Golden v. Google LLC

Case: 24-2024 Document: 41 Page: 1 Filed: 06/25/2025

NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals

for the Federal Circuit

______________________

LARRY GOLDEN,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

GOOGLE LLC,

Defendant-Appellee

______________________

2024-2024

______________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of California in No. 3:22-cv-05246-RFL,

Judge Rita F. Lin.

______________________

Decided: June 25, 2025

______________________

LARRY GOLDEN, Greenville, SC, pro se.

MATTHEW WARREN, Warren Kash Warren LLP, San

Francisco, CA, for defendant-appellee.

______________________

Before MOORE, Chief Judge, HUGHES and CUNNINGHAM,

Circuit Judges.

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2 GOLDEN v. GOOGLE LLC

PER CURIAM.

Before the court is Larry Golden’s appeal of a decision

by the United States District Court for the Northern Dis-

trict of California dismissing his amended complaint for

patent infringement against Google LLC (“Google”).

Golden v. Google LLC, No. 22-CV-05246-RFL, 2024 WL

1880336, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 3, 2024) (“Decision”), recons.

den., No. 22-CV-05246-RFL, 2024 WL 2745904

(N.D. Cal. May 28, 2024). For the reasons stated below, we

affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

Mr. Golden is the named inventor and applicant on U.S.

Patent Nos. 10,163,287, 9,589,439, 9,096,189, and

10,984,619. See generally ’287 patent, ’439 patent, ’189 pa-

tent, ’619 patent; see also App’x 283. 1 These patents have

common specifications and pertain to “a chemical/biologi-

cal/radiological detector unit with a disabling locking sys-

tem for protecting products . . . from terrorist activity, and

also for preventing unauthorized access to and tampering

with the storage and transport of ordnance and weapons.”

See, e.g., ’287 patent col. 3 ll. 36–41. 2

On September 14, 2022, Mr. Golden sued Google, as-

serting infringement of the claims of the ’287 patent, ’439

patent, and ’189 patent because Google “makes, uses, of-

fer[s] to sell, or sells Google Pixel smartphones 3, 3XL, 3a,

3aXL, 4a, 4a(5G), and 5.” App’x 54–55; see App’x 54–213.

1 We refer to the supplemental appendix filed by

Google, ECF No. 23, as “App’x” throughout this opinion.

2 Mr. Golden has previously asserted these patents

against other defendants. See, e.g., Golden v. Apple Inc.,

No. 2023-1161, 2023 WL 3400595, at *2 (Fed. Cir. May 12,

2023) (summarizing Mr. Golden’s patent infringement fil-

ings).

Case: 24-2024 Document: 41 Page: 3 Filed: 06/25/2025

GOLDEN v. GOOGLE LLC 3

Google moved to dismiss Mr. Golden’s complaint under

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing that the

complaint did not adequately allege infringement.

App’x 221, 227; see App’x 214–229. The district court

granted Google’s motion with leave to amend because it

could not “say at this stage that amendment necessarily

would be futile.” App’x 280; see App’x 274–281.

On August 22, 2023, Mr. Golden filed an amended com-

plaint adding allegations relating to the ’619 patent and

newer models of Google’s phones. App’x 283; see

App’x 282–561. Mr. Golden alleged that Google infringed

the claims of the asserted patents “jointly, directly, and/or

indirectly . . . [or] under the ‘doctrine of equivalents.’”

App’x 286. Mr. Golden further contended that “Google ac-

tively encouraged the [Department of Defense/Defense

Threat Reduction Agency (“DoD/DTRA”)] and Draper La-

boratory Inc.’s infringement, knowing that the acts they in-

duced constituted patent infringement, and their

encouraging acts actually resulted in direct patent in-

fringement.” App’x 284 (emphasis omitted); Decision at *3.

Google moved to dismiss the amended complaint.

App’x 562–580.

The district court granted Google’s motion to dismiss

the amended complaint without leave to amend. Decision

at *5. The district court determined that Mr. Golden’s di-

rect infringement allegations failed because his infringe-

ment theories required the accused products to be further

modified to infringe. Id. at *1–3. The district court further

determined that Mr. Golden failed to state a claim for indi-

rect infringement because he failed to properly allege direct

infringement. Decision at *3. Regarding joint and willful

infringement, the district court held that Mr. Golden’s al-

legations were too conclusory to state claims, “even apply-

ing the lenient pleading standards for pro se plaintiffs.”

