Johnson v. Rowe

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT

:

TERENCE M. JOHNSON, :

Plaintiff, :

:

v. : No. 3:24-cv-617 (MPS)

:

OFFICER ROWE, et al., :

Defendants. :

:

RULING ON DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS

The plaintiff, Terrance Johnson, commenced this action asserting that several prison

officials violated his rights under the United States Constitution and Connecticut state law. On

initial review, the Court permitted the plaintiff to pursue Fourteenth Amendment deliberate

indifference claims against Officers Munoz, Hester and Wilder in their individual capacities;

Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process claims against Officers Hester and Wilder in

their individual capacities; and state common law claims of recklessness against Officers Munoz,

Hester, and Wilder. IRO, ECF No. 14 at 9–10. The defendants now move to dismiss the

amended complaint, maintaining that the plaintiff failed to allege facts therein sufficient to state

a plausible claim upon which relief can be granted and that the defendants are entitled to

qualified immunity. Def. Mot., ECF No. 26 at 1. For the following reasons, the motion to dismiss

is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

I. Standard

The defendants move to dismiss the plaintiff’s amended complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(b)(6). Id. To withstand a motion to dismiss filed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), “a complaint

must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible

on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “To state a plausible claim, the complaint’s [f]actual

allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Nielsen v.

AECOM Tech. Corp., 762 F.3d 214, 218 (2d Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). “A

claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to

draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556

U.S. at 678.

That the Court’s initial review order permitted one or more claims to proceed past initial

review “does not preclude a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) and a subsequent finding by

the court, after entertaining such a motion, that the claim fails to satisfy the plausibility

standard.” King Knowledge Born Allah v. Semple, No. 3:18-cv-887 (KAD), 2019 WL 109002, at

*5 (D. Conn. Jan. 4, 2019); Smalls v. Wright, No. 3:16-cv-2089 (JCH), 2017 WL 3477070, at *4

(D. Conn. Aug. 11, 2017) (concluding that a court may reconsider its decision made in an initial

review order allowing a claim to proceed because the court may not be able to make a

determination that a claim should be dismissed without the “benefit of an adversarial

presentation” (quotation omitted)).

When considering whether a claim satisfies the plausibility standard, the Court assumes

that the factual allegations are true, but legal conclusions and “[t]hreadbare recitals of the

elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements,” are not entitled to a

presumption of truth. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “Because a Rule 12(b)(6) motion challenges the

complaint as presented by the plaintiff, taking no account of its basis in evidence, a court

adjudicating such a motion may review only a narrow universe of materials.” Goel v. Bunge,

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Ltd., 820 F.3d 554, 559 (2d Cir. 2016). In general, courts “do not look beyond facts stated on the

face of the complaint, documents appended to the complaint or incorporated in the complaint by

reference, and matters of which judicial notice may be taken.” Id. (citation, quotation marks, and

ellipses omitted). When reviewing a motion to dismiss, the court must draw all reasonable

inferences in the non-movant’s favor. Graziano v. Pataki, 689 F.3d 110, 114 (2d Cir. 2012).

II. Facts

The plaintiff alleges in his amended complaint that during a cell inspection of the

plaintiff’s whole tier, Officer Rowe confiscated a leaking water bag from an inmate’s cell. Am.

Compl., ECF No. 13 at 5. As a result, Officer Rowe left a puddle of water in front of the

plaintiff’s cell. Id. Officer Munoz had conducted his tour several times but never acted to remedy

the “mess” caused by the leaking water bag. Id. After the plaintiff entered his cell with food, he

remembered he needed water for his rice. Id. When the plaintiff left his cell to get water, he

slipped on the puddle outside his cell. Id. After he fell, the plaintiff blacked out and experienced

whiplash. Id. at 5–6.

Officer Munoz approached the plaintiff to ask, “What did you do?” Id. at 5. The plaintiff

informed Officer Munoz that he was hurt. Id. Officer Munoz failed to follow protocol by calling

a Code White; instead, he called for help, and Officers Hester and Wilder arrived. Id. at 6.

