State v. Burton

750 June 24, 2025 No. 24

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE

STATE OF OREGON

STATE OF OREGON,

Respondent on Review,

v.

JAYSON HARRISON BURTON,

Petitioner on Review.

(CC 18CR78018) (CA A177214) (SC S070441)

En Banc

On review from the Court of Appeals.*

Argued and submitted May 14, 2024.

Daniel C. Bennett, Deputy Public Defender, Oregon

Public Defense Commission, Salem, argued the cause and

filed the briefs for petitioner on review. Also on the briefs

was Ernest G. Lannet, Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate

Section.

Lauren P. Robertson, Assistant Attorney General, Salem,

argued the cause and filed the brief for respondent on

review. Also on the brief were Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney

General, and Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General.

MASIH, J.

The decision of the Court of Appeals and the judgment of

the circuit court are affirmed.

______________

* On Appeal from Washington County Circuit Court, D. Charles Bailey, Jr.,

Judge.326 Or App 815 (2023) (nonprecedential memorandum opinion).

Cite as 373 Or 750 (2025) 751

752 State v. Burton

MASIH, J.

This criminal case involves statements made by

defense counsel during closing argument that the trial

court ruled were improper. Prior to defendant’s arrest on

charges of second-degree sexual abuse and third-degree

rape, law enforcement had a phone interview with him,

during which he made no admissions. The state did not

introduce evidence of that phone call during its case-in-

chief at defendant’s trial, and the prosecutor assumed that

the state’s failure to do so precluded defense counsel from

asking about the call on cross-examination. During closing

arguments, defense counsel did not specifically mention the

phone call, but did refer three times to the lack of evidence

about any interview with, or admissions by, defendant. The

state objected each time, and the court sustained the first

two objections, but did not rule on the third. After the third

objection, the court told defense counsel—outside the jury’s

presence—that counsel was not permitted to say that no

interview had occurred but could refer to the absence of any

evidence of admissions by defendant. After defense counsel

tried a fourth time to refer to the absence of evidence of any

police interview—and again, the state objected—the court

sustained that objection and instructed the jury, sua sponte,

that they should not speculate about whether any interview

had occurred and that whether any interview had occurred

was “not important” for them to know.

The jury found defendant guilty on both charges,

and he appealed, contending that the trial court had erred

in sustaining the state’s objections and that the court’s sua

sponte instruction had been an improper comment on the

evidence. The Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that

the trial court had not abused its discretion in sustaining

the objections and that defendant had not preserved his

argument as to the jury instruction. State v. Burton, 326 Or

App 815 (2023) (nonprecedential memorandum opinion). For

the reasons explained below, we conclude that, although the

trial court did not err when it sustained the state’s objection

to defense counsel’s first statement, it did err in sustaining

the state’s objection to defense counsel’s fourth statement.

Cite as 373 Or 750 (2025) 753

However, we conclude that the error was harmless.1 In addi-

tion, although we agree that the court’s sua sponte jury

instruction could have been worded more carefully, defen-

dant did not preserve his argument that the instruction

was an improper comment on the evidence, and we therefore

decline to reach the merits of that issue. Accordingly, we

affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The charges against defendant arose from allega-

tions that, at a hotel in Hillsboro, Oregon, he had had sexual

intercourse with his then-girlfriend’s daughter, Z, who was

14 years old at the time. The incident was reported to offi-

cials in King County, Washington, where Z and her mother

lived, and the report was later forwarded to the Hillsboro

Police Department. Detective Gay was assigned to inves-

tigate, coordinating with detectives from the King County

Sheriff’s Office, including Detective Gerlitz. Detective Gay

had difficulty locating defendant, but eventually spoke

with him once over the phone. Defendant did not make any

admissions during that conversation. Ultimately, the state

charged defendant with one count of second-degree sexual

abuse, ORS 163.425, and one count of third-degree rape,

ORS 163.355, and the case proceeded to trial.

During opening statements, the prosecutor told

the jury that they would be hearing testimony from numer-

ous witnesses, including law enforcement. Defense counsel

then told the jury that they would hear about a phone call

between law enforcement and defendant:

“You’ll also hear testimony from law enforcement. They

attempted to interview [defendant] and what you’re going

to hear from law enforcement is that [defendant] made no

admissions. None. This was what we would call a pretext

call and I think that you can surmise from the evidence

that they wanted to lure [defendant] into making admis-

sions that he had sexually assaulted this young girl.

