CARTER v. ALLEGHENY COUNTY JAIL

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

PITTSBURGH DIVISION

ANTHONY CARTER, )

)

) Civil Action No. 2:24-cv-00026

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. ) Christopher B. Brown

) United States Magistrate Judge

KEVIN M. KRAUS, SHERIFF OF )

ALLEGHENY COUNTY; )

)

ALLEGHENY COUNTY SHERIFF'S )

OFFICE, ALLEGHENY COUNTY, )

DEPUTY JOHN DOE #1, and )

)

DEPUTY JOHN DOE #2, )

)

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION ON MOTIONS TO DISMISS,

ECF NOS. 30 AND 32

Christopher B. Brown, United States Magistrate Judge

Pending before the Court are two motions to dismiss the Amended Complaint

for failure to state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6): a motion to dismiss filed

by Allegheny County, ECF No. 30, and a motion to dismiss filed by the Allegheny

County Sheriff’s Office and Sheriff Kevin Kraus (collectively, the “Sheriff’s Office”).

ECF No. 32. For the reasons below, the motion to dismiss filed by Allegheny

County will be granted in its entirety and the motion to dismiss filed by the Sheriff’s

Office will be granted in part and denied in part.1

1 In accordance with the provisions of 29 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1), Plaintiff and the named and

served Defendants have voluntarily consented to have a United States Magistrate Judge conduct

proceedings in this case, including trial and the entry of a final judgment. Restricted ECF Nos. 4,

24, and 25. While named and unserved parties generally must also consent for a magistrate judge to

exercise jurisdiction based on “consent of the parties” under that statute, see Burton v. Shamp, 25

F.4th 198 (3d Cir. 2022) (citing with approval Williams v. King, 875 F.3d 500 (9th Cir. 2017) and

I. Factual Background2

On November 4, 2022, Carter and his ex-girlfriend, Jessica Hooper, were in

his vehicle driving on E. Carson Street, Pittsburgh, PA, when Carter noticed a

“black vehicle speeding towards” him from behind. ECF No. 28, at 3, ¶1. The

vehicle followed Carter for about 2-3 miles before the vehicle activated its lights. Id.

Carter pulled over and Allegheny County Sheriff Deputy John Doe #1 got out of the

black vehicle and approached the driver’s side window of Carter’s vehicle. Id. John

Doe #1 told Carter he was stopped “[b]ecause your vehicle’s registration was bad.”

Id. According to Carter, this was a “lie because [he] hadn’t even had the vehicle for

6 months yet, so there was no way possible [the] vehicle’s registration could’ve been

bad.” Id. Carter gave John Doe #1 the registration and insurance information for

his vehicle. Id.

As John Doe #1 was running Carter’s license, Allegheny County Sheriff

Deputy John Doe #2 arrived as backup and approached the passenger side window

of Carter’s vehicle and started “asking a lot of questions” to both Carter and Hooper.

Id. ¶2. At some point, Carter “decide[d] to stop answering any and all questions

Coleman v. Lab. & Indus. Rev. Comm’n of Wisconsin, 860 F.3d 461 (7th Cir. 2017)), this Court is

unaware of any decision holding that consent is necessary from defendants who are both unserved

and unidentified, such as the Doe defendants here. Courts disregard such defendants in other

contexts, including contexts affecting jurisdiction. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(1) (providing that for

removal based on diversity of citizenship, “the citizenship of defendants sued under fictitious names

shall be disregarded”); Fat T, Inc. v. Aloha Tower Assocs. Piers 7, 8 & 9, 172 F.R.D. 411, 414–15 (D.

Haw. 1996) (reaching the same conclusion for diversity jurisdiction over cases first filed in federal

court). The Court therefore concludes the consent of the unserved Doe defendants here, Deputy John

Doe #1 and Deputy John Doe #2 specifically, is unnecessary to proceed under § 636(c).

2 Carter’s allegations are set forth in the Amended Complaint and are accepted as true with

all reasonable inferences drawn in the light most favorable to Tipton. See Phillips v. Cnty. of

Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 237 (3d Cir. 2008).

and invoke[d his] first and fifth amendment rights.” Id. John Doe #2 “got visibly

mad and irritated” and asked Carter why he was invoking his rights. Id. Carter

replied, “cause I can and I don’t have to answer any questions at all, so I’m choosing

to not answer any other questions.” Id. John Doe #2 then stated, “Oh yeah, your

really going to regret that, I promise you that” and then walked towards John Doe

#1 and the two deputy sheriffs spoke together. Id. ¶3.

