DEMERCHANT v. MAINE STATE PRISON

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF MAINE

HEATH DEMERCHANT, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) 1:24-cv-00385-JAW

)

MAINE STATE PRISON, )

)

Defendant. )

ORDER ON RECOMMENDED DECISION

A federal magistrate judge recommends a federal district court grant the

Maine State Prison’s motion to dismiss an incarcerated individual’s complaint

against it, on the ground that the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief

can be granted. Having performed a de novo review, the court affirms the magistrate

judge’s recommended decision over the plaintiff’s objection, and accordingly grants

the defendant’s motion to dismiss, concluding the plaintiff’s complaint and objection

do not state a colorable claim against the Maine State Prison plausibly entitling him

to relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

I. BACKGROUND

On November 12, 2024, Heath DeMerchant filed a civil complaint against the

Maine State Prison (MSP), alleging that, while incarcerated at Mountain View

Correctional Facility in Charleston, Maine, he was assaulted multiple times by fellow

inmates and that corrections officers took no actions to keep him safe despite their

knowledge of the danger he confronted. Form to Be Used in Filing a Compl. Under

the Civ. Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, With Jurisdiction Under 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (ECF

No. 1) (Compl.).1

On March 21, 2025, the MSP moved to dismiss Mr. DeMerchant’s complaint

against it pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing that it “is not

a proper defendant because it is not a person subject to suit under [42 U.S.C.] § 1983.”

Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss at 1 (ECF No. 14). Mr. DeMerchant did not respond.

The Magistrate Judge recommended the Court grant the MSP’s motion to

dismiss on May 5, 2025. Recommended Decision on Mot. to Dismiss (ECF No. 15)

(Rec. Dec.). Because the Magistrate Judge reviewed the motion to dismiss under 28

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), Mr. DeMerchant has a statutory right to de novo review by the

district judge upon filing an objection within fourteen days of being served. 28 U.S.C.

§ 636(b)(1)(C). He timely objected on May 22, 2025. Obj. to Rep. and Recommended

Decision (ECF No. 16) (Pl.’s Obj.).

II. THE PARTIES’ POSITIONS

A. The Magistrate Judge’s Recommended Decision

The Magistrate Judge recommends the Court grant the Defendant’s motion to

dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted. Def.’s

Mot. to Dismiss. As an initial matter, the Magistrate Judge observes that although

District of Maine Local Rule 7(b) provides that a party’s failure to oppose a motion to

1 Mr. DeMerchant had some difficulty complying with the requirements for a completed

application for in forma pauperis status. However, on January 21, 2025, he filed a proper application

and on January 22, 2025, the Magistrate Judge granted in forma pauperis status to Mr. DeMerchant.

Appl. to Proceed Without Prepayment of Fees and Aff. (ECF No. 7); Order Granting Mot. to Proceed

Without Prepayment of Fees and Costs (ECF No. 8). Mr. DeMerchant’s difficulties complying with the

in forma pauperis requirements has not affected the Court’s decision to affirm the recommended

decision.

dismiss is a waiver of any objection to the same, “where the record before the court

permits the assessment of the merits of the motion, the failure to oppose should not

be determinative.” Id. at 1 n.1 (citing Pomerleau v. W. Springfield Pub. Sch., 362

F.3d 143, 145 (1st Cir. 2004) (“[A] court may not automatically treat a failure to

respond to a 12(b)(6) motion as a procedural default”); Vega-Encarnacion v.

Babilonia, 344 F.3d 37, 41 (1st Cir. 2003) (“If the merits are at issue, the mere fact

that a motion to dismiss is unopposed does not relieve the district court of the

obligation to examine the complaint itself to see whether it is formally sufficient to

state a claim”)).

