Ken Paxton, in His Official Capacity as Attorney General of Texas, and Greg Abbott, in His Official Capacity as Governor of Texas v. American Oversight

Supreme Court of Texas

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No. 24-0162

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Ken Paxton, in his Official Capacity as Attorney General of

Texas, and Greg Abbott, in his Official Capacity as Governor of

Texas,

Petitioners,

v.

American Oversight,

Respondent

═══════════════════════════════════════

On Petition for Review from the

Court of Appeals for the Third District of Texas

═══════════════════════════════════════

Argued February 19, 2025

CHIEF JUSTICE BLACKLOCK delivered the opinion of the Court.

JUSTICE YOUNG filed a concurring opinion.

Justice Sullivan did not participate in the decision.

This case raises the age-old question of the judiciary’s authority

to issue a writ of mandamus against an executive officer. See, e.g.,

Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803). A private, nonprofit group

called American Oversight filed a petition for writ of mandamus in

district court against the Governor and the Attorney General, alleging

violations of the Public Information Act. As we observed thirty years

ago, however, the relevant statutes and constitutional provisions do not

empower district courts to issue writs of mandamus against

constitutional executive officers like the Governor and the Attorney

General. See A & T Consultants, Inc. v. Sharp, 904 S.W.2d 668, 672–73

(Tex. 1995). The Legislature could have provided otherwise in the three

decades since Sharp, but we conclude that it has not done so. As a result,

without addressing any other issues, we reverse the judgment of the

court of appeals and direct the district court to dismiss the mandamus

petition for lack of jurisdiction.

This result, which arises from the peculiarities of mandamus

jurisdiction, does not mean that constitutional executive officers cannot

be sued if they violate the Public Information Act. In addition to the

PIA’s criminal penalties, section 552.3215 authorizes suits for

declaratory or injunctive relief “against a governmental body that

violates this chapter.” TEX. GOV’T CODE § 552.3215(b). American

Oversight could have proceeded under that provision, which requires

the participation of the Travis County district attorney, but it did not.

In addition to that available remedy, the Legislature could have

attempted to authorize district courts to issue mandamus relief against

constitutional executive officers under the PIA, but we conclude that it

has not. It has, instead, limited mandamus jurisdiction over

constitutional executive officers to this Court. See TEX. GOV’T CODE

§ 22.002(c). We are bound to follow that statutory directive, just as all

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governmental bodies in Texas, including those headed by constitutional

executive officers, are bound to follow the Public Information Act.

I.

In 2022, American Oversight sent three Public Information Act

requests to the Governor’s office. The first sought official

communications involving any non-governmental email address

attributed to the Governor. The second sought all text messages sent or

received by the Governor regarding official business. The third sought

emails between the Governor’s office and the National Rifle Association,

the Texas State Rifle Association, and similar groups.

The Governor’s office identified documents responsive to the first

request, but it considered them exempt from disclosure for various

reasons, including attorney-client privilege. It requested a ruling from

the Attorney General’s office, as contemplated by the PIA. See generally

TEX. GOV’T CODE § 552.301. The AG’s office determined that all the

responsive documents were privileged or related to pending litigation.

For the second request, the Governor’s office again sought to withhold

the responsive information and submitted a request for a ruling to the

AG’s office. The AG’s office agreed that some of the responsive

information must be or could be withheld, but it also ruled that some of

the information must be turned over. The Governor’s office provided

American Oversight with roughly 100 pages of text messages in

response to the second request. For the third request, the Governor’s

office determined that it had no responsive information.

American Oversight also sent four Public Information Act

requests to the Attorney General’s office. The first sought all emails

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sent by the Attorney General or his solicitor general between January 6

and January 8, 2021. The second sought official communications

involving any non-governmental email address used by the Attorney

General. The third sought all text messages sent or received by the

Attorney General regarding official business. The fourth sought emails

between the AG’s office and the National Rifle Association, the Texas

State Rifle Association, and other similar groups.

For the first and third requests, the AG’s office produced some

responsive documents but sought to withhold others. It requested an

AG’s office ruling, 1 and the ruling confirmed its authority to withhold

the remaining information. For the second request, the AG’s office

sought to withhold all responsive information, and the resulting ruling

confirmed that approach. For the fourth request, the AG’s office

identified no responsive information.