Both deputy sheriffs then walked back to Carter’s vehicle, and John Doe #1

attempted to pull Carter out of the vehicle. Id. ¶3. According to the Amended

Complaint, John Doe #1 handled Carter “roughly . . . trying to force [Carter] into 1

set of handcuffs when [he] needed 2 sets of handcuffs.” Id. After Hooper told John

Doe #2 that Carter had medical issues, John Doe #2 told John Doe #1 to cuff Carter

upfront. Id. John Doe #1 then cuffed Carter upfront and told Carter he was being

arrested pursuant to an outstanding arrest warrant. Id. Carter told John Doe #1

there was “some type of mistake” as there was not an outstanding warrant. Id.

Carter states, “I knew for sure I didn’t have a warrant for anything because I had

just talked to my probation officer a few days prior and she didn’t tell me to turn

myself in or tell me that I had a warrant.” Id.

John Doe #1 ignored Carter and called for someone to transport Carter to

ACJ. Id. Carter’s request to John Doe #1 for his medicine bag was denied. Id.

John Doe #1 and John Doe #2 then starting searching Carter’s vehicle without his

permission. Id.

While being transported to ACJ, Carter heard on the police radio “that I was

the wrong Anthony Carter; I didn’t have a warrant.” Id. Carter heard one of the

officers on the radio ask John Doe #1 to bring Carter his medicine bag, and John

Doe #1 refused, telling the officers to tell Carter he would get the medicine bag

when he got to ACJ. Id.

When Carter arrived at ACJ, he told staff he needed his medication and was

told,

they can’t give me anything until I’m in their custody,

which I won’t be until John Doe #1 has my warrant. So I

had to sit and wait in pain and agony, going through

withdrawals due to John Doe #1 sending me to ACJ

without an warrant and without anyone else intervening

and without my medication.

Id. ¶4. Although Carter was arrested around 11:30 A.M., he did not see John Doe

#1 again until around 6 PM that evening. Id. At that time, John Doe #1 asked

Carter some questions, including asking for his Social Security number. Carter told

him he did not know his Social Security number. John Doe #1 told Carter he “won’t

be getting anything until I give him my Social Security number” and he left. Id.

Carter asked ACJ staff why he had not “gotten thru to the other side of the

jail,” and was told it was because “I’m about to leave cause I wasn’t the person they

thought I was.” Id. Another hour passed before John Doe #1 told Carter he was

going to let him go “to look for [his] Social Security card, so he’ll know for sure if I’m

the right person he’s looking for.” Id.

“After about 10-11 hours, [John Doe #1] tells [Carter] he’s going to take me

home.” Id. ¶5. Carter replied he would rather be taken to his vehicle and medicine,

but John Doe #1 said he did not know where the vehicle was because he had given

the car keys to Hooper. Id. John Doe #1 then transported Carter to Carter’s

friend’s house. Once there, Carter reached Hooper who told him she could not come

to get him because “she ended up crashing my vehicle, rendering it undrivable.”

Id.3

II. Procedural History

As a result of these events, Carter initiated this case on January 8, 2024, by

the filing of a Motion for Leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP Motion”),

together with a proposed Complaint . ECF No. 1. His IFP Motion was granted on

January 10, 2024, and the Complaint officially filed that day. ECF Nos. 6 and 7. He

seeks relief against Allegheny County, the Allegheny County Sheriff’s Office, Sheriff

Kevin Kraus, and the two arresting John Doe Sheriff Deputies under 42 U.S.C. §

1983 and various state-law tort theories.

Defendants moved to dismiss the Complaint. ECF Nos. 17 and 20. Carter

was ordered to either file an Omnibus Response or an Amended Complaint. ECF

Nos. 22 and 27. On September 23, 2024, Carter filed an Amended Complaint, ECF

No. 28, which remains his operative pleading.4

3 Carter makes similar allegations in another pending lawsuit in this Court. See Carter v.

Fitzgerald, et al., No. 2:23-cv-1913. In that case, Carter contends he was arrested on February 12,

2022, by a City of Pittsburgh police officer while he was driving his vehicle and, following his arrest,

was brought to ACJ, where he was detained until March 18, 2022. He alleges the police officer gave

Carter’s car keys to his ex-girlfriend, who stole from his family and crashed his car. He alleges his

constitutional rights were violated by the police officer during his arrest and by ACJ corrections

officers and medical personnel during his confinement in ACJ.

4 “In general, an amended pleading supersedes the original pleading and renders the original

pleading a nullity.” Garrett v. Wexford Health, 938 F.3d 69, 82 (3d Cir. 2019) (citations omitted).

“Thus, the most recently filed amended complaint becomes the operative pleading.” Id. (citation

omitted).

Carter contends John Doe #1 “knowingly sent [him] to ACJ knowing that I

didn’t have a warrant, in hopes of finding some drugs and in doing this he violated

my constitutional and statutory rights.” Id. ¶6. According to the Amended

Complaint, Carter was forced to “sit and endure through pain and suffering from

sitting in jail for almost 12 hours without food and without my medications all

because of being falsely arrested and pulled over.” Id. ¶7.

