“[W]hen making a determination of standing[,]” trial courts “are exhorted to consider ... whether the plaintiff is asserting his or her own legal rights and interests rather than the legal rights and interests of third parties.”
How later courts described this case
- “[W]hen making a determination of standing[,]” trial courts “are exhorted to consider ... whether the plaintiff is asserting his or her own legal rights and interests rather than the legal rights and interests of third parties.”
- holding that the plaintiff “would lack standing to seek § 1983 damages for violations of other prisoners’ rights....”
- “The district court's entry of judgment against both the corporation and [defendant] in her official capacity [in this § 1983 action] would therefore effectively make the corporation liable twice for the same act.”
- “[A] party may not maintain a suit against both an employer and its agent under Title VII.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
PAUL POUPART (#357073) CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS
24-931-SDD-RLB
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY, ET AL.
NOTICE
Please take notice that the attached Magistrate Judge’s Report has been filed with the
Clerk of the United States District Court.
In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), you have fourteen (14) days after being served
with the attached Report to file written objections to the proposed findings of fact, conclusions of
law and recommendations therein. Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings,
conclusions, and recommendations within 14 days after being served will bar you, except upon
grounds of plain error, from attacking on appeal the unobjected-to proposed factual findings and
legal conclusions of the Magistrate Judge which have been accepted by the District Court.
ABSOLUTELY NO EXTENSION OF TIME SHALL BE GRANTED TO FILE
WRITTEN OBJECTIONS TO THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT.
Signed in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, on May 28, 2025.
S
RICHARD L. BOURGEOIS, JR.
U NITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
PAUL POUPART (#357073) CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS
24-931-SDD-RLB
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY, ET AL.
MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
The pro se plaintiff, an inmate confined at the Elayn Hunt Correctional Center, St.
Gabriel, Louisiana, filed this proceeding pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Department of
Public Safety and Corrections, Secretary Gary Westcott, and Warden Edward Bickham,
complaining that his constitutional rights have been violated due to excessive heat which causes
infections in the plaintiff’s J-pouch. The plaintiff requests monetary and injunctive relief.
28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e) and 1915A
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e) and 1915A, this Court is authorized to dismiss an
action or claim brought by a prisoner who is proceeding in forma pauperis or is asserting a claim
against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity if satisfied that
the action or claim is frivolous, malicious or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted. An action or claim is properly dismissed as frivolous if the claim lacks an arguable basis
either in fact or in law. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992), citing Neitzke v. Williams,
490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Hicks v. Garner, 69 F.3d 22, 24-25 (5th Cir. 1995). A claim is
factually frivolous if the alleged facts are “clearly baseless, a category encompassing allegations
that are ‘fanciful,’ ‘fantastic,’ and ‘delusional.’” Id. at 32-33. A claim has no arguable basis in
law if it is based upon an indisputably meritless legal theory, “such as if the complaint alleges the
violation of a legal interest which clearly does not exist.” Davis v. Scott, 157 F.3d 1003, 1005
(5th Cir. 1998). The law accords judges not only the authority to dismiss a claim which is based
on an indisputably meritless legal theory, but also the unusual power to pierce the veil of the
factual allegations. Denton v. Hernandez, supra, 504 U.S. at 32. Pleaded facts which are merely
improbable or strange, however, are not frivolous for purposes of § 1915. Id. at 33; Ancar v. Sara
Plasma, Inc., 964 F.2d 465, 468 (5th Cir. 1992). A § 1915 dismissal may be made any time,
before or after service or process and before or after an answer is filed, if the court determines
that the allegation of poverty is untrue; or the action is frivolous or malicious; fails to state a
claim on which relief may be granted; or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is
immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and Green v. McKaskle, 788 F.2d 1116,
1119 (5th Cir. 1986).
Plaintiff’s Allegations
In his Complaint the plaintiff alleges that he has an Ileoanal Reservoir (a J-pouch). A J-
pouch is formed, after removal of the rectum, by forming a pouch with a piece of the small
intestine which is then attached to the anus. In the area where the plaintiff is housed, he is
subjected to excessive heat and humidity which has caused or exacerbated pouchitis, which is a
rare re-occurring infection inside his J-pouch that causes bowel frequency which leads to
dehydration. Other areas in the prison that house inmates with medical conditions are air
conditioned.
Subjecting the plaintiff to the excessive heat and humidity violates his Eighth
Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. Failure to regulate the
temperature in the plaintiff’s housing unit violates the ADA and RA. Additionally, treating other
similarly situated inmates differently by providing them with air conditioning violates the Equal
Protection Clause.