“There were no admissions. None.”

1

As we will discuss in more detail later in this opinion, we need not resolve

any issues pertaining to defense counsel’s second or third statement. Defendant

concedes that the second statement was withdrawn, and the trial court never

issued a clear ruling on the prosecutor’s objection to the third statement.

754 State v. Burton

After opening statements, the court excused the

jury to consider a defense motion to dismiss for improper

venue. Detective Gay testified for the state about the pro-

priety of venue. During cross-examination, defense counsel

asked Detective Gay if she had attempted to interview defen-

dant, and she answered yes. Defense counsel then asked

whether defendant had “admit[ted] to [Detective Gay] that

something happened” in Hillsboro, to which Gay responded,

“He didn’t admit to anything, no.” The trial court denied

defendant’s motion to dismiss for improper venue.

At the beginning of the second day of trial, and again

outside the jury’s presence, the prosecutor brought up defense

counsel’s reference in his opening statement to a “pretext”

phone call and explained that the state did not intend to play

its recording of the call or present any evidence about the

call, including any statements that defendant had made. The

prosecutor continued, asserting that “the only avenue, essen-

tially, for those [statements] to come out is if the State brings

them out. And so[,] with Detective Gay on the stand, if I don’t

ask her about those, they can’t ask her about those state-

ments, about that conversation.” In other words, the prosecu-

tor took the position that, if the state presented no evidence

of a phone call, then defense counsel could not ask Gay during

cross-examination whether defendant had made any admis-

sions during any such call.2 The trial court explained that it

understood the prosecutor to be arguing that the statements

would be inadmissible because they were not party-opponent

admissions. Defense counsel stated that, if the state did not

raise the issue, he would not either. The court withheld any

ruling, noting that it did not “make decisions in a vacuum”

and that “[t]hings can unfold far differently than people

anticipate and I’ll make my call on that.”

During trial, the jury heard testimony from

Z, Gerlitz, Gay, and Z’s mother, as well as a recording of

Gerlitz’s interview of Z. On direct examination by the state,

Gay testified about her overall investigation, including that

it had been difficult to locate defendant, but the prosecu-

tor did not ask her about her phone call with defendant. On

2

As we discuss later in this opinion, the prosecutor’s assumption that defense

counsel would be precluded from asking Gay about that conversation altogether

was likely incorrect. See 373 Or at 764-65.

Cite as 373 Or 750 (2025) 755

cross-examination, defense counsel also did not ask Gay

about the phone interview but did ask about other aspects

of the investigation, including what steps she had taken to

verify the truthfulness of Z’s story. During that question-

ing, Gay acknowledged that she had not verified the hotel

records until the day of her testimony, had not found any

witnesses to the incident, and had not looked for or found

any video from that time that might have showed defendant

and Z together. Defendant did not testify.

Defendant’s theory at trial was that the allegations

had not been adequately investigated and, therefore, the

state had not proved his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

Defense counsel’s closing argument criticized the thorough-

ness of the state’s investigation. In support of that argu-

ment, defense counsel stated:

“You heard the prosecutor acknowledging no DNA, no

hospital records, no immediate reporting, no rape kit, noth-

ing. No police investigation until much later in time.

“* * * * *

“This could have been a more thorough investigation.

Law enforcement, we heard them today. They could have

investigated in a way that would have been extremely per-

suasive in terms of did this crime happen or not. Don’t have

much from law enforcement, right? * * *

“So, when you pull all of this together, let’s look at the

different kinds of evidence or information you have. [Z]

admitted there were things that she didn’t say. So, you

have missing information, there’s no doubt about that. So

you have information * * * that comes in, that’s not cor-

roborated, that really is important. And [defendant] has

exercised his right to not testify and as I suggested to you

(inaudible) the only people that really know what might

have happened or didn’t happen would be [defendant] and

you didn’t hear from him. That’s his right.

“So, you’re trying to figure out what happened without

[defendant]. What you also didn’t hear was reports by law

enforcement about their attempt to interview [defendant]. So,

one of two things might have happened. Maybe he wasn’t

investigated. We don’t know. We didn’t hear any testimony

about that. It’s certainly leaning to * * *[.]”

756 State v. Burton

(Emphasis added.) At that point, the state objected. The trial

court sustained the objection on the ground that defense

counsel’s argument assumed facts not in evidence.

