrepresentation prejudiced

his ability to effectively present his case and misled the Court to conclude that

Maine’s guide licensing regime passed intermediate First Amendment scrutiny. Id.

at 10-11. Finally, he claims his ability to present his case was further affected by

Defendant’s counsel withholding this information because he may have proceeded

differently, such as bringing a claim in state court or raising arguments under 5

M.R.S. § 5303, had he known 5 M.R.S. § 5303 limited 12 M.R.S. § 10908 to three years

after release. Id. at 11-12.

B. Commissioner Camuso’s Opposition to the Motion

The Commissioner opposes Mr. Nicholas’s requested relief from judgment,

arguing the Plaintiff’s attempts to raise a new argument and to claim his failure to

raise that same argument earlier stemmed from Defendant’s “fraud on the court” fail

to meet the standards of Rule 60(d)(3). Def.’s Opp’n at 1. Defendant argues the

statute cited by Mr. Nicholas is inapposite and that the present motion “amounts to

a second intemperate and unjustified ad hominem attack regarding the proceedings

below,” reminding the Court that the Commissioner denied Mr. Nicholas’s application

in part “due to his failure to accept responsibility for his actions” and that Plaintiff

accused this Court of “treason” in his appeal to the First Circuit. Id. at 2 (citing id.,

Attach. 1, Br. of Pl.-Appellant at 38).

The Commissioner continues that Plaintiff’s claims that 5 M.R.S. § 5303, a

publicly available statute, was purportedly hidden from him does not meet the

standard of “fraud on the court.” Id. at 6. After collecting caselaw on the high bar

required for such a finding, the Commissioner contends that her statement of the law

governing licensure in Maine was supported by accurate citations to 12 M.R.S. §

10908 and does not meet this threshold, nor does her failure to cite 5 M.R.S. § 5303,

a statute Plaintiff now contends should apply to his guide license application. Id. at

6-7. Collecting caselaw from other federal circuits, the Commissioner insists “’[f]raud

on the court’ concerns false evidence created with the knowledge and participation of

a litigant which deceives the court,” while here the publicly available nature of the

statute conclusively demonstrates the inappropriateness of Plaintiff’s allegations. Id.

at 8 (citing, e.g., United States v. Smiley, 553 F.3d 1137, 1145 (8th Cir. 2009); Wilson

v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 873 F.2d 869, 872 (5th Cir. 1989)).

The Commissioner next reasserts that 12 M.R.S. § 10908 governs her

consideration of applications for guide licenses, contrary to Plaintiff’s claims

regarding the relevance of 5 M.R.S. § 5303. Id. at 9. She points out that 5 M.R.S. §

5303(1) states “[t]here is no time limitation for consideration of an applicant’s or

licensee’s conduct which gave rise to the criminal conviction if that conduct is

otherwise a ground for disciplinary action against a licensee.” Id. (quoting 5 M.R.S.

§ 5303(1)). In Mr. Nicholas’s case, Defendant says, her decision to deny his

application for a guide license was explained in her written decision:

Nicholas was convicted in the Westchester County Court (New York) on

June 14, 1991, of Manslaughter Second Degree, for which he received a

sentence of 5 to 15 years in prison.

Nicholas described the incident resulting in the conviction as follows: He

was 19 years old and out drinking with friends when they were

approached by the victim. Nicholas warned the victim to freeze but he

didn’t. It looked to Nicholas like the victim went to pull a gun, so

Nicholas shot at the victim three times with a sawed-off shotgun that

was in the car. The victim ran off and Nicholas and his friends drove

away. One-week later Nicholas found out the victim had died. Nicholas

left New York and joined the Army Reserves. He returned to New York

several months later [and] was arrested.

Id. at 10 (quoting Cloutier Aff., Ex. C, Decision at 3). The Commissioner opines that

the conduct of “homicide followed by fleeing the jurisdiction” amounts to a proper

basis for denying his application under 12 M.R.S. § 10908 and that, even if applicable,

5 M.R.S. § 5303(1) expressly provides for no time limit in consideration of conduct

giving rise to a criminal conviction. Id.