Officers Hester and Wilder lifted the plaintiff off the ground after he expressed that he was hurt

and that his vision was blurry. Id. When Officers Hester and Wilder forced the plaintiff to stand

up on his feet, he fell and twisted his leg. Id. The plaintiff alleges that there were also “multiple

times that I almost fell over due to” their “negligence.” Id. The plaintiff alleges that these officers

“harassed” him to tell him who had “physically assaulted” him. Id. The plaintiff had, however,

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never been harmed before his fall. Id. The plaintiff claims he was verbally forced to sign a

disciplinary “ticket” to plead guilty or he would have had to stay in segregation for fifteen days.

Id.

III. Discussion

The defendants assert several arguments in support of their motion to dismiss. First, the

defendants maintain that the plaintiff’s deliberate indifference claim against Officer Munoz

should be dismissed because the plaintiff “has not pled that the wet floor outside his cell was an

exceptional circumstance.” ECF No. 26 at 1. Second, the defendants argue that the plaintiff’s

deliberate indifference claims against Officers Hester and Wilder should be dismissed because

the plaintiff’s claim “that he ‘twisted his leg’ and ‘nearly fell’ is at most de minimus and

therefore insufficient to establish deliberate indifference.” Id. Third, the defendants claim that the

plaintiff’s procedural due process claim against all defendants should be dismissed because the

plaintiff “fails to allege that any of Defendants were personally involved with his allegedly

forced guilty plea.” Id. And last, the defendants contend that the plaintiff’s “failure to allege any

constitutional violation also entitles Defendants to qualified immunity from suit.” Id. The Court

discusses each basis for dismissal in turn.

A. Deliberate Indifference Claim against Officer Munoz

The Eighth Amendment requires prison officials to provide “humane conditions of

confinement,” which include “‘tak[ing] reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the

inmates.’” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994) (quotation omitted). But because the

plaintiff was a pre-trial detainee when he was injured, see ECF No. 14 at 1 n.1, his claim “of

unconstitutional conditions of confinement [is] governed by the Due Process Clause of the

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Fourteenth Amendment, rather than the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth

Amendment.” Darnell v. Pineiro, 849 F.3d 17, 29 (2d Cir. 2017).

A pretrial detainee who asserts a conditions-of-confinement claim under the Fourteenth

Amendment must allege facts satisfying two components. First, the plaintiff must allege facts

showing that “the challenged conditions were sufficiently serious to constitute objective

deprivations of the right to due process.” Id. To determine whether a condition was “sufficiently

serious,” the Court must “assess whether society considers the risk that the prisoner complains

of to be so grave that it violates contemporary standards of decency to expose anyone

unwillingly to such a risk.” Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 36 (1993) (emphasis original).

“In other words, the prisoner must show that the risk of which he complains is not one that

today’s society chooses to tolerate.” Id.

Second, the plaintiff must allege facts showing that “the defendant-official acted

intentionally to impose the alleged condition, or recklessly failed to act with reasonable care to

mitigate the risk that the condition posed to the pretrial detainee even though the defendant-

official knew, or should have known, that the condition posed an excessive risk to health or

safety.” Darnell, 849 F.3d at 35. “A detainee must prove that an official acted intentionally or

recklessly, and not merely negligently.” Id.

When applying this standard to a plaintiff’s allegations that he “stepped into a snowbank

and slipped on concealed ice, permanently injuring his ankle and shoulder,” the Second Circuit

concluded that the plaintiff’s complaint “did not make any claims of exceptional circumstances

that would elevate the Green Haven yard conditions beyond the typical level of danger

presented by a slippery sidewalk or a wet floor.” McCray v. Lee, 963 F.3d 110, 114, 120 (2d

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Cir. 2020). The McCray court accordingly affirmed dismissal of the plaintiff’s conditions-of-

confinement claim under Rule 12(b)(6). Id. at 120–21.