American Oversight was unsatisfied with both offices’ responses.

It filed a petition for writ of mandamus in Travis County district court

against the Governor and the Attorney General. It brought the

mandamus petition under section 552.321 of the PIA, which provides

1 When the AG’s office requests a ruling under the PIA, an oddity arises

in that it must submit the request to another section of its own office. In such

circumstances, we understand that the section of the AG’s office requesting the

ruling and the section of the AG’s office making the ruling are sealed off from

one another and, at least in principle, operate independently. See generally

Pub. Util. Comm’n of Tex. v. Cofer, 754 S.W.2d 121 (Tex. 1988). We are not

asked to consider whether two sections of the same office, both of which answer

to and exercise authority derived from the same constitutionally elected officer,

can ever truly operate independently of one another. The PIA affords no

alternative way of handling information requests submitted to the AG’s office,

which means the office is often obligated to “wear two hats” in this way and to

navigate the consequent ethical challenges as best it can.

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that “[a] requestor or the attorney general may file suit for a writ of

mandamus compelling a governmental body to make information

available for public inspection if the governmental body . . . refuses to

supply public information.” Id. § 552.321(a). Section 552.321 further

provides that the suits authorized by subsection (a) “must be filed in a

district court for the county in which the main offices of the

governmental body are located.” Id. § 552.321(b).

The Governor and the Attorney General (collectively, “the State”)

challenged the district court’s jurisdiction. They argued that sovereign

immunity bars the mandamus petition because American Oversight did

not plead a viable claim of the State’s refusal to provide public

information. They contended they had properly followed the PIA’s

procedures for withholding the documents not produced, and they

provided affidavits indicating they had conducted a “diligent and good

faith search” for responsive information. The district court denied the

State’s pleas to the jurisdiction, and the State filed an interlocutory

appeal. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 51.014(a)(8).

On appeal, the State re-urged its initial position but also pointed

out an additional potential defect in the district court’s jurisdiction. See

Tex. Dep’t of Transp. v. Self, 690 S.W.3d 12, 20 (Tex. 2024) (questions of

subject-matter jurisdiction “cannot be waived” and “can be raised for the

first time on appeal”). The State contended that the Legislature has

empowered only the Supreme Court to issue writs of mandamus against

constitutional executive officers, see TEX. GOV’T CODE § 22.002(c), and

that the PIA does not authorize district courts to do so. American

Oversight disagreed, arguing that section 552.321 grants district courts

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mandamus jurisdiction over any “governmental body,” including

governmental bodies headed by constitutional executive officers.

The court of appeals affirmed. 683 S.W.3d 873, 884 (Tex. App.—

Austin 2024). It held that despite the general statutory reservation of

mandamus authority over constitutional executive officers to the

Supreme Court, section 552.321(b) authorizes district courts to issue

mandamus relief when any governmental body, including one headed by

a constitutional executive officer, “refuses to supply public information.”

Id. The court of appeals further held that American Oversight had

alleged a viable claim that the State “refuse[d] to supply public

information.” Id. at 885; see TEX. GOV’T CODE § 552.321(a). The State

petitioned for review, and we granted the petition.

II.

A.

The Legislature has authorized PIA requestors like American

Oversight to “file suit for a writ of mandamus compelling a

governmental body to make information available.” TEX. GOV’T CODE

§ 552.321(a) (emphasis added). Section 552.321 could certainly have

authorized a procedural vehicle other than a mandamus petition, with

all of its attendant substantive and procedural quirks. For instance, the

very next section authorizes suits by district and county attorneys for

declaratory and injunctive relief, either on their own or at the urging of

a dissatisfied requestor. Id. § 552.3215(c), (e). But rather than give

requestors a unilateral right to sue for declaratory relief, injunctive

relief, or some other conventional remedy available in run-of-the-mill

civil litigation, the Legislature chose to authorize requestors to pursue

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petitions for writ of mandamus. And a common-law term like “writ of

mandamus,” when transplanted into the statutory law, “brings the old

soil with it.” Hall v. Hall, 584 U.S. 59, 73 (2018) (internal quotation

omitted). The outcome of this appeal turns on the Legislature’s choice

to provide mandamus relief as the sole remedy available to requestors

under section 552.321(a). That choice, which we must assume was

deliberate, naturally incorporates Texas law’s pre-existing limitations

on mandamus relief, including limitations on jurisdiction.