Next, the Commissioner contests the applicability of 5 M.R.S. § 5303 to

applications for a Maine guide license by invoking the doctrine of generalia

specialibus non derogantas3 to assert specific statutes take precedence over general

ones when a conflict arises. Id. at 11 (citing Aurelius Inv., LLC v. Puerto Rico, 915

F.3d 838, 851 (1st Cir. 2019)). Pointing out that Plaintiff provides no basis for his

conclusion that 5 M.R.S. § 5303 applies specifically to guide licensure, the

Commissioner avers 12 M.R.S. § 10908, entitled “Guide License Revocation,”

specifically authorizes the Commissioner of the Maine Department of Inland

Fisheries and Wildlife, without imposing any time restriction on considerations, to

“revoke, suspend, refuse to issue, or renew a guide license” if “an applicant for a guide

license has been convicted of committing a crime in the State or any other jurisdiction

that is punishable by imprisonment for a term of one year.” Id. (quoting 12 M.R.S. §

10908(1)(D)). If a permit is denied and the applicant requests a hearing, 12 M.R.S. §

10908(1)(D)(1) authorizes the Commissioner to “issue a guide license or reinstate a

guide license that has been revoked, suspended or denied if the commissioner

determines that the applicant has been sufficiently rehabilitated from the conviction

to warrant the public trust or the nature of the conviction or the circumstances

surrounding it do not warrant disqualification from licensure.” Id. (quoting 12 M.R.S.

§ 10908(1)(D)(1)).

The Commissioner directs the Court to Senty v. Board of Osteopathic

Examination & Registration, 594 A.2d 1068 (Me. 1991), which she describes as “[t]he

only reported case addressing 5 M.R.S. § 5303,” which held that the Maine

3 As the First Circuit explained in Aurelius, generalia specialibus non derogantas means the

“specific governs the general.” 915 F.3d at 851; see generally ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER,

READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS, 183-88 (2012).

Legislature can, in separate enactments, adopt additional requirements to qualify for

licensure. Id. at 12 (discussing Senty, 594 A.2d at 1069-70). Further, Defendant

points out, 5 M.R.S. § 5301 et seq. does not define the term “licensed profession, trade

or occupation,” such that Plaintiff’s unsupported argument that 5 M.R.S. § 5303

applies to guide licensure under 12 M.R.S. § 10908 is conclusory and should not be

credited. Id. To the contrary, Defendant notes, the Office of Professional and

Occupational Regulation expressly includes thirteen enumerated boards, id. at 13

(citing 10 M.R.S. § 8001(38)), and Maine law elsewhere addresses over one hundred

trades, professions, and occupations. Id. (citing 32 M.R.S § 59, et seq.). Nowhere, the

Commissioner insists, are Maine guides included in such lists. Id. Concluding this

line of argument, Defendant maintains the specific legislative directives for

consideration of guide licenses under 12 M.R.S. § 10908 should take precedence over

the general mandate of 5 M.R.S. § 5303. Id.

The Commissioner next submits that application of 5 M.R.S. § 5303 to guide

licensure decisions would lead to unreasonable results. Id. After collecting federal

caselaw on the maxim of statutory interpretation to avoid unreasonable results,

Defendant points out that reading 5 M.R.S. § 5303 to apply to Title 12 would thus

extend to consideration of criminal history prior to the issuance of any “license or

permit” administered by the Maine Department of Inland Fisheries and Wildlife. Id.

at 13-14. Using 12 M.R.S. § 10752 as an example, the Commissioner explains how

subsection (5) restricts trapping, fishing, or hunting licenses based on convictions of

enumerated burglary-related crimes, while subsection (6) extends this period to 10

years if the offense occurred in the context of a trapping, fishing, or hunting activity.

Id. (citing 12 M.R.S. § 10752(5), (6)). Thus, Defendant explains, applying the three-

year limit of 5 M.R.S. § 5303 would have the unreasonable effect of simultaneously

lengthening the period of one provision while reducing another. Id.

Based on the foregoing, Defendant asks the Court to deny Plaintiff’s motion for

relief from judgment. Id. at 16.

C. JB Nicholas’s Reply in Support of His Motion

Mr. Nicholas’s reply reiterates his request for relief from judgment and accuses

the Commissioner of continuing to perpetrate “fraud on the court” in her response.

Pl.’s Reply at 1-2. He begins by refuting Commissioner Camuso’s claim that his

application was denied “in part, due to his failure to accept responsibility for his

actions,” asserting that the Commissioner’s decision only articulates two reasons:

that he did not present evidence he was “sufficiently rehabilitated to warrant the

public trust” or that he “received counseling.” Id. at 2 & 2 n.1 (citing Decision at 3).