The Amended Complaint states Allegheny County, Sheriff Kevin M. Kraus,

and the Allegheny County Sheriff’s Office have “policies, procedures, customs and

practices that allows Sheriff’s Deputies to falsely arrest and detain innocent citizens

and illegally seize and search through their belongings, against their will.” Id. ¶8.

Carter claims his “1st, 4th, 5th, Due Process Clause, 8th, 13th, 14th

Amendments were violated and torts such as negligence, false imprisonment, false

arrest, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Failure to interview, failure

to supervise.” Id. ¶3. See also id. ¶4. He seeks injunctive and declaratory relief,

compensatory damages “in the amount of $50,000 against each defendant, jointly

and severally,” and nominal and punitive damages “in the amount of $150,000

against each defendant, jointly and severally.” Id. at IV, Prayer for Relief, ¶¶9-12.

The Court has federal jurisdiction over the Amended Complaint pursuant to

28 U.S.C. §1331 and can exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law

claims under 28 U.S.C. §1337.

Pending before the Court are two motions to dismiss the Amended Complaint

for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). ECF Nos.

30 and 32. Despite being granted an extension of time to file an Omnibus Response

to these motions, ECF No. 47, to date, Carter has failed to respond. Although

Defendants’ motions are unopposed, the Court will address the merits of their

arguments because Carter is proceeding pro se. Angle v. Smith, No. 1:22-cv-33,

2023 WL 2873255, *5 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 7, 2023) (internal citations omitted), report

and recommendation adopted, 2023 WL 2299304 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 1, 2023). See also

Stackhouse v. Mazurkiewicz, 951 F.2d 29, 30 (3d Cir. 1991) (“The Third Circuit

recommends that in the case of a pro se litigant, a district court address a case on

the merits even if a motion is unopposed.”).

For the below reasons,

● The motion filed by Allegheny County will be granted in its entirety;

and

● The motion filed by the Sheriff’s Office will be granted in part and

denied in part.

II. Standard of Review – Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)

The applicable inquiry under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is well

settled. A complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief[,]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), and can be

dismissed for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted[.]” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A defendant has the burden of showing that a complaint fails to

state a claim. See Gould Elecs. v. United States, 220 F.3d 169, 178 (3d Cir. 2000),

holding modified by Simon v. United States, 341 F.3d 193 (3d Cir. 2003).

To survive a motion to dismiss, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual

matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550

U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A complaint must be dismissed if it merely alleges

entitlement to relief without supporting facts. Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578

F.3d 203, 211 (3d Cir. 2009). This “‘does not impose a probability requirement at

the pleading stage,’ but instead ‘simply calls for enough facts to raise a reasonable

expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of’ the necessary element.’” Phillips,

515 F.3d at 234 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The court need not accept as

true “unsupported conclusions and unwarranted inferences[,]” Doug Grant, Inc. v.

Great Bay Casino Corp., 232 F.3d 173, 183–84 (3d Cir. 2000), nor a plaintiff's “bald

assertions” or “legal conclusions.” Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902,

906 (3d Cir. 1997). The court's role is limited to determining whether a plaintiff is

entitled to offer evidence in support of their claims – not if they will ultimately

prevail. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974).

Finally, because Carter is proceeding pro se, the allegations in the Amended

Complaint must be held to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted

by lawyers[.]” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). If the Court can

reasonably read Carter’s Amended Complaint to state a claim upon which relief can

be granted, it will do so despite his failure to cite proper legal authority, confusion

of legal theories, poor syntax, and sentence construction, or unfamiliarity with

pleading requirements. See Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364 (1982). Despite this

leniency, “pro se litigants still must allege sufficient facts in their complaints to

support a claim.” Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013)

(citing Riddle v. Mondragon, 83 F.3d 1197, 1202 (10th Cir. 1996)).

With these standards in mind, the Court now turns to Carter’s Amended

Complaint and Defendants’ motions to dismiss.

III. Discussion

Carter brings his constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,5 which

provides:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,

regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . . , subjects, or

causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or

other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the

deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities

secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to

the party injured in an action at law, . . . .

To prevail on a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must establish that a

defendant, acting under color of state law, deprived the plaintiff of a right, privilege,

or immunity secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.6 42 U.S.C. §

1983; see also Harvey v. Plains Twp. Police Dep't, 421 F.3d 185,189 (3d Cir. 2005).

“The first step in any such claim is to identify the specific constitutional right

allegedly infringed.” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (citations omitted).

5 Title 42, United States Code, section 1983 “is not a source of substantive rights but a vehicle

for vindicating rights conferred by the U.S. Constitution or by federal statute.” DiBella v. Borough of

Beachwood, 407 F.3d 599, 601 (3d Cir. 2005) (citation omitted).

