SHUJA v. N.J. DEPT. CORRECTIONS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

SHUJA, also known as

TERENCE THOMPSON, Case No. 25–cv–01440–ESK–EAP

Plaintiff,

v. OPINION

KEYSHA FISHER, et al.,

Defendants.

KIEL, U.S.D.J.

THIS MATTER comes before the Court on pro se plaintiff Shuja’s, also

known as Terence Thompson, complaint filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

(Complaint). (ECF No. 1.) As plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, I

must review the Complaint to determine whether it should be dismissed as

frivolous or malicious, for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted, or because it seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from

such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). For the following reasons, I will

dismiss the Complaint with prejudice. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff is a convicted and sentenced state prisoner and was formerly

detained in South Woods State Prison (South Woods). (ECF No. 1 p. 3.)

Plaintiff asserts defendants Keysha Fisher and Anthony Degner violated his

Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. (Id.

p. 4.) Fisher and Degner are employed by defendant New Jersey Department

of Corrections (Department). (Id.) Plaintiff seeks $ 750,000 in damages.

(Id. p. 6.)

II. LEGAL STANDARD

The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires a district court to sua sponte

screen a civil complaint filed by plaintiffs proceeding in forma pauperis for

cognizable claims and to dismiss any claim that is frivolous, malicious, fails to

state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from

a defendant immune from suit. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).

To survive a sua sponte screening for failure to state a claim, a complaint

must allege “sufficient factual matter” to show that the plaintiff’s claims are

facially plausible. Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir.

2009). “‘A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual

content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.’” Fair Wind Sailing, Inc. v.

Dempster, 764 F.3d 303, 308 n. 3 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556

U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). “[A] pleading that offers ‘labels or conclusions’ or ‘a

formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’” Iqbal,

556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).

“The Court must accept all facts in the complaint as true, draw all

reasonable inferences in the prisoner’s favor, and ask only whether the

complaint contains facts sufficient to state a plausible claim.” Durham v.

Kelley, 82 F.4th 217, 223 (3d Cir. 2023). Moreover, “[c]omplaints filed pro se

should be construed liberally and held to ‘less stringent standards than formal

pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Id. (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89,

94 (2007) (per curiam)).

III. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff does not include a fact section in his Complaint; instead, he

includes a copy of an administrative grievance filed on January 13, 2025 and

an article from the New Jersey Monitor (Monitor) dated February 10, 2022.

(ECF No. 1–3 pp. 2, 3.) The grievance alleges that South Woods experienced a

four-day bathroom shortage beginning on January 20, 2024, during which time

plaintiff and other inmates were forced to urinate and defecate in plastic bags

and bottles. (Id. p. 2.) A South Woods employee responded to the grievance

on February 7 stating that “there was no water shut off on January 20, 2024

and the four days to follow.” (Id.) Plaintiff clarified on February 8, 2025 that

“[t]he specific dates were Jan. 1st to the 4th and the second time being Jan. 19th

to the 21st.” (Id.)

The Monitor article, titled “Prison Toilet Troubles Prompt Protest,”

recounts a water main break at South Woods that forced prison employees to

bring in port-a-potties and the fire department to provide restrooms for the

inmates. (Id. p. 3.) It quotes a prison justice advocate as saying “‘[w]e have

been getting stories that people have been forced to urinate in plastic bottles …

and defecat[e] in plastic bags.’” (Id.) According to the article, South Woods

toilets and showers were unavailable for 28 hours. (Id.) Bathrooms and

showers were available beginning on January 20, 2022 at 4:00 p.m., but “normal

service didn’t resume until [January] 23 … .” (Id.)

“The Eighth Amendment imposes duties on prison officials to ‘provide

humane conditions of confinement’ and ‘ensure that inmates receive adequate

food, clothing, shelter, and medical care.’” Barndt v. Wenerowicz, 698 F. App’x

673, 676–77 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832

(1994)). “To establish an Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement claim,

[plaintiff] must show that (1) the deprivation alleged was objectively,

‘sufficiently serious’ such that the prison officials’ acts or omissions resulted in

the denial of ‘the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities’; and (2) that

the prison officials exhibited a ‘deliberate indifference’ to his health and safety.”

