Tate v. Culver & Cain Production

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI

EASTERN DIVISION

REBECCA LEE TATE, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) No. 4:25-CV-00913 RHH

)

CULVER & CAIN PRODUCTION, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

OPINION, MEMORANDUM AND ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE

This matter is before the Court on the motion of self-represented plaintiff Rebecca Lee Tate

for leave to commence this civil action without prepayment of the required filing fee. [ECF No.

2]. Upon consideration of the financial information provided with the motion, the Court finds

plaintiff is unable to pay any portion of the filing fee. As a result, plaintiff will be granted leave to

proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Additionally, for the reasons discussed

below, plaintiff will be directed to show cause as to why this case should not be dismissed for lack

of subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). Plaintiff’s motion for appointment of

counsel will be denied at this time. [ECF No. 3].

Legal Standard on Initial Review

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court is required to dismiss a complaint filed in forma

pauperis if it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. To

state a claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate a plausible claim for relief, which is more than a “mere

possibility of misconduct.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). “A claim has facial

plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 678. Determining whether

a complaint states a plausible claim for relief is a context-specific task that requires the reviewing

court to draw upon judicial experience and common sense. Id. at 679. The court must “accept as

true the facts alleged, but not legal conclusions or threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of

action, supported by mere conclusory statements.” Barton v. Taber, 820 F.3d 958, 964 (8th Cir.

2016). See also Brown v. Green Tree Servicing LLC, 820 F.3d 371, 372-73 (8th Cir. 2016) (stating

that court must accept factual allegations in complaint as true but is not required to “accept as true

any legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation”).

When reviewing a self-represented complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court

must give it the benefit of a liberal construction. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). A

“liberal construction” means that if the essence of an allegation is discernible, the district court

should construe the plaintiff’s complaint in a way that permits his or her claim to be considered

within the proper legal framework. Solomon v. Petray, 795 F.3d 777, 787 (8th Cir. 2015).

However, even self-represented complaints are required to allege facts which, if true, state a claim

for relief as a matter of law. Martin v. Aubuchon, 623 F.2d 1282, 1286 (8th Cir. 1980). See

also Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 914-15 (8th Cir. 2004) (stating that federal courts are not

required to “assume facts that are not alleged, just because an additional factual allegation would

have formed a stronger complaint”). In addition, affording a self-represented complaint the benefit

of a liberal construction does not mean that procedural rules in ordinary civil litigation must be

interpreted so as to excuse mistakes by those who proceed without counsel. See McNeil v. United

States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993).

The Complaint

Plaintiff Rebecca Tate is a self-represented litigant who filed the instant civil action against

six defendants: Culver & Cain Production; Culver Oil & Gas; Griffin Operating Company, Inc.,

Harman Operating Company, Inc., Hunt Oil Company, and Sunoco. Plaintiff has listed defendants’

addresses in Texas.

Plaintiff indicates her mailing address is in Florissant, Missouri. And she asserts this Court

has jurisdiction over this action because it deals with “land condemnation, theft of property,

contractual fraud, including an unconscionable oil and gas lease.” However, she fails to indicate

the actual jurisdictional basis for the Court’s jurisdiction, i.e. the statutory basis for jurisdiction

Under the section titled, “Amount in Controversy,” plaintiff states that she is seeking

“$100,000,000” because defendants “stole” her late mother’s land, “along with its wealth.” She

states that she no longer has an inheritance. However, plaintiff fails to articulate the value of the

alleged land.

Plaintiff’s “Statement of Claim” in the complaint consists of the following:

1. I have been deprived of my inheritance, including Mineral interests, Royalty

payments, and monies owed to me accumulated over the years.

2. The year my mother signed an oil & gas lease (in 1963) . . . till today.

3. In the U.S. (in the state of Texas).

4. Emotional, Financial and Economic Hardships (and distress).

5. The Defendants cheated me out of my inheritance, and wealth, through my

Theft of my late mother’s land.

