K.B. v. Delaware County Office of Judicial Support, and Mary J. Walk, in her official capacity as Director of the Delaware County Office of Judicial Support

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

K. B., :

Petitioner :

: No. 446 M.D. 2023

v. :

: Argued: December 11, 2024

Delaware County Office of Judicial :

Support, and Mary J. Walk, in her :

official capacity as Director of the :

Delaware County Office of Judicial :

Support, :

Respondents :

BEFORE: HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge

HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge

HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge

HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge

HONORABLE LORI A. DUMAS, Judge

HONORABLE STACY WALLACE, Judge

HONORABLE MATTHEW S. WOLF, Judge

OPINION BY

JUDGE DUMAS FILED: June 27, 2025

Currently before us is K.B.’s (Petitioner) Application for Summary

Relief in the Form of Judgment on the Pleadings (Application). Through his

Application, Petitioner requests judgment on the pleadings in his favor regarding his

original jurisdiction petition for review (PFR) against Respondents Delaware

County Office of Judicial Support and Mary J. Walk, in her official capacity as

Director of the Delaware County Office of Judicial Support (individually Office and

Director, and collectively Respondents). After thorough review, we grant the

Application in part and deny it in part.

I. BACKGROUND1

In January 2023, Petitioner received an unconditional pardon from

then-Governor Tom Wolf regarding Petitioner’s 2019 conviction in Delaware

County for marijuana possession. Thereafter, Petitioner filed a “Petition for

Expungement Pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 790” (Expungement Petition) in the Court

of Common Pleas of Delaware County (Common Pleas), through which he requested

that his marijuana possession conviction be expunged in accordance with the terms

of the pardon. In April 2023, the Honorable Anthony D. Scanlon granted the

Expungement Petition and, in doing so, ordered Respondents to expunge Petitioner’s

criminal record regarding that conviction; Judge Scanlon’s order was also

unconditional, in that it did not require Petitioner to take any additional steps in order

for the expungement to take place.2 Despite this, Respondents declined to expunge

1

We draw the substance of this section from Petitioner’s PFR, the exhibits attached thereto,

and Petitioner’s Application. See generally Appl., 4/2/24; PFR, 10/5/23.

2

Judge Scanlon’s order reads as follows, in relevant part:

All criminal justice agencies upon which this order is served shall

expunge all criminal history record information from [Petitioner’s]

arrest record pertaining to the charges below [in attachment listing

2019 marijuana possession conviction and “[a]ny and all additional

charges association with the same [Offense Tracking Number.]”]

Criminal history record information includes information collected

by criminal justice agencies concerning this individual and arising

from the initiation of these criminal proceedings including but not

limited to all fingerprints, photographs, identifiable descriptions,

dates and notations of arrests, indictments, informations or other

formal criminal charges, any dispositions arising from the above-

captioned proceedings, and all electronic or digital records

regarding any of the foregoing.

The Pennsylvania State Police shall request the Federal Bureau of

Investigation to return to them all records pertaining to said arrest(s),

which shall be destroyed by said agency upon their receipt of same.

2

Petitioner’s marijuana possession conviction unless and until he settled the

outstanding balance of court costs that had accrued as a consequence of his

conviction.

This intransigence prompted Petitioner to file suit against Respondents

in our Court. Therein, Petitioner asserts that Respondents violated parts of the

Criminal History Record Information Act (CHRIA),3 the Judicial Code (Code),4 the

Pennsylvania Constitution, and the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure by

declining to expunge his criminal record unless he first paid all outstanding court

costs. Petitioner consequently seeks declaratory judgment to that effect, injunctive

relief barring Respondents from conditioning the expungement upon such payment,

and damages, costs, and fees. Petitioner subsequently filed his Application, in which

he asserts that he is entitled on the face of the pleadings to the full breadth of the

relief he requested in his PFR, while also stating that Respondents eventually

processed Judge Scanlon’s order and expunged Petitioner’s marijuana possession

conviction, but only after Petitioner had filed suit against them. Thereafter,

Respondents filed a response to Petitioner’s Application, via which they oppose his

requested relief.