Mr. Nicholas continues that Defendant’s statement that he “accused this Court of

‘treason’” in his appeal misrepresents the truth, conceding he did use the word

“treason” but pointing out the word was part of a quote from New Orleans Public

Service, Inc. v Council of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 358 (1989). Id. at 2-3.

Turning to the merits of his case, Mr. Nicholas argues Defendant’s position

that “5 M[.]R[.]S[.] § 5303(1) does not, as a matter of law, limit 12 M[.]R[.]S[.] § 10908

. . .. misses--or mischaracterizes--Plaintiff’s point entirely . . .. [and] [i]t’s also not

true.” Id. at 3. Plaintiff first clarifies his position is “that it is at the very least simply

arguable 5 M[.]R[.]S[.] § 5303(1) limits 12 M[.]R[.]S[.] § 10908,” such that Defendant

was obligated to disclose the existence of 5 M.R.S. § 5303(1) to the Plaintiff. Id. at 3-

4 (Plaintiff’s emphasis). He argues that while Commissioner Camuso cites federal

caselaw in support of the proposition that specific statutes take precedence over

general, the interpretation of the Maine laws at issue in this case should be guided

by decisions from the Maine Supreme Judicial Court. Id. at 4-6 (citing, e.g., Keach v

Wheeling & Lake Erie Ry. Co., 888 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2018)). After reviewing the Law

Court’s standard tools of statutory interpretation, id. at 6-7, he collects Maine

caselaw in which the Law Court endeavored to “if possible[,] give effect to both

statutes.” Id. at 7-8 (quoting State v. London, 156 ME 123, 127-28, 162 A.2d 150

(1960)), and collecting cases).

Applying this rule to his case, Mr. Nicholas submits the two statutes could, in

the words of the Law Court, be “harmonized,” by incorporating the three-year

limitation from 5 M.R.S. § 5303(1) into 12 M.R.S. § 10908. Id. at 8 (quoting London,

156 ME at 127-28). He disagrees with the Defendant’s suggestion that the two

statutes present an irreconcilable conflict, arguing that the Commissioner “tortured”

interpretation ignores 5 M.R.S. § 5303(1)’s textual context and legislative history to

conclude, without support, that “there is no time limitation” under 12 M.R.S. § 10908.

Id. at 8-9. Following the Defendant’s statutory interpretation, he contends, would

“effectively negate” the rest of 5 M.R.S. § 5303(1) and frustrate its purpose by allowing

this exception to consume the rule, and thus for Maine agencies to consider

applicants’ entire criminal history in every case, an absurd result he argues would

not align with the Law Court’s goals of statutory interpretation. Id. at 10-11.

Turning to the legislative history of 5 M.R.S. § 5301 et seq., Plaintiff argues

the Maine Legislature intended to protect the ability of those with criminal records

to apply for skilled trades and occupations licensed by the State. Id. at 12 (citing id.,

Attach. 1, Affirmation in Reply at 4 (in turn citing id., Attach. 4, Digest of Findings

at 10, 27)). The Maine State Legislature amended 5 M.R.S. § 5303(1) in 1989 to add

the fifth sentence at issue in this case, but Plaintiff asserts the legislative history

reflects no intent to eliminate or repeal the provision’s three-year limit. Id. at 12-13

(citing Affirmation in Reply at 4-8; see also id., Attachs. 5-9). As such, Plaintiff says,

the Court should not read the fifth sentence to “cut the heart out” of 5 M.R.S. § 5303(1)

by permitting licensing agencies to consider criminal history beyond the three-year

limit. Id. at 13.

Plaintiff insists that the Commissioner’s interpretation contravenes the text

and legislative intent of 5 M.R.S. § 5303(1), and further conflicts with the Maine

Attorney General’s 1976 opinion. Id. at 13-14 (citing 1976 Me. AG LEXIS 311).

Further, Plaintiff says, the Senty Court, as cited by the Defendant, “did not actually

interpret any part of 5 M[.]R[.]S[.] § 5301-5304,” but rather interpreted another

statute in light of 5 M.R.S. § 5301-5304, and also disqualified the applicant in that

case based on incompetence rather than a criminal record. Id. at 14-15. Plaintiff

maintains that Senty actually supports his position by demonstrating Maine statutes

governing licensure must be read together. Id. at 15-16.