6 No party disputes that all defendants are state actors.

Carter claims Defendants have violated his federal rights under the First, Fourth,

Fifth, Eighth, Thirteenth, and Fourteenth Amendments.7 ECF No. 28, ¶¶ 3, 4.

Allegheny County and the Sheriff’s Office each seek to dismiss the Amended

Complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). ECF Nos. 30 and 32. The

Sheriff’s Office also raises a qualified immunity defense on behalf of John Doe #1

and John Doe #2. ECF No. 33 at 8-9. Given the distinct defenses raises by the

parties, the Court will address the pending motions in order.

1) Motion to Dismiss Filed by Allegheny County, ECF No. 30

Defendant Allegheny County argues the Amended Complaint makes no

specific liability claim against it. Rather, Carter alleges Allegheny County is

“legally responsible for actors employed through the county.” ECF No. 28, at Section

III, ¶4. The only factual allegations in the Amended Complaint relevant to

Allegheny County are (1) Carter was taken to ACJ after he was arrested and (2) he

was told by jail employees they could not give him medication until they had a

warrant from the arresting deputy and he was in their custody. At some point, it

7 The due process clause under the Fifth Amendment only protects against federal

governmental action and does not limit the actions of state or local officials. See Schweiker v. Wilson,

450 U.S. 221, 227 (1981); Caldwell v. Beard, 324 F. App'x 186, 189 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing Riley v.

Camp, 130 F.3d 958, 972 n.19 (11th Cir. 1997)). In other words, a due process claim under the Fifth

Amendment only applies to federal officials. See Bergdoll v. City of York, 515 F. App'x 165, 170 (3d

Cir. 2013) (citing Nguyen v. U.S. Cath. Conf., 719 F.2d 52, 54 (3d Cir. 1983)). Because Carter cannot

recover on a § 1983 claim for violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment against

any defendant named here, that claim will be dismissed for failure to state a claim. Additionally, the

treatment of arrestees and pretrial detainees is governed by the Fourteenth Amendment Due

Process Clause and not the Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. See

Wharton v. Danberg, 854 F.3d 234, 247 (3d Cir. 2017) (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 551

(1979)). Therefore, all claims brought under the Eighth Amendment will be dismissed for failure to

state a claim. And while the Amended Complaint states Carter has brought claims under the First

and Thirteenth Amendments, there are no factual averments in the Amended Complaint addressing

either. Therefore, any claims under the First and Thirteenth Amendment will also be dismissed for

failure to state a claim. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1).

was confirmed Carter was not the subject of an outstanding warrant and he was

released from ACJ.

Construed broadly, Carter’s allegations may be read to include a claim based

on alleged inadequate medical care during his detention in ACJ. Delaying medical

care to an individual in police custody can constitute a constitutional violation

under § 1983 only if that delay “rises to the level of deliberate indifference to that

person's serious medical needs.” Groman v. Twp. of Manalapan,, 47 F.3d 628, 637

(3d Cir. 1995). “A serious medical need is ‘one that has been diagnosed by a

physician as requiring treatment or one that is so obvious that a lay person would

easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.’” Atkinson v. Taylor, 316 F.3d

257, 272-73 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting Monmouth Cnty. Corr. Institutional Inmates v.

Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 357 (3d Cir. 1987)) (citation omitted). This standard is in

effect a two-pronged test requiring a plaintiff prove: (1) his medical needs were

“objectively serious” and (2) defendant exhibited “deliberate indifference” to those

needs. See Monmouth Cnty. Corr. Correctional Inst. Inmates, 834 F.2d at 346.

As with his initial Complaint, Carter has not plausibly alleged in his

Amended Complaint that his medical needs were “objectively serious.” He claims

only that he needed his medication8 and was told by an unidentified ACJ staff

member he would not be given anything until he was in their custody. ECF No. 28,

¶4. Carter does not allege anyone knew he had a pressing need for medical

attention. See, e.g., Montgomery v. Pinchak, 294 F.3d 492, 504 (3d Cir. 2002)

8 The Amended Complaint contains no factual allegations identifying either the name of the

medication or why Carter needed the medication.

(explaining that certain medical issues “unlike, for example, broken legs or bullet

wounds, do not clearly manifest themselves in ways that are obvious and

ascertainable to a lay person.”). All that can be established from the Amended

Complaint is Carter told ACJ staff he needed his medicine. Such an allegation is

not enough to state a deliberate indifference to medical care claim.