The information required under Pa.R.Crim.P. 790 appears on the

attached page(s) which is hereby incorporated into this ORDER by

reference.

PFR, Ex. A.

3

18 Pa.C.S. §§ 9101-9183.

4

42 Pa.C.S. §§ 101-9913.

3

II. DISCUSSION5

Petitioner offers several arguments in support of his Application, which

we summarize as follows. First, he is entitled to judgment on the pleadings regarding

Count I of his PFR, because Respondents had a ministerial, nondiscretionary duty to

process and implement Judge Scanlon’s order as written, but nevertheless failed to

do so. Petitioner’s Br. at 9-15. Second, he is entitled to judgment on the pleadings

regarding Count II, because Respondents’ refusal to give effect to that order violated

the duties imposed upon them through CHRIA; relatedly, he must be awarded actual

damages and attorney’s fees on account of this CHRIA violation and, because

Respondents’ CHRIA violation was willful, punitive damages as well. Id. at 17-27.

Finally, he is entitled to judgment on the pleadings regarding Count III, because

Respondents’ refusal to process the expungement order harmed his reputation in

violation of article I, section 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution.6 Id. at 23-25.

We agree with Petitioner that he is entitled to judgment on the pleadings

regarding Count I. It is beyond cavil that lower courts’ clerks of court and

prothonotaries occupy a purely ministerial role, in which they may exercise only the

5

When ruling on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, we view all

of the opposing party’s allegations as true, and only those facts that

the opposing party has specifically admitted are considered against

the opposing party. We consider only the pleadings themselves and

any documents properly attached to them[, and will] grant judgment

on the pleadings only when there is no genuine issue of fact and the

moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Stilp v. Gen. Assembly, 929 A.2d 660, 662 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007) (cleaned up). “Such a motion may

be granted only where the law is clear that a trial would be a fruitless exercise.” Stoppie v. Johns,

720 A.2d 808, 809 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1998).

6

“All men are born equally free and independent, and have certain inherent and indefeasible

rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty, of acquiring, possessing

and protecting property and reputation, and of pursuing their own happiness.” PA. CONST. art. I, §

1.

4

power vested in them via rule or statute, but do not have the discretionary ability to

apply their own interpretation to those sources or to choose which ones to follow or

disregard. See In re Admin. Ord. No. 1-MD-2003, 936 A.2d 1, 9 (Pa. 2007); Warner

v. Cortese, 288 A.2d 550, 552 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1972); see also 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 2737,

2757 (enumerating the office of the prothonotary and the office of the clerk of courts’

statutory powers and duties); PA. CONST. art. V, Sched. to Judiciary art. § 15 (“Until

otherwise provided by law, . . . the offices of prothonotary and clerk of courts of the

court of common pleas of the judicial district . . . shall . . . perform the duties of the

office and . . . maintain and be responsible for the records, books and dockets[.]”).

“Nothing in this grant of authority suggests the power to interpret statutes and to

challenge actions of the court that the clerk [or prothonotary] perceives to be in

opposition to a certain law.” In re Admin. Ord., 936 A.2d at 9; accord Com. v.

Williams, 106 A.3d 583, 588 (Pa. 2014) (“The clerk of courts and prothonotary are

not permitted to interpret statutes or challenge court actions.”). “Therefore, if

documents tendered for filing are proper on their face and in conformity to rules of

court, a prothonotary [or clerk of courts] does not have discretion to refuse to enter

them[.]” Thompson v. Cortese, 398 A.2d 1079, 1081 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1979).