This Court later acknowledged in Branch v. Guadarrama, No. 3:24-CV-00536 (MPS),

2024 WL 3342991 (D. Conn. July 9, 2024), “that slip-and-fall claims are seldom viewed as

rising to constitutional dimension, but could if ‘exceptional circumstances’ elevated the danger

of a condition beyond that typically presented by a slippery sidewalk or a wet floor.” Id. at * 3

(cleaned up) (quoting McCray, 963 F.3d at 115, 120). Accordingly, this Court and other courts

in this District have recognized conditions-of-confinement claims where the plaintiff has

alleged “exceptional circumstances” elevating the danger of a condition beyond that typically

presented by a wet floor. See, e.g., id. (slippery floor caused by leaking roof documented long

before plaintiff’s slip and fall could constitute “exceptional circumstance”); Abernathy v.

Comm’r of Correction, No. 3:20-CV-00628 (VAB), 2021 WL 1240018, at *7 (D. Conn. Apr. 2,

2021) (concluding allegations that correctional staff ignored waxed wet floor that was extremely

slippery suggested an “exceptional circumstance” involving a violation of contemporary

standards of decency).

In the initial review order, this Court relied on McCray, Branch, and Abernathy to

conclude that the plaintiff here had alleged facts suggesting an “exceptional circumstance”

elevating the danger of a condition beyond that typically presented by a wet floor because the

water puddle was directly outside of the plaintiff’s cell and was not remediated when Officer

Munoz toured the plaintiff’s cell block “several times.” See ECF No. 14 at 6. The defendants,

however, maintain that plaintiff has not alleged facts suggesting an “exceptional circumstance”

because “the slippery floor existed for a matter of hours, as opposed to days.” ECF No. 26-

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1 at 7. But the complaint does not specify whether it was “hours” or “days.” What it says is that

“Munoz did his tour several times and never acted on the mess that was created.” ECF No. 13 at

5. Because I must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff at this stage, I infer that

the risk of a fall was obvious to Munoz because he had walked by the puddle “several times.”

The amount of time a slippery surface existed was not determinative in Branch,

Abernathy, or McCray. Branch involved allegations that plaintiff slipped on a wet cell block

floor caused by a roof leak that “was documented long before he slipped and fell” and was

“willfully neglected or ignored” by prison officials. Branch, supra, at *3. This Court could

“infer from the presence of the bucket used to collect water falling through the ceiling . . . that

the risk was obvious to prison officials” and that “[p]rison officials recklessly failed to act with

reasonable care to mitigate this obvious risk.” Id. Accordingly, this Court concluded that “[t]he

persistently dangerous condition of the floor over time elevates the wet floor here to an

‘exceptional circumstance.’” Id. (citing, inter alia, Abernathy, supra, at *7; Helling, 509 U.S. at

36). The same is true here: The allegations suggest that the dangerous condition of the wet floor

outside the plaintiff’s cell was obvious to Munoz and that he recklessly failed to mitigate this

obvious risk.

Abernathy involved similar allegations that a cell block floor “became saturated with

water” because of “a broken ventilation system inoperable for several days.” Abernathy, supra,

at *1. The plaintiff informed prison officials about the wet floor, but they told the plaintiff that

“he should not ‘worry about it’” and “made no effort to discontinue movement to remedy the risk

posed by the saturated floor.” Id. The Abernathy court concluded that plaintiff’s allegations

“raise[d] an inference that the John Doe Officers consciously ignored a risk of harm posed by a

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potentially extremely slippery floor for two days.” Id. at *7 (citing, inter alia, Helling, 509 U.S.

at 36). And as in Branch, these additional facts combined to “suggest an exceptional

circumstance involving a violation of contemporary standards of decency.” Id.

That the slippery cell block floor “was documented long before [the plaintiff] slipped and

fell” in Branch and “consciously ignored” by prison officials “for two days” in Abernathy was

relevant only insofar as it showed prison officials’ knowledge of the condition and their failure to

remedy it—allegations absent from McCray. Unlike the plaintiff in McCray, who merely alleged

he slipped on ice that was concealed beneath “waist-high” snow in the prison yard without

alleging prison officials knew of the dangerous condition, McCray, 963 F.3d at 114, the plaintiff

alleged in Branch and Abernathy that officials knew of the dangerous condition and failed to

remedy it. This knowledge of the dangerous condition and refusal to remedy it—not the amount

of time that the dangerous condition had been present—was the “exceptional circumstance” that

elevated the slippery floor “beyond the typical level of danger presented by a slippery sidewalk

or a wet floor.” McCray, 963 F.3d at 120.