Additionally, to the extent Carter is attempting to hold Allegheny County

liable for the conduct of the Allegheny County Sheriff’s Office, the Sheriff, and its

deputies, this claim also fails. As the Honorable William S. Stickman, IV recently

explained:

The County and the Allegheny County Sheriff are legally

distinct entities. In Pennsylvania, the office of sheriff is a

constitutional one: “[c]ounty officers shall consist of . . .

sheriffs. . . .” Pa. Const. art. IX, § 4. Although the

Pennsylvania Constitution recognizes the sheriff's office,

it does not define its powers. There are two statutory

provisions which specifically reference the sheriff's duties.

First, sheriffs and deputy sheriffs are required to perform

all those duties authorized or imposed on them by statute.

13 P.S. § 40. Second, under the Pennsylvania Judicial

Code, “[t]he sheriff, either personally or by deputy, shall

serve process and execute orders directed to him pursuant

to law.” 42 Pa. C.S. § 2921. Thus, the Pennsylvania

statutes expressing a sheriff's duties address court-

related functions. The sheriff also has common law power

and authority to arrest without a warrant for all crimes

committed in his presence. Commonwealth v. Leet, 641

A.2d 299 (Pa. 1994). The Administrative Code of

Allegheny County further specifies that the Allegheny

County Sheriff's Office is an “Independently elected

County Official[ ],” Allegheny Cty. Admin. Code § 5-

201.03, vested with its own powers, duties and

responsibilities including the “hiring, supervising and

terminating of all personnel within their respective

offices,” § 5-601.02. See also Shim v. Allegheny County,

Pa., No. 23-393, 2024 WL 1095811, *1 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 13,

2024) (holding that Allegheny County “Sheriff's Office is

an ‘independently elected County Official[ ],’ vested with

its own ‘powers, duties, and responsibilities,’ regarding

‘hiring, supervising, and terminating of all [sic] personnel

within their respective offices,’ not Allegheny County.”);

Day v. Westmoreland Cty., 2021 WL 5015774, at *6 (W.D.

Pa. Oct. 28, 2021) (applying the factors set forth in

Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318 (1992)

and holding, as a matter of law, that the county was not a

joint employer based on the Sheriff's Office's statutory

authority).[ ]

Plaintiffs have not alleged that the County controlled the

daily activities of the Allegheny County Sheriff's Office.

Nor could they because the County cannot appoint or

remove the sheriff, and it has no ability to overrule his

exclusive authority in his employment decisions. Nothing

proffered by Plaintiffs vests the County with any

meaningful policymaking authority over the Allegheny

County Sheriff Office's law enforcement functions.[ ] The

sheriff, acting in his law enforcement capacity, is not a

policymaker for the County. Plaintiff's respondeat

superior theory of liability—i.e., that County is the entity

and employer of the Allegheny County Sheriff's Office and

therefore responsible for the actions of its deputy sheriffs-

is not an appropriate basis for § 1983 municipal liability

in this case.

Bernard v. Ignelzi, No. 2:23-cv-1463, 2024 WL 424364, at *5-6 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 19,

2024) (emphasis added).

For all these reasons, Allegheny County’s motion to dismiss will be granted in

its entirety and all claims against Allegheny County will be dismissed with

prejudice, as amendment would be futile.

2) Motion to Dismiss Filed by The Sheriff’s Office, ECF No. 32

Carter contends he was wrongfully arrested on November 4, 2022, by Sheriff

Deputies John Does #1 and #2 and that his wrongful arrest resulted from the

“policies, procedures, customs, and practices” of the Sheriff’s Office. ECF No. 28 at

7, ¶8. The Sheriff’s Office raises six arguments: first, the Amended Complaint fails

to state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); second, the claims against Sheriff

Kraus fail based on individual liability; third, the claims against Sheriff Kraus fail

based on supervisor liability; fourth, the municipal claims against the Allegheny

County Sheriff’s Office fail; fifth, the official capacity claims against Sheriff Kraus

are duplicative of the municipal claims against the Allegheny County Sheriff’s

Office; and sixth, the claims against John Doe #1 and John Doe #2 fail based on

qualified immunity.9 ECF No. 33.

a) The Sheriff’s Office

Carter contends the Sheriff’s Office has “policies, procedures, customs and

practices that allows Sheriff’s Deputies to falsely arrest and detain innocent citizens

and illegally seize and search through their belongings, against their will.” ECF

No. 28, at 8, ¶8. According to the Amended Complaint, pursuant to this policy,

around “election time of every year [ ] the defendants ramps up it arrest and pull

over rates to keep certain officials in office or to make certain officials look good.”

Id.

Municipal liability under § 1983 may not be proven under a respondeat

superior theory of liability but must instead be found on allegations that the

government itself supported a violation of constitutional rights. See Monell v. Dep't

9 The Court notes Defendants John Doe #1 and John Doe #2 remain unnamed and unserved

and an appearance by counsel on their behalf has not been entered. That said, counsel for the

Sheriff’s Office has moved to dismiss the Doe Defendants based on a qualified immunity argument.

of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). Municipal liability

exists only where execution of the municipality's policy or custom, whether made by

lawmakers or decisionmakers whose edicts may fairly represent official policy,

inflict the injury. Id. at 694.