Mr. Nicholas continues to maintain that 12 M.R.S. § 10908 should not be

applied to his application because he was convicted in 1991 but the statute was not

enacted until 2006, arguing the statute is thus being retroactively applied in violation

of his “vested rights.” Id. at 17 (citing NECEC Transmission LLC v. Bureau of Parks

& Lands, 2022 ME 48, ¶¶ 33-42, 281 A.3d 618). He also reasserts the arguments

from his memorandum that the Commissioner’s omission of 5 M.R.S. § 5303(1)

perpetrated fraud on this Court, the First Circuit, and the Supreme Court, and that

public officials should be held to a higher ethical standard. Id. at 17-21. He adds

that any misrepresentations were especially prejudicial in this case because he is

proceeding pro se. Id. at 19-20.

Finally, Mr. Nicholas asserts that ruling in favor of the Defendant would

“effectively grant[] [her] a license to lie” and points out that her example of the effect

of 5 M.R.S. § 5303(1) to Title 12’s provisions governing trapping, fishing, or hunting

licenses is inapposite, as these are not occupational licenses. Id. at 21-22. Plaintiff

insists that the Commissioner’s position that 5 M.R.S. § 5303(1) does not apply to

Title 12 suggests the “agency has been defying Maine’s legislature since 1975--the

year 5 M.R.S. § 5303(1) was enacted.” Id. at 22.

In conclusion, Plaintiff asks the Court to grant his motion for relief from

judgment and sanction the Commissioner by denying her motion to dismiss or, in the

alternative, to certify the question of whether 5 M.R.S. § 5303(1) limits 12 M.R.S. §

10908 for resolution by the Maine Supreme Judicial Court. Id. at 22-23.

III. LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60 permits a court, inter alia, to “set aside a

judgment for fraud on the court.” FED. R. CIV. P. 60(d)(3). To support such relief from

judgment, the evidence would have to reveal “an unconscionable scheme” or “the most

egregious conduct designed to corrupt the judicial process.” Roger Edwards, LLC v.

Fiddes & Son Ltd., 427 F.3d 129, 133 (1st Cir. 2005) (quoting Geo. P. Reintjes Co. v.

Riley Stoker Corp., 71 F.3d 44, 48 n.5 (1st Cir. 1995)); accord Greater Omaha Packing

Co. v. Fairbank Reconstruction Corp., No. 2:13-cv-436-GZS, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

133369, at *26 (D. Me. Sept. 23, 2014). A movant must support a claim of “fraud on

the court” by clear and convincing evidence. Hofland v. Westrum, No. CV-09-218-B-

W, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80448, at *5 (D. Me. Aug. 28, 2009) (to be granted, a motion

to set aside judgment for “fraud on the court” “must be supported by clear,

unequivocal and convincing evidence”) (quoting United States v. Yeje-Cabrera, 430

F.3d 1, 28 n.22 (1st Cir. 2005)).

“A ‘fraud on the court’ occurs where it can be demonstrated, clearly and

convincingly, that a party has sentiently set in motion some unconscionable scheme

calculated to interfere with the judicial system’s ability impartially to adjudicate a

matter by improperly influencing the trier or unfairly hampering the presentation of

the opposing party's claim or defense.” Aoude, 892 F.2d at 1118. Typical examples

of “fraud on the court” under this provision include “[b]ribery of a judge or counsel

exerting improper influence on the Court,” though First Circuit caselaw is clear that

perjury alone does not qualify as a basis for invocation of Rule 60(d)(3). Roger

Edwards, 427 F.3d at 133.

IV. DISCUSSION

After reviewing the parties’ filings, the Court concludes Mr. Nicholas has failed

to demonstrate his case meets the high bar imposed by Rule 60(d)(3) for relief from

judgment and, in the alternative, has failed to establish that Commissioner Camuso’s

denial of his application violated the requirements of 5 M.R.S. § 5303.

A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(d)(3)

First, and more significant, Mr. Nicholas presents no evidence to support his

allegations that Defendant intentionally omitted any reference to 5 M.R.S. § 5303

with the conscious goal of misleading the Court or interfering with the Plaintiff’s

ability to present his case. In applying Rule 60(d)(3), the First Circuit has required

that “it can be demonstrated, clearly and convincingly, that a party has sentiently

set in motion some unconscionable scheme calculated to interfere with the judicial

system’s ability impartially to adjudicate a matter by improperly influencing the trier

or unfairly hampering the presentation of the opposing party’s claim or defense.”