The history of the writ of mandamus in Texas dates (at least) to

the 1836 Constitution of the Republic of Texas, which charged the new

Congress with adopting the English common law, from which the writ

derives. REPUB. TEX. CONST. of 1836, art. IV, § 13, reprinted in 1 H.P.N.

Gammel, The Laws of Texas 1822–1897, at 1074 (Austin, Gammel Book

Co. 1898); Act approved Jan. 20, 1840, 4th Cong., R.S., § 1, 1840 Repub.

Tex. Laws 3, 4, reprinted in 2 H.P.N. Gammel, The Laws of Texas

1822–1897, at 177, 178 (Austin, Gammel Book Co. 1898) (adopting the

common law of England). 2 The writ itself long pre-existed the Republic,

of course. See THOMAS TAPPING, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE HIGH

PREROGATIVE WRIT OF MANDAMUS 56 (London, Wm. Benning & Co.

1848) (tracing the origins of the writ of mandamus perhaps to the

fourteenth-century reign of King Edward III, but at the latest to Bagg’s

Case from the King’s Bench in 1615).

2 See also Bradley v. McCrabb, Dallam 504, 506, 508 (Tex. 1843)

(holding that the inadequate-legal-remedy requirement for writs of mandamus

was part of the English common law adopted into the law of the Republic); Yett

v. Cook, 268 S.W. 715, 718–19 (Tex. 1925) (observing that the writ of

mandamus is “construed in light of the common law”).

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This Court often issues the writ of mandamus—or does so

provisionally—to compel a lower court to perform a duty that is “simply

ministerial and involves no judicial discretion.” Lloyd v. Brinck, 35 Tex.

1, 10 (1871). But the writ’s historical uses extend beyond supervision of

lower courts and include the possibility that writs of mandamus may be

issued against officials in other branches of government, in appropriate

cases where the issuing court is lawfully authorized to do so. The writ

is an order from a court “whereby a person or officer is required to do

something which he wrongfully declines to do,” and “in exceptional cases

it may properly be given a restraining effect” to “revers[e] or amend[]

. . . a previous act.” Seagraves v. Green, 288 S.W. 417, 425 (Tex.

[Comm’n Op.] 1926); cf. Lewright v. Bell, 63 S.W. 623, 623 (Tex. 1901)

(“The courts cannot, by the writ in question, compel an officer to perform

an official duty, where that duty involves . . . discretion on his part.”).

In mandamus actions against non-judicial officials, we have

stated that “[m]andamus may issue to compel public officials to perform

ministerial acts, as well as ‘to correct a clear abuse of discretion by a

public official.’” In re Williams, 470 S.W.3d 819, 821 (Tex. 2015) (quoting

Anderson v. City of Seven Points, 806 S.W.2d 791, 793 (Tex. 1991)). “An

act is ministerial when the law clearly spells out the duty to be

performed by the official with sufficient certainty that nothing is left to

the exercise of discretion.” Id. (quoting same).

With these general observations about the nature of the writ of

mandamus in mind, we turn to the question of the power of the district

court in this case, under our Constitution and statutes, to issue the writ

requested by American Oversight.

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B.

The question is whether section 552.321 of the Government Code

authorizes the district court to issue a writ of mandamus against two

constitutional executive officers, the Governor and the Attorney

General. To answer that question, we must first understand the

constitutional and statutory landscape in which section 552.321

operates.

District court jurisdiction is generally defined by Article V,

section 8 of the Constitution:

District Court jurisdiction consists of exclusive, appellate,

and original jurisdiction of all actions, proceedings, and

remedies, except in cases where exclusive, appellate, or

original jurisdiction may be conferred by this Constitution

or other law on some other court, tribunal, or

administrative body. District Court judges shall have the

power to issue writs necessary to enforce their jurisdiction.

TEX. CONST. art. V, § 8. This provision does not mention writs of

mandamus, but the Constitution is not unconcerned with the subject.