Defense counsel then tried to rephrase, asking,

“Did you hear any of the investigators say[, ‘]I spoke to [defen-

dant]?[’] The answer is no.” (Emphasis added.) Again, the

state objected. The trial court sustained the objection, and

defense counsel withdrew that statement.

Defense counsel then rephrased again, stating,

“So, we have no admissions.” (Emphasis added.) The state

objected a third time, and the court asked the jury to leave

the courtroom without ruling on the objection.

Outside the jury’s presence, the state contended that

defense counsel was arguing facts not in evidence because he

was arguing that defendant had not spoken to law enforce-

ment, when, in fact, he knew that defendant had spoken to

Detective Gay and that the state had chosen not to present

evidence of that interview. The trial court responded that

“there’s a difference between whether or not [defendant] was

interviewed and whether or not [the jury] heard any testi-

mony regarding any admissions.” The court continued that

it would allow defense counsel to argue to the jury that none

of the officers had testified about any admissions made by

defendant, but that counsel could not state that there had

been no investigation or interview. The court explained its

reasoning as follows:

“THE COURT: I’d allow him to [state] that none of

the officers testified to any admissions. If you want to go

back[,] * * * [defense counsel] didn’t ask [the detectives] any

questions about whether or not they had any interview, you

can’t speculate as to whether or not there [were] any inter-

views of him or not. You can certainly be sure that if there

was anything favorable for them, [defense counsel] would

have probably tried to bring it in. It’s a slippery slope, that’s

why * * * if we keep it to ‘you didn’t hear any testimony from

the officers—[’]

“[PROSECUTOR:] Right.

“THE COURT: [’]—of any admissions,[’] I’m good with

that, because I think that’s—

Cite as 373 Or 750 (2025) 757

“[PROSECUTOR:] Right. I have concerns—

“THE COURT: —likely factually—

“[PROSECUTOR:] —with him saying that there was

not an investigation and he was not—

“THE COURT Different.

“[PROSECUTOR:] —interviewed, that’s a—

“THE COURT: Different.

“[PROSECUTOR:] —different—

“THE COURT: That part * * * is why I sustained it.

The second one is why I didn’t make a decision until we

at least had the jury go out. I think it’s fair for him to say

none of the officers testified to any admissions made by his

client.

“[DEFENSE COUNSEL:] Okay.

“THE COURT Because we do know he’s interviewed

and I think that’s factually correct that it’s not—so that’s—

“[DEFENSE COUNSEL:] (Inaudible.)

“THE COURT: —that’s fair game for you. Just be

careful—

“[DEFENSE COUNSEL:] I will.

“THE COURT: —how you do it[.]”

In sum, the court explained that defense counsel could state

to the jury that neither officer had testified about any admis-

sions from defendant but could not state that no investiga-

tion or interview had occurred. Both defense counsel and

the prosecutor stated that they understood.

Immediately after that discussion, the following

exchange occurred in front of the jury:

“THE COURT: [Defense counsel], you may continue.

“[DEFENSE COUNSEL:] Thank you.

“You didn’t hear from the law enforcement witnesses that

they had interviewed [defendant]. You just didn’t hear that.

“[PROSECUTOR:] I object, your honor.

“THE COURT: Sustained. Just—

758 State v. Burton

“[DEFENSE COUNSEL:] Let me—

“THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen, I don’t want

you * * * speculating about whether there were, or not, any

interviews. Certainly, it was not raised. And it’s not import-

ant for you * * * to know if there was or was not any inter-

views done of the defendant in this particular case.

“* * * [R]egarding the argument, it’s only argument and

so that’s all [they] are. They’re not facts to be presented to

you all. But I don’t want you * * * speculating whether there

were or were not any interviews done by the defendant.”

(Emphases added.) Defense counsel did not object to the

court’s instruction and continued his argument without fur-

ther reference to the detectives’ testimony. During rebuttal

closing argument, the prosecutor focused on the evidence that

the state had presented, asking the jury to base its verdict on

the evidence, which in this case was witness testimony that

the prosecutor argued was uncontroverted. The jury found

defendant guilty on both charges. The court merged those

guilty verdicts and convicted defendant of a single count of

sexual abuse in the second degree, ORS 163.425.