In this instance, Respondents clearly exceeded their legal authority by

attempting to condition expungement of Petitioner’s marijuana possession

conviction upon his satisfaction of all related, outstanding court costs. As our

Supreme Court has made unmistakably clear, an unconditional pardon necessitates

expungement of the implicated criminal offense. Com. v. C.S., 534 A.2d 1053, 1054

(Pa. 1987). Accordingly, a trial court must issue an order directing that a criminal

conviction be expunged upon receiving notice that a pardon has been issued. See

id.; 18 Pa.C.S. § 9122(a.1). There is nothing in either rule or statute that allows a

5

clerk or prothonotary to ignore such an order once it has been issued, or to place

additional, extratextual conditions upon its docketing or the implementation of its

terms.7 Given this, Respondents were required to perform their ministerial duties by

following Judge Scanlon’s order and expunging Petitioner’s marijuana possession

conviction, and acted unlawfully by failing to do so.

Next, we turn to Petitioner’s claim in Count II that Respondents’ failure

to docket and disseminate the expungement order violated CHRIA. Per Section

9111(a) of CHRIA, “[i]t shall be the duty of every criminal justice agency within the

Commonwealth to maintain complete and accurate criminal history record

information and to report such information at such times and in such manner as

required by the provisions of this chapter or other applicable statutes.” 18 Pa.C.S. §

9111(a). CHRIA expressly defines “criminal justice agency,” in relevant part, as

“[a]ny court, including the minor judiciary, with criminal jurisdiction[.]” Id. at §

9102. Notably, this does not state that a court’s employees or officers are subsumed

within the definition; rather, by its plain terms, Section 9102 establishes that only a

court itself can constitute a criminal justice agency. Cf. Kmonk-Sullivan v. State

Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 788 A.2d 955, 962 (Pa. 2001) (cleaned up) (although a

court must “listen attentively to what a statute says[,] [a court] must also listen

attentively to what it does not say”). It therefore stands to reason that the duties

imposed by Section 9111 fell upon the Office as a subsidiary component of Common

Pleas, but not upon Director. See Haron v. Pa. State Police, 171 A.3d 344, 353 (Pa.

7

Indeed, the only duty expressly imposed by the relevant rules and statutes is that “[t]he clerk

of courts shall serve a certified copy of the [expungement] order to each criminal justice agency

identified in the court’s order and to all other entities required to be notified by statute.”

Pa.R.Crim.P. 790(c)(2). This directive necessarily imposes an implied antecedent responsibility

to both docket that order and to complete the expungement of the subject offense or offenses, for

without doing so, there would be nothing to transmit to the relevant agencies and entities.

6

Cmwlth. 2017) (noting that “the record-keeping provisions of CHRIA apply almost

exclusively to governmental units, with the exception of one provision that relates

to the use of criminal records by employers”); cf. 18 Pa.C.S. § 9183(a) (authorizing

the Attorney General to file suit “against any person [or] agency . . . to enjoin any

criminal justice agency . . . or individual violating the provisions of this chapter or

to compel such agency . . . or person to comply with the provisions of this chapter”).

Accordingly, the Office violated CHRIA by failing to docket and disseminate the

expungement order, whereas Director did not.8

This brings us to Petitioner’s related assertion that he has clearly

established at this juncture that he is entitled to an award of actual damages,

attorney’s fees, and punitive damages on account of Respondents’ violation of

CHRIA. We only agree with him in part. Per Section 9183(b)(1) of CHRIA, “[a]ny

person aggrieved by a violation” of CHRIA itself or any related rules or regulations

may file suit for damages against the alleged perpetrator of the violation. 18 Pa.C.S.

§ 9183(b)(1). In the event a person is determined to have been aggrieved by the

violation, they are “entitled to actual and real damages of not less than $100 for each

violation and to reasonable costs of litigation and attorney’s fees.” Id. § 9183(b)(2).