When a plaintiff brings a complaint under Monell, the specific offending

custom, policy, or practice must be pleaded in the complaint. See McTernan v. City

of York, 564 F.3d 636, 658 (3d Cir. 2009) (“To satisfy the pleading standard, [a

plaintiff] must identify a custom or policy and specify what exactly that custom or

policy was.”) (citing Philips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224 (3d Cir. 2008)). In

addition, a plaintiff must also allege that the policy or custom was the “proximate

cause” of his injuries, see Est. of Roman v. City of Newark, 914 F.3d 789, 798 (3d

Cir. 2019) (citing Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 1213 (3d Cir. 1996)), “by

demonstrating an ‘affirmative link’ between the policy or custom and the particular

constitutional violation he alleges. See id. (citing Bielevicz v. Dubinon, 915 F.2d 845,

851 (3d Cir. 1990)). At the pleading stage, this generally requires some facts that

tend to show that policymakers were aware of similar unlawful conduct in the past,

but failed to take precautions against future violations, and that this failure, at

least in part, led to the injuries in question. See id.

In McTernan v. City of York, 564 F.3d 636, 659 (3d Cir. 2009), the Court of

Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed dismissal of claims against a municipality

because the plaintiff alleged only that he was injured by “the City's policy of

ignoring First Amendment right[s].” Id. at 658. Similarly, in Wood v. Williams, 568

F. App’x 100, 104 (3d Cir. 2014), the Court of Appeals affirmed dismissal of claims

against a municipality because plaintiff alleged only that defendants maintained a

“policy and/or custom. . . to inadequately screen during the hiring process and to

inadequately train, retrain and/or supervise BAVTS employees . . . thereby failing

to adequately discourage Constitutional violations on the part of BAVTS

employees.” Wood, 568 F. App'x at 103 (omissions in original).

Similar to the above cases, Carter’s policy or custom allegations are

extremely sparse; he asserts the Sheriff’s Office has a policy to “ramp up it arrests

and pull over rates to keep certain officials in office or to make certain officials look

good.” ECF No. 28, ¶ 8. Carter offers no additional facts to support his allegations

that such a policy or custom existed or that there were any prior similar incidents

that would have put policymakers on notice that unlawful conduct was occurring.

As a result, the allegations that a policy or custom caused Carter’s constitutional

violation are too conclusory to state a claim for relief as to the Sheriff’s Office (and

Sheriff Kraus to the extent he is the alleged policymaker) and the Monell claim will

be dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim for relief.10

b) Sheriff Kevin Kraus

At the time of the events giving rise to this lawsuit, Kevin Kraus was the

Sheriff of Allegheny County. An individual supervisor, such as a sheriff, “may be

10 Nothing in this decision prevents Carter from seeking discovery on whether John Doe #1 and

John Doe #2 acted pursuant to (or in violation of) any policies or customs or whether any prior

similar incidents had occurred. If discovery reveals a basis for one or more Monell claims, Carter

may seek leave to move to amend his Amended Complaint if he can meet the requirements of Rule

15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

personally liable under § 1983 if he or she participated in violating the plaintiff’s

rights, directed others to violate them, or, as the person in charge, had knowledge of

and acquiesced in his subordinates’ violations.” A.M. ex rel. J.M.K. v. Luzerne Cnty.

Juv. Det. Ctr., 372 F.3d 572, 586 (3d Cir. 2004). Supervisory liability under Section

1983 is an individual capacity claim against a supervisor. Santiago v. Warminster

Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010). Such liability requires a showing of

proximate causation, so a plaintiff must “demonstrate a ‘plausible nexus' or

‘affirmative link’ between the [directions] and the specific deprivation of

constitutional rights at issue.’” Santiago, 629 F.3d at 130 (quoting Hedges v. Musco,

204 F.3d 109, 121 (3d Cir. 2000)).

The only factual allegation against Sheriff Kraus is that he is “legally

responsible for his deputies and their actions.” ECF No. 28, ¶ III(5). But like

municipal liability, individual “[l]iability cannot be predicated solely on the

operation of respondeat superior.” Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d

Cir. 1988). Carter has not pleaded with any particularity the Sheriff’s participation

in, or actual knowledge of and acquiescence to, the alleged actions of Defendants

John Doe #1 and John Doe #2.11 Therefore, the motion to dismiss will be granted

and all claims against Sheriff Kraus, in his individual capacity, will be dismissed

with prejudice, as amendment would be futile.12

11 Given the Court’s recommended disposition of Carter’s claims against the Sheriff, the Court

need not address the alternative argument that the Sheriff is entitled to qualified immunity.