Following this instruction, the Magistrate Judge proceeds to the merits and

construes Mr. DeMerchant’s complaint as asserting a violation of his Eighth

Amendment rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id. at 3. With this framing, the

Magistrate Judge observes, “[a]lthough Plaintiff references in his complaint some

unknown corrections officers, he has not asserted a claim against an individual [and]

. . . alleges his claim solely against the Maine State Prison.” Id. This, the Magistrate

Judge determines, is a fatal flaw, because “[t]he [MSP], as an agency of the state of

Maine, may not be sued by citizens in federal court, regardless of the form of relief

requested, under the doctrine of sovereign immunity exemplified by the Eleventh

Amendment.” Id. (citing Poirier v. Mass. Dep’t of Corr., 558 F.3d 92, 97 n.6 (1st Cir.

2009)). “Additionally,” the Magistrate Judge notes, “while a federal district court

would have jurisdiction under the Civil Rights Act over claims against persons

exercising state authority, § 1983 does not authorize claims against states or its

agencies.” Id. (citing Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64 (1989));

Nieves-Marquez v. Puerto Rico, 353 108, 124 (1st Cir. 2003) (“No cause of action for

damages is stated under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against a state, its agency, or its officials

acting in an official capacity”)). Based on the foregoing, the Magistrate Judge

recommends the Court grant the Defendant’s motion to dismiss. Id.

B. Heath DeMerchant’s Objection

Mr. DeMerchant’s objection reports that “[he] received . . . a Recommended

Decision of Motion to Dismiss on behalf of the Defendant the Maine State Prison,”

and proceeds to explain that inmates’ “mail goes to the [MSP] in Warren[,] Maine

then it[’]s scanned there and then photocopied and then it undergoes this facilities

process and finall[y] sent or handed out to [the] residents,” commenting “it[’]s quite a

process.” Pl.’s Obj. at 1. Plaintiff writes that “[he] do[es not] want this matter

dismissed for any reason at all,” telling the Court “[he] ha[s] no lawyer helping [him]

with all of this[,] [he] do[es] it all by [him]self and as soon as [he] receive[s] any

paperwork from [the Court] [he] write[s] back as soon as possible.” Id.

Mr. DeMerchant next recounts the assault described in his complaint, telling

the Court he “went through all the proper channels to try and keep [him]self safe,”

but his “attempts were ignored,” and he suffers from “severe physical and emotional

damage” as a result. Id. He again states that “[t]his happened at the prison in

Warren not any other facilities in Maine.” Id. at 2.

III. LEGAL STANDARD

The Plaintiff timely filed an objection to the Magistrate Judge’s Recommended

Decision, and the Court thus “shall make a de novo determination of those portions

of the . . . recommendations to which objection is made.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); see

also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). At the same time, the Court is “only obliged to perform

de novo review of disputed portions of the report and recommendation.” United States

v. J.C.D., 861 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2017). Under this standard, the Court reviews factual

findings for clear error, Phinney v. Wentworth Douglas Hosp., 199 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir.

1999), and gives plenary review to pure questions of law. PowerShare, Inc. v. Syntel,

Inc., 597 F.3d 10, 15 (1st Cir. 2010).

IV. DISCUSSION

The Court reviewed and considered the Magistrate Judge’s Recommended

Decision, together with the entire record. Having made a de novo determination of

“disputed portions of the report and recommendation,” the Court affirms the

Recommended Decision of the Magistrate Judge over the Plaintiff’s objection and

determines that no further proceedings are necessary. See J.C.D., 861 F.3d at 6.

The Magistrate Judge logically reads Mr. DeMerchant’s complaint as raising

an Eighth Amendment violation pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Rec. Dec. at 3;

Compl. at 1. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,

custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,

subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or

other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any

rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,

shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or

other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought

against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s

judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a

declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

42 U.S.C. § 1983. It is black letter law that § 1983 “‘is not itself a source of substantive

rights,’ but merely provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere

conferred.’” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan,

443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)). To maintain a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must

establish: “1) that the conduct complained of has been committed under color of state

law, and 2) that this conduct worked a denial of rights secured by the Constitution or

laws of the United States.” Barreto-Rivera v. Medina-Vargas, 168 F.3d 42, 45 (1st

Cir. 1999).