With respect to the Supreme Court, Article V twice mentions the writ of

mandamus. Section 3(a) provides that the “Supreme Court and the

Justices thereof . . . may issue . . . writs of mandamus . . . as may be

necessary to enforce its jurisdiction,” subject to “such regulations as may

be prescribed by law.” Id. § 3(a). That same section further provides:

“The Legislature may confer original jurisdiction on the Supreme Court

to issue writs of quo warranto and mandamus in such cases as may be

specified, except as against the Governor of the State.” Id. 3 The latter

3 Article V elsewhere mentions the writ of mandamus in section 5(c),

which authorizes the “Court of Criminal Appeals and the Judges thereof,”

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provision reflects our Constitution’s acknowledgement of the obvious

separation-of-powers concerns implicated by judicial authority to issue

writs of mandamus against high-ranking executive officials. See TEX.

CONST. art. II, § 1. 4 The Legislature has acknowledged those concerns

as well, as reflected in the limitations it has placed on the judiciary’s

authority to issue writs of mandamus against constitutional executive

officers. See TEX. GOV’T CODE § 22.002(c). We turn now to those

limitations.

A district court’s constitutional grant of jurisdiction consists of

“exclusive, appellate, and original jurisdiction of all actions,

proceedings, and remedies,” which the parties agree includes

mandamus actions. TEX. CONST. art. V, § 8. 5 An important caveat

“[s]ubject to such regulations as may be prescribed by law,” to issue the writ of

mandamus “in criminal law matters.” TEX. CONST. art. V, § 5(c).

4 “The powers of the Government of the State of Texas shall be divided

into three distinct departments, each of which shall be confided to a separate

body of magistracy . . . and no person, or collection of persons, being of one of

these departments, shall exercise any power properly attached to either of the

others . . . .”

5 Until 1985, the Constitution specifically mentioned the writ of

mandamus as within a district court’s authority. See TEX. CONST. art. V, § 8

(amended 1985) (providing that “[d]istrict [c]ourt[s] . . . have power to issue

writs of . . . mandamus”). It no longer does so, instead providing only that

“District Court judges shall have the power to issue writs necessary to enforce

their jurisdiction.” TEX. CONST. art. V, § 8. Section 24.011 of the Government

Code authorizes a district judge to “grant writs of mandamus, injunction,

sequestration, attachment, garnishment, certiorari, and supersedeas and all

other writs necessary to the enforcement of the court’s jurisdiction.” TEX.

GOV’T CODE § 24.011. The parties do not question the general authority of

district courts to issue writs of mandamus. They focus, as do we, only on

whether that authority extends to constitutional executive officers in PIA

cases.

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follows, however. The apparently broad grant of jurisdiction does not

extend to “cases where exclusive, appellate, or original jurisdiction may

be conferred by this Constitution or other law on some other court,

tribunal, or administrative body.” Id. (emphasis added). The

Legislature is thus authorized to withdraw jurisdiction from district

courts and confer it upon other courts. One way in which the Legislature

has done so is section 22.002 of the Government Code:

(a) The supreme court or a justice of the supreme court may

issue . . . all writs of quo warranto and mandamus

agreeable to the principles of law regulating those writs,

against a statutory county court judge, a statutory probate

court judge, a district judge, a court of appeals or a justice

of a court of appeals, or any officer of state government

except the governor, the court of criminal appeals, or a

judge of the court of criminal appeals.

....

(c) Only the supreme court has the authority to issue

a writ of mandamus or injunction, or any other

mandatory or compulsory writ or process, against any of

the officers of the executive departments of the

government of this state to order or compel the

performance of a judicial, ministerial, or discretionary act

or duty that, by state law, the officer or officers are

authorized to perform.

TEX. GOV’T CODE § 22.002 (emphases added).

Setting aside the constitutional question of whether any court can

issue a writ of mandamus against the Governor, see post at 25–37

(Young, J., concurring), section 22.002(c) states that only this Court has

authority to do so “against any of the officers of the executive

departments of the government of this state,” TEX. GOV’T CODE

§ 22.002(c). In other words, no court, except for the Supreme Court, has

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that authority. As we have held before, the phrase “officers of the

executive departments of the government of this state” includes the

officers of the Executive Department enumerated in the Constitution:

The Executive Department of the State shall consist of a

Governor, who shall be the Chief Executive Officer of the

State, a Lieutenant Governor, Secretary of State,

Comptroller of Public Accounts, Commissioner of the

General Land Office, and Attorney General.

