The opinion
2025 IL 130344
IN THE
SUPREME COURT
OF
THE STATE OF ILLINOIS
(Docket No. 130344)
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v.
KRYSTLE HOFFMAN, Appellee.
Opinion filed June 26, 2025.
CHIEF JUSTICE THEIS delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Justices Overstreet, Holder White, and Cunningham concurred in the judgment
and opinion.
Justice O’Brien dissented, with opinion, joined by Justices Neville and
Rochford.
OPINION
¶1 This issue in this appeal is whether section 5-4-1(c-1.5) of the Unified Code of
Corrections (Code) (730 ILCS 5/5-4-1(c-1.5) (West 2022)) permits the trial court
to deviate from the otherwise mandatory minimum prison term for drug-induced
homicide. The Kendall County circuit court found that the statute did not permit a
sentencing deviation for that offense. The appellate court determined, however, that
it did. 2023 IL App (2d) 230067, ¶ 40. For the reasons that follow, we hold that
section 5-4-1(c-1.5) does not allow a sentencing deviation for drug-induced
homicide, as that construction of the statute would lead to absurd results. Therefore,
we reverse the judgment of the appellate court, in part.
¶2 BACKGROUND
¶3 Defendant Krystle Hoffman was charged with the drug-induced homicide of
Lorna Haseltine. On August 12, 2017, Haseltine texted defendant to inquire
whether her boyfriend could obtain heroin for Haseltine. Defendant responded that
her roommate, Mark Matthews, would have heroin that afternoon. Haseltine then
wired money to defendant via Western Union. Defendant retrieved the money and
drove Matthews to Haseltine’s home, where Matthews handed Haseltine the heroin.
Shortly thereafter, Haseltine went upstairs to take a bath. Sometime later, her nine-
year-old son checked on her and began screaming that she would not wake up. An
autopsy report attributed her death to heroin laced with other substances, including
fentanyl. About one year later, the police interviewed defendant. Although
defendant was not herself a drug user, she ultimately acknowledged arranging for
Matthews to give Haseltine heroin.
¶4 On September 14, 2022, defense counsel informed the trial court that defendant
intended to enter an open guilty plea to drug-induced homicide and asked to be
sentenced under the recently enacted section 5-4-1(c-1.5) of the Code, although the
State did not agree that the statute applied. After the State presented the factual
basis, the trial court accepted defendant’s guilty plea.
¶5 At the sentencing hearing, the State presented the text messages between
Haseltine and defendant, a document showing the Western Union transfer, and the
video of defendant’s interview with police. Haseltine’s father testified regarding
the events on the day she died, and her sister read a victim impact statement
attesting to her family’s trauma and emotional suffering, including the deprivation
experienced by Haseltine’s son.
-2-
¶6 Several of defendant’s friends and family members testified on her behalf. Their
collective testimony indicated that defendant was a hard worker, was against drug
use, and would often help others. She was naïve, however, rather than a leader.
Suzanne Rubin, a psychotherapist, testified that defendant was not a threat to the
public and was at a low risk for recidivism as to this offense. In addition, Karen L.
Smith’s psychosocial evaluation revealed that defendant was a slow learner, as well
as a people pleaser, and struggled with codependency. The presentence
investigation report showed that defendant had no criminal background but had
been sentenced to supervision for driving under the influence of alcohol after being
charged in this case. In elocution, defendant acknowledged that what she did was
wrong and apologized to Haseltine’s family.
¶7 The parties disputed whether, under section 5-4-1(c-1.5) of the Code, the trial
court could deviate from the mandatory minimum prison sentence required for
drug-induced homicide. Section 5-4-1(c-1.5) permits a trial court to deviate from a
mandatory prison term when, among other things, “the offense involves the use or
possession of drugs.” 730 ILCS 5/5-4-1(c-1.5) (West 2022).
¶8 The State argued that the statute referred to the “use” or “possession” of drugs
but omitted “delivery,” which is required to commit drug-induced homicide.
Defendant did not use drugs, and although Matthews possessed them, defendant
did not. According to the State, the statute was only intended to address “minimum
sentencing laws that were imposed in the ’80s for drug cases” and drug users who
were imprisoned for having an addiction. Sentencing a defendant to probation for
killing someone would be absurd.
¶9 Defense counsel argued that this case clearly involved the “use” of heroin but
acknowledged that the statute did not specify whether it applied to a defendant’s
“use” or a victim’s “use.” Additionally, the statute applied to drug-induced
homicide because that offense required “delivery” and delivery required
“possession.” Defense counsel further argued that, because the statute was
ambiguous, it should be interpreted in defendant’s favor.
¶ 10 The trial court found that, if section 5-4-1(c-1.5) applied, “it may very well be
that a term of probation would be appropriate under the very specific facts of this
case.” Yet the court surmised that “the phrase use or possession of drugs in
conjunction with a mandatory minimum sentence as set forth in the statute does not
-3-
apply to the offense of drug-induced homicide, a Class X felony.” The trial court
imposed the minimum six-year prison term.
¶ 11 The appellate court vacated Hoffman’s sentence and remanded this matter for
a new sentencing hearing. 2023 IL App (2d) 230067. The appellate court held that
drug-induced homicide constitutes an offense that “involves the use or possession
of drugs” within the unambiguous meaning of section 5-4-1(c-1.5), which
permitted the trial court to deviate from the mandatory minimum prison term. Id.
¶¶ 31-33, 38, 40. Because drug-induced homicide requires a defendant to commit
the offense of delivery and delivery requires possession, the court opined that
possession is closely involved with delivery and drug-induced homicide. Id. ¶¶ 32-
33. Moreover, under the statute, a defendant convicted of drug-induced homicide
would nonetheless be subject to a mandatory prison term if she posed a risk to
public safety or if the interest of justice did not require a sentencing deviation. Id.