Aoude, 892 F.2d at 1118 (emphasis added by this Court); accord Yeje-Cabrera, 430

F.3d at 28 n.22 (1st Cir. 2005)) (a motion brought pursuant to Rule 60(d)(3) “must be

supported by clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence”). Simply put, that high bar

with its even higher burden of proof has not been met here.

Mr. Nicholas repeatedly alleges that Commissioner Camuso “lied to this Court

. . . [and] the First Circuit Court of Appeals . . .. [and] even lied to the Supreme Court.”

Pl.’s Mem. at 1, 12-13; see also Pl.’s Reply at 18-19 (alleging Defendant “intentionally

misrepresented Maine statutory law not just to the pro se plaintiff but to 13 federal

judges by omitting a clearly controlling state statute that totally undermined their

entire defense precisely because the statute totally undermined it”). However,

nowhere in his extensive briefing of the issue does Mr. Nicholas include any evidence

to support his allegation that Defendant’s omission of any reference to 5 M.R.S. §

5303(1) was part of an intentional scheme to defraud the courts.

The Commissioner’s written decision originally denying Mr. Nicholas’s guide

application bases its authority solely on 12 M.R.S. § 10908(1)(D). Decision at 1-3.

Similarly, Mr. Nicholas’s complaint challenges the constitutionality of “Maine’s guide

licensing regime” specifically with reference to 12 M.R.S. § 10908(1)(D). Compl. ¶¶

21-23. This statutory provision remained the one at issue on Defendant’s motion to

dismiss, Plaintiff’s appeal, and his petition for writ of certiorari. See [Def.’s] Mot. to

Dismiss at 8-12; First Cir. J. at 1-3; Petition for Writ of Cert. to the First Cir. at 17,

Nicholas v. Camuso, No. 23-7172 (Apr. 5, 2024). By Plaintiff’s own admission, he did

not become aware of the potential relevance of 5 M.R.S. § 5301 et seq. until it was

“uncovered” by pro bono counsel he secured to assist with the filing of his reply in

support of his petition for a writ of certiorari. Pl.’s Mot. at 16-17.

At no time, however, does Mr. Nicholas present evidence that Commissioner

Camuso or her counsel were aware of the supposed limiting effect of 5 M.R.S. §

5303(1) on 12 M.R.S. § 10908 and made a knowing, conscious decision to suppress it

and thus attempt to mislead the Court, as well-established precedent of this Circuit

requires to grant Rule 60(d) relief. In fact, as Plaintiff himself submits, his own

review of legal databases “failed to uncover a single decision from any Maine court

interpreting 5 M.R.S. § 5303,” id. at 15, and though the Commissioner cites one such

case in her opposition, Senty does not explicitly contemplate any effect on 12 M.R.S.

§ 10908. Senty, 594 A.2d at 1069-70. Mr. Nicholas presents no additional evidence,

“clear, unequivocal, and convincing” or otherwise, to support his allegations that the

Commissioner knowingly and intentionally perpetrated “fraud on the Court.” See

Yeje-Cabrera, 430 F.3d at 28 n.22.

As Defendant points out, the publicly available nature of the statute bolsters

the Court’s conclusion. See Def.’s Opp’n at 8. Mr. Nicholas claims Defendant

hampered his ability to present his case and insists he may have proceeded differently

had he known earlier about 5 M.R.S. § 5303, Def.’s Mot. at 11-12, but he presents no

evidence to suggest any actions by Defendant to prevent his earlier invocation of 5

M.R.S. § 5303. As a publicly available statute, § 5303 was equally available to Mr.

Nicholas and Commissioner Camuso, and a litigant typically responds to the

arguments the opposing party makes, not ones he does not. In the Court’s view, the

general principle that heightened ethical standards are imposed on state attorneys’

general and their professional employees does not mean in the context of this

controversy that the Assistant Attorney General should have cited § 5303, a statute

Mr. Nicholas himself did not cite, and that the Court has determined does not apply

to Mr. Nicholas’s case.

