Com. v. Sosnowski, V.

J-S16023-25

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

: PENNSYLVANIA

:

v. :

:

:

VINCENT JOSEPH SOSNOWSKI :

:

Appellant : No. 1244 MDA 2024

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered March 27, 2024

In the Court of Common Pleas of Lebanon County Criminal Division at

No(s): CP-38-CR-0000304-2022

BEFORE: LAZARUS, P.J., BOWES, J., and LANE, J.

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED JUNE 30, 2025

Vincent Joseph Sosnowski appeals from the judgment of sentence of six

to fourteen years in prison following his convictions for homicide by vehicle

while driving under the influence (“DUI”) and related traffic offenses. We

affirm.

By way of background, in the early morning hours of January 16, 2021,

Appellant was driving on State Route 422 with Melissa Morrisey in the front

passenger seat. After passing another motorist while going significantly faster

than the speed limit, Appellant collided into a tree that had fallen on the road

only minutes before. A protruding branch struck through the windshield,

impaling Ms. Morrisey.

By happenstance, an ambulance was driving in the opposite direction

and came upon the accident almost instantly. Two paramedics attempted to

render lifesaving aid to Ms. Morrisey, but were ultimately unsuccessful. Police

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arrived on scene within several minutes. Appellant was generally aggressive

toward responding personnel, keeping his distance from them, and he initially

refused to undergo any medical examination or treatment. Officers eventually

convinced him to enter the back of an ambulance to be checked for injuries,

wherein they detected the odor of alcohol on his breath. They placed

Appellant under arrest and transported him to a local hospital. His blood was

drawn, revealing a blood alcohol content (“BAC”) of .135. It is undisputed

that his blood was not drawn until approximately two and one-half hours after

the collision.

The Commonwealth charged Appellant with homicide by vehicle while

DUI, DUI–high rate of alcohol, DUI–general impairment, and involuntary

manslaughter. Appellant waived arraignment on April 6, 2022. Notably, he

did not file an omnibus pretrial motion.

In August 2023, the Commonwealth filed a motion in limine which, as

amended, sought among other things to preclude Appellant from introducing

expert testimony concerning the fallen tree. Specifically, the Commonwealth

noted that Appellant procured an expert report from Jonathan A. Schach, an

operations manager with a local tree and lawn care company and a board-

certified arborist. Mr. Schach generally opined that the homeowner of the

property on which the tree was located should have removed it due to its poor

and hazardous condition. While this motion was still pending, Appellant

submitted on October 24, 2023, a motion in limine to suppress introduction of

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his BAC results, arguing inadmissibility since his blood was not drawn within

two hours of being in control of his car, as required by 75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(b).1

The trial court held a hearing addressing, inter alia, the motions from

both the Commonwealth and Appellant. It granted relief to the

Commonwealth and precluded any expert testimony from Mr. Schach, finding

that it would be irrelevant to the determination of guilt. With regard to

Appellant’s motion in limine, the court treated it as an untimely omnibus

pretrial motion to suppress, and denied it without taking testimony.

The matter proceeded to a jury trial, at the end of which Appellant was

convicted of all offenses. The trial court sentenced Appellant as indicated

hereinabove, finding that the involuntary manslaughter and two DUI

convictions merged with homicide by vehicle while DUI.

This timely appeal followed. Both Appellant and the trial court complied

with their respective obligations pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925. Appellant

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1 This subsection states:

High rate of alcohol.--An individual may not drive, operate or

be in actual physical control of the movement of a vehicle after

imbibing a sufficient amount of alcohol such that the alcohol

concentration in the individual’s blood or breath is at least 0.10%

but less than 0.16% within two hours after the individual has

driven, operated or been in actual physical control of the

movement of the vehicle.

75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(b). The statute provides for an exception to this two-hour

rule if the Commonwealth can (1) show good cause explaining why the test

sample could not be obtained within that period and (2) establish that the

defendant did not consume alcohol between the time of arrest and the

obtaining of the sample. See 75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(g).