Plaintiff asks the Court to terminate the oil & gas lease her mother signed relating to her

mother’s property in Texas which she believes “disproportionately favors the energy sector.” She

seeks compensatory and punitive damages.

Discussion

The Court has carefully reviewed the instant complaint and determined plaintiff has not

carried her burden of establishing subject matter jurisdiction.

A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Subject matter jurisdiction refers to a court’s power to decide a certain class of cases.

LeMay v. U.S. Postal Serv., 450 F.3d 797, 799 (8th Cir. 2006). “Federal courts are not courts of

general jurisdiction; they have only the power that is authorized by Article III of the Constitution

and the statutes enacted by Congress pursuant thereto.” Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist.,

475 U.S. 534, 541 (1986). See also Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251, 256 (2013) (“Federal courts are

courts of limited jurisdiction, possessing only that power authorized by Constitution and statute”).

The presence of subject matter jurisdiction is a threshold requirement that must be assured in every

federal case. Kronholm v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 915 F.2d 1171, 1174 (8th Cir. 1990). See also

Sanders v. Clemco Indus., 823 F.2d 214, 216 (8th Cir. 1987) (“The threshold requirement in every

federal case is jurisdiction and we have admonished the district court to be attentive to a

satisfaction of jurisdictional requirements in all cases”). As such, the issue of subject matter

jurisdiction may be raised at any time, by any party or the court. Gray v. City of Valley Park, Mo.,

567 F.3d 976, 982 (8th Cir. 2009).

Federal courts have subject matter jurisdiction over both federal question cases and

diversity of citizenship cases. See Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Tribal Court of Spirit Lake Indian

Reservation, 495 F.3d 1017, 1020 (8th Cir. 2007) (finding that subject matter jurisdiction is lacking

if neither diversity of citizenship nor federal question jurisdiction applies); McLaurin v. Prater, 30

F.3d 982, 984-85 (8th Cir. 1994) (noting Congress has directed that district courts shall have

jurisdiction in both federal question and diversity cases). The burden of proving subject matter

jurisdiction belongs to the plaintiff. V S Ltd. P'ship v. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 235 F.3d

1109, 1112 (8th Cir. 2000).

B. Federal Question Jurisdiction Under 28 U.S.C. § 1331

Federal question jurisdiction gives district courts “original jurisdiction over civil actions

arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” Griffioen v. Cedar Rapids &

Iowa City Ry. Co., 785 F.3d 1182, 1188 (8th Cir. 2015). See also 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Whether a

claim arises under federal law is determined by reference to the “well-pleaded complaint.” Great

Lakes Gas Transmission Ltd. P'ship v. Essar Steel Minn. LLC, 843 F.3d 325, 329 (8th Cir. 2016).

The well-pleaded complaint rule provides that jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is

presented on the face of a plaintiff’s properly pleaded complaint. Markham v. Wertin, 861 F.3d

748, 754 (8th Cir. 2017). See also Thomas v. United Steelworkers Local 1938, 743 F.3d 1134,

1139 (8th Cir. 2014) (“Under the well-pleaded complaint rule, a federal question must exist on the

face of the plaintiff’s properly pleaded complaint in order to establish federal question subject

matter jurisdiction”).

Plaintiff’s complaint must establish “either that federal law creates the cause of action or

that the plaintiff’s right to relief necessarily depends on the resolution of a substantial question of

federal law.” Williams v. Ragnone, 147 F.3d 700, 702 (8th Cir. 1998). See also Northwest South

Dakota Production Credit Ass'n v. Smith, 784 F.2d 323, 325 (8th Cir. 1986) (stating that “[a] non-

frivolous claim of a right or remedy under a federal statute is sufficient to invoke federal

question jurisdiction”). “If the asserted basis of federal jurisdiction is patently meritless, then

dismissal for lack of jurisdiction is appropriate.” Biscanin v. Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc., 407 F.3d

905, 907 (8th Cir. 2005).