¶ 39.
¶ 12 Justice Jorgensen specially concurred. She agreed that the statute’s plain
language supported the majority’s holding but expressed concern that the
legislative history showed that the legislature did not intend for the statute to apply
broadly to all delivery offenses. Id. ¶¶ 61-63 (Jorgensen, J., specially concurring).
She urged the legislature to clarify its intent if this was the case. Id. ¶ 63.
¶ 13 We allowed the State’s petition for leave to appeal. Ill. S. Ct. R. 315(a) (eff.
Dec. 7, 2023).
¶ 14 ANALYSIS
¶ 15 The issue before us is the proper construction of section 5-4-1(c-1.5) and
whether it authorizes a trial court to deviate from the mandatory minimum prison
sentence for drug-induced homicide.
¶ 16 Our primary objective in construing a statute is to ascertain and effectuate the
legislature’s intent. People v. Burge, 2021 IL 125642, ¶ 20. The best indication of
that intent is the statute’s plain language, given its ordinary meaning. People v.
Wells, 2023 IL 127169, ¶ 31. Where a statute’s language is clear and unambiguous,
we must effectuate the statute’s meaning without consulting other aids of statutory
-4-
construction. People v. Davidson, 2023 IL 127538, ¶ 14. Where a statute is
ambiguous, however, we must consult extrinsic tools. People v. Boyce, 2015 IL
117108, ¶ 22.
¶ 17 Section 5-4-1(c-1.5) of the Code states:
“Notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary, in imposing a
sentence for an offense that requires a mandatory minimum sentence of
imprisonment, the court may instead sentence the offender to probation,
conditional discharge, or a lesser term of imprisonment it deems appropriate if:
(1) the offense involves the use or possession of drugs, retail theft, or driving
on a revoked license due to unpaid financial obligations; (2) the court finds that
the defendant does not pose a risk to public safety; and (3) the interest of justice
requires imposing a term of probation, conditional discharge, or a lesser term
of imprisonment. The court must state on the record its reasons for imposing
probation, conditional discharge, or a lesser term of imprisonment.” (Emphasis
added.) 730 ILCS 5/5-4-1(c-1.5) (West 2022).
¶ 18 Initially, we observe that this statute is not a model of clarity in legislative
drafting. The legislature seemingly intended to allow the trial court to depart from
mandatory minimum prison terms for certain offenses that it deemed to be less
serious. Beyond that, little is clear. Nonetheless, our construction must be guided
by the language of the statute and well-settled principles of statutory construction.
¶ 19 Here, the parties dispute what it means for an offense to constitute one that
“involves the *** possession of drugs,” focusing on the term “involves.” Id.
¶ 20 The State argues that the legislature modified the “possession of drugs” with
the word “involves” because Illinois recognizes not just one offense for the mere
possession of drugs but several possession offenses spread across several acts. See
720 ILCS 570/402 (West 2022); 720 ILCS 646/60 (West 2022); 720 ILCS 550/4
(West 2022). The State suggests that the legislature unambiguously referred to an
offense that “involves” drug possession as an alternative to listing every statutory
possession offense. Thus, the legislature did not intend to allow sentencing
deviations for offenses that involve additional conduct beyond mere possession.
-5-
¶ 21 Defendant contends that, by modifying “possession of drugs” with the word
“involves,” the legislature unambiguously intended to include offenses beyond
mere possession. She argues that, because one cannot deliver what one does not
possess, section 5-4-1(c-1.5) encompasses the delivery of drugs. See, e.g., 720
ILCS 570/102(h) (West 2022) (stating that under the Illinois Controlled Substances
Act, “ ‘delivery’ means the actual, constructive or attempted transfer of possession
of a controlled substance, with or without consideration”). Defendant further asserts
that, because drug-induced homicide requires the delivery of drugs (720 ILCS 5/9-
3.3(a) (West 2022)), section 5-4-1(c-1.5) also encompasses drug-induced homicide.
¶ 22 A statute is ambiguous if reasonably well-informed persons could understand it
in multiple ways. People v. Lighthart, 2023 IL 128398, ¶ 39. In addition, ambiguity
is a question of statutory context, not definitional possibilities. Slepicka v. Illinois
Department of Public Health, 2014 IL 116927, ¶ 14. If a statutory term has multiple
definitions that would each make some sense in the statute’s context, the statute is
ambiguous. Id. We review matters of statutory construction de novo. People v. Fair,
2024 IL 128373, ¶ 61.
¶ 23 We find section 5-4-1(c-1.5) to be ambiguous. A reasonably well-informed
person could understand this statute to allow the trial court to deviate from a
mandatory sentence for any offense that requires mere drug possession, to the
exclusion of other conduct, regardless of where the offense appears in the Criminal
Code. A reasonably well-informed person could also, however, understand the
statute to permit the trial court to deviate from a mandatory minimum prison term
for any offense that includes the possession of drugs in addition to other conduct.
In short, reasonably well-informed persons could understand “involves” in multiple
ways.
¶ 24 Dictionary definitions provide no clarity here. The word “involve” is
susceptible to several meanings. The term “involve” means “to have within or as
part of itself” but also “to relate closely: connect.” (Emphasis added.) Merriam-
Webster Online Dictionary, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
involves (last visited Apr. 29, 2025) [https://perma.cc/7JN5-DBH3].
¶ 25 As defendant argues, delivery and drug-induced homicide each have drug
possession “within or as part of itself.” On the other hand, the State’s assertion that
drug-induced homicide is a far cry from mere drug possession—i.e., drug-induced
-6-
homicide is not “closely” related to mere drug possession—is also well taken. The
respective definitions ascribed to “involves” by each party make some sense within
the context of this statute. This supports our determination that the statute is
ambiguous. See People v. Beachem, 229 Ill. 2d 237, 246 (2008) (finding the statute
to be ambiguous because “custody” has several definitions and the statute’s context
did not indicate the appropriate definition to apply).