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presents two issues for our review, which we have reordered for ease of

disposition:

A. Whether, where Appellant’s blood was drawn more than two

hours after his operation of a motor vehicle and he was not

in exclusive custody and control of police officers between

operation and blood draw, the lower court erred in admitting

evidence of [Appellant]’s BAC?

B. Whether the lower court erred by precluding Appellant, the

defendant in a prosecution for homicide by motor vehicle

while [DUI], from admitting expert testimony regarding the

cause of the crash underlying that charge?

Appellant’s brief at 4 (some capitalization altered).

Appellant first argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion in

limine, hence permitting the Commonwealth to introduce evidence of his BAC

when his blood was drawn more than two hours after operation of the vehicle

in question. See Appellant’s brief at 10-11. “The standard of review on appeal

of a denial of a motion in limine is abuse of discretion.” Commonwealth v.

Brown, 200 A.3d 986, 991 (Pa.Super. 2018) (citation omitted). We have

stated that “[a]n abuse of discretion is not merely an error of judgment.

Rather, discretion is abused when the law is overridden or misapplied, or the

judgment exercised is manifestly unreasonable or the result of partiality,

prejudice, or ill-will, as shown by the evidence of record.” Id. at 990 (citation

omitted).

At issue is whether the trial court correctly denied Appellant’s motion as

an untimely suppression motion. The Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal

Procedure require that an omnibus pretrial motion “shall be filed and served

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within [thirty] days after arraignment, unless opportunity therefor did not

exist, or the defendant . . . was not aware of the grounds for the motion, or

unless the time for filing has been extended by the court for cause shown.”

Pa.R.Crim.P. 579(A). Further, “[u]nless otherwise required in the interests of

justice, all pretrial requests for relief shall be included in one omnibus motion.”

Pa.R.Crim.P. 578. The comment states that suppression of evidence is the

“[t]ype of relief appropriate for the omnibus pretrial motions[.]” Id., cmt.

Nonetheless, it also provides that “[t]he omnibus pretrial motion rule is not

intended to limit other types of motions, oral or written, made pretrial or

during trial, including those traditionally called motions in limine, which may

affect the admissibility of evidence or the resolution of other matters. The

earliest feasible submissions and rulings on such motions are encouraged.”

Id., cmt.

We have recognized the difference between these types of motions

thusly:

A motion in limine differs from a suppression motion in that a

suppression motion is designed to preclude evidence that was

obtained in violation of a defendant’s constitutional rights, while a

motion in limine precludes evidence that was constitutionally

obtained but which is prejudicial to the moving party.

Commonwealth v. Reese, 31 A.3d 708, 715 (Pa.Super. 2011) (citation

omitted).

Additionally, Pa.R.Crim.P. 581 governs “suppression of evidence,”

stating: “The defendant’s attorney, or the defendant if unrepresented, may

make a motion to the court to suppress any evidence alleged to have been

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obtained in violation of the defendant’s rights.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 581(A). Such a

motion “shall be contained in the omnibus pretrial motion set forth in Rule

578. If timely motion is not made hereunder, the issue of suppression of such

evidence shall be deemed to be waived.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 581(B).

In addressing this issue, the trial court relied upon the rules discussed

above, finding as follows:

[Appellant] did not file a timely omnibus motion to suppress his

BAC results. His arraignment was scheduled for April 6, 2022.

The Commonwealth notes that [Appellant] was represented by an

attorney when [he] waived his arraignment and that discovery,

including his BAC results, were provided to his defense counsel at

that time. His motion in limine was not filed until [sixteen] months

later on August 23, 2023. Thus, [Appellant] was aware of the BAC

results, did not request an extension of time to file an omnibus

pretrial motion, and has provided no explanation as to why the

opportunity to file such a motion did not exist prior to August

2023. [Appellant] has also failed to show any

circumstances which necessitated his request for

suppression to be raised via a motion in limine rather than

in an omnibus pretrial motion. Thus, he is deemed to have

waived this issue pursuant to Rule 581(B).

Trial Court Opinion, 12/29/23, at 17 (some capitalization altered, emphasis

added). The court further proffered that while Appellant’s charge for DUI-high

rate of alcohol required proof of his blood being drawn within two hours of

operating a vehicle, the charge for general impairment DUI did not, and

therefore evidence of Appellant’s BAC would be relevant even if it was

established more than two hours after operation of a vehicle.2 Id. at 18.