Rather, Plaintiff appears to claim that the Commissioner’s failure to make him

aware of 5 M.R.S. § 5303 amounted to obstructing the presentation of his case. While

Mr. Nicholas is correct that government entities have a duty to treat opposing parties

fairly and to seek justice, Pl.’s Mot. at 5, 7-9 (citing, e.g., United States v. Doe, 860

F.2d 488, 494 n.4 (1st Cir. 1988); Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935)), the

Plaintiff does not direct the Court to any authority obligating a government entity to

generate novel legal defenses on an opposing party’s behalf, and the Court is aware

of none.

B. 5 M.R.S. § 5303

The Court could stop its analysis here and dismiss Mr. Nicholas’s motion for

relief from judgment on this basis alone. However, in light of Mr. Nicholas’s

insistence that 5 M.R.S. § 5303 should govern the review of his application and the

First Circuit’s directive that lower courts should construe pro se filings liberally,

Gakuba v. Frey, Nos. 23-1084, 23-1095, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 18703, at *1 (1st Cir.

Apr. 10, 2024) (citing Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)), the Court considers

whether Mr. Nicholas’s 5 M.R.S. § 5303 arguments would change the result.

The Court based its dismissal of Mr. Nicholas’s case on two grounds. First, it

dismissed his as-applied challenge on Burford grounds because his state appeal was

ongoing. Second, it dismissed his facial challenge upon concluding that “Maine’s

guide licensing regime is narrowly tailored to serve a significant government

interest.” Order on Mot. to Dismiss at 14-15. Upon review, application of 5 M.R.S. §

5303 does not affect either of these grounds for dismissal.

First, with regard to his as-applied challenge, the Court dismissed Mr.

Nicholas’s claims pursuant to Burford, 319 U.S. 315, based on Mr. Nicholas’s pursuit

of administrative review of his application’s denial, a process which entitled him to a

final appeal in state court, in parallel to bringing his federal claim. Order on Mot. to

Dismiss at 18-23. The conclusion to dismiss his as-applied claim pursuant to Burford

did not depend on the Court’s interpretation of 12 M.R.S. § 10908; rather, the Court

based its dismissal on the First Circuit’s directive to avoid creating a “dual review

structure for adjudicating a state’s specific regulatory actions” in accordance with the

Burford abstention doctrine. See, e.g., Chico Serv. Station v. Sol Puerto Rico Ltd.,

633 F.3d 20, 32-34 (1st Cir. 2011)). Permitting a federal appeal of his application’s

denial at this stage implicates the same concerns by theoretically generating a risk

of conflicting decisions at the state and federal levels, the exact reason the Supreme

Court created the Burford abstention doctrine. Proceeding under 5 M.R.S. § 5303

instead of 12 M.R.S. § 10908 in his federal case does not change the fact that Mr.

Nicholas was simultaneously appealing his application’s denial within the state

system while pursuing his federal lawsuit, and thus does not affect the Court’s

conclusion to dismiss Mr. Nicholas’s as-applied challenge pursuant to Burford, 319

U.S. 315.

Mr. Nicholas now asserts that he would have been entitled to appeal the denial

of his guide application made under 5 M.R.S. § 5303 by filing a complaint in the

District Court for the District of Maine pursuant to 5 M.R.S. § 5304. Pl.’s Mot. at 14.

However, this argument mistakes the law. 5 M.R.S. § 5304 indeed states “[a]ny

person who is aggrieved by the decision of any licensing agency in possible violation

of this chapter may file a statement of complaint with the District Court designated

in chapter 375.”4

4 The subsection of Chapter 375 dealing with judicial review of final agency actions, 5 M.R.S. §

11001, provides that “any person who is aggrieved by final agency action shall be entitled to judicial

review thereof in the Superior Court in the manner provided by this subchapter.” (emphasis added by

this Court).

Fundamentally misreading the reference to “the District Court” in § 5304 as

the United States District Court, not the Maine State District Court, Mr. Nicholas

has filed suit in federal court to challenge the Commissioner’s decision. Mr. Nicholas

is in the wrong court. The reference to “District Court” in § 5304 is not to the United

States District Court, but to the state of Maine District Court.

If § 5304 referred to the federal district court (which it does not), it would

violate fundamental concepts of federalism. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1257, only the United

States Supreme Court has jurisdiction to hear appeals from final state court

judgments. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, federal district courts can only exercise original,

not appellate, jurisdiction. The Supreme Court merged the two statutes in two

cases: Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923), and District of Columbia

Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983), commonly known as the Rooker-

Feldman doctrine. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine is “jurisdictional in nature” and

therefore “if a case is dismissed because the Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies, it

means the court has no subject-matter jurisdiction to hear the case.” Mills v. Harmon

Law Offices, P.C., 344 F.3d 42, 44 (1st Cir. 2003) (citing In re Middlesex Power Equip.