¶ 26 Having determined that the statute is ambiguous, we must resort to extrinsic
tools of statutory interpretation. Boyce, 2015 IL 117108, ¶ 22. Where a statute is
ambiguous, courts may examine legislative history and debates to ascertain the
legislature’s intent. People v. Reyes, 2023 IL 128461, ¶ 32.
¶ 27 Defendant and the State each argue that the legislative history behind section 5-
4-1(c-1.5) supports their respective positions. We conclude that it supports neither
party.
¶ 28 The provision in question was introduced as part of House Bill 1587 on January
30, 2019, and was amended four times. 101st Ill. Gen. Assem., House Bill 1587,
2019 Sess. The first two amendments broadened the offenses that would be
excluded from the deviations permitted by the statute. Id. (as amended March 14
and March 21, 2019). The third, however, eliminated the list of exclusions and
instead enumerated the offenses that would be eligible for a sentencing deviation,
including an offense that “involves the possession of drugs.” Id. (amended April 4,
2019). The fourth and final amendment narrowed eligible offenses for driving on a
revoked license to those in which the license was revoked due to unpaid financial
obligations. Id. (amended April 5, 2019). That amendment also added eligibility for
offenses involving the “use” of drugs. Id.
¶ 29 Defendant states that it is significant that the legislature added drug “use” to the
list of eligible offenses. She has not, however, explained the import of that
significance. We also observe that, because a person must “possess” a drug to “use”
it, the addition of “use” undermines defendant’s argument that section 5-4-1(c-1.5)
encompasses delivery offenses solely because delivery requires possession. Such
reasoning would seemingly render the term “use” superfluous because use, like
delivery, necessarily entails possession. See Fair, 2024 IL 128373, ¶ 61
(recognizing that a statute must be construed as a whole so that, if possible, no term
is rendered superfluous).
-7-
¶ 30 Defendant further argues that legislators’ remarks during debates show that the
legislature intended to return offenders to society (101st Ill. Gen. Assem., House
Proceedings, Apr. 11, 2019, at 179-80 (statements of Representative Connor)) and
undo the general harm done by mandatory minimums (id. at 180 (statements of
Representative Skillicorn)). Examining the debates more closely, those comments
shed no light on which offenders should be returned to society or which mandatory
minimums were considered to have been unduly harmful.
¶ 31 During House debates on House Bill 1587, Representative Sonya Harper, one
of the bill’s sponsors, stated that it allowed “judges to sentence an offender to a
sentence less than the statutory minimum when it makes sense.” Id. at 175
(statements of Representative Harper). In opposition, Representative Terri Bryant
remarked that the bill permitted deviations for “a whole plethora of charges,”
including “drug-induced homicides.” Id. at 175-76 (statements of Representative
Bryant). Representative Mark Batinick then asked whether it was correct that the
bill would make mandatory minimums optional. Id. at 176 (statements of
Representative Batinick). Representative Harper responded, “No, I believe there’s
a misunderstanding about the [b]ill. *** [T]his [b]ill only refers to offenses only
involving drug use or possession, retail theft, or driving on a revoked license for
unpaid financial obligation.” Id. (statements of Representative Harper).
¶ 32 We reject the State’s assertion that Representative Harper’s reference to a
misunderstanding was clearly directed at Representative Bryant’s belief that the
statute would apply to drug-induced homicide. Rather, that reference immediately
followed Representative Batinick’s question and may have been limited to the
suggestion that the trial court could deviate from a mandatory prison term for any
offense. We further note that Representative Harper merely recited the provision’s
language without clarifying its scope.
¶ 33 During Senate proceedings, Senator Steve McClure questioned why the
category of an offense that “involves the use or possession of drugs” was “so
ambiguous” and “so broad” compared to the “very specific” offenses of retail theft
and driving on a revoked license due to unpaid financial obligations. 101st Ill. Gen.
Assem., Senate Proceedings, May 24, 2019, at 16-17 (statements of Senator
McClure). He observed that even Class X aggravated criminal sexual assault based
on delivering a controlled substance to the victim would be eligible for a deviation
-8-
and remarked that “judges, for whatever reason, *** can make very poor decisions
on the wrong day.” Id. at 17-18. Senator McClure concluded that this was “bad
legislation.” Id. at 19.
¶ 34 Defendant argues that, despite these comments, the statute was enacted without
altering its language, showing that the legislature intended to adopt the broad
meaning discussed by Senator McClure. Defendant ignores, however, that
following Senator McClure’s comments, House Bill 1587 failed to pass in the
Senate. 101st Ill. Gen. Assem., House Bill 1587, 2019 Sess. (failed to pass in the
Senate, was placed on postponed consideration, and ultimately adjourned sine die);
101st Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate Proceedings, May 24, 2019, at 20-21. Instead, the
provision was subsequently included verbatim in House Bill 3653 and passed with
no acknowledgement of Senator McClure’s prior remarks. 101st Ill. Gen. Assem.,
House Bill 3653, 2019 Sess. Thus, the passage of House Bill 3653 does not signify
an endorsement of Senator McClure’s prior interpretation of the statute during
debates on House Bill 1587.
¶ 35 Representative Justin Slaughter, House Bill 3653’s chief sponsor, stated that
the statute provided “more judicial discretion for lower level, non-violent offenses.”
101st Ill. Gen. Assem., House Proceedings, Jan. 13, 2021, at 7 (statements of
Representative Slaughter). Yet, we note that even a simple possession offense may
constitute a Class X felony. See, e.g., 720 ILCS 646/60(4) (West 2022) (stating that
possession of 100 grams or more of methamphetamine constitutes a Class X
felony). Accordingly, we also reject the State’s suggestion that Representative
Slaughter’s view of House Bill 3653 demonstrates the legislature’s intent.