TEX. CONST. art. IV, § 1; see Sharp, 904 S.W.2d at 672 (“[T]he

[C]onstitution identifies seven officials as executive officers” and

section 22.002(c) “confer[s] exclusive original jurisdiction on this Court

over mandamus proceedings against executive officers, except for the

[G]overnor.”). 6

C.

To summarize, district courts generally have broad original

jurisdiction unless another law provides otherwise. Section 22.002(c) is

another law providing otherwise. It says no court but the Supreme

Court may issue a writ of mandamus against constitutional executive

officers, which includes the two parties at issue here, the Governor and

the Attorney General. District courts therefore lack jurisdiction to issue

a writ of mandamus against the Governor or the Attorney General,

unless some other statute overrides section 22.002(c) and empowers

them to do so.

6 Sharp’s count of seven constitutional executive officers included the

Treasurer, a position eliminated by a 1995 constitutional amendment. See

Tex. S.J. Res. 1, 74th Leg., R.S., 1995 Tex. Gen. Laws 4980 (adopted at the

general election on Nov. 7, 1995, by a vote of 495,181 to 218,473).

12

American Oversight contends that section 552.321 is just such a

statute. It states:

(a) A requestor or the attorney general may file suit for a

writ of mandamus compelling a governmental body to

make information available for public inspection if the

governmental body refuses to request an attorney general’s

decision as provided by Subchapter G or refuses to supply

public information or information that the attorney general

has determined is public information that is not excepted

from disclosure under Subchapter C.

(b) A suit filed by a requestor under this section must be

filed in a district court for the county in which the main

offices of the governmental body are located . . . .

TEX. GOV’T CODE § 552.321. This is not the first time we have considered

the interplay between the PIA’s mandamus remedy and section 22.002’s

restrictions on mandamus jurisdiction against executive officers. In

1995, the statute authorizing PIA mandamus actions was, in relevant

respects, identical to today’s subsection (a), quoted above. Subsection (b)

did not yet exist. The question arose of a district court’s authority to

issue a writ of mandamus under the PIA against the Comptroller.

Relying on section 22.002(c)’s clear reservation to the Supreme Court of

exclusive mandamus jurisdiction over constitutional executive officers,

we held:

[D]istrict courts generally have no jurisdiction over

executive officer respondents. Any exception to this rule

would require express statutory authorization by the

legislature naming district courts as the proper fora. See

id. § 552.353(b)(3). Under the current statutory scheme,

when a relator seeks to compel an executive officer to

perform duties imposed by law, generally this Court alone

is the proper forum.

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Sharp, 904 S.W.2d at 672. Further, although the statute authorized

mandamus relief against a “governmental body,” we held that the

constitutional executive officer himself, in that case the Comptroller,

was “the proper party,” because he had “the legal obligation to perform

the duties under [the PIA].” Id. at 673. Because the constitutional

executive officer himself is the proper respondent in a mandamus action

to enforce the PIA against a constitutional office, the law’s restrictions

on mandamus relief against such officers were implicated. See id. The

Legislature had not avoided this quandary by authorizing mandamus

relief against the “governmental body,” as opposed to its officer. See id.

at 681. 7

In 1999, the Legislature added subsection (b) to section 552.321,

which now states that “[a] suit filed by a requestor under this section

must be filed in a district court for the county in which the main offices

of the governmental body are located.” TEX. GOV’T CODE § 552.321(b).

Determining this provision’s meaning determines the outcome of this

appeal.

American Oversight argues that subsection (b) is the

Legislature’s effort, in response to Sharp, to empower district courts to

7 The extent to which any legally relevant distinction may be drawn

between a constitutional executive officer and the governmental body he heads

is a complicated and interesting question. The parties join issue on it to some

extent, but we need not endeavor to answer it here. It is enough, for present

purposes, to follow Sharp’s holdings that (1) the proper respondent in a

mandamus action under the PIA involving a constitutional executive office is

the constitutional executive officer; and (2) the PIA’s mandamus remedy

against a “governmental body” necessarily implicates section 22.002(c)’s

limitations on the judiciary’s authority to issue mandamus relief against

constitutional executive officers.