____________________________________________

2 For its part, the Commonwealth advocates that the trial court did not err in

rejecting Appellant’s motion as untimely, since Appellant was represented by

(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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In his principal brief, Appellant contends that the court incorrectly

treated his motion as an untimely suppression challenge instead of a motion

in limine, baldly asserting, in toto: “The lower court wrongfully found this was

a suppression issue, rather than an issue for a motion in limine, and denied it

as untimely. This was rightly brought as a motion to preclude evidence rather

than to suppress evidence.” See Appellant’s brief at 10. Appellant offered no

citation to legal authority therein. In his reply brief, he cites a single case,

Commonwealth v. Phillips, 700 A.2d 1281 (Pa.Super. 1997), for the

proposition that “courts have allowed the admission of blood results outside

of the two[-]hour window to be challenged via motions in limine.” Appellant’s

reply brief at 2.

Upon review, we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its

discretion in denying Appellant’s motion in limine to suppress. To begin, we

do not find Appellant’s reliance on Phillips availing since, although the

defendant there challenged the admission of his BAC results via a motion in

limine, the issue of the motion’s timeliness was never raised or otherwise

discussed. Critically, there is no indication that the Phillips Court endorsed

the use of a motion in limine as an end run around the failure to file a timely

omnibus motion pursuant to Rule 579(A). Accordingly, Phillips is not

dispositive to the trial court’s decision herein.

____________________________________________

counsel and had all the information necessary to litigate his motion sixteen

months before it was filed. See Commonwealth’s brief at 12-14.

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Instead, notwithstanding whether the trial court properly considered

Appellant’s motion as untimely or as seeking suppression instead of

preclusion, he nevertheless would not be entitled to relief. This Court has

iterated that when a defendant faces charges for DUI-general impairment,

evidence of the BAC is relevant to the Commonwealth’s prosecution, even if

drawn more than two hours after operation of a vehicle. See

Commonwealth v. Benenvisti-Zarom, 229 A.3d 14, 24 (Pa.Super. 2020)

(stating that “evidence of blood tests taken more than two hours after driving

is admissible under subsection (a)(1) without resort to [§] 3802(g)”). This is

true even if the defendant is also charged with DUI-high rate of alcohol, which

does require proof of the BAC being ascertained within that period.3 Id.; see

also 75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(b). Therefore, had the court entertained the motion

as timely filed, Appellant could not have succeeded on the merits, regardless

of the Commonwealth’s ability to prove applicability of the exception to the

two-hour blood draw rule. Since the BAC results were admissible, the court

did not err in denying the motion in limine.

In his remaining issue, Appellant contests the trial court’s decision to

preclude him from introducing expert testimony that a property owner should

____________________________________________

3 Insofar as the trial court may have been tasked with providing a limiting

instruction to the jury directing it to consider the BAC results for a limited

purpose, such as only for the DUI-general impairment charge, Appellant does

not assert trial court error in this regard. We will not make this argument for

him. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Hardy, 918 A.2d 766, 771 (Pa.Super.

2007) (“This Court will not act as counsel and will not develop arguments on

behalf of an appellant.”).

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have had the tree removed before it fell onto the road. See Appellant’s brief

at 11-13. “Our standard of review in cases involving the admission of expert

testimony is broad[.] Generally speaking, the admission of expert testimony

is a matter left largely to the discretion of the trial court, and its rulings

thereon will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion.” Commonwealth

v. Watson, 945 A.2d 174, 176 (Pa.Super. 2008) (cleaned up). Additionally,

“[a]n expert’s testimony is admissible when it is based on facts of record and

will not cause confusion or prejudice.” Id. (citation omitted).

The trial court’s decision to disqualify this evidence was based on both

its lack of relevance and its risk of confusing the jury. Our Rules of Evidence

state that evidence is relevant if: “(a) it has any tendency to make a fact

more or less probable than it would be without the evidence; and (b) the fact

is of consequence in determining the action.” Pa.R.E. 401.