C. Diversity of Citizenship Jurisdiction Under 28 U.S.C. § 1332

“Under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), district courts have original diversity jurisdiction over civil

actions when the matter in controversy exceeds $75,000, without considering interest and costs,

and when the citizenship of each plaintiff is different from the citizenship of each defendant.” Ryan

ex rel. Ryan v. Schneider Nat. Carriers, Inc., 263 F.3d 816, 819 (8th Cir. 2001).

With regard to the amount in controversy, a complaint making a good faith allegation of

the jurisdictional amount is sufficient to confer jurisdiction. Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. Universal Crop

Prot. All., LLC, 620 F.3d 926, 931 (8th Cir. 2010). However, a “complaint will be dismissed if it

appears to a legal certainty that the claim is really for less than the jurisdictional amount.” Id. See

also Kopp v. Kopp, 280 F.3d 883, 884 (8th Cir. 2002). “The legal certainty standard is met where

the legal impossibility of recovery is so certain as virtually to negative the plaintiff’s good faith in

asserting the claim.” Peterson v. The Travelers Indem. Co., 867 F.3d 992, 995 (8th Cir. 2017).

Additionally, “[c]omplete diversity of citizenship exists where no defendant holds

citizenship in the same state where any plaintiff holds citizenship.” OnePoint Solutions, LLC v.

Borchert, 486 F.3d 342, 346 (8th Cir. 2007). Diversity jurisdiction requires that the parties be

citizens of different states, not merely residents. Sanders, 823 F.2d at 216. For purposes of

diversity, state citizenship requires an individual’s physical presence in the state coupled with an

indefinite intention there to remain. Blakemore v. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co., 789 F.2d 616, 618 (8th

Cir. 1986).

D. Failure to Prove Subject Matter Jurisdiction

The burden of proving subject matter jurisdiction belongs to the plaintiff. V S Ltd. P’ship,

235 F.3d at 1112. In this case, plaintiff has failed to establish the existence of subject matter

jurisdiction.

As to federal question jurisdiction, plaintiff does not meet the requirements because he

simply does not assert any issues arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United

States. Federal question jurisdiction is only proper where a plaintiff asserts “[a] non-frivolous

claim of a right or remedy under a federal statute.” Northwest South Dakota Prod. Credit Ass'n,

784 F.2d at 325. “If the asserted basis of federal jurisdiction is patently meritless, then dismissal

for lack of jurisdiction is appropriate.” Biscanin, 407 F.3d at 907. Here, plaintiff does not cite to a

specific federal statute or provision of the United States Constitution which is at issue in this case.

As to diversity jurisdiction, plaintiff has not shown that the amount in controversy exceeds

the jurisdictional threshold. Moreover, plaintiff has not established diversity between the parties.

For diversity of citizenship to exist, plaintiff cannot be a citizen of the same state as the defendants.

Here, plaintiff provides a Missouri address for herself, and she lists Texas addresses for defendants,

but she fails to list states of citizenship for either herself or the Texas defendants.1

In the section of the form complaint for demonstrating the citizenship of the parties,

plaintiff purposefully does not indicate the state in which she is a citizen. Similarly, she has not

listed in the complaint the states of citizenship of any of the defendants. Thus, plaintiff has not

shown subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332.

E. Venue

The instant complaint also fails to show that venue is proper in the Eastern District of

Missouri. The general venue provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1391 provide the basis for determining the

proper venue for plaintiff’s claims. Section 1391(b) provides:

1 Under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, a corporation is “deemed to be a citizen of every State and foreign state by which

it has been incorporated and of the State or foreign state where it has its principal business.” 28 U.S.C. §

1332(c)(1). See also Jet Midwest International Co., Ltd. v. Jet Midwest Group, LLC, 932 F.3d 1102, 1104

(8th Cir. 2019). According to the Supreme Court, the “principal place of business is best read as referring

to the place where a corporation’s officers direct, control, and coordinate the corporation’s activities.” Hertz

Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 93 (2010). Normally, this should “be the place where the corporation

maintains its headquarters,” so long that the headquarters is “the nerve center, and not simply an office

where the corporation holds is board meetings.” Id. Only corporations receive this treatment under § 1332,

and the citizenship of non-incorporated entities, such as limited liability companies, depends on the

citizenship of their members. See GMAC Commercial Credit LLC v. Dillard Dept. Stores, Inc., 357 F.3d

827, 829 (8th Cir. 2004).