Here, as noted and as with the prison officials in Branch and Abernathy, Officer Munoz

was aware of the slippery floor in the cell block because he conducted his tour “several times,”

ECF No. 13 at 5, and here, as with the prison officials in Branch and Abernathy, Officer Munoz

never acted to remedy the slippery floor despite knowing of it. See id. Here, as with the plaintiffs

in Branch and Abernathy, the plaintiff alleges facts that suggest a prison official knew of the

slippery floor but failed to remedy the condition. When reasonable inferences are drawn in favor

of the plaintiff, these additional allegations remove this case from those cases involving “a run-

of-the-mill wet floor” (McCray) and place it among those cases involving an “exceptional

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circumstance” (Branch and Abernathy). Accordingly, the defendant’s motion to dismiss is

denied on this ground.

B. Deliberate Indifference Claim against Officers Hester and Wilder

Officers Hester and Wilder move to dismiss the deliberate indifference claim against

them because they maintain that the plaintiff failed to allege facts suggesting they were

deliberately indifferent to the plaintiff’s serious medical needs. ECF No. 26-1 at 7.

Because the plaintiff was a pretrial detainee when he allegedly slipped on the water

outside of his cell, see ECF No. 14 at 1 n.1, his deliberate indifference to serious medical needs

claim is evaluated under the Fourteenth Amendment. See Darnell, 849 F.3d at 29. Deliberate

indifference to serious medical needs may be “manifested by prison doctors in their response to

the prisoner’s needs or by prison guards in intentionally denying or delaying access to medical

care or intentionally interfering with the treatment once prescribed.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S.

97, 104–05 (1976) (footnotes omitted).

“To state such a claim, a plaintiff must plead facts showing that [he] had a serious

medical condition and that it was met with deliberate indifference.” Bruno v. City of

Schenectady, 727 F. App’x 717, 720 (2d Cir. 2018) (citation and quotation marks omitted). A

“serious medical condition” is one that “is, in objective terms, sufficiently serious - that is, the

prisoner must prove that his medical need was a condition of urgency, one that may produce

death, degeneration, or extreme pain.” Johnson v. Wright, 412 F.3d 398, 403 (2d Cir. 2005)

(citations and quotation marks omitted). If a plaintiff establishes that he had a serious medical

condition, the plaintiff must next show that a particular defendant was deliberately indifferent to

that condition. See Charles v. Orange Cnty., 925 F.3d 73, 86 (2d Cir. 2019). “[A] detainee

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asserting a Fourteenth Amendment claim for deliberate indifference to his medical needs can

allege either that the defendants knew that failing to provide the complained of medical treatment

would pose a substantial risk to his health or that the defendants should have known that failing

to provide the omitted medical treatment would pose a substantial risk to the detainee’s health.”

Id. at 87 (emphasis omitted).

The plaintiff alleges in his amended complaint that Officers Hester and Wilder arrived to

help the plaintiff after Officer Munoz called for help. See ECF No. 13 at 6. According to the

plaintiff, Officers Hester and Wilder lifted the plaintiff off the ground. Id. After Officers Hester

and Wilder forced him to stand up on his feet, the plaintiff fell and twisted his leg. Id. The Court

concluded in its initial review order that the plaintiff’s deliberate indifference allegations against

Officers Hester and Wilder were “thin” and “barely sufficient to permit him to proceed on his

Fourteenth Amendment damages claims against Officers Hester and Wilder for acting with

deliberate indifference to an obvious risk of harm to his health and safety after his fall.” ECF No.

14 at 7. Officers Hester and Wilder now maintain that the plaintiff’s deliberate indifference claim

against them should be dismissed because the plaintiff failed to allege facts satisfying the

objective and subjective components of a deliberate indifference claim against these officers.