¶ 36 In short, the legislative history here does not clarify what the collective
legislative body intended when section 5-4-1(c-1.5) was enacted. Instead, it reflects
individual legislators talking past one another. People v. R.L., 158 Ill. 2d 432, 442
(1994) (recognizing that courts generally give individual legislators’ comments
little weight, as the collective body’s intent guides our construction).
¶ 37 Among the many guides for interpreting an ambiguous statute is our
consideration of the consequences of any given interpretation. Solon v. Midwest
Medical Records, Ass’n, 236 Ill. 2d 433, 441 (2010). We may reject an otherwise
reasonable interpretation of a statute if that interpretation would lead to absurd
results. See Wells, 2023 IL 127169, ¶ 31 (stating that this court must presume the
-9-
legislature did not intend absurdity). We find that defendant’s interpretation of
section 5-4-1(c-1.5) would indeed lead to absurd results.
¶ 38 Defendant’s expansive reading of the statute would permit a trial court to
deviate from a mandatory minimum prison term for any offense that encompasses
drug possession, which, as we have noted, implicates delivery. In turn, a sentencing
court could deviate from a mandatory prison term with respect to any offense that
includes delivery. Many offenses requiring delivery constitute Class X offenses that
are subject to mandatory minimum prison terms (730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-25(d) (West
2022)) and would therefore be eligible for sentencing deviations under defendant’s
interpretation of section 5-4-1(c-1.5). See, e.g., 720 ILCS 5/31A-1.2(c), (e) (West
2022) (Class X unauthorized delivery of contraband, including controlled
substances, to an inmate); 720 ILCS 570/407(b)(1) (West 2022) (Class X delivery
of a controlled substance within 500 feet of a school when minors are present); 720
ILCS 5/33G-3(e)(4), 33G-4, 33G-5 (West 2022) (Class X racketeering predicated
on methamphetamine delivery). For several reasons, we find that casting such a
broad net would lead to absurd results.
¶ 39 As the offense of drug-induced homicide shows, offenses that require delivery
may lead to another’s death. See 720 ILCS 5/9-3.3(a) (West 2022). Delivery of a
controlled substance, or even possession, may be a component of felony murder
(id. § 9-1(a)(3)), which is also subject to a mandatory minimum prison term (730
ILCS 5/5-4.5-20 (West 2022)). See 720 ILCS 5/33A-2(a) (West 2022); People v.
Trowers, 215 Ill. App. 3d 862, 865-66 (1991) (recognizing that armed violence may
be predicated on possession of a controlled substance); People v. Greer, 336 Ill.
App. 3d 965, 971 (2003) (recognizing that armed violence based on delivery of a
controlled substance may constitute a forcible felony, serving as a predicate for
felony murder). We find that it would be absurd for the legislature to extend the
same sentencing grace to a defendant who merely possesses drugs and a defendant
whose actions lead to someone’s death.
¶ 40 As the State observes, certain Class X offenses may also be committed by
deliberately delivering drugs to a victim as a tool to further violate the victim’s
person. Class X predatory criminal sexual assault of a child, for example, may be
committed by “deliver[ing] *** any controlled substance to the victim.” 720 ILCS
5/11-1.40(a)(2)(D), (b) (West 2022). Similarly, a person may commit Class X
- 10 -
aggravated criminal sexual assault by “deliver[ing] *** any controlled substance to
the victim.” Id. § 11-1.30(a)(7), (d). Under defendant’s interpretation of section 5-
4-1(c-1.5), a trial court could find such offenses where the defendant weaponized
the delivery of drugs eligible for sentencing deviations. We find that this too renders
defendant’s construction of the statute inherently absurd. Simply put, there is no
reason why a defendant’s use of drugs against another would reduce the defendant’s
culpability.
¶ 41 Moreover, certain offenses may be committed both with and without the
delivery of drugs. For example, the foregoing offense of predatory criminal sexual
assault of a child may be committed by delivering drugs to the victim but may also
be committed by being armed with a firearm. Id. § 11-1.40(a)(2)(A), (d).
Aggravated criminal sexual assault may be committed through the delivery of drugs
but may also be committed by displaying a dangerous weapon. Id. § 11-1.30(a)(1),
(7), (d). Similarly, a person may confine a child for the purpose of committing the
Class X offense of promoting juvenile prostitution “by administering to the child
*** any *** drug” or by administering alcohol. Id. § 11-14.4(a)(4), (d). Defendant
has failed to identify any conceivable reason why the legislature would empower
the trial court to return to society individuals who commit offenses by weaponizing
drugs but deny the trial court’s authority to do the same for defendants who commit
the same offenses through other means.
¶ 42 Defendant argues that section 5-4-1(c-1.5)’s other requirements—that the
defendant is not a threat to public safety and that the interest of justice require a
sentencing deviation—ameliorate these absurdities. Those requirements, however,
do not explain why the legislature would make sentencing relief available for the
aforementioned delivery offenses in the first instance.
¶ 43 In light of the presumption that the legislature did not intend absurd results,
section 5-4-1(c-1.5)’s reference to an offense that “involves the *** possession of
drugs” cannot mean any offense that includes or necessarily entails possession and,
in turn, delivery.
¶ 44 In contrast, the State’s interpretation of what it means for an offense to
“involve[ ] the *** possession of drugs” does not lead to absurd results. The State
contends that such language refers to any offense criminalizing the mere possession
of drugs, regardless of what enactment the offense appears in. This interpretation
- 11 -
furthers the legislature’s purpose of alleviating the effects of mandatory minimum
prison terms, as some offenders will be entitled to a sentencing deviation.
¶ 45 We hold that section 5-4-1(c-1.5)’s reference to an offense that involves drug
possession authorizes a trial court to deviate from a mandatory minimum prison
term for the mere possession of drugs, not for any and all offenses that implicate
drug possession, provided that the statute’s other requirements are satisfied.
