Pyles v. Legner

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

PEORIA DIVISION

TERRY PYLES, )

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. 1:24-cv-1197-SEM-EIL

)

JOHN/JANE DOES, et al., )

Defendants. )

MERIT REVIEW ORDER ON AMENDED COMPLAINT

SUE E. MYERSCOUGH, United States District Judge:

Before the Court is a Motion for Leave to File Amended

Complaint (Doc. 20) filed by Plaintiff pro se Terry Pyles. For the

following reasons, the Motion is granted and Plaintiff may proceed

with a Fourth Amendment claim of unlawful search and seizure as

well as a civil conspiracy claim.

I. Background

The Court entered a Merit Review Order (Doc. 19) on April 17,

2025, dismissing Plaintiff’s initial Complaint (Doc. 1).

In Plaintiff’s Complaint, he alleged that Defendants searched

him without probable cause or a warrant. The search resulted in

criminal charges being brought against Plaintiff, who was convicted

in McLean County Circuit Court and is currently incarcerated in

the Illinois Department of Corrections (“IDOC”). The Court

dismissed Plaintiff’s Complaint because he sought release from

IDOC custody, which is not a remedy available in a § 1983 action.

The Court granted Plaintiff 21 days in which to file an

amended complaint. Plaintiff has now done so, and the Amended

Complaint is before the Court for screening.

II. Screening Standard

The Court must “screen” Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint and

dismiss any legally insufficient claim or the entire action if

warranted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. A claim is legally insufficient if it

“(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief

may be granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who

is immune from such relief.” Id. In reviewing the complaint, the

Court accepts the factual allegations as accurate, liberally

construing them in the plaintiff’s favor. Turley v. Rednour, 729 F.3d

645, 649 (7th Cir. 2013). However, conclusory statements and

labels are insufficient. Enough facts must be provided to “state a

claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Alexander v. United

States, 721 F.3d 418, 422 (7th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).

III. Facts Alleged

In Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that

Defendants with the Bloomington Police Department1 and with the

Illinois State Police2 conspired to stop and search him without

probable cause or a warrant on September 14, 2022.

More specifically, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants received an

unsubstantiated and uncorroborated tip from a confidential

informant that Plaintiff and a woman named Nicole Pruser would be

returning from St. Louis to Bloomington on an Amtrak train with

approximately half a pound of methamphetamine. Plaintiff alleges

that certain Defendants engaged in a “pretextual” traffic stop of

Pruser while, separately, Defendants Rizzi and Freshour stopped

and searched Plaintiff without a warrant and without probable

cause while Plaintiff was simply walking on the public sidewalk

away from the train station.

1 Joseph Rizzi, Anna Legner, Alex Freshour, Manuel

Hernandez, Paul Swanlund, David Ashbeck, Timothy Marvel,

Martin Krylowicz, Richard Beoletto, and Clayton Arnold

2 Richard Shanks, Kevin Ryan, Adrian Ortiz, Austin Quinn,

Jeffrey Albee, Ryan Strebing, Stephen Brown, Greg Lindemulder,

J.D. Russell, Jeremy Melville, and Christopher Lemke

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Rizzi later included in his

written report, dated September 20, 2022, that Defendants had

engaged in a parole search of Plaintiff, who was on Mandatory

Supervised Release (“MSR”) at the time. However, Plaintiff alleges

that Defendants Rizzi and Freshour did not notify Plaintiff that the

search being conducted was a parole search, and he maintains that

Defendants were unaware of his MSR Agreement search condition

prior to the search.

Plaintiff further alleges that on September 15, 2022, Assistant

State’s Attorney Jeffrey Horve initiated criminal proceedings against

him by filing an Information in the McLean County Circuit Court.