First, Officers Hester and Wilder maintain that “the Plaintiff’s alleged condition is not

sufficiently serious.” ECF No. 26-1 at 8. They maintain that the plaintiff’s “twisted leg” was not

“a condition which could produce ‘death, degeneration, or extreme pain.’” Id. at 9. Were the

complaint drafted by counsel, the Court would tend to agree. But “submissions of a pro se

litigant must be construed liberally and interpreted ‘to raise the strongest arguments that they

suggest.’” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (emphasis

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original; quotation omitted). A “twisted leg” could suggest a serious medical need, like a knee

injury. See, e.g., Vines v. McCrystal, No. 3:18CV1432(MPS), 2018 WL 6050896, at *4 (D.

Conn. Nov. 19, 2018) (concluding “[t]he plaintiff’s allegations that Officers Olivio and Barrows

refused to facilitate treatment of his knee injury by the medical department, despite his

complaints of excruciating pain, state a plausible claim of deliberate indifference to a serious

medical need.”).

Second, Officers Hester and Wilder argue the plaintiff does not allege that these

defendants “failed to provide [the plaintiff] or assist him in receiving necessary medical care.”

ECF No. 26-1 at 9. The Court agrees. Even if the Court liberally construes plaintiff’s amended

complaint, the plaintiff’s allegations do not suggest that Officers Hester and Wilder were

deliberately indifferent to the plaintiff’s serious medical condition. By the plaintiff’s account,

these officers lifted the plaintiff off the ground after the plaintiff told them he was hurt. See ECF

No. 13 at 6. While the plaintiff allegedly fell as the officers attempted to get him to his feet, the

officer’s efforts to help the plaintiff constitute, at most, negligence, especially when considering

the wet condition of the floor. See, e.g., Germano v. Cook, No. 3:19-CV-01204 (JAM), 2020 WL

264763, at *9 (D. Conn. Jan. 17, 2020) (concluding that plaintiff’s allegations that correctional

officer “neglected to help him safely negotiate the step into the prison van, resulting in his foot

injury . . . sound at best in negligence and may not support a claim for deliberate indifference to

safety.”). Such allegations of negligent conduct do not establish deliberate indifference. See id.;

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835 (noting that “Estelle establishes that deliberate indifference entails

something more than mere negligence”). Accordingly, the plaintiff’s deliberate indifference

claims against Officers Hester and Wilder are dismissed.

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C. The plaintiff’s Procedural Due Process Claim

Defendants also move to dismiss the plaintiff’s procedural due process claims. See ECF

No. 26-1 at 10. The plaintiff alleged in his amended complaint that he was “verbally forced to

sign a ticket that plead me guilty or stay in seg 15 days.” ECF No. 13 at 6. The Court liberally

construed this allegation as a procedural due process claim and permitted the plaintiff to pursue

damages from Officers Hester and Wilder. See ECF No. 14 at 8. These defendants now move to

dismiss these claims because the plaintiff failed to allege which officer forced him into signing

the disciplinary ticket. See ECF No. 26-1 at 10.

A plaintiff seeking monetary damages from a defendant must allege facts that establish

the personal involvement of that defendant in the alleged constitutional violation. See Wright v.

Smith, 21 F.3d 496, 501 (2d Cir. 1994). Personal involvement requires “intentional participation

in the conduct constituting a violation of the victim’s rights by one who knew of the facts

rendering it illegal.” Provost v. City of Newburgh, 262 F.3d 146, 155 (2d Cir. 2001) (footnote

omitted). Conclusory allegations of personal involvement are insufficient. See Davis v. United

States, 430 F. Supp. 2d 67, 79 (D. Conn. 2006) (noting that “Defendant’s personal involvement

cannot be inferred or presumed from Plaintiff’s ‘bald assertion[s] and conclusory terms.’”

(quoting Friedl v. City of New York, 210 F.3d 79, 85 (2d Cir. 2000)).

The plaintiff alleges that Officers Hester and Wilder were “constantly harass[ing] [the

plaintiff]” to tell them who physically assaulted him, but he does not allege that Officers Hester

or Wilder forced him to sign the disciplinary ticket. See ECF No. 13 at 6. The plaintiff merely

states that “[he] was verbally forced to sign” it, without specifying who verbally forced him to do

so. This conclusory allegation is insufficient to establish personal involvement. See Foster v.