¶ 46 In reaching this determination, we reject defendant’s assertion that the rule of
lenity requires us to construe the statute in her favor. Under that rule, a court adopts
a more lenient interpretation of a criminal statute where, after applying traditional
tools of statutory construction, an ambiguous statute remains. People v. Gaytan,
2015 IL 116223, ¶ 39.
¶ 47 Here, we have resolved the specific ambiguity before us by using traditional
tools of statutory construction to determine the legislature’s intent. Consequently,
we are not presented with a grievous ambiguity requiring us to apply the rule of
lenity. See People v. Gutman, 2011 IL 110338, ¶ 44 (distinguishing between an
ambiguity and a “grievous ambiguity”).
¶ 48 Finally, although well-settled rules of statutory construction have enabled us to
resolve the specific ambiguity before us, our review of the statute and the parties’
arguments has revealed several hurdles to understanding and applying section 5-4-
1(c-1.5). We briefly touch on them here.
¶ 49 The statute refers to an offense that involves the “use” of drugs, but neither the
Controlled Substances Act (720 ILCS 570/100 et. seq. (West 2022)), the
Methamphetamine Control and Community Protection Act (720 ILCS 646/1
et. seq. (West 2022)), nor the Cannabis Control Act (720 ILCS 550/1 et seq. (West
2022)) criminalizes drug “use.” Instead, they criminalize conduct such as
possession, delivery, manufacturing, and trafficking. See 720 ILCS 570/401, 401.1,
402 (West 2022); 720 ILCS 646/15, 55, 56, 60 (West 2022); 720 ILCS 550/4, 5.1,
5.2, 6 (West 2022). Additionally, section 5-4-1(c-1.5) does not define “drugs.”
Although the statute encompasses offenses involving “retail theft or driving on a
revoked license due to unpaid financial obligations,” the parties dispute when, if
ever, those offenses are subject to a mandatory minimum prison term, as is required
for the statute to apply. Moreover, licenses are generally not “revoked” due to
- 12 -
unpaid financial obligations; they are “suspended.” See 625 ILCS 5/7-303(a), (b),
7-702(c) (West 2022); see also id. § 7-205(a).
¶ 50 For the benefit of defendants, the public, and the courts, we urge the legislature
to revisit this statute to ensure that the language employed clearly reflects the
legislature’s intent.
¶ 51 CONCLUSION
¶ 52 For the foregoing reasons, we hold that section 5-4-1(c-1.5) permits the trial
court to deviate from a mandatory minimum prison term where an offense
criminalizes the mere possession of drugs, regardless of what enactment the offense
appears in. The statute does not authorize a deviation for offenses that include
possession in addition to other conduct, including the conduct involved in drug-
induced homicide. Recognizing this, the trial court correctly sentenced defendant
to the mandatory minimum six-year prison term for that offense. Accordingly, we
reverse the appellate court’s judgment to the extent that the court vacated
defendant’s prison sentence and affirm the appellate court’s judgment in all other
respects. The appellate court also remanded with directions to set the manner and
method of paying restitution, and we do not disturb this portion of the appellate
court’s judgment.
¶ 53 Appellate court judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part.
¶ 54 Circuit court judgment affirmed and remanded with directions.
¶ 55 JUSTICE O’BRIEN, dissenting:
¶ 56 I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the sentence reduction statute
(730 ILCS 5/5-4-1(c-1.5) (West 2022)) is ambiguous and does not apply to the
offense of drug-induced homicide. See supra ¶¶ 1, 23. I also disagree with the
majority’s speculative belief that the application of the sentence reduction statute
to the instant case will lead to absurd results in the future. Supra ¶ 38. Because I
would find that the sentence reduction statute is unambiguous and applicable to the
offense of drug-induced homicide, I dissent.
- 13 -
¶ 57 The question to be answered in this appeal is whether the sentence reduction
statute (730 ILCS 5/5-4-1(c-1.5) (West 2022)) applies to the offense of drug-
induced homicide. “This is a question of statutory interpretation, and as such the
principles guiding our analysis are well established.” People v. Swift, 202 Ill. 2d
378, 385 (2002). This court’s primary objective when interpreting a statute is to
give effect to the legislature’s intent. Id. Importantly, it is the statutory text that best
reflects the legislature’s intent. People v. Grant, 2022 IL 126824, ¶ 24. When the
statutory text is clear and unambiguous, a court may not depart from the plain
language and meaning of the statute by reading into it exceptions, limitations, or
conditions that the legislature did not express. Id. ¶ 25 (citing King v. First Capital
Financial Services Corp., 215 Ill. 2d 1, 26 (2005), and In re Marriage of Beyer,
324 Ill. App. 3d 305, 309-10 (2001)). If we can determine the legislative intent from
the plain language of the statute, we must give that intent effect without resorting
to other interpretive aids or consideration of the legislative history of the statute.
Roberts v. Alexandria Transportation, Inc., 2021 IL 126249, ¶ 44; People v.
De Filippo, 235 Ill. 2d 377, 384 (2009); People v. Roberts, 214 Ill. 2d 106, 116
(2005); Eden Retirement Center, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 213 Ill. 2d 273,
292 (2004) (citing Envirite Corp. v. Illinois Environmental Protection Agency, 158
Ill. 2d 210, 216-17 (1994)); County of Du Page v. Graham, Anderson, Probst &
White, Inc., 109 Ill. 2d 143, 151 (1985); Illinois Power Co. v. Mahin, 72 Ill. 2d 189,
194 (1978) (citing Western National Bank of Cicero v. Village of Kildeer, 19 Ill. 2d
342, 350 (1960)).