Standing
First, to the extent the plaintiff raises issues on behalf of other inmates1, persons claiming
a deprivation of constitutional rights are required to show a deprivation of their personal rights,
as opposed to the rights of others. Coon v. Ledbetter, 780 F.2d 1158, 1159 (5th Cir. 1986);
Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 255 (1953) (“Ordinarily, one may not claim standing in this
Court to vindicate the constitutional rights of some third party.”). In Resendez v. Texas, 440 F.
App'x 305, 306 (5th Cir. 2011), for example, the court held that “to the extent that [the plaintiff]
seeks to raise issues regarding the illegal confinement of other prisoners ..., he lacks standing to
bring those claims.”); see Kennedy v. Dallas Police Dep't, 2007 WL 30260, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Jan.
4, 2007) (plaintiff may bring a Section 1983 action only for deprivations he suffered).2
In addition, Plaintiff may not function as counsel for other prisoners. See, e.g., Wade v.
Carrollton–Farmers Branch Indep. Sch. Dist., 2009 WL 2058446, at *2 (N.D. Tex. July 14,
2009) (“[I]ndividuals who do not have a law license may not represent other parties even on a
next friend basis.”). Parties can represent themselves or they can be represented by an attorney; a
non-lawyer cannot represent them. See Gonzales v. Wyatt, 157 F.3d 1016, 1021 (5th Cir. 1998).
As such, any claims the plaintiff is raising on behalf of others should be dismissed.
Section 1983 Official Capacity Claims
Next to the extent the plaintiff may be asserting a § 1983 claim for monetary damages
against defendants in their official capacities, § 1983 does not provide a federal forum for a
1 Plaintiff states that his rights and others are being violated due the excessive heat and humidity. See R. Doc. 1, p. 5,
fn. 4.
2 See also Gregory v. McKennon, 430 F. App'x 306, 310 (5th Cir. 2011) (holding that the plaintiff “would lack
standing to seek § 1983 damages for violations of other prisoners’ rights....”); Doe ex rel. Doe v. Beaumont Indep.
Sch. Dist., 173 F.3d 274, 281 (5th Cir. 1999), on reh'g en banc sub nom. Doe v. Beaumont Indep. Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d
462 (5th Cir. 2001) (“[W]hen making a determination of standing[,]” trial courts “are exhorted to consider ...
whether the plaintiff is asserting his or her own legal rights and interests rather than the legal rights and interests of
third parties.”).
litigant who seeks monetary damages against either a state or its officials acting in their official
capacities, specifically because these officials are not seen to be “persons” within the meaning of
§ 1983. Will v. Michigan Department of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). In addition, in
Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21 (1991), the United States Supreme Court addressed the distinction
between official capacity and individual capacity lawsuits and made clear that a suit against a
state official in an official capacity for monetary damages is treated as a suit against the state and
is therefore barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Id. at 25. Accordingly, to the extent the plaintiff
may be asserting a § 1983 claim against defendants in their official capacities for monetary
damages, any such claims are subject to dismissal. The plaintiff's section 1983 claims for
monetary damages asserted against the defendants in their individual capacities remain viable
because a claim against a state official in his individual capacity, seeking to impose liability for
actions taken by the official under color of state law, is not treated as a suit against the state. Of
course, the plaintiff must prove a deprivation of a constitutional right to obtain any relief.
Furthermore, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, only a “person” may be sued for the violation
of an inmate's constitutional rights. Defendant Department of Public Safety and Corrections is
not a person within the meaning of § 1983. Washington v. Louisiana, 425 F. App'x 330, 333 (5th
Cir. 2011). The Department is also entitled to sovereign immunity with regards to the plaintiff's §
1983 claims. “[T]he Fifth Circuit has squarely held that the Louisiana Department of Public
Safety and Corrections is an arm of the State that is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity.”
Beyard v. Caddo Parish Com'n, 2007 WL 1741970, at * 2 (W.D. La. April 27, 2007) (citing
Champagne v. Jefferson Parish Sheriff's Office, 188 F.3d 312, 314 (5th Cir. 1999)). As such, the
plaintiff’s section 1983 claims asserted against defendant Department of Public Safety and
Corrections should be dismissed.