& Marine, Inc., 292 F.3d 61, 66 (1st Cir. 2002)). In essence, the Rooker-Feldman

doctrine prohibits lower federal courts from sitting in direct review of final state court

judgments—unless Congress has specifically authorized such relief—and holds that

therefore federal courts should not become a court of appeals for state court decisions.

See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005); Miller

v. Nichols, 586 F.3d 53, 58 (1st Cir. 2009) (“Rooker-Feldman bars jurisdiction

whenever parties who lost in state court seek review and rejection of that judgment

in federal court”); Puerto Ricans for P.R. Party v. Dalmau, 544 F.3d 58, 68 (1st Cir.

2008). In light of this well-known precept, the Court does not conclude that the Maine

Legislature intended to make this Court—as opposed to a state court—the reviewing

court for the denial by the Maine Commissioner of Inland Fisheries and Wildlife of

an application for a license to register as a Maine guide. This is a state matter to be

determined by the state court system.

Moreover, it is highly questionable whether the Maine Legislature would have

the authority to enact a statute directly affecting the jurisdiction of the United States

District Court. “‘Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction,’ possessing ‘only

that power authorized by Constitution and statute.’” Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251,

256 (quoting Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 511 U.S. 375, 377

(1994)). Pursuant to § 1331, federal district courts “have original jurisdiction of all

civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28

U.S.C. § 1331. The Court is dubious that the Maine Legislature intended to vest the

United States District Court with jurisdiction over appeals from state administrative

rulings, as Mr. Nicholas believes, or that a state legislature could by state statute

control federal court jurisdiction in this fashion.

As the statute does not entitle Mr. Nicholas to file a federal complaint to

challenge the denial of his application, but rather makes review available in the state

court system, this argument fails to convince the Court that it erred in its invocation

of the Burford abstention doctrine with regard to his as-applied challenge in its order

on motion to dismiss. See Order on Mot. to Dismiss at 22.

Second, the Court dismissed Mr. Nicholas’s facial challenge based on its

conclusion that Maine’s guide licensing regime under 12 M.R.S. § 10908 is narrowly

tailored to serve a significant government interest—to wit, protecting public safety.

Order on Mot. to Dismiss at 14-15. Mr. Nicholas now argues that the Maine guide

application review process is instead governed by 5 M.R.S. §§ 5301-03 and that

Commissioner Camuso’s consideration of his prior criminal conviction violated the

statutory protections contemplated by 5 M.R.S. § 5303. Even accepting as true his

claim that this statute applies to his application, however, his argument that the

Commissioner denied his application based on the fact of his prior conviction is belied

by the factual record.

5 M.R.S. § 5303 indeed imposes a three-year limit on considering a prior

criminal conviction in the context of an application to a licensed profession. 5 M.R.S.

§ 5303(1). However, assuming without deciding that Maine guide licensures fall

within the statutory meaning of a licensed profession for the purposes of this order,

the statute continues to provide a significant caveat, stating “[t]here is no time

limitation for consideration of an applicant’s or licensee’s conduct which gave rise to

the criminal conviction if that conduct is otherwise a ground for disciplinary action

against a licensee.” Id. In her written decision, Commissioner Camuso grounded her

denial of Mr. Nicholas’s application not only on the fact of his prior conviction, but

also, in her own words, “the nature of the conviction and the circumstances

surrounding it.” Decision at 2. She explained, in detail, that “[i]f granted a guide

license[,] Nicholas would be entrusted with the safety and welfare of the adults and

children under his charge, individuals who may have little or no experience engaging

in such activities in the woods or on the waters of the State of Maine” and focused her

discussion on the facts underlying his conviction:

His conviction stemmed from his violent conduct that resulted in the

death of another person. The circumstances of the crime and

Nicholas’[s] actions following it show a serious lack of judgment. By his

own testimony, Nicholas[] admits he was drinking at the time of the

incident, that he shot at a person three times with a sawed-off shotgun,

and that he later left the State of New York and joined the Army

Reserves despite learning one[ ]week later that person he shot at had

died.

Id. at 3. Based on this conduct, not merely his felon status, Commissioner Camuso

concluded Mr. Nicholas did not warrant the significant exercise of public trust of

issuance of a Maine guide license. Id.