Defendant appealed, raising two assignments

of error. First, he argued that the trial court had errone-

ously limited defense counsel’s closing argument when it

sustained the state’s objections that defense counsel was

asserting facts not in evidence because his counsel’s argu-

ment had been a proper invocation of the “missing witness”

or “missing evidence” inference. The Court of Appeals dis-

agreed, concluding that the trial court had acted within

its discretion in controlling the scope of defense counsel’s

closing argument because counsel’s argument had invited

the jury to draw an inference that counsel knew to be false;

that is, that law enforcement had not contacted defendant.

Burton, 326 Or App at 819 (citing United States v. Blueford,

312 F3d 962, 968 (9th Cir 2002) (“It is certainly within the

bounds of fair advocacy for a prosecutor, like any lawyer,

to ask the jury to draw inferences from the evidence that

the prosecutor believes in good faith might be true. But it

is decidedly improper for the government to propound infer-

ences that it knows to be false, or has very strong reason to

doubt[.]”)).

Cite as 373 Or 750 (2025) 759

Second, defendant argued that the trial court had

impermissibly commented on the evidence when it instructed

the jury sua sponte not to speculate about whether an inter-

view had occurred and directed the jury that whether any

such interview had occurred was “not important” for the

jury to know. The Court of Appeals rejected that argument

as unpreserved. Id. at 816. We allowed defendant’s petition

for review.

II. ANALYSIS

Defendant’s arguments present two issues. The first

issue is whether, during closing argument, a defendant can

emphasize the state’s failure to present certain evidence,

where the inference that the jury might naturally draw from

that failure is one that defense counsel knows has no good-

faith support in the record. Relatedly, defendant invokes the

“missing evidence” inference, and we consider whether that

inference applies in this case. The second issue is whether,

when the state decides not to present certain evidence, and

the defendant then attempts to call attention to that fact

during closing argument, the trial court may instruct the

jury that the absence of the evidence is “not important.”

Because it will provide helpful context for our analysis of the

specific questions presented, we begin by discussing some

generally applicable principles regarding the permissible

scope of closing argument.

A. General Principles Regarding Closing Argument

We generally review a trial court’s decisions regard-

ing control of jury argument for abuse of discretion. R.J.

Frank Realty, Inc. v. Heuvel, 284 Or 301, 306, 586 P2d 1123

(1978). This court has explained that discretion “refers to

the authority of a trial court to choose among several legally

correct outcomes.” State v. Rogers, 330 Or 282, 312, 4 P3d

1261 (2000). Specific to criminal cases, a court’s exercise of

discretion may be informed by certain limitations that serve

to protect the defendant’s constitutional right to a trial by

an impartial jury under Article I, section 11, of the Oregon

Constitution and the right to a fair trial guaranteed by the

Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States

760 State v. Burton

Constitution. State v. Banks, 367 Or 574, 582, 481 P3d 1275

(2021).

We have also recognized that, in some cases, the

exercise of discretion by the trial court “may be predicated

on certain subsidiary determinations—either findings of

fact or conclusions of law—that trigger their own standards

of review.” State v. Hightower, 361 Or 412, 421, 393 P3d 224

(2017); see, e.g., Charles v. Palomo, 347 Or 695, 703-04, 227

P3d 737 (2010) (concluding that trial court erred in denying

plaintiff the opportunity to present a rebuttal closing argu-

ment based on its misreading of ORCP 58 B(6)).

As to the permissible scope of jury arguments, this

court has long recognized that trial counsel have “ ‘a large

degree of freedom’ to comment on the evidence submitted”

and to “urge the jury to draw any and all legitimate infer-

ences from that evidence.” Cler v. Providence Health System-

Oregon, 349 Or 481, 487-88, 245 P3d 642 (2010) (quoting

Huber v. Miller, 41 Or 103, 115, 68 P 400 (1902)). However,

“that freedom is not without limitations.” 3 Cler, 349 Or at

488. For instance, although counsel may be permitted to

argue that a jury may draw certain inferences based on

the evidence presented, counsel may not make abusive or

highly inflammatory arguments, or appeal to the “passion

and prejudice” of the jury, encouraging it to decide the case

on an improper basis. Id. at 488 n 5 (citing cases following

that principle); see also Walker v. Penner, 190 Or 542, 553,

227 P2d 316 (1951) (improper for counsel to make argument

that is “highly inflammatory” and “only calculated to cause

prejudice”).

Another limitation on jury argument is that counsel

may not refer to information outside the evidentiary record.