“Aggrieved” is not expressly defined in CHRIA; however, as our

Supreme Court has noted in the past, that term “has acquired a particular meaning

in the law[,]” which controls unless the General Assembly has seen fit to expressly

define it to mean something else. Spahn v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 977 A.2d

1132, 1149 (Pa. 2009). Specifically, an individual is “aggrieved” only if their

interest in the matter at hand is substantial, direct, and immediate. Ams. for Fair

8

Given this, we need not address Respondents’ argument that Director has official and/or

sovereign immunity against Petitioner’s CHRIA claim. See Resp’ts’ Br. at 11-13; Resp’ts’ Sur-

Reply Br. at 3-4.

7

Treatment, Inc. v. Phila. Fed’n of Teachers, 150 A.3d 528, 533 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016).

A substantial interest “must be distinct from and surpass the interest of all citizens

in procuring compliance with the law.” Id. A direct interest requires “a causal

connection between harm to the [petitioner’s] interest and the alleged violation of

law that is the subject of the action.” Id. Finally, an immediate interest exists “if the

causal connection is not remote or speculative.” Id. As the General Assembly did

not see fit to define “aggrieved” in a different way for purposes of CHRIA, we

conclude that this generally understood definition applies here as well.

It follows, then, that Petitioner was aggrieved by the Office’s violation

of CHRIA. As already discussed, Petitioner was pardoned by Governor Wolf and

had his Expungement Petition subsequently granted by Judge Scanlon.

Consequently, Respondents had a ministerial duty to process Judge Scanlon’s order

and expunge Petitioner’s marijuana possession conviction. They, however, failed to

do so, which caused the Office to maintain inaccurate information regarding

Petitioner’s criminal record and to fail to notify all legally mandated entities about

the expungement. In other words, the Office’s intransigence resulted in Petitioner

being improperly listed as having a marijuana possession conviction for some period

of time beyond which it was proper for that conviction to be listed on Petitioner’s

criminal record. Such a state of affairs, which is evident on the face of the pleadings,

undoubtedly renders Petitioner aggrieved for purposes of CHRIA. Petitioner is

therefore entitled at this juncture to an award of actual costs and attorney’s fees

against the Office.

The same is not true regarding his request for punitive damages,

however. In instances where the perpetrator is found to have violated CHRIA or the

related rules and regulations in a “willful” manner, the aggrieved individual is

8

entitled to “[e]xemplary and punitive damages of not less than $1,000 nor more than

$10,000[.]” 18 Pa.C.S. § 9183(b)(2). “Willful” is not explicitly defined in CHRIA,

so we must construe that term in accordance with its “common and approved usage.”

P.R. v. Pa. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 759 A.2d 434, 437 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2000) (cleaned

up). “In ascertaining the common and approved usage or meaning, a court may

resort to the dictionary definitions of the terms left undefined by the legislature.”

Mountz v. Columbia Borough, 260 A.3d 1046, 1050 n.4 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2021) (quoting

Leventakos v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Spyros Painting), 82 A.3d 481, 484 n.4

(Pa. Cmwlth. 2013)). Per Black’s Law Dictionary, a “willful” act is one that was

“[d]one wittingly or on purpose, as opposed to accidentally or casually; voluntary

and intentional, but not necessarily malicious. The word connotes

blameworthiness.” Willful, Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024). Furthermore,

“[a] voluntary act becomes willful, in law, only when it involves conscious wrong

or evil purpose on the part of the actor, or at least inexcusable carelessness, whether

the act is right or wrong. The term willful is stronger than voluntary or intentional;

it is traditionally the equivalent of malicious, evil, or corrupt.” Id. (cleaned up). The

high bar set by this definition, when coupled with Respondents’ assertion that their

refusal to process Judge Scanlon’s order was done in good faith,9 necessitates the

creation of a proper factual record in order for us to determine whether the Office’s

CHRIA violation was willful.

9

Respondents assert that they justifiably believed that they were without authority to waive

Petitioner’s court costs because neither Governor Wolf’s pardon nor the Expungement Order or

CHRIA itself expressly authorized them to do so. See Resp’ts’ Br. in Opp. to Appl. at 10-11.