Decision at *1, 3–4. Lastly, the district court denied leave

to amend because amendment would be futile. Decision

at *4–5. Mr. Golden sought reconsideration and

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4 GOLDEN v. GOOGLE LLC

disqualification of the presiding district court judge.

App’x 786–875. The district court denied Mr. Golden’s mo-

tions for reconsideration and disqualification. App’x 41–

43.

Mr. Golden appealed. We have jurisdiction under 28

U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1).

II. DISCUSSION

We review a district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss

according to applicable regional circuit law. Mobile Acuity

Ltd. v. Blippar Ltd., 110 F.4th 1280, 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2024).

The Ninth Circuit reviews de novo a district court’s grant

of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Fed-

eral Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Id. To survive a mo-

tion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must

“contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to

‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ash-

croft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl.

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). While “pro se

pleadings are to be liberally construed,” Durr v. Nicholson,

400 F.3d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2005), a “pro se plaintiff

must still meet minimal standards to avoid dismissal un-

der Rule 12(b)(6).” Ottah v. Fiat Chrysler, 884 F.3d 1135,

1141 (Fed. Cir. 2018).

A.

As an initial matter, Mr. Golden argues that our deci-

sion in Apple that a different complaint and claim chart

from Mr. Golden were “not facially frivolous” precludes dis-

missal here. See Appellant’s Br. 16–30; Golden v. Apple

Inc., No. 2022-1229, 2022 WL 4103285, at *2

(Fed. Cir. Sept. 8, 2022). Google responds that under the

doctrine of issue preclusion, Apple has no bearing on this

appeal. Appellee’s Br. 25–30. We agree with Google.

Although we previously “express[ed] no opinion as to

the adequacy of [Mr. Golden’s] complaint or claim chart ex-

cept that it is not facially frivolous,” we also concluded that

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GOLDEN v. GOOGLE LLC 5

“[o]ur decision does not preclude subsequent motions to dis-

miss by the defendant for failure to state a claim or for

summary judgment.” Apple, 2022 WL 4103285, at *2; see

also Golden v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., No. 2023-2120,

2024 WL 539973, at *2 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 12, 2024) (discussing

the scope of Apple), cert. denied, 144 S. Ct. 1395 (2024). Ac-

cordingly, our decision in Apple has no preclusive effect on

the dismissal issue in this case.

B.

Mr. Golden also argues that the district court “inappro-

priately dismissed [Mr.] Golden’s case at the pleadings

stage,” Appellant’s Br. 13, because Mr. Golden “provided

the [d]istrict [c]ourt with enough factual allegations to

show Google makes the alleged[ly] infringing

smartphones.” Appellant’s Br. 14. Google responds that

the district court correctly dismissed the amended com-

plaint for failing to state a claim for direct infringement.

Appellee’s Br. 30–34. Google further argues that the dis-

trict court correctly found that the amended complaint

failed to state claims for indirect infringement, joint in-

fringement, and willful infringement. Appellee’s Br. 34–

39. We agree with Google.

As the district court explained, the amended complaint

fails to sufficiently plead a claim for direct infringement

against Google. Although a plaintiff “need not prove its

case at the pleading stage” and “is not required to plead

infringement on an element-by-element basis,” it “cannot

assert a plausible claim for infringement under the Iq-

bal/Twombly standard by reciting the claim elements and

merely concluding that the accused product has those ele-

ments.” Bot M8 LLC v. Sony Corp. of Am., 4 F.4th 1342,

1352–53 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (citation and quotation marks

omitted). Each theory of infringement in the amended

complaint, App’x 400–439; Decision at *1, is deficient for

the same reason that Mr. Golden’s previous allegations of

infringement were deficient: the “factual allegations

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6 GOLDEN v. GOOGLE LLC

plausibly show, at the most, only that [Google]-made-and-

sold smartphones could be modified post-sale by others.