¶ 58 The sentence reduction statute states:
“(c-1.5) Notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary, in
imposing a sentence for an offense that requires a mandatory minimum sentence
of imprisonment, the court may instead sentence the offender to probation,
conditional discharge, or a lesser term of imprisonment it deems appropriate if:
(1) the offense involves the use or possession of drugs, retail theft, or driving
on a revoked license due to unpaid financial obligations; (2) the court finds that
the defendant does not pose a risk to public safety; and (3) the interest of justice
requires imposing a term of probation, conditional discharge, or a lesser term
of imprisonment. The court must state on the record its reasons for imposing
probation, conditional discharge, or a lesser term of imprisonment.” 730 ILCS
5/5-4-1(c-1.5) (West 2022).
- 14 -
¶ 59 The statute provides the trial court discretion to impose a sentence below the
mandatory minimum term in three instances: if “the offense involves the use or
possession of drugs, retail theft, or driving on a revoked license due to unpaid
financial obligations.” Id. The majority finds ambiguity in both the individual
word—“involves”—and the relevant nine words—“the offense involves the use or
possession of drugs.” The majority believes a reasonable person could read the
sentence reduction statute as applicable only to “mere drug possession” offenses
but also as applying to offenses that include drug possession “in addition to other
conduct.” Supra ¶ 23. Likewise, the majority believes that “well-informed persons
could understand ‘involves’ in multiple ways.” Supra ¶ 23. I emphasize that the
common understanding and usage of the term “involves” in our everyday
vocabulary is not an abstract or amorphous concept. Using this unambiguous term,
the legislature’s intent is crystal clear—if the offense involves the use or possession
of drugs and the other requirements of the statute are met, the defendant is eligible
for a lesser sentence. See 730 ILCS 5/5-4-1(c-1.5) (West 2022). This language
cannot be reasonably read to apply only to a narrow and specific subset of drug
possession offenses. The majority’s opposite conclusion that a reasonable person
could interpret this language as applicable only to “mere drug possession” offenses
violates the cardinal rule of statutory construction that a court “may not depart from
the plain language and meaning of a statute by reading into the statute exceptions,
limitations, or conditions that the legislature did not express.” People v. Legoo,
2020 IL 124965, ¶ 14; see People v. Lighthart, 2023 IL 128398, ¶ 39 (citing
Brunton v. Kruger, 2015 IL 117663, ¶ 24, and Gaffney v. Board of Trustees of the
Orland Fire Protection District, 2012 IL 110012, ¶ 56); People v. Hardman, 2017
IL 121453, ¶ 31 (citing Roberts, 214 Ill. 2d at 116); People v. Giraud, 2012 IL
113116, ¶ 6 (citing People v. Perry, 224 Ill. 2d 312, 323-24 (2007)); People v.
Dominguez, 2012 IL 111336, ¶ 16; People v. Amigon, 239 Ill. 2d 71, 85 (2010);
People v. Rissley, 206 Ill. 2d 403, 414 (2003).
¶ 60 Because the statute does not define the term “involves,” my analysis, like the
majority’s, begins with looking to the word’s plain meaning as set forth in the
dictionary. People v. Chapman, 2012 IL 111896, ¶ 24 (“When a statute contains a
term that is not specifically defined, it is entirely appropriate to look to the
dictionary to ascertain the plain and ordinary meaning of the term.”). “Involve” is
defined as “to have within or as part of itself: include” or “to relate closely: connect”
(Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, https://www.merriam-webster.com/
- 15 -
dictionary/involve (last visited June 6, 2025) [https://perma.cc/DS3Z-NLNB]) and
“to contain as a part; include” and “to connect closely and often incriminatingly;
implicate” (American Heritage College Dictionary 716 (3d ed. 1997). Unlike the
majority, I find no conflict in the dictionary definitions of “involves.” The
dictionary definitions assign similar meanings to “involves,” such as “connect,”
“contain,” and “include.” I hold that the meaning and definition of the word
“involves” is unambiguous.
¶ 61 While the majority distorts the plain meaning of the word “involves,” it also
disregards and removes the word “use” from the statute. Specifically, the majority
focuses entirely on drug possession as an eligible offense, not drug “use or
possession” as the statute dictates. Supra ¶ 45. By focusing only on drug possession
and omitting drug use from its interpretation of the statutory text, the majority
violates the well-established principle that all words in a statute are to be considered
when construing it. People v. Casas, 2017 IL 120797, ¶ 18 (“Each word, clause,
and sentence of a statute must be given a reasonable meaning, if possible, and
should not be rendered superfluous.”). I would find the statute read in its entirety,
giving meaning to each and every word, is unambiguous.
¶ 62 The statute does not limit its applicability to specific drug use or drug
possession offenses. As the appellate court concluded, if the legislature had
intended a narrow application of section 5-4-1(c-1.5) (730 ILCS 5/5-4-1(c-1.5)
(West 2022)) incorporating only drug use and possession offenses, it would not
have employed “involves.” 2023 IL App (2d) 230067, ¶ 36. For example, instead
of using the word “involves,” the legislature could have enacted the sentence
reduction statute to unambiguously apply to a narrow and specific subset of drug
offenses if it so intended. Significantly, that is exactly what the legislature did when
addressing the sentence reduction statute’s applicability to offenses involving
“driving on a revoked license due to unpaid financial obligations.” (Emphasis
added.) 730 ILCS 5/5-4-1(c-1.5) (West 2022). The legislature was consciously
aware of its ability to include such limiting language. It therefore logically follows
that the legislature could have restricted the sentence reduction statute’s application
to offenses involving use or possession of drugs as defined in the Illinois Controlled
Substances Act (720 ILCS 570/100 et seq. (West 2022)), the Methamphetamine
Control and Community Protection Act (720 ILCS 646/1 et seq. (West 2022)), the
Cannabis Control Act (720 ILCS 550/1 et seq. (West 2022)), and the Use of
- 16 -
Intoxicating Compounds Act (720 ILCS 690/0.01 et seq. (West 2022)). Or the
legislature could have restricted the statute’s application based on the class of the
offense or the nonviolent nature of the offense. It, however, did not include any of
the above restrictions or limiting language. Instead, the legislature consciously
chose for the statute to plainly apply “if: (1) the offense involved the use or
possession of drugs.” 730 ILCS 5/5-4-1(c-1.5) (West 2022).