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Connecticut, No. 3:24-CV-773 (JAM), 2024 WL 4528874, at *3 (D. Conn. Oct. 18, 2024) (citing

Jean-Baptiste v. Froehlich, No. 3:21CV01482 (SALM), 2022 WL 94407, at *2 (D. Conn. Jan.

10, 2022) (collecting cases)) (stating that the plaintiffs’ “conclusory allegations that the

‘defendants’ violated their rights” without alleging “any facts to support these claims or identify

the nature of the personal involvement of any individual actors” was insufficient to establish

personal involvement). Accordingly, the plaintiff’s procedural due process claim is dismissed.

D. Qualified immunity

The defendants last move to dismiss the amended complaint on qualified immunity

grounds. See ECF No. 26-1 at 11. “[Q]ualified immunity shields officials from civil liability so

long as their conduct ‘does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of

which a reasonable person would have known.’” Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 11 (2015)

(quotation omitted). Qualified immunity may be asserted on a motion to dismiss because

“qualified immunity provides government officials ‘immunity from suit rather than a mere

defense to liability.’” Looney v. Black, 702 F.3d 701, 705 (2d Cir. 2012) (quotation omitted).

However, a defendant asserting a qualified immunity defense on a motion to dismiss must

overcome a “formidable hurdle,” Horn v. Stephenson, 11 F.4th 163, 169–70 (2d Cir. 2021), as

“the plaintiff is entitled to all reasonable inferences from the facts alleged, not only those that

support his claim, but also those that defeat the immunity defense.” Neary v. Wu, 753 F. App’x

82, 84 (2d Cir. 2019) (quotation marks omitted). Defendants bear of the burden of establishing

qualified immunity. Outlaw v. City of Hartford, 884 F.3d 351, 367 (2d Cir. 2018) (“Qualified

immunity is an affirmative defense on which the defendant has the burden of proof.”).

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The defendants have not met their burden of establishing qualified immunity at the

pleadings stage. The defendants maintain that the plaintiff’s failure to state a claim against

Officers Munoz, Hester, and Wilder “entitles these Defendants to qualified immunity by

definition.” Id. But officers Hester and Wilder’s claims of qualified immunity relating to the

plaintiff’s deliberate indifference and procedural due process claims are moot because the Court

has dismissed these claims. See Dube v. State Univ. of N.Y., 900 F.2d 587, 589 (2d Cir. 1990)

(“[O]rder[ing] the district court to (1) dismiss Dube’s Fourteenth Amendment claim, and,

consequently, (2) dismiss as moot defendants’ claim of qualified immunity from section 1983

liability on the Fourteenth Amendment claim.”). Officer Munoz’s claim of qualified immunity is

not moot, but it is insufficient to prevail at the pleadings stage.

The defendants make no effort to show that “their conduct does not violate clearly

established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”

See Blissett v. Coughlin, 66 F.3d 531, 539 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding the defendants waived

qualified immunity defense by “never articulat[ing] a qualified immunity defense distinct from

their contention—the heart of their defense throughout these proceedings—that no constitutional

violation occurred.”). And, as noted above, when all reasonable inferences are drawn in the

plaintiff’s favor, it appears, according to the allegations, that Officer Munoz was well aware of a

dangerous pool of water outside of plaintiff’s cell, had time to remedy it, but refused to do so.

Under these circumstances, he does not have qualified immunity.

IV. CONCLUSION

The Court GRANTS the defendant’s motion to dismiss as to the plaintiff’s deliberate

indifference claim against Officers Hester and Wilder and the plaintiff’s procedural due process

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claim against all defendants. The Court DENIES the defendant’s motion to dismiss as to the

plaintiff’s deliberate indifference claim against Officer Munoz.

Accordingly, the plaintiff may continue to proceed on his deliberate indifference claim

against Officer Munoz and his state common law claims of recklessness against all defendants.

SO ORDERED this 27th day of June 2025 at Hartford, Connecticut.

/s/

Michael P. Shea

United States District Judge

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