See State v. Oatney, 369 Or 555, 569, 508 P3d 482 (2022)

(“Arguments that urge the jury to draw legitimate inferences

based on admissible evidence are generally acceptable; con-

versely, arguments that go beyond the admissible evidence

generally are not.”); State v. Sperou, 365 Or 121, 134, 442

P3d 581 (2019) (explaining rule in context of witness vouch-

ing and collecting cases); State v. Pace, 187 Or 498, 510, 212

3

We discuss one such limitation with regards to instructing the jury on the

law in State v. Worsham, 373 Or 739, __ P3d __ (June 24, 2025), also decided today.

Cite as 373 Or 750 (2025) 761

P2d 755 (1949) (improper for prosecutor, in argument to the

jury, to refer to statements that the defendant’s wife had

made to attorney before trial); Tenny v. Mulvaney, 8 Or 513,

521-22 (1880) (“Th[e] rule is * * * that counsel must confine

themselves to facts in evidence.”); see also Trial, 88 CJS

§ 298 (2024) (“Counsel must be confined to the issues and

the evidence and will not be allowed to comment on or state

facts not in evidence or within the issues.”). That limitation

is consistent with OEC 103(3), which provides that, in jury

trials, “proceedings shall be conducted, to the extent prac-

ticable, so as to prevent inadmissible evidence from being

suggested to the jury by any means, such as making state-

ments or offers of proof or asking questions in the hearing

of the jury.” See Banks, 367 Or at 585-86 (stating that OEC

103(3) applies to statements by lawyers); see also Cler, 349

Or at 490 (applying that limitation).4

Yet another limitation on jury arguments is that

counsel may not suggest that they are aware of evidence

4

The limitation that counsel may not refer to information outside the evi-

dentiary record is also generally supported by Rule 3.4(e) of the American Bar

Association’s (ABA) Model Rules of Professional Conduct, which provides, in

part, that a lawyer shall not “in trial, allude to any matter that the lawyer does

not reasonably believe is relevant or that will not be supported by admissible

evidence.” ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 3.4(e); see also Oregon

Rule of Professional Conduct (RPC) 3.4(e) (to same effect). And it conforms to

Standard 4-7.8(a) of the ABA Criminal Justice Standards for the Defense Function

(2017), which provides:

“In closing argument to a jury (or to a judge sitting as trier of fact),

defense counsel may argue all reasonable inferences from the evidence in

the record. Defense counsel should, to the extent time permits, review the

evidence in the record before presenting closing argument. Defense counsel

should not knowingly misstate the evidence in the record, or argue inferences

that counsel knows have no good-faith support in the record.”

The standard has a corollary for prosecutors:

“In closing argument to a jury (or to a judge sitting as trier of fact), the

prosecutor should present arguments and a fair summary of the evidence

that proves the defendant guilty beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecutor

may argue all reasonable inferences from the evidence in the record, unless

the prosecutor knows an inference to be false. The prosecutor should, to the

extent time permits, review the evidence in the record before presenting clos-

ing argument. The prosecutor should not knowingly misstate the evidence in

the record, or argue inferences that the prosecutor knows have no good-faith

support in the record. The prosecutor should scrupulously avoid any refer-

ence to a defendant’s decision not to testify.”

Standard 3-6.8(a) of the ABA Criminal Justice Standards for the Prosecution

Function (2017).

762 State v. Burton

that was not presented to the jury—thereby creating an

invitation for the jury to speculate. See, e.g., Banks, 367 Or at

589-90 (prosecutor’s statements suggesting that additional

evidence existed but had to be excluded under the rules of evi-

dence encouraged speculation and were not harmless); State

v. Wederski, 230 Or 57, 61, 368 P2d 393 (1962) (prosecutor’s

reference to evidence that the state “might have produced,

but did not, was an open invitation for the jury to speculate

in a manner which has been denounced by this court on sev-

eral occasions”); State v. Newburn, 178 Or 238, 241-42, 166

P2d 470 (1946) (prosecutor’s argument implying to the jury

that the state had other inadmissible evidence that tended

to show the defendant’s guilt was improper and prejudicial

to the defendant); see also State v. Perez, 373 Or 591, 619, __

P3d __ (2025) (Bushong, J., concurring) (stating that a pros-

ecutor “should never suggest or insinuate that there is more

evidence of the defendant’s guilt than what the prosecutor

has presented at trial” because doing so “amounts to either

impermissible vouching, an implicit reference to facts not in

evidence, or both”).