There is no plausible allegation that [Google] itself is mak-

ing, selling (or offering to sell), using, or importing

smartphones that have the claimed detector/sensor func-

tionality, either literally or [under the doctrine of] equiva-

lents.” Samsung, 2024 WL 539973, at *3.

We conclude that the district court did not err in find-

ing that Mr. Golden’s five infringement “theories all re-

quire that the accused products be modified in some way

for them to infringe on the patents-in-suit.” Decision at *1;

see also Nazomi Commc’ns, Inc. v. Nokia Corp., 739 F.3d

1339, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (finding no infringement when

the accused products “do not infringe without modifica-

tion—the modification of installing the required soft-

ware.”). Mr. Golden’s first theory of infringement requires

the use of the third-party app “ATAK-CIV” for at least two

limitations of each asserted claim. App’x 300–302 ¶¶ 56–

63; see also App’x 400–407. Mr. Golden’s second theory of

infringement requires the use of “NFC tags,” which are ex-

ternal to Google products. App’x 307 (“NFC-enabled

smartphones communicate with NFC tags.”); see also

App’x 408–415. Mr. Golden’s third theory of infringement

requires using “Google’s camera lens with [a] microfluidic

lens” that “uses [a] microscope to focus on a chemical sen-

sor.” App’x 420–422 (emphasis added); see also App’x 416–

423. Mr. Golden’s fourth theory of infringement requires

external sensors that the complaint alleges must be added

on to Google’s device. App’x 308; see also App’x 424–431.

Mr. Golden’s fifth theory of infringement requires “Google

Beacon,” a separate device. App’x 308; see also App’x 432–

439. Therefore, each of Mr. Golden’s direct infringement

theories solely against Google fails because Mr. Golden’s

infringement allegations require modification of the ac-

cused products to show infringement.

Because Mr. Golden has failed to adequately plead di-

rect infringement by Google, his complaint also fails to

Case: 24-2024 Document: 41 Page: 7 Filed: 06/25/2025

GOLDEN v. GOOGLE LLC 7

sufficiently plead indirect infringement and willful in-

fringement. See, e.g., Dynacore Holdings Corp. v. U.S.

Philips Corp., 363 F.3d 1263, 1272 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“Indi-

rect infringement, whether inducement to infringe or con-

tributory infringement, can only arise in the presence of

direct infringement, though the direct infringer is typically

someone other than the defendant accused of indirect in-

fringement.”); Johnson & Johnston Assocs. Inc. v. R.E.

Serv. Co., 285 F.3d 1046, 1055 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (because

“the district court erred as a matter of law in concluding

that RES infringed” the claims of the patent-at-issue,

“[c]onsequently, this court reverses the district

court’s . . . judgment of willful infringement”); Decision

at *3–4. Therefore, the district court did not err in finding

that Mr. Golden fails to state claims of indirect infringe-

ment and willful infringement.

In addition, the district court did not err in finding that

the amended complaint fails to sufficiently plead a claim

for joint infringement. A claim of joint infringement re-

quires “pleading facts sufficient to allow a reasonable in-

ference that all steps of the claimed method are performed

and either (1) one party exercises the requisite ‘direction or

control’ over the others’ performance or (2) the actors form

a joint enterprise such that performance of every step is

attributable to the controlling party.” Lyda v. CBS Corp.,

838 F.3d 1331, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing Akamai Techs.,

Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 797 F.3d 1020, 1022

(Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc)). Mr. Golden appears to allege

joint infringement by Google and Draper Laboratory Inc.

and Google and the DoD/DTRA. App’x 284; see also

App’x 441–445 (claim chart alleging induced, contributory

and joint infringement by DoD/DTRA and Draper Labora-

tory Inc.). However, Mr. Golden does not allege any factual

allegations regarding the degree of control that Google had

over Draper Laboratory Inc. or DoD/DTRA or allege any

facts showing those entities formed a joint enterprise.

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8 GOLDEN v. GOOGLE LLC

Thus, the district court did not err in finding that

Mr. Golden fails to adequately allege joint infringement.

III. CONCLUSION

We have considered Mr. Golden’s remaining argu-

ments and find them unpersuasive. For the above reasons,

we affirm the district court’s judgment.

AFFIRMED

COSTS

No costs.