Also at play are the elements of the crime of homicide by vehicle while

DUI. The Vehicle Code defines the offense as follows:

(1) A person who unintentionally causes the death of another

person as the result of a violation of [§] 3802 (relating to [DUI]

of alcohol or controlled substance) and who is convicted of

violating [§] 3802:

....

(ii) is guilty of a felony of the first degree if, before

sentencing on the present violation, the person has incurred

a conviction, adjudication of delinquency, juvenile consent

decree, acceptance of Accelerated Rehabilitative Disposition

or other form of preliminary disposition for any of the

following:

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(A) An offense under [§] 3802.

(B) An offense under former [§] 3731 (relating to

driving under influence of alcohol or controlled

substance).

(C) An offense which constitutes a felony under this

subchapter.

(D) An offense substantially similar to an offense

under clause (A), (B) or (C) in another jurisdiction.

(E) Any combination of the offenses under clause (A),

(B), (C) or (D).

75 Pa.C.S. § 3735(a).

Appellant argues that the court incorrectly prohibited him from

introducing expert testimony that went to causation of death, an element of

the crime. See Appellant’s brief at 11-12. He compares this matter to

Commonwealth v. Uhrinek, 544 A.2d 947, 950-51 (Pa. 1988), wherein our

High Court held that it was error for the trial court to preclude a defendant

driver from introducing expert testimony as to a pedestrian victim’s BAC, since

if believed, it could have led the jury to conclude that the victim was the cause

of death by unsafely walking into the roadway. Id. at 12. Appellant states

that “[h]ere, the condition of the tree, timing of the tree fall, and reason for

the tree fall were all material issues beyond the knowledge of an ordinary

layperson. All of this goes to causation for the accident.” Id.

As to this issue, the trial court explained:

We do not believe evidence of the condition of the tree is

relevant to the issue of causation in this criminal action. The jury

will certainly understand that the obstruction of the road by the

fallen tree was a factor in the occurrence of this incident.

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However, the reason for the tree being in the road is irrelevant to

what the jury will actually have to determine. The jury will be

required to decide whether [Appellant] was in violation of the DUI

statute, . . . , and if so, whether [Ms.] Morrisey’s death occurred

as a result of [Appellant’s] violation of that statute by driving

under the influence. This will require them to determine whether

[Appellant] would have noticed the tree in the roadway had he not

been under the influence of alcohol so that he would have been

able to stop in time to avoid hitting the tree and the branch which

went through the windshield and struck [Ms.] Morrisey in the

head.

We believe that injecting evidence of the tree’s allegedly

hazardous condition into the matter would only be an attempt to

assign blame to the homeowner and confuse the jury by deflecting

its focus from the question of [Appellant]’s conduct. The

admission of such evidence would not disprove that [Appellant]’s

conduct was a direct and substantial cause of [Ms.] Morrisey’s

death.

Trial Court Opinion, 12/29/23, at 8-9.

Again, we find no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court. It

cogently weighed the relevance of the proposed testimony and its potential

for causing confusion at trial, finding that those favored preclusion. While Mr.

Schach’s expert testimony could have suggested civil liability as to the

homeowner in question, it could not speak to legal causation for purposes of

establishing whether Appellant’s intoxication caused Ms. Morrisey’s death.

Stated another way, even if the jury believed that the tree should have been

removed before it fell onto the road, that would not provide a cognizable

defense to Appellant in this criminal action. The jury was tasked with

acsertaining whether Appellant’s actions of driving while impaired, and not

merely the existence of an accident itself, caused Ms. Morrisey’s death. See,

e.g., Commonwealth v. Fabian, 60 A.3d 146, 152 (Pa.Super. 2013) (“It has

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never been the law of this Commonwealth that criminal responsibility must be

confined to a sole or immediate cause of death. Criminal responsibility is

properly assessed against one whose conduct was a direct and substantial

factor in producing the death even though other factors combined with that

conduct to achieve the result.” (cleaned up, emphasis added)).

Based on the above, we have no reason to disturb Appellant’s judgment

of sentence.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 06/30/2025

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