Within the limitations on jury argument described

above, counsel retain their ability to advocate freely on behalf

of their clients. Cf. Huber, 41 Or at 115-16 (“[W]hen arguing

within the limits of admitted or controverted facts[,] the

counsel should enjoy the greatest latitude consistent with

decorum and a reasonable ambition to succeed by honorable

means.”) In doing so, a defendant can comment on the state’s

failure to present evidence. That is because the presumption

of innocence afforded to a defendant—and thus, the state’s

burden to overcome that presumption—is a “substantial part

of the law,” which requires the state “to establish every * * *

element of the crime as charged.” State v. Rosasco, 103 Or

343, 357, 205 P 290 (1922). And the burden rests with “the

prosecution to prove [this] to the satisfaction of the trial jury,

beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. That requirement is funda-

mental to the American justice system. State v. Chitwood,

370 Or 305, 317, 518 P3d 903 (2022). Therefore, in the con-

text of a criminal trial, a defense argument that holds the

state to its burden to “prove by evidence” that the defendant

committed the crime charged, and points to the state’s fail-

ure to meet that burden, is permissible. Cf. Rosasco, 103 Or

Cite as 373 Or 750 (2025) 763

at 357 (explaining that, throughout trial, the burden of proof

is “never shifted from the state to the defendant”). Such an

argument falls within the “large degree of freedom” given to

defense counsel to argue their case to the jury. Cler, 349 Or

at 487 (internal quotation marks omitted).

With those general principles in mind, we turn

to the first issue regarding the limits that the trial court

imposed on defendant’s closing argument.

B. Trial Court’s Rulings Related to Defendant’s Closing

Argument

As noted, defendant argues that the trial court

erred when it limited the scope of his closing argument and

prevented him from pointing out gaps in the state’s evidence

regarding an interview of defendant or any admissions made

by defendant. Defendant specifically argues that the court’s

rulings were based on a misapplication of the “missing evi-

dence” inference. In general, that inference provides that,

“ ‘[w]hen it would be natural under the circumstances for a

party to call a particular witness * * * and the party fails to

do so, tradition has allowed the adversary to use this fail-

ure as the basis for invoking an adverse inference’ ” that the

testimony would have been unfavorable to the party. Cler,

349 Or at 489 (quoting 2 McCormick on Evidence § 264, 220

(6th ed 2006) (brackets in Cler)).5 Thus, as defendant frames

it, the issue is whether, under the “missing evidence” infer-

ence, it was permissible for defense counsel to point out the

“gap” in Detective Gay’s testimony—her failure to testify

about any interview—and the state’s failure to otherwise

present evidence of the phone call with defendant. The state

counters that the inference is not applicable and that the

court’s rulings represented a correct application of the well-

established rule that a party may not comment on or state

facts not in evidence. See, e.g., Huber, 41 Or at 115 (coun-

sel may not make “statements of facts outside the range of

evidence”).

5

The inference may be called the “missing witness” or “missing evidence”

inference, because it applies not only to testimony but also to a party’s failure

“to produce documents or other objects in his or her possession as evidence.” 2

McCormick on Evidence § 264 (9th ed 2025). Because this case relates only to

missing evidence, we refer to the inference as the “missing evidence” inference.

764 State v. Burton

Both parties have presented extensive briefing and

argument in this court regarding whether the “missing evi-

dence” inference is applicable to this case. Although discus-

sions of the “missing evidence” inference are often framed

around counsel’s arguments, the inference is an eviden-

tiary principle.6 When raised in the context of arguments, it

requires the court to determine whether counsel is arguing

a fact not in evidence—which is generally prohibited—or the

absence of evidence that would be relevant to the issues in

the trial, which may, in some circumstances, be permitted.

The “missing evidence” inference can be raised

independently or in conjunction with defense counsel’s argu-

ments based on the burden of proof and presumption of inno-

cence. See, e.g., Banks, 367 Or at 581 (defense counsel, in

closing argument, asserted that the state had failed to carry

its burden of proof, and argued more specifically that the

state had the power to request certain video evidence but

that it had not produced it). However, as we will explain, we

conclude that any invocation of the inference was not neces-

sary in this case to permit defendant to point to the lack of

evidence in the record of any interview or admissions. Such

arguments, as noted above, are grounded in the presump-

tion of innocence and a criminal defendant’s general right to

hold the state to its burden of proof. It does not require the

application of the “missing evidence” inference.