On review, the Court concludes the Commissioner’s explanation for her denial

of Mr. Nicholas’s application comports with the requirements of 5 M.R.S. § 5303, such

that, even accepting Mr. Nicholas’s argument that 5 M.R.S. § 5303 applies to his

Maine guide application, he has not established a basis for relief from judgment. As

stated, 5 M.R.S. § 5303 specifically permits consideration of “conduct which gave rise

to the criminal conviction if that conduct is otherwise a ground for disciplinary action

against a licensee” without imposing any time limitation on when such conduct can

be considered. Shooting another person, even mistakenly, and fleeing from

consequences is unequivocally conduct which, if taken by a licensed Maine guide,

would give rise to disciplinary action. Commissioner Camuso was thus entitled to

consider the circumstances underlying Mr. Nicholas’s conviction in her review of his

application.

Further, the Court cannot conclude Commissioner Camuso erred in her

determination that Mr. Nicholas’s conduct of misusing firearms while using alcohol

and of subsequently fleeing state jurisdiction despite his knowledge of, and

opportunity to reflect on, the fact that the person had died from his wounds raised

concerns about whether Mr. Nicholas “can safely lead persons in guiding activities in

the State of Maine.” Decision at 2-3. The Court credits Commissioner Camuso’s

recognition that Maine guides are often tasked with bringing novice outdoorsmen into

remote and potentially dangerous environments, and as such that such licenses are

a serious commitment of public trust.

The Commissioner additionally noted that Mr. Nicholas described “having

grown up in a violent environment” and that his conviction “stemmed from his violent

conduct that resulted in the death of another person.” Id. at 3. Furthermore, Mr.

Nicholas acknowledged that he had been “drinking at the time of the incident, that

he shot at a person three times with a sawed-off shotgun, and that he later left the

State of New York and joined the Army Reserves despite learning one-week later that

person he shot at had died.” Id. Significantly, the Commissioner emphasized that

“[t]here is no evidence in the record that Nicholas has received counseling.” Id. Thus,

Mr. Nicholas simply did not convince the Commissioner that “he has been sufficiently

rehabilitated to warrant entrustment with a Maine guide license.” Id.

The Court concludes Commissioner Camuso acted well within her discretion

by deciding Mr. Camuso’s prior conduct disqualified him from being granted a Maine

guide license, and that her basis for this denial comports with the requirements of 5

M.R.S. § 5303.

Finally, the Court emphasizes that, on February 20, 2024, the First Circuit

affirmed this Court’s dismissal of Mr. Nicholas’s case, approving of this Court’s

exercise of Burford abstention as to the as-applied challenge and its conclusion that

Maine’s licensing regime is facially constitutional. First Cir. J. at 2-3. It is the

practice, and indeed the obligation, of this Court to follow the mandates of the First

Circuit. See, e.g., Carson v. Makin, 668 F. Supp. 3d 26, 33 (D. Me. 2023) (“[T]he

mandate rule is a ‘branch of the law of the case doctrine that “prevents relitigation in

the trial court of matters that were explicitly or implicitly decided by an earlier

appellate decision in the same case”’”) (quoting United States v. Dávila-Félix , 763

F.3d 105, 109 (1st Cir. 2014) (in turn quoting United States v. Moran, 393 F.3d 1, 7

(1st Cir. 2004))). The Court thus declines to contravene the First Circuit’s mandate

in this case by changing its conclusion on the merits of Mr. Nicholas’s claims.

For all the reasons discussed, the Court concludes Mr. Nicholas has failed to

demonstrate, by any clear and convincing evidence, that the Commissioner or her

counsel intentionally perpetrated “fraud on the court,” or that applying 5 M.R.S. §

5303 to the Maine guide application process would change Commissioner Camuso’s

denial of his application or the Court’s decision to grant Commissioner Camuso’s

motion to dismiss his complaint. The Court thus declines to exercise its authority

under Rule 60(d)(3) to set aside its prior judgment dismissing his complaint.

V. CONCLUSION

The Court DENIES JB Nicholas’s Notice of Motion for Relief from Judgment

Pursuant to FRCP 60(d)(3) (ECF No. 28).

SO ORDERED.

/s/ John A. Woodcock, Jr.

JOHN A. WOODCOCK, JR.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Dated this 30th day of June, 2025