Id. at 677 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834). Plaintiff has not pleaded facts

that would suggest defendants were deliberately indifferent.

The Monitor article attributes the absence of restroom facilities to an

emergency that persisted for slightly more than a day. (ECF No. 1–3 p. 3.)

South Woods staff provided portable toilets for the inmates, “enlisted the fire

department to fill hundreds of buckets with water, and opened up gym

bathrooms to ensure the 3,200 inmates and hundreds of staff could still relieve

themselves until repairs were made.” (Id.) Although “normal operations” did

not resume until January 23, prisoners were able to shower and use the

restroom as of 4:00 p.m on January 20, 2022. (Id.) Based on the sparse facts

available, it appears that South Woods staff undertook extraordinary efforts to

manage the crisis, and nothing in this record supports a reasonable inference

that their conduct reflected a culpable state of mind or deliberate indifference.

Therefore, plaintiff has failed to state a claim.

Generally, “[a] plaintiff[ ] who file[s a] complaint[ ] subject to dismissal

under [§ 1915] should receive leave to amend unless amendment would be

inequitable or futile.” Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 114 (3d

Cir. 2002). I conclude that it would be futile to permit plaintiff to amend the

Complaint because the Complaint is barred by the statute of limitations.

“Although the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense, a court may

dismiss claims sua sponte if a time-bar is obvious from the face of the complaint

and no further development of the record is necessary.” Demby v. Cnty. of

Camden, No. 21–1433, 2021 WL 4957002, at *1 (3d Cir. Oct. 26, 2021) (citing

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c)), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 1163 (2022). Section 1983

complaints are governed by New Jersey’s limitations period for personal

injuries and must be brought within two years of the claim’s accrual. See

Dique v. New Jersey State Police, 603 F.3d 181, 185 (3d Cir. 2010). “Under

federal law, a cause of action accrues ‘when the plaintiff knew or should have

known of the injury upon which the action is based.’” Montanez v. Sec’y

Pennsylvania Dep’t of Corr., 773 F.3d 472, 480 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Kach v.

Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 634 (3d Cir. 2009)).

According to the Monitor article, which I may consider because plaintiff

submitted it with the Complaint, South Woods experienced the water shortage

between January 19 and 23, 2022. (ECF No. 1–3 p.3.) Accordingly, plaintiff

needed to submit his Complaint by January 23, 2024. The Complaint is over

a year late, having been submitted on February 19, 2025. (ECF No. 1.)

I may equitably toll the statute of limitations in certain circumstances, but

“[a] party must plausibly plead allegations to support equitable tolling and ‘a

district court may dismiss an untimely cause of action if it is plain on the face

of the complaint that the limitations period cannot be tolled.’” Margolis v.

Warner Chilcott (US) LLC, No. 17–cv–04550, 2018 WL 2455925, at *6 (D.N.J.

May 31, 2018) (quoting Menichino v. Citibank, N.A., No. 12–cv–00058, 2013 WL

3802451, at *6 (W.D. Pa. July 19, 2013)). There are no facts in the Complaint

from which I could reasonably conclude that equitable tolling would be

appropriate in this matter. Therefore, I will deny leave to amend as plaintiff

cannot remedy the expiration of the statute of limitations. Ostuni v. Wa Wa’s

Mart, 532 F. App’x 110, 112 (3d Cir. 2013) (affirming dismissal with prejudice

due to expiration of statute of limitations); McCargo v. Camden Cty. Jail, 693

F. App’x 164, 166 (3d Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (“We therefore agree with the

[d]istrict [c]ourt’s assessment that amendment of the complaint would be futile

because the statute of limitations clearly had expired when [plaintiff] filed this

complaint.”).

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, I will dismiss the Complaint with prejudice.

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Leave to amend is denied. An appropriate

Order accompanies this Opinion.

/s/ Edward S. Kiel

EDWARD S. KIEL

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Dated: June 23, 2025