12 To the extent Carter attempts to bring a claim against the Sheriff in his official capacity that

claim will be dismissed as redundant to the municipal liability claim against the Sheriff’s Office. See

c) Sheriff Deputies John Does #1 and #2

The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons,

houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable

searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no

Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported

by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the

place to be searched, and the persons or things to be

seized.

U.S. Const. amend. IV. “The proper inquiry in a section 1983 claim based on false

arrest or misuse of the criminal process is not whether the person arrested in fact

committed the offense but whether the arresting officers had probable cause to

believe the person arrested had committed the offense.” Dowling v. City of

Philadelphia, 855 F.2d 136, 141 (3d Cir.1988); see Groman v. Twp. of Manalapan,

47 F.3d 628, 634 (3d Cir. 1995).

To prevail on a Fourth Amendment false arrest claim, a plaintiff must show

that he or she was arrested without probable cause. Groman, 47 F.3d at 634.

Probable cause to arrest generally exists when an officer makes an arrest pursuant

to a valid warrant. See Lawson v. Pennsylvania SPCA, 124 F. Supp. 3d 394, 405

(E.D. Pa. 2015) (citing Kis v. Cty. of Schuylkill, 866 F. Supp.1462, 1469 (E.D. Pa.

1994)). “[A] sheriff executing an arrest warrant is [not] required by the

Constitution to investigate independently every claim of innocence, whether the

Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25, (1991). While the Sheriff may be a policymaker under Section 1983,

any allegation based on the Sheriff’s status as a policymaker is encompassed within the municipal

liability claim and cannot be properly categorized as a supervisory liability claim. A.M. ex rel.

J.M.K., 372 F.3d at 586.

claim is based on mistaken identity” or otherwise. Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137,

145-46 (1979). Equally clear, however, is that the mere existence of a warrant does

not automatically insulate an officer from false arrest liability. Goodwin v. Conway,

836 F.3d 321, 327 (3d Cir. 2016) (citing Wilson v. Russo, 212 F.3d 781, 786-90 (3d

Cir. 2000)). “[A] mistakenly issued or executed warrant cannot provide probable

cause for an arrest.” Berg v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 219 F.3d 261, 270 (3d Cir. 2000)

(citing Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 13 (1995)). When subsequent events reveal

that the person arrested is not the person named in the warrant, the arresting

officer may be liable for false arrest. See, e.g., Thomas v. Middlesex Cty. Sheriff's

Dep't, No. 07-3017, 2007 WL 2306879, at *1, 3-4 (D.N.J. Aug. 8, 2007). The “key

question” in misidentification cases is whether the arrest of the wrong person was

“reasonable” under the totality of the circumstances. See Alassani v. Walter, No. 10-

4491, 2011 WL 135018, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 14, 2011) (citing McHenry v. Cty. of

Delaware, No. 04-1011, 2005 WL 2789182, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 24, 2005)); McHenry,

2005 WL 2789182, at *5 (collecting cases).

Carter does not argue he was arrested pursuant to a facially invalid arrest

warrant; rather, he asserts he was not the person named in the warrant. The Doe

Defendants do not dispute this, but they argue they acted reasonably and lawfully:

“Said John Does were acting pursuant to the reasonable belief that the Plaintiff was

the subject of an outstanding warrant.” ECF No. 33, at ¶34. Additionally, the Doe

Defendants contend that once it was confirmed the Anthony Carter arrested and

transported to ACJ was, in fact, not the subject of the warrant, John Doe #1

transported Carter to his friend’s residence. Id.

Viewed in the light most favorable to Carter, the Court finds the Amended

Complaint contains sufficient allegations to suggest the Doe Defendants had reason

to doubt Carter was the individual named in the warrant. According to the

Amended Complaint, Carter told John Doe #1 there was a mistake as there was no

outstanding warrant for his arrest and the arresting deputies received a radio

communication that the Anthony Carter they had arrested was “the wrong Anthony

Carter.” Thus, the allegations in the Amended Complaint adequately support an

inference that John Doe #1 and John Doe #2 lacked probable cause to arrest Carter.

Any determination that probable cause necessarily existed or that the actions of

John Doe #1 and John Doe #2 were reasonable is premature at this point. For this

reason, the motion to dismiss Carter’s claims against John Doe #1 and John Doe #2

will be denied.13

3) Placeholder for Unknown John Doe #1 and John Doe #2

Carter has a right to service by the United States Marshals Service. See 28

U.S.C. § 1915(d); Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3). That said, it is unlikely the Marshals

Service could properly serve the Doe Defendants without more precise identifying

information, such as a last name, first name, etc. In circumstances such as these,

the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit seems to have implicitly sanctioned the

use of an employer or supervisor as a placeholder for unknown defendants only to

13 Because Defendants did not address the supplemental state-law tort claims, those will be not

be resolved at this time.