However, to state a valid claim under § 1983, a complaint must bring such

allegations against a “person” acting under color of state law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. It is

well settled that neither a state nor its agencies are “persons” within the meaning of

§ 1983. See, e.g., Poirier, 558 F.3d at 97 & n.6; Will, 491 U.S. at 64, 70-71; Nieves-

Marquez, 353 F.3d at 124 (“No cause of action for damages is stated under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 against a state, its agency, or its officials acting in an official capacity”). The

MSP is not a “person” for purposes of § 1983 and, consequently, Mr. DeMerchant has

failed to state a cognizable § 1983 claim against the Defendant. See Commeau v.

Maine, Civil No. 9-361-B-W, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87124, at *2-3 (D. Me. Aug. 28,

2009) (dismissing complaint seeking relief against the state of Maine, the Maine

Department of Corrections, and Maine State Prison pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983

because none are “persons” within the meaning of that statute); Brensinger v.

Hunnewell, 1:14-CV-00011-GZS, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85117, at *4 n.4 (D. Me. May

22, 2014) (“Plaintiff cannot prevail against Defendant Maine State Prison under 42

U.S.C. § 1983 because the State is not a ‘person’ under § 1983”)); see also Humphrey

v. Me. State Prison, Civil No. 05-63-B-W, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17389, at *3-4 (D.

Me. Aug. 19, 2005) (“The Maine State Prison is neither an agency nor a legal entity

which can sue or be sued”) (quoting Clark v. Me. Dept. of Corrs., 463 A.2d 762, 765

(Me. 1983)). Based on the foregoing, the Court affirms the Magistrate Judge’s

recommendation that the Court grant MSP’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a

claim upon which relief can be granted. Rec. Dec. at 1-3.

One additional issue warrants discussion. As noted, Mr. DeMerchant’s

objection to the Recommended Decision begins by describing the prison mail system.

See Pl.’s Obj. at 1. Although Mr. DeMerchant does not explain his purpose for

including this information, the Court, consistent with the First Circuit’s instruction

to district courts reviewing pro se pleadings to construe these submissions liberally,

see Sanchez v. Brown Univ., No. 23-1983, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 15530, at *1 (1st Cir.

2024) (citing Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)), interprets this language as

offering an explanation for why the Plaintiff did not file a response to MSP’s motion

to dismiss. However, this liberal reading does not alter the Court’s determination

that dismissal is warranted, for a simple reason, which is that the Magistrate Judge

did not recommend dismissal based on Mr. DeMerchant’s failure to respond to the

motion to dismiss. Rec. Dec. at 1 n.1. Instead, consistent with First Circuit authority,

the Magistrate Judge proceeded to consider the merits of the Plaintiff’s claim against

the MSP, as pleaded in his complaint. Id. (citing, e.g., Vega-Encarnacion, 344 F.3d

at 41 (“If the merits are at issue, the mere fact that a motion to dismiss is unopposed

does not relieve the district court of the obligation to examine the complaint itself to

see whether it is formally sufficient to state a claim”)). Thus, the Magistrate Judge

recommended dismissal based not on Mr. DeMerchant’s failure to respond, but on the

determination of the insufficiency of the allegations in his complaint in attempting to

state a claim against the Maine State Prison. Id. at 1-3.

V. CONCLUSION

Having performed a de novo review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 363(b)(1)(B), the

Court AFFIRMS the Recommended Decision on Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 15),

OVERRULES the Objection to Report and Recommended Decision (ECF No. 16),

GRANTS the Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 14), and accordingly

DISMISSES without prejudice Heath DeMerchant’s complaint, Form to be Used by

a Prisoner in Filing a Complaint Under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, With

Jurisdiction Under 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (ECF No. 1).

SO ORDERED.

/s/ John A. Woodcock, Jr.

JOHN A. WOODCOCK, JR.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Dated this 25th day of June, 2025