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issue writs of mandamus against constitutional executive officers. It

contends that, in addition to being later in time, subsection (b) is more

specific than section 22.002(c) in that it specifically governs PIA

mandamus actions, whereas section 22.002(c) governs mandamus

actions generally.

The State responds that section 552.321(b) merely specifies where

a mandamus action under the PIA must be filed, rather than expanding

the authority of a district court over an executive officer respondent who

is not otherwise within the court’s jurisdiction. In the State’s view,

subsection (b) does not mention constitutional executive officers or

jurisdiction, and it should be understood as a general venue provision

for PIA mandamus actions, which remains subject to section 22.002(c)’s

specific limitation on a district court’s mandamus authority over

constitutional executive officers.

We conclude that section 552.321(b) did not expand the

jurisdiction of district courts over constitutional executive officers. The

Supreme Court’s exclusive jurisdiction under section 22.002(c) of the

Government Code to issue writs of mandamus against constitutional

executive officers has been a settled feature of Texas law for at least a

century, and section 552.321(b) contains none of the indicia required to

overcome it.

To begin with, section 552.321(b) does not mention jurisdiction,

authority, power, or anything of the sort. The key holding of Sharp,

which American Oversight contends has been abrogated by

subsection (b), is that district courts lack the jurisdiction—that is, the

power—to issue writs of mandamus against constitutional executive

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officers under the PIA. But nothing in section 552.321(b) speaks to the

question of the district court’s power. The provision reads:

(b) A suit filed by a requestor under this section must be

filed in a district court for the county in which the main

offices of the governmental body are located . . . .

Id. By its own terms, subsection (b) merely establishes a mandatory

venue for the suits authorized by subsection (a). That venue is the local

district court, which in the overwhelming majority of PIA disputes

across all levels of state and local government throughout Texas will

have the power to entertain such a suit. In the small fraction of PIA

disputes involving constitutional executive officers, however, Sharp

instructs that district courts lack jurisdiction. American Oversight asks

us to read into subsection (b)’s venue requirement an unspoken

legislative intent to abrogate Sharp and to expand the power of district

courts to include all PIA mandamus actions, including those against

constitutional executive officers that would otherwise run afoul of

section 22.002(c) of the Government Code. The problem is that

subsection (b) does not say that. It reads as a garden-variety venue

provision, which resembles many other venue provisions, 8 none of which

8 See, e.g., TEX. GOV’T CODE § 2007.044(b) (“A suit under this section

must be filed in a district court in the county in which the private real property

owner’s affected property is located.”); TEX. GOV’T CODE § 551.142(d) (“A suit

filed by the attorney general under Subsection (c) must be filed in a district

court of Travis County.”); TEX. TRANSP. CODE § 342.302(c) (“A suit under this

section must be filed in a justice court of the county [from which a license is

required under this chapter].”); TEX. TRANSP. CODE § 342.304(b) (“A suit under

this section must be filed in a justice court of the county in which the license is

issued.”); TEX. GOV’T CODE § 2007.021(a) (“A suit under this subchapter must

be filed in a district court in the county in which the private real property

owner’s affected property is located.”).

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are thought to alter the jurisdiction of any court. See Tex. Mut. Ins. Co.

v. Chicas, 593 S.W.3d 284, 289 (Tex. 2019) (statute providing for venue

transfers “clearly did not [implicate] subject-matter jurisdiction” (citing

Morales v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 241 S.W.3d 514, 516 n.1 (Tex. 2007))).

A key pillar of American Oversight’s position is the notion that

subsection (b) was the Legislature’s answer to Sharp. Whether or not

that is true as a matter of legislative history, the operative force of

subsection (b) derives from its text, not from the purpose it was thought

to serve at the time it was enacted. Yet even if we assume subsection (b)

was indeed the Legislature’s “answer” to Sharp, that gets us nowhere,

because the question remains: What was the answer? American

Oversight suggests that the answer must have been to empower district

courts with mandamus authority over constitutional executive officers.