assist a pro se plaintiff in obtaining sufficient information to identify defendants to

effectuate proper service. See Wyatt v. Municipality of Commonwealth of

Philadelphia, 718 F. App’x 102, 103-04 (3d Cir. 2017) (recognizing the difficulties

presented where a pro se plaintiff could only provide limited information for the

United States Marshals Service for purpose of serving the defendants as employees

of the City of Philadelphia).14

Therefore, in order to ultimately facilitate a more effective attempt at service

by the Marshals, the Court finds that the prudent course for the Court to follow at

this time is to maintain Kevin Kraus, Sheriff, in his official capacity on behalf of the

Sheriff’s Office, as a defendant for the limited, and sole purpose, so that the Sheriff’s

Office may assist Carter in identifying the unnamed John Doe Defendants. At such

time as Carter is able to identify the unnamed John Doe Defendants, the Court will

dismiss Defendant Kraus as a placeholder for these Defendants.

IV. Leave to Amend

The Court must allow amendment by the plaintiff in a civil rights case

brought under § 1983 before dismissing under Rule 12(b)(6), irrespective of whether

it is requested, unless doing so would be “inequitable or futile.” Fletcher-Harlee

Corp. v. Pote Concrete Contractors, Inc., 482 F.3d 247, 251 (3d Cir. 2007); see also

14 The Court recognizes that in Wyatt the plaintiff sued the unknown defendants in both their

individual and official capacities as City of Philadelphia employees and the Court of Appeals noted

the plaintiff effectively sought relief against the City of Philadelphia the City could have attempted

to identify the individual defendants. Here, though, it is unclear if Carter has sued the Doe

Defendants in both their individual and official capacities, or only in their individual capacities. It is

also unclear whether or not the Court of Appeals would have reached the same conclusion in Wyatt

had the plaintiff in that case not named the unknown defendants in their official capacities. That

said, in the interest of justice, this Court will adopt the same approach.

Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 235 (3d Cir. 2004) abrogated on other grounds by

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). With respect to all claims dismissed

with prejudice, namely the claims against Allegheny County and the Sheriff in his

individual and official capacities, the Court finds allowing leave to amend here

would be futile.

Carter filed his original complaint on January 10, 2024. Defendants moved

to dismiss the Complaint, which placed Carter on notice of deficiencies in his factual

allegations. In response, he filed an Amended Complaint on September 23, 2024,

which did not correct the deficiencies. Further amendment would be futile as

Carter has had the opportunity to revise his claims to add any missing averments,

but has not done so. See Jones v. Unknown D.O.C. Bus Driver & Transportation

Crew, 944 F.3d 478, 483 (3d Cir. 2019) (concluding where inmate-plaintiff “has

already had two chances to tell his story,” providing “further leave to amend would

be futile.”).

V. Conclusion

For the above reasons, the motion to dismiss filed by Allegheny County, ECF

No. 30, will be granted in its entirety and all claims against Allegheny County will

be dismissed with prejudice.

The motion to dismiss filed by the Allegheny County Sheriff’s Office and

Kevin Kraus, Sheriff, ECF No. 32, will be granted in part and denied in part as

follows:

● All claims against the Sheriff’s Office will be dismissed without

prejudice;

● All claims against Sheriff Kraus in his individual capacity will be

dismissed with prejudice;

● All claims against Sheriff Kraus in his official capacity will be

dismissed with prejudice; and

● The motion will be denied as to all claims against John Doe #1 and

John Doe #2.

All claims brought for violations of the First, Fifth, Eighth, and Thirteenth

Amendments will be dismissed sua sponte for failure to state a claim. See 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1).

Kevin Kraus, Sheriff, in his official capacity on behalf of the Sheriff’s Office,

will remain as a defendant for the limited, and sole purpose, so that the Sheriff’s

Office may assist Carter in identifying the unnamed John Doe Defendants. At such

time as Carter is able to identify the unnamed John Doe Defendants, the Court will

dismiss Defendant Kraus as a placeholder for these Defendants.

In sum, the only claims remaining are those claims brought against John Doe

#1 and John Doe #2 for alleged violations of Carter’s federal rights under the Fourth

and Fourteenth amendments and various violations of state-tort law, including,

negligence, false arrest / false imprisonment, and intentional infliction of emotional

distress. See ECF No. 28, ¶¶3, 4.

An appropriate Order follows.

DATED this 25th day of June, 2025.

BY THE COURT:

s/Christopher B. Brown

Christopher B. Brown

United States Magistrate Judge

cc: ANTHONY CARTER

QR0011

SCI CAMP HILL

P.O. Box 8837

2500 Lisburn Road

Camp Hill, PA 17001

(via U.S. First Class Mail)

All Counsel of Record

(via ECF electronic notification)