A civil action may be brought in (1) a judicial district in which any defendant

resides, if all defendants are residents of the State in which the district is located;

(2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving

rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the

action is situated; or (3) if there is no district in which an action may otherwise be

brought as provided in this section, any judicial district in which any defendant is

subject to the court's personal jurisdiction with respect to such action.

Here, it appears that the property at issue in the complaint is in Texas. Moreover, all the defendants

appear to be residents, if not citizens, of the State of Texas. Thus, venue appears to be improper in

his Court.

Section 1406 of Title 28 of the United States Code allows this Court to dismiss or transfer

a case filed in the wrong district. However, it does not appear to be in the interest of justice to

transfer this case to a District Court in Texas where this action should have been brought because

plaintiff has not articulated the jurisdictional basis for bringing her claims in federal Court.

F. Order to Show Cause

As discussed above, plaintiff has the burden of establishing the Court’s subject matter

jurisdiction. In this case, plaintiff has failed to articulate an amount in controversy over the

jurisdictional amount (or that the property in question is worth more than the jurisdiction amount),

has not clearly alleged diversity of citizenship, and has not pointed to a federal statute or

constitutional provision to support this case involves a federal matter. Therefore, the Court will

order plaintiff to show cause as to why this action should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

Plaintiff shall also address why venue would be appropriate in the Eastern District of Missouri.

Plaintiff will be given thirty (30) days to submit a written response. Failure to comply with this

order will result in the dismissal of this case without prejudice and without further notice.

Motion for Appointment of Counsel

Plaintiff has filed a motion for appointment of counsel. [ECF No. 3]. The motion will be

denied at this time. In civil cases, a pro se litigant does not have a constitutional or statutory right

to appointed counsel. Ward v. Smith, 721 F.3d 940, 942 (8th Cir. 2013). See also Stevens v.

Redwing, 146 F.3d 538, 546 (8th Cir. 1998) (stating that “[a] pro se litigant has no statutory or

constitutional right to have counsel appointed in a civil case”). Rather, a district court may appoint

counsel in a civil case if the court is “convinced that an indigent plaintiff has stated a non-frivolous

claim…and where the nature of the litigation is such that plaintiff as well as the court will benefit

from the assistance of counsel.” Patterson v. Kelley, 902 F.3d 845, 850 (8th Cir. 2018). When

determining whether to appoint counsel for an indigent litigant, a court considers relevant factors

such as the complexity of the case, the ability of the pro se litigant to investigate the facts, the

existence of conflicting testimony, and the ability of the pro se litigant to present his or her claim.

Phillips v. Jasper Cty. Jail, 437 F.3d 791, 794 (8th Cir. 2006).

After reviewing these factors, the Court finds that the appointment of counsel is not

warranted at this time. Plaintiff has demonstrated, at this point, that she can adequately present her

claims to the Court. Additionally, neither the factual nor the legal issues in this case appear to be

complex. The Court will entertain future motions for appointment of counsel as the case

progresses.

Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis

[ECF No. 2] is GRANTED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff is ordered to show cause in writing and within

thirty (30) days of the date of this order as to why this action should not be dismissed for lack of

subject matter jurisdiction and venue.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that if plaintiff fails to submit a show cause response in

writing and within thirty (30) days of the date of this order, this action will be dismissed without

prejudice and without further notice.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff's motion for appointment of counsel [ECF

No. 3] is DENIED at this time.

Dated this 25" day of June, 2025.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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