But we must discern the Legislature’s answer from the text it chose, and

nothing in the text of subsection (b) accomplishes such a result.

Subsection (b) simply does not pick up the glove thrown down by

Sharp, which holds that “an action against” the “executive officer

respondents” “would require express statutory authorization by the

legislature naming district courts as the proper fora.” 904 S.W.2d at 672

(emphasis added). The proper fora for what? For actions against

executive officer respondents. Section 552.321(b) does not mention

constitutional executive officers at all. It therefore does nothing to

expressly authorize district courts as the proper fora for mandamus suits

against those officers.

Immediately following Sharp’s indication that only “express

statutory authorization” would do the trick, the Court cited an example,

17

from within the PIA, of the kind of express language it had in mind. See

id. The example the Court provided, section 552.353(b)(3), at the time

referred to:

[A] petition for a declaratory judgment, a writ of

mandamus, or both, against the attorney general in a

Travis County district court seeking relief from compliance

with the decision of the attorney general . . . .

Act of May 4, 1993, 73d Leg., R.S., ch. 268, § 1, 1993 Tex. Gen. Laws 583,

607 (amended 2009) (current version at TEX. GOV’T CODE § 552.353(b)(3))

(emphasis added). Thus, had the Legislature wanted to respond to

Sharp by further empowering district courts, the Court provided

line-by-line instructions. It did so by pointing to a provision specifically

contemplating a mandamus petition against the attorney general in a

district court. But subsection (b)’s venue requirement looks nothing like

the statute the Court pointed to as a rubric for accomplishing the result

American Oversight seeks. It looks, instead, like many other venue

provisions throughout the statute books, to which courts do not typically

assign jurisdictional significance. See supra note 8.

Two basic rules arose from Sharp: (1) district courts lack the

power to issue PIA mandamus relief against constitutional executive

officers; and (2) the Supreme Court generally has the power to issue PIA

mandamus relief against constitutional executive officers (setting aside

the Governor). 904 S.W.2d at 672–73. To these two rules, the

Legislature added another: (3) all PIA mandamus actions must be

brought in district court. TEX. GOV’T CODE § 552.321(b). American

Oversight would like the Legislature’s answer to Sharp to have been

that the third rule overrides the first rule. But subsection (b) does not

say that. Indeed, by restricting venue in PIA mandamus actions to

18

district court without mentioning constitutional executive officers or the

jurisdiction of any court, the Legislature may very well have been

responding to Sharp by preventing parties from filing mandamus

actions against constitutional executive officers in the Supreme Court.

In other words, the Legislature may have intended the third rule

mentioned above to override the second rule, not the first.

We need not decide today whether an original mandamus action

in this Court under the PIA against a constitutional executive officer

could proceed in the face of subsection (b)’s mandatory venue

requirement. It is enough, for present purposes, to hold that the text of

subsection (b) of section 552.321 contains no indication that its aim was

to expand the authority of district courts over constitutional executive

officers. The text of subsection (b) fixes venue in the local district court

for the mandamus actions authorized by subsection (a). It does so

without changing the nature of the actions authorized by subsection (a)

or the power of various courts over those actions. Because that is all the

text says, that is all the text does.

D.

For American Oversight to prevail, it would have to be the case

that a statute authorizing lower courts to issue writs of mandamus

against a general category of respondent that includes constitutional

executive officers is enough to override section 22.002(c)’s grant to this

Court of exclusive mandamus jurisdiction against constitutional

executive officers. Yet if this were true, section 22.002(c) would always

give way to general statutory grants of mandamus authority to lower

courts. We have never taken such a limited view of section 22.002(c).

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To the contrary, as we held in Sharp, overcoming section 22.002(c)’s

prohibition on lower-court mandamus authority over constitutional

executive officers will typically require “express statutory

authorization” of the sort we pointed to in that case. See Sharp,

904 S.W.2d at 672 (pointing to a provision specifically contemplating

mandamus relief in district court against the attorney general).