Equal Protection
The Equal Protection Clause directs that “all persons similarly circumstanced shall be
treated alike.” “To state a claim under the Equal Protection Clause, a § 1983 plaintiff must
allege that a state actor intentionally discriminated against him because of his membership in a
protected class.” Williams v. Bramer, 180 F.3d 699, 705 (5th Cir. 1999). Poupart alleges a
violation of the Equal Protection Clause because other inmates with medical conditions are
provided with air conditioning while he and others are not.
Poupart is attempting to claim a “class of one” equal protection claim, which is an equal
protection claim that is based on differential treatment but not based on membership in a suspect
class or the infringement of a fundamental right. Engquist v. Oregon Dep’t. of Agr., 553 U.S.
591, 594 (2008); Wood v. Collier, 836 F.3d 534, 539 (5th Cir. 2016). To succeed with a “class of
one” claim, a plaintiff must show that he or she was intentionally treated differently from others
similarly situated and that there was no rational basis for the difference in treatment. Engquist,
553 U.S. at 601. However, the plaintiff has stated that there are numerous similarly situated
inmates at Elayn Hunt who have heat sensitive medical conditions who are also not being
provided with air conditioning. See R. Doc. 1, p. 5, fn. 4 and p. 7, para. 10. Accordingly, Plaintiff
has not stated a claim for violation of the Equal Protection Clause, and this claim should be
dismissed.
Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA ”)
and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (“RA”)
Title II of the ADA provides: “[N]o qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason
of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services,
programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.”
42 U.S.C. § 12132. It defines “public entities” to include local governments. Id. at §
12131(1)(A). The United States Supreme Court has held that prisons are public entities that may
not exclude disabled individuals from participation in or deny them the benefits of their services,
programs, or activities. Cadena v. El Paso Cnty., 946 F.3d 717, 723 (5th Cir. 2020) (citing
Pennsylvania Dep't of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 210 (1998)).
Similarly, the Rehabilitation Act prohibits any “otherwise qualified individual with a
disability in the United States” from being “excluded from the participation in, be[ing] denied
the benefits of, or be[ing] subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance,” including any instrumentality of a local government. 29 U.S.C. §
794. The remedies, procedures, and rights available under the Rehabilitation Act parallel those
available under the ADA. Cadena, 946 F.3d at 723 (citing Delano-Pyle v. Victoria Cnty., Tex.,
302 F.3d 567, 574 (5th Cir. 2002) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12133)). “Thus, ‘[J]urisprudence
interpreting either section is applicable to both.’” Cadena, 946 F.3d at 723 (citing Delano-Pyle,
302 F.3d at 574) (quoting Hainze v. Richards, 207 F.3d 795, 799 (5th Cir. 2000)). Accordingly,
the Court analyzes Plaintiff's ADA and RA claims under one rubric. See Guy v. LeBlanc, 400 F.
Supp. 3d 536, 540–41 (M.D. La. 2019).” (citations omitted). To demonstrate a violation of either
Title II of the ADA or Section 504 of the RA, “a plaintiff must prove ‘(1) that he has a qualifying
disability; (2) that he is being denied the benefits of services, programs, or activities for which
the public entity is responsible, or is otherwise discriminated against by the public entity; and (3)
that such discrimination is by reason of his disability.’ ” Miraglia v. Bd. of Supervisors of La.
State Museum, 901 F.3d 565, 574 (5th Cir. 2018).
Individual Capacity
The Supreme Court in Pa. Dep't of Corrections v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 209–10 (1998),
recognized that state prisoners may bring claims against their jailors for disability discrimination
under Title II of the ADA, which prohibits discrimination by public entities. The term “public
entity” in Title II does not include individuals; therefore, individual defendants cannot be held
personally liable for violations of Title II of the ADA. Walker v. Snyder, 213 F.3d 344, 347 (7th
Cir. 2000), abrogated on other grounds by Bd. of Trustees v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 n.9
(2001), as stated in Bruggeman ex rel. Bruggeman v. Blagojevich, 324 F.3d 906, 912 (7th Cir.
2003). Accordingly, to the extent that defendants Westcott and Bickham are being sued in their
individual capacities, the plaintiff's ADA claims against them must be dismissed.
Official Capacity
Title II of the ADA validly abrogates state sovereign immunity when the state's conduct
actually violates the Fourteenth Amendment. United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151, 159
(2006). In United States v. Georgia, the Supreme Court recognized that refusal of prison officials
to accommodate an inmate's disability needs “in such fundamentals as mobility, hygiene, [and]
medical care” is conduct that can violate both the ADA and Eighth Amendment. Id. at
157. Because the Eighth Amendment applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment,
an ADA violation that is also an Eighth Amendment violation actually violates the Fourteenth
Amendment. Because Plaintiff’s ADA claim involves conduct substantially related to his Eighth
Amendment claims, sovereign immunity is abrogated, and the Department of Public Safety and
Corrections (“DOC”) is a proper defendant for Plaintiff’s ADA claim.