¶ 63 The legislature’s placement of the words “offense involves” before the words
“use or possession of drugs,” without any additional limiting language or citations
of specific criminal statutes, illustrates its unambiguous intent for the statute to
include all offenses that “involve[d] the use or possession of drugs,” as opposed to
merely applying to a possession or use of drug offense under a particular criminal
statute. See id. Put simply, the sole condition precedent to the satisfaction of this
portion of the sentence reduction statute is that the “offense involves the use or
possession of drugs.” Id. Unlike the majority, I would hold that the legislature’s
selection of this unambiguous language illustrates its clear intent to widen the
statutory scope of the sentence reduction statute to allow trial courts to exercise
discretion to impose a lower sentence in circumstances where the offense “involves
the use or possession of drugs” and the respective “public safety” and “interest of
justice” requirements of the statute are also met. Id.
¶ 64 The remaining question therefore with respect to the instant case is whether the
offense of drug-induced homicide constitutes an offense that “involves the use or
possession of drugs.” Id. The offense has two elements: (1) the defendant
“unlawfully deliver[ed] a controlled substance to another,” and (2) a “person’s
death is caused by the injection, inhalation, absorption, or ingestion of any amount
of that controlled substance.” 720 ILCS 5/9-3.3(a) (West 2018). The indictment
here alleged defendant “unlawfully delivered” heroin to Haseltine and Haseltine’s
subsequent “injection, inhalation, absorption, or ingestion” of the heroin resulted in
Haseltine’s death. The appellate court correctly explained that defendant could not
have delivered the heroin without possessing it. 2023 IL App (2d) 230067, ¶¶ 32-
33. “ ‘Deliver’ or ‘delivery’ means the actual, constructive or attempted transfer of
possession of a controlled substance, with or without consideration, whether or not
there is an agency relationship.” (Emphasis added.) 720 ILCS 570/102(h) (West
2018). The State acknowledged the applicability of this definition during the
proceedings in the trial court and conceded that “one has to possess drugs before
- 17 -
one can deliver them.” Even the majority itself tepidly acknowledges the legal truth
that one cannot knowingly deliver a drug without first knowingly possessing it.
Supra ¶¶ 25, 38. It therefore logically follows that the first element the State was
required to prove to convict defendant of drug-induced homicide—unlawful
delivery of heroin to Haseltine—unambiguously “involves” the “possession” of a
drug (heroin). Likewise, the second element the State was required to prove to
convict defendant of drug-induced homicide—Haseltine’s “injection, inhalation,
absorption, or ingestion” of the heroin resulting in her death—unambiguously
“involves” the “use” of a drug (heroin). Accordingly, I would hold that the offense
of drug-induced homicide constitutes an offense that “involves the use or
possession of drugs.”
¶ 65 For these reasons, I would affirm the appellate court’s judgment vacating
defendant’s six-year sentence and remanding this cause for the trial court to
consider whether to impose a sentence under section 5-4-1(c-1.5) of the sentence
reduction statute. 730 ILCS 5/5-4-1(c-1.5 (West 2022).
¶ 66 While the following portion of my dissent is not necessary to my dispositional
analysis above, I would be remiss if I did not offer comment on the further flawed
reasoning of the majority after it found the sentence reduction statute to be
ambiguous. Upon finding the statute ambiguous, the majority proceeds to find
ambiguity throughout the statute’s legislative history. Because I have found the
statute to be unambiguous, I offer no comment on its legislative history. People v.
Reyes, 2023 IL 128461, ¶ 30 (courts do not consider legislative history when a
statute is unambiguous). However, to summarize, the majority finds the following
ambiguous: (1) the individual word “involves” (supra ¶ 23), (2) the relevant nine
words—“the offense involves the use or possession of drugs” (supra ¶ 23), and
(3) the statute’s legislative history (supra ¶ 30). At this point, there is no remaining
text or history for the majority to examine. Ignoring this reality, the majority
curiously proceeds to reject defendant’s argument that “the rule of lenity requires
us to construe the statute in her favor.” Supra ¶ 46. The sole stated basis for the
majority’s rejection: “[W]e are not presented with a grievous ambiguity requiring
us to apply the rule of lenity.” Supra ¶ 47. Such a finding prompts the question: If
the statute in question is deemed to be ambiguous, along with the statute’s entire
legislative history, what remains to be deemed ambiguous before the existing
ambiguity qualifies to be one of a grievous nature? In pondering this question, I
- 18 -
believe the majority compounds its error by failing to apply the rule of lenity,
considering its multiple findings of ambiguity. There is simply nothing of substance
remaining for the majority to review. Put more plainly, all the ambiguity boxes have
been checked. This court, citing a case from 1820, recently stated: “In construing a
criminal statute, courts must resist the impulse to speculate regarding legislative
intent, for ‘probability is not a guide which a court, in construing a penal statute,
can safely take.’ ” People v. Hartfield, 2022 IL 126729, ¶ 69 (quoting United States
v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76, 105 (1820)); see United States v. Davis, 588
U.S. 445, 464 (2019); People v. Gaytan, 2015 IL 116223, ¶ 39; Fitzsimmons v.
Norgle, 104 Ill. 2d 369, 374 (1984). The majority violates this precedent by not
applying it to the instant case.