American Oversight argues that if subsection (b) is not a

jurisdictional grant, then it must be superfluous. See Hunter v. Fort

Worth Cap. Corp., 620 S.W.2d 547, 551 (Tex. 1981) (“[T]he Legislature

is never presumed to do a useless act.”). That is not the case. As already

observed, subsection (b) could be read to foreclose the direct mandamus

actions in this Court against constitutional executive officers

contemplated by Sharp. Whether or not it goes that far, there is no

question that subsection (b) provides clarity on an important and

muddled question the statute previously left unaddressed—where

petitioners should file the PIA mandamus actions authorized by

subsection (a). Unlike most lawsuits, mandamus petitions may

originate at all three levels of our court system. A mandamus petition

initiates an original action in the court in which it is filed, and as a

colloquial matter mandamus petitions are often more associated with

appellate courts rather than with district courts. It would therefore

come as no surprise—and would certainly not be superfluous or

redundant—for the Legislature to specify that these mandamus

petitions, authorized by section 552.321(a), must originate in district

court, rather than leaving it to litigants and courts to divine such a rule

from the pre-existing legal landscape.

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The Legislature’s provision of clarity and specificity is generally

a welcome feature of a user-friendly statutory scheme. Legislative

clarity and specificity should not lightly be confused for superfluity or

redundancy. When the Legislature spells out the rules governing a

cause of action, such as by providing a venue rule, the canon against

superfluity does not require us to ask whether, in the absence of the

legislative venue rule, the pre-existing law would have required the

same rule—and then to assign an alternative meaning to the statutory

venue rule, beyond the natural meaning of its text, in a quest to avoid

superfluity. Like any canon of construction, the presumption against

“useless acts” is merely one tool, among many, to be used in service of

the overriding goal, which is to understand the meaning of the statutory

text, within its context, as would an ordinary reader of English. See

Malouf v. State ex rels. Ellis, 694 S.W.3d 712, 718 (Tex. 2024) (“We . . .

apply the common, ordinary meaning” of a “statute’s text,” “constru[ing]

the words in light of their statutory context . . . .”). Stretching the text

beyond its natural meaning to avoid perceived superfluity or

redundancy is just as misguided as stretching the text beyond its

natural meaning for any other reason.

Finally, American Oversight suggests that if the State’s

arguments prevail, then constitutional executive officers and their state

agencies will be able to violate the PIA with impunity. That is not so.

The PIA contains abundant criminal penalties. To take one capacious

example, “[a]n officer for public information, or the officer’s agent,

commits an offense if, with criminal negligence, the officer or the officer’s

agent fails or refuses to give access to, or to permit or provide copying

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of, public information to a requestor as provided by this chapter.” TEX.

GOV’T CODE § 552.353(a). There are also civil remedies beyond the

mandamus action at issue here. Section 552.3215 authorizes parties

like American Oversight to “file a complaint alleging a violation of this

chapter.” Id. § 552.3215(e). If the governmental body is a state agency,

the complaint may be filed with the Travis County district attorney, who

then has thirty days to decide whether a violation of the PIA was

committed and to decide whether to initiate an action for declaratory or

injunctive relief. Id. § 552.3215(e), (g)(1). The district attorney must

inform the complainant in writing of these determinations. Id.

§ 552.3215(g)(2).

American Oversight objects that this pathway makes civil

litigation of its allegations contingent on the agreement of the Travis

County district attorney to take up the mantle. It does. But that

requirement hardly diminishes the incentive of state officials, who face

the prospect of both criminal and civil liability at the hands of the Travis

County district attorney, to comply in good faith with the PIA. American

Oversight is correct, of course, that its reading of the statutory scheme

would maximize the ability of private litigants to unilaterally enforce

the PIA against constitutional executive officers through civil litigation.

We are under no obligation, of course, to maximize the scope of the PIA’s

remedies. Our job is to understand what those remedies are, as the

Legislature has written them. “Liberally construed” or otherwise, the

words of section 552.321 do not support the remedy American Oversight

seeks. See id. § 552.001(a). If that result is thought to be undesirable,

the Legislature may of course provide otherwise.

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III.

For these reasons, the district court lacks jurisdiction over the

petitions for writ of mandamus against the Governor and the Attorney

General. Without reaching any other issues, we reverse the judgment

of the court of appeals and remand the case to the district court for

dismissal.

James D. Blacklock

Chief Justice

OPINION DELIVERED: June 27, 2025

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