Plaintiff alleges that the Information contained intentionally

perjured information. That same day, Plaintiff went before the

McLean County Circuit Court for a probable cause determination,

at which Assistant State’s Attorney Lewis Liv allegedly presented a

false probable cause statement that Plaintiff’s arrest was incident to

the traffic stop of Nicole Pruser’s car. This statement was

consistent with Plaintiff’s Parole Violation Report, dated September

16, 2022, which relied upon a police report that apparently falsely

indicated that Plaintiff left the Amtrak station in a car, which was

stopped for a moving violation and a police K-9 alerted to the

presence of drugs inside the car.

IV. Analysis

Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint contains sufficient facts to state

a Fourth Amendment claim for unlawful search and seizure3 in

violation of the Fourth Amendment. See Neita v. City of Chicago,

830 F.3d 494, 498 (7th Cir. 2017) (“Warrantless searches are per se

unreasonable, subject to a few carefully defined exceptions.”);

United States v. Price, 28 F.4th 739, 750 (7th Cir. 2022) (“[W]hen a

parole or probationary search operates as a subterfuge for a

criminal investigation to evade the Fourth Amendment's warrant

and probable cause requirements, such searches violate the Fourth

Amendment.” (internal citations and quotations omitted)); Manuel v.

City of Joliet, Ill., 580 U.S. 357, 367 (2017) (“The Fourth

Amendment prohibits government officials from detaining a person

in the absence of probable cause…[which] can occur when legal

process itself goes wrong—when, for example, a judge’s probable-

3 “‘False arrest’ is shorthand for an unreasonable seizure

prohibited by the Fourth Amendment.” Gibbs v. Lomas, 755 F.3d

529, 537 (7th Cir. 2014), quoting Gonzalez v. Village of Milwaukee,

671 F.3d 649, 655 (7th Cir. 2012).

cause determination is predicated solely on a police officer’s false

statements.”); Olson v. Champaign County, Ill., 784 F.3d 1093, 1100

(7th Cir. 2015) (neither police officer nor prosecutor is entitled to

absolute immunity for swearing to false information).

Plaintiff may also proceed on a civil conspiracy claim against

Defendants. See Beaman v. Freesmeyer, 776 F.3d 500, 511 (7th

Cir. 2015) (to state a claim for civil conspiracy, a plaintiff must

plead an underlying constitutional violation and “that the

defendants agreed to inflict the constitutional harm”).

Plaintiff’s suit is limited to these claims, and he may seek only

money damages—not release from IDOC custody nor an

overturning of his conviction by the McLean County Circuit Court.

Further, Plaintiff may not proceed on an Illinois state law claim of

malicious prosecution, which would have required termination of

the underlying criminal proceedings in his favor. See Colbert v. City

of Chicago, 851 F.3d 649, 654-55 (7th Cir. 2017).4

4 Plaintiff’s § 1983 action, even if successful, does not

necessarily imply that his conviction was unlawful. See Heck v.

Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487 n.7 (1994) (discussing doctrines like

independent source, inevitable discovery, and harmless error).

Plaintiff has failed to state a claim based upon allegations that

certain supervisors failed to train or properly supervise Defendants

because their written reports did not comply with department

guidelines or policy. See Monell v. Department of Social Services,

436 U.S. 658, 663 n.7 (1978) (“[R]espondent superior is not a basis

for rendering municipalities liable under § 1983 for the

constitutional torts of their employees.”); Scott v. Edinburg, 346 F.3d

752, 760 (7th Cir. 2003) (“42 U.S.C. § 1983 protects plaintiffs from

constitutional violations, not violations of state law

or…departmental regulations”).

Finally, the Court notes that Plaintiff may not proceed on any

claim that the allegedly pretextual traffic stop against Nicole Pruser

violated her Fourth Amendment rights. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S.

128, 133-34 (1989) (“Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights”

and “may not be vicariously asserted.”).