Respondents also maintain that they interpreted an order from Common Pleas’ president judge to

process an expungement order in a similar matter without satisfaction of outstanding court costs

as only applying to that specific case, rather than as a broadly applicable edict. Id. at 10.

9

Finally, we conclude that we are unable to grant judgment on the

pleadings in Petitioner’s favor regarding Count III, in which he claims that

Respondents’ refusal to process and promulgate Judge Scanlon’s order violated his

constitutional right to reputation. Every individual in our Commonwealth has a

fundamental right to protect their reputation, which is secured through article I,

section 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. R.W. v. Dep’t of Educ. (Pro. Standards

& Pracs. Comm’n), 304 A.3d 79, 93 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2023), appeal granted sub nom.

R.W. v. Dep’t of Educ., 321 A.3d 862 (Pa. 2024). “Although it is not a tangible right,

individuals have a fundamental right to protect their reputation from false or

misleading information that affects how they are regarded by their community.” Id.

Since “[e]xpungement is a mechanism utilized to protect an individual’s reputation

from the stigma that accompanies an arrest record[,]” Com. v. Wallace, 97 A.3d 310,

319 (Pa. 2014), it follows that the failure to properly process and promulgate an

expungement order may violate the affected individual’s reputational rights by

causing them to suffer unnecessary or inaccurate stigma.

Even so, it is important to recognize that an individual’s reputation is

based upon others’ perceptions about them. See Street Road Bar & Grille, Inc. v.

Pa. Liquor Control Bd., 876 A.2d 346, 356-57 (Pa. 2005) (defining “repute” as “the

account or consideration of a person held by others, i.e., what people think of

another, reputation”). Thus, it is theoretically possible for an individual to suffer no

reputational injury on account of inaccurate criminal record information if that

information is not known in their community or by those with whom they interact.

We consequently conclude that a determination regarding whether Respondents’

handling of Judge Scanlon’s order violated Petitioner’s constitutional right to

reputation cannot be made on the pleadings alone.

10

III. CONCLUSION

In accordance with the foregoing analysis, we grant Petitioner’s

Application in part regarding Counts I and II. Specifically, we grant declaratory

judgment in his favor as to his claims that Respondents failed to perform their

ministerial, nondiscretionary duty to docket and disseminate Judge Scanlon’s order,

as well as that the Office violated CHRIA and that he is entitled to actual damages

and attorney’s fees as a result. We also deny the Application in part as moot

regarding Petitioner’s request for injunctive relief, due to the fact that Respondents

have already given him the relief he sought by processing and promulgating Judge

Scanlon’s order after the commencement of this litigation. Finally, we deny the

remainder of Petitioner’s Application.

_____________________________________

LORI A. DUMAS, Judge

11

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

K. B., :

Petitioner :

: No. 446 M.D. 2023

v. :

:

Delaware County Office of Judicial :

Support, and Mary J. Walk, in her :

official capacity as Director of the :

Delaware County Office of Judicial :

Support, :

Respondents :

ORDER

AND NOW, this 27th day of June, 2025, it is hereby ORDERED:

1. Petitioner K.B.’s Application for Summary Relief in the Form of Judgment

on the Pleadings (Application) is GRANTED IN PART, as to his request in Count I

of his petition for review (PFR) for declaratory judgment against Respondents

Delaware County Office of Judicial Support (Office), and Mary J. Walk, in her

official capacity as Director of the Delaware County Office of Judicial Support, and

his request in Count II of his PFR for declaratory judgment, actual damages, and

attorney’s fees against the Office;

2. Petitioner’s Application is DENIED AS MOOT IN PART, to the extent he

requests injunctive relief through his PFR against Respondents;

3. Petitioner’s Application is otherwise DENIED.

____________________________________

LORI A. DUMAS, Judge