¶ 67 Instead of adhering to our cautionary precedent and applying the rule of lenity
in defendant’s favor, however, the majority succumbs to “the impulse to speculate
regarding legislative intent.” Hartfield, 2022 IL 126729, ¶ 69. In doing so, the
majority compares what it believes to be two reasonable interpretations of the
sentence reduction statute and proceeds to pick the one it concludes will lead to the
least absurd result. To emphasize, the majority’s entire dispositional outcome in the
instant case rests upon speculating whether the application of the sentence reduction
statute to the instant case will lead to absurd results in future hypothetical scenarios.
While the majority claims otherwise, its analysis is not grounded in “traditional
tools of statutory construction.” Supra ¶¶ 46-47. Specifically, the majority presents
a list of offenses it contends exemplify the absurd results of expansively
interpreting the sentence reduction statute to include delivery offenses that
therefore involve drug possession. These offenses include unauthorized delivery of
contraband, including controlled substances, to an inmate (720 ILCS 5/31A-1.2(c),
(e) (West 2022)); delivery of a controlled substance within 500 feet of a school
when minors are present (720 ILCS 570/407(b)(1) (West 2022)); racketeering
predicated on methamphetamine delivery (720 ILCS 5/33G-3(e)(4), 33G-4, 33G-
5, (West 2022)); felony murder predicated on delivery or possession of a controlled
substance (id. § 9-1(a)(3); 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-20 (West 2022)); armed violence
predicated on possession of a controlled substance (720 ILCS 5/33A-2(a) (West
2022)); predatory criminal sexual assault committed by delivering a controlled
substance to the victim (id. § 11-1.40(a)(2)(D), (b)); and aggravated criminal sexual
assault by delivering any controlled substance to a victim (id. § 11-1.30(a)(7), (d)).
Supra ¶¶ 38-39, 41.
- 19 -
¶ 68 Importantly, none of the above scenarios are before us today. See People v.
Bass, 2021 IL 125434, ¶ 29 (reviewing courts do not decide “moot or abstract
questions, will not review cases merely to establish precedent, and will not render
advisory opinions”). Our analysis must be limited to the case and facts presently
before us. See id. More specifically, the question is not whether a reviewing court
can contrive a hypothetical absurd result that may arise in the future if the sentence
reduction statute is applied in the instant case. The appropriate question is instead
whether the “proffered reading of a statute leads to absurd results.” Dawkins v.
Fitness International, LLC, 2022 IL 127561, ¶ 27; see Evans v. Cook County
State’s Attorney, 2021 IL 125513, ¶ 27; People v. Johnson, 2017 IL 120310, ¶ 15;
People v. Hanna, 207 Ill. 2d 486, 498 (2003). Importantly, the appropriate question
is one of present tense form, not future tense form. Reviewing the present
circumstances, I note that the trial court stated it would be inclined to sentence
defendant to a term of probation had it believed such an option was available. The
court stated: “Certainly if the court had broad discretion in imposing a sentence, it
may very well be that a term of probation would be appropriate under the very
specific facts of this case.” The majority’s creation of hypothetical scenarios it
arbitrarily finds to be absurd is not a “traditional tool[ ] of statutory construction.”
Supra ¶¶ 46-47. “ ‘[T]he absurd results doctrine should be used sparingly because
it entails the risk that the judiciary will replace legislative policy on the basis of
speculation that the legislature could not have meant what it unmistakably said.’ ”
In re D.F., 208 Ill. 2d 223, 250 (2003) (Freeman, J., specially concurring, joined by
McMorrow, C.J.) (quoting 2A Norman J. Singer, Sutherland on Statutory
Construction § 46:07, at 199 (6th ed. 2000)).
¶ 69 Lastly, the majority’s hypothetical and speculative discussion dismisses
entirely the fact that the sentence reduction statute is discretionary in nature and
contains two additional requirements that the trial court must determine exist prior
to being afforded said discretion. Specifically, the trial court must find that the
defendant poses no risk to public safety and that the interests of justice support a
reduction in the statutory minimum sentence. 730 ILCS 5/5-4-1(c-1.5) (West
2022). Here, in sentencing defendant, the trial court found that defendant did not
pose a risk to the public and that, although the State, defendant, and Haseltine’s
family all wanted to satisfy the interests of justice, there was “no agreement as to
what form that justice should take.” Unlike the majority, I will not render judgment
on cases or specific issues that may appear before this court in the future; however,
- 20 -
I will note that the legislature, via these two additional requirements, makes clear
that merely being convicted of an offense involving “use or possession of drugs”
will not automatically entitle a defendant to a reduced sentence, as the majority
seems to believe. The sentence reduction statute unambiguously requires that all
three factors are satisfied first and only then “may” the trial court impose a reduced
sentence. (Emphasis added.) Id. Indeed, the fact that the statute “may” apply to a
defendant who committed one of the hypothetical offenses proposed by the
majority does not mean that the defendant will ultimately be deemed eligible for a
reduced sentence when the other two statutory factors are considered. And even if
all three statutory factors are met, that does not mean the trial court will ultimately
exercise its discretion and sentence the defendant to a reduced sentence. The
majority chooses to ignore this reality and instead rests its entire dispositional
conclusion on hypothetical scenarios and imaginary defendants that are not before
us today.
¶ 70 To summarize, the sentence reduction statute is unambiguous. The offense of
drug-induced homicide involves both the use and possession of drugs. Accordingly,
the appellate court’s judgment vacating defendant’s six-year sentence and
remanding this cause for the trial court to consider whether to impose a sentence
under section 5-4-1(c-1.5) of the sentence reduction statute must be affirmed.
Alternatively, if both the text and legislative history of the sentence reduction
statute are ambiguous, as the majority finds, we have no choice but to apply the rule
of lenity under our existing precedent.
¶ 71 For these reasons, I dissent.
¶ 72 JUSTICES NEVILLE and ROCHFORD join in this dissent.
- 21 -