However, the plaintiff’s ADA and RA claims against Westcott and Bickham in their
official capacities should be dismissed. An ADA suit against a state official in his or
her official capacity is not a suit against the official, but rather a claim against the official's
office. Moss v. Harris Cnty. Constable Precinct One, 851 F.3d 413, 420 n.5 (5th Cir.
2017); see Phillips ex rel. J.H. v. Prator, 2021 WL 3376524, at *2 (5th Cir. Aug. 3, 2021) (“As a
defendant she named Sheriff Prator in his official capacity, which means this is a suit against the
Sheriff's Office.”). Because the plaintiff brings suit against the DOC, any claims against the
individual defendants in their official capacities are duplicative of those against the entity
itself. See Indest v. Freeman Decorating, Inc., 164 F.3d 258, 262 (5th Cir. 1999) (“[A] party may
not maintain a suit against both an employer and its agent under Title VII.”); Sims v. Jefferson
Downs Racing Ass'n, Inc., 778 F.2d 1068, 1081 (5th Cir. 1985) (“The district court's entry of
judgment against both the corporation and [defendant] in her official capacity [in this § 1983
action] would therefore effectively make the corporation liable twice for the same act.”).
Therefore, Plaintiff cannot bring ADA/RA claims against both DOC and Westcott and Bickham
in their official capacities. See Shabazz v. Tex. Youth Comm'n, 300 F. Supp. 2d 467, 474 (N.D.
Tex. 2003) (referencing Indest) (“The Fifth Circuit's rationale for prohibiting concurrent suits
under Title VII against an employer and the employer's agent in her official capacity is equally
applicable under the ADA.”). Because Plaintiff cannot bring ADA/RA claims against both DOC
and Westcott and Bickham in their official capacities, his claims against Westcott and Bickham
in their official capacities should be dismissed.3
3 See Adams v. Louisiana Department of Corrections, 2023 WL 2442386 (M.D. La. Feb. 6, 2023) (dismissing
ADA/RA claims against individual defendants in their official capacities as redundant when the state Department of
Corrections was also named as a defendant); Diemond v. Mich. Dep't of Corr., 2020 WL 3481540
(W.D. Mich. June 26, 2020) (same); Davis v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 2011 WL 5526081 (D.N.J. Nov. 14, 2011) (same);
Streeter v. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 2023 WL 5532186 (S.D. Ga. Aug. 28, 2023) (same); Oliver v. Oliver, 2025 WL
1151034 (M.D. Ga. Apr. 17, 2025) (same); Cavitt v. Mass. Dep't of Corr., 512 F. Supp. 3d 149, 153 (D. Mass. 2021)
(same); and Norfleet v. Illinois Dept. of Corrections, 2025 WL 9455572 (S.D. Ill. Dec. 28, 2015) (same).
RECOMMENDATION
It is recommended, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e) and 1915A,4 that the following
claims be dismissed with prejudice: (1) all claims the plaintiff is attempting to assert on behalf of
others; (2) plaintiff’s claim for violation of the Equal Protection Clause; (3) plaintiff’s section
1983 claims asserted against defendant Department of Public Safety and Corrections; (4)
plaintiff’s section 1983 claims for monetary damages asserted against defendants Westcott and
Bickham in their official capacities; and (5) plaintiff’s ADA and RA claims asserted against
defendants Westcott and Bickham in their individual and official capacities.
It is further recommended that this matter be referred back to the Magistrate Judge for
further proceedings herein on the plaintiff’s remaining claims: (1) plaintiff’s constitutional claim
for exposure to excessive heat asserted against defendants Westcott and Bickham in their
individual capacities; and (2) plaintiff’s ADA and RA claims asserted against the Louisiana
Department of Public Safety and Corrections.
Signed in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, on May 28, 2025.
S
RICHARD L. BOURGEOIS, JR.
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
4 The plaintiff is advised that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) provides that, “In no event shall a prisoner bring a civil action or
appeal a judgment in a civil action or proceeding under this section [Proceedings in forma pauperis] if the prisoner
has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal in a
court of the United States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted, unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical injury.”