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:

1) Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint

[20] is GRANTED, and the Amended Complaint is now the

operative pleading in this case. The Clerk is DIRECTED to

substitute the following Defendants in place of the

John/Jane Doe Defendants: Anna Legner, Alex Freshour,

Manuel Hernandez, Paul Swanlund, David Ashbeck,

Timothy Marvel, Martin Krylowicz, Richard Beoletto, and

Clayton Arnold, Richard Shanks, Kevin Ryan, Adrian

Ortiz, Austin Quinn, Jeffrey Albee, Ryan Strebing, Stephen

Brown, Greg Lindemulder, J.D. Russell, Jeremy Melville,

Christopher Lemke, Jeffrey Horve, and Lewis Liv. Joseph

Rizzi likewise remains a Defendant in this case.

2) According to the Court’s Merit Review of Plaintiff’s

Complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, Plaintiff has alleged

enough facts to proceed with a Fourth Amendment claim

of unlawful search and seizure and a civil conspiracy claim

against all Defendants. Additional claims shall not be

included in the case, except at the Court’s discretion on

motion by a party for good cause shown or under Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 15.

3) This case is now in the process of service. The Court

advises Plaintiff to wait until counsel has appeared for

Defendants before filing any motions, to give Defendants

notice and an opportunity to respond to those motions.

Motions filed before Defendants’ counsel has filed an

appearance will generally be denied as premature. Plaintiff

need not submit evidence to the Court unless otherwise

directed by the Court.

4) The Court will attempt service on Defendants by mailing

waivers of service. Defendants have sixty days from

service to file an Answer. If a Defendant has not filed an

Answer or appeared through counsel within ninety days of

the entry of this Order, Plaintiff may file a motion

requesting the status of service. After Defendants have

been served, the Court will enter an order setting

discovery and dispositive motion deadlines.

5) Concerning a Defendant who no longer works at the

address provided by Plaintiff, the entity for whom that

Defendant worked while at that address shall submit to

the Clerk said Defendant’s current work address or, if not

known, said Defendant’s forwarding address. This

information shall be used only for effectuating service.

Documentation of forwarding addresses shall be retained

only by the Clerk and shall not be maintained in the

public docket nor disclosed by the Clerk.

6) Defendants shall file an Answer within sixty days of the

date the Clerk sends the waiver. A motion to dismiss is

not an answer. The Answer should include all defenses

appropriate under the Federal Rules. The Answer and

subsequent pleadings shall be to the issues and claims

stated in this Order. In general, an answer sets forth a

Defendants’ positions. The Court does not rule on the

merits of those positions unless and until a Defendant

files a motion. Therefore, no response to an Answer is

necessary or will be considered.

7) This District uses electronic filing, which means that,

after Defendants’ counsel has filed an appearance, counsel

will automatically receive electronic notice of any motion

or other paper filed by Plaintiff with the Clerk. Therefore,

Plaintiff does not need to mail copies of motions and other

documents that Plaintiff has filed with the Clerk to

Defendants’ counsel. However, this does not apply to

discovery requests and responses. Discovery requests and

responses are not filed with the Clerk. Instead, Plaintiff

must mail his discovery requests and responses directly to

Defendants’ counsel. Discovery requests or responses sent

to the Clerk will be returned unfiled unless they are

attached to and the subject of a motion to compel.

Discovery does not begin until Defendant’s counsel have

filed an appearance, and the Court has entered a

scheduling order, which will explain the discovery process

in more detail.

8) Defendants’ counsel is granted leave to depose Plaintiff.

Defendants’ counsel shall arrange the time for the

deposition.

9) Plaintiff shall immediately notify the Court, in writing, of

any change in her mailing address and telephone number.

Plaintiff’s failure to inform the Court of a change in

mailing address or phone number will result in the

dismissal of this lawsuit with prejudice.

10) If a Defendant fails to sign and return a waiver of service

to the Clerk within thirty days after the waiver is sent, the

Court will take appropriate steps to effect formal service

through the U.S. Marshals service on that Defendant and

will require the Defendant to pay the total costs of formal

service under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(d)(2).

11) The Court directs the Clerk to attempt service on

Defendants under the standard procedures.

ENTERED June 25th, 2025.

s/ Sue E. Myerscough

____________________________________

SUE E. MYERSCOUGH

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE