United States Institute of Peace v. Kenneth Jackson

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

____________

No. 25-5185 September Term, 2024

1:25-cv-00804-BAH

Filed On: June 27, 2025

United States Institute of Peace, et al.,

Appellees

v.

Kenneth Jackson, in his official capacity as

Assistant to the Administrator for

Management and Resources for USAID and

in his purported capacity as acting president

of the United States Institute of Peace, et al.,

Appellants

BEFORE: Katsas, Rao, and Walker, Circuit Judges

ORDER

Upon consideration of the emergency motion for stay pending appeal and an

immediate administrative stay, the opposition thereto, and the reply, it is

ORDERED that the motion for stay pending appeal be granted. The Government

has shown that (1) it “is likely to succeed on the merits,” (2) it “will be irreparably injured

absent a stay,” (3) a stay will not “substantially injure” other interested parties, and (4) a

stay is in the “public interest.” See Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 434 (2009).

I. Background

Congress created the United States Institute of Peace in 1984 as “an

independent, nonprofit, national institute” designed “to promote international peace and

the resolution of conflicts among the nations and peoples of the world without recourse

to violence.” 22 U.S.C. § 4601(b). The Institute is governed by a fifteen-member board,

comprised of three ex officio members — the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense,

and president of the National Defense University — and twelve members appointed by

the President and confirmed by the Senate. Id. § 4605(b). The twelve appointed

members are statutorily insulated from at-will removal by the President. Id. § 4605(f)

(specifying removal restrictions).

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

____________

No. 25-5185 September Term, 2024

On February 19, 2025, President Trump issued an executive order directing that

the “non-statutory components and functions” of the Institute “shall be eliminated to the

maximum extent consistent with applicable law” and that the Institute “shall reduce the

performance of [its] statutory functions and associated personnel to the minimum

presence and function required by law.” Exec. Order No. 14,217 § 2, 90 Fed. Reg.

10577, 10577 (Feb. 19, 2025). Following that order, on March 14, 2025, President

Trump terminated the Institute’s appointed members without invoking the criteria in

22 U.S.C. § 4605(f). United States Institute of Peace v. Jackson, No. 25-cv-804, 2025

WL 1428641, *7 (D.D.C. May 19, 2025). The three remaining ex officio members then

replaced the Institute’s president and transferred the Institute’s headquarters building to

the General Services Administration, among other contested actions. Id. at *7, *10; see

22 U.S.C. § 4606(a) (authorizing Board to appoint and remove the Institute’s president).

Five of the removed board members challenged their terminations as unlawful.

United States Institute of Peace, 2025 WL 1428641 at *10. They requested

reinstatement and further argued that after their removals, “all subsequent actions taken

on behalf of [the Institute] under defendants’ leadership” are invalid. Id. at *10, *12.

The district court agreed. It entered a permanent injunction reinstating the removed

board members and unwinding various actions taken by the ex officio members during

the removed members’ absences. Id. at *45-47.

II. Likelihood of Success on the Merits

As a general rule, the President may remove executive officers at will. Seila Law

LLC v. CFPB, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2206 (2020). The Supreme Court has recognized a

narrow exception for “multimember expert agencies that do not wield substantial

executive power” and that exercise “quasi-judicial” or “quasi-legislative” power. Id. at

2199-2200. Because the Institute exercises substantial executive power, the

Government is likely to succeed on its claim that the Board’s removal protections are

unconstitutional.1

1

Although Congress structured the Institute as a nonprofit corporation, it “is part of the

federal government for constitutional separation-of-powers purposes.” United States

Institute of Peace v. Jackson, No. 25-cv-804, 2025 WL 1428641, *20 (D.D.C. May 19,

2025); Herron v. Fannie Mae, 861 F.3d 160, 167 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (“a corporation is part

of the Government for constitutional purposes when: (1) the Government creates the

corporation by special law, (2) for the furtherance of governmental objectives, and

(3) retains for itself permanent authority to appoint a majority of the directors of that

corporation” (cleaned up)).

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

____________

No. 25-5185 September Term, 2024

The record shows that the Institute engages in extensive activities within the

domain of the President’s foreign affairs powers. According to declarations submitted

by the plaintiffs, the Institute “has engaged in peacebuilding with conflict parties, armed

groups, key civil society actors, and other stakeholders” abroad. Robinson Decl. ¶ 4,

Dkt. No. 20-11. For example, the Institute brought together “trusted Palestinian, Israeli,

and regional interlocutors to work together on problem-solving related to post-conflict

recovery and stabilization in Gaza.” Id. ¶ 6. It also fielded requests from the

government of the Philippines “to discreetly facilitate ceasefire efforts” between it and a

rebel group. Harding Decl. ¶ 6, Dkt. No. 20-8. In Afghanistan, the Institute rented an

office in Kabul to “convene a variety of Afghan and international stakeholders . . . and

create[ ] a neutral space for peacebuilders to engage in open dialogue.” Worden Decl.

¶ 5, Dkt. No. 20-34. And the Institute facilitated “informal conversations with the

Azerbaijani and Armenian Embassies about what would be needed . . . to reach a

peace agreement ending their 30-plus year war.” Dale Decl. ¶ 6, Dkt. No. 20-9. We

agree with the Government that “[f]acilitating the foreign policy of the United States by

brokering peace among warring parties on the international stage is plainly an exercise

of executive power under our Constitution.” Stay Mot. at 11.

The Institute also shapes foreign affairs in the interest of the United States

through the exercise of soft power. For example, it provides “stipends, grants,

fellowships, and other support to . . . leaders and scholars” from abroad and “conduct[s]

training, symposia, and continuing education programs” for “noncitizens.” 22 U.S.C.

§ 4604(b)(1), (6). These are not merely “investigative and informative activities,” contra

United States Institute of Peace, 2025 WL 1428641 at *29 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo,

424 U.S. 1, 137 (1976)), but soft-power initiatives intended “to further the Nation’s

interest in promoting international peace,” 22 U.S.C. § 4601(a)(7). The Institute does all

this while authorized to use “‘United States’ or ‘U.S.’ or any other reference to the

United States Government or Nation in its title or in its corporate seal, emblem, badge,

or other mark of recognition.” Id. § 4603(e)(2).

The President’s inability to control the Institute’s exercise of these “significant

executive power[s]” undermines his ability to set and pursue his foreign policy

objectives. Seila Law, 140 S. Ct. at 2192; cf. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export

Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936) (the President is the “sole organ of the federal

government in the field of international relations”). For that reason, the Government is

likely to succeed on its claim that the Board’s removal restrictions violate Article II.

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United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

____________

No. 25-5185 September Term, 2024

III. Remaining Stay Factors

The remaining factors favor a stay.

The President faces irreparable harm from not being able to fully exercise his

executive powers. That harm outweighs any harm the removed board members may

face. Trump v. Wilcox, 145 S. Ct. 1415, 1415 (2025) (“the Government faces greater

risk of harm from an order allowing a removed officer to continue exercising the

executive power than a wrongfully removed officer faces from being unable to perform

her statutory duty”). And finally, a stay is in the public interest because the people

elected the President, not the removed board members, to wield the executive power.

* * *

For these reasons, the Government has met its burden for a stay pending

appeal.

Per Curiam

FOR THE COURT:

Clifton B. Cislak, Clerk

BY: /s/

Selena R. Gancasz

Deputy Clerk

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