We understand that defendant may have felt com-

pelled to try to invoke the inference due to a belief that

he was prohibited from cross-examining law enforcement

about any interview with defendant. That belief may have

6

“Historically, courts faced with the absence of a material witness turned for

guidance to two doctrines:” the best evidence rule and the presumption against

spoliators. Robert H. Stier, Jr., Revisiting the Missing Witness Inference—Quieting

the Loud Voice from the Empty Chair, 44 Md L Rev 137, 139 (1985). Courts were

willing to allow an adverse inference to be drawn for two primary reasons, based

on those doctrines. Id. at 143. First, the courts “suspected the nonproducing

party of concealing evidence, but because they could not show that unsavory act,

they punished the would-be spoliators by depriving them of their supposed gain.”

Id. Second, the courts aimed to provide incentive for parties to come forward

with evidence. Id. With those evidentiary principles serving as guideposts, the

rule developed such that “the inference of unfavorable testimony from an absent

witness became accepted as the general rule.” Id. Our decision in Banks is a

more recent example of the application of that principle in a criminal case. See

367 Or at 589 (applying principle to counsel arguments regarding missing video

evidence (citing Cler, 349 Or at 489)).

Cite as 373 Or 750 (2025) 765

been based on the prosecutor’s argument that, “if I don’t

ask [Detective Gay] about [the phone call, defendant] can’t

ask her about those statements, about that conversation.”

However, the prosecutor’s assumption—that defense coun-

sel could not cross-examine Detective Gay about the inter-

view if the prosecutor did not ask any questions about that

part of the investigation—was likely incorrect.7 Under OEC

611(2), “[c]ross-examination should be limited to the sub-

ject matter of the direct examination and matters affecting

the credibility of the witness.” However, cross-examination

“should not be limited to the exact facts stated on direct

examination, but [may] extend[ ] to other matters which tend

to limit, explain, or qualify them, or to rebut or modify any

inference resulting therefrom, provided they are directly

connected with the matter stated in the direct examina-

tion.” Ritchie v. Pittman, 144 Or 228, 231, 24 P2d 328 (1933)

(internal quotation marks omitted); see State v. Wirfs, 250

Or App 269, 275, 281 P3d 616, rev den, 352 Or 378 (2012)

(explaining that OEC 611(2) maintains “[t]hat broad view

of the scope of cross-examination”); see State v. Cuevas, 263

Or App 94, 104, 326 P3d 1242 (2014), aff’d, 358 Or 147, 361

P3d 581 (2015) (concluding that, where the adequacy of the

investigation is challenged on direct examination, questions

about the investigation are not beyond the scope of cross-

examination); see also OEC 106 (“When part of an act * * *

is given in evidence by one party, the whole on the same

subject, where otherwise admissible, may at that time be

inquired into by the other[.]”).

Contrary to the prosecutor’s argument, defense

counsel’s questions regarding Gay’s interview with defen-

dant likely would have been permissible so long as they were

not seeking to introduce any statements that defendant had

made but were instead focused on the circumstances of the

interview and that defendant did not make any admissions.

As we have just explained, because the prosecutor asked

Gay questions on direct examination about her investigation

as a whole, it would have then been permissible for defense

7

The state has not provided any support for why the prosecutor’s belief would

be correct and, in arguing that the missing witness inference was not applicable

in this instance, acknowledged that defense counsel could have, but chose not to,

cross-examine Detective Gay when she was an available witness.

766 State v. Burton

counsel to question Gay about the investigation as a whole,

including the manner in which the interview had been con-

ducted (such as whether by phone or in person), the length

of the interview, and similar circumstances related to the

interview.8

Additionally, as we will discuss in more detail below,

the trial court also allowed defense counsel to argue to the

jury that there had been no testimony about any admis-

sions. It follows that defense counsel, in cross-examining

Gay, could have asked her whether defendant had made

any admissions during that interview, without asking her

to relate any statements that defendant had made. And,

as mentioned, because defense counsel is generally free to

argue about the state’s failure to present evidence—which is

grounded in the fundamental presumption of innocence and

the state’s burden of proof—we conclude that, in this case,

defense counsel was permitted to point to the lack of such

evidence so long as the argument did not call for speculation

or inferences that counsel knew had no good-faith support

in the record.

We turn, therefore, to an examination of each chal-

lenged statement that defense counsel made during closing

argument to determine whether each was within the bounds

of permissible comments on the state’s purported failure to

meet its burden of proof and overcome the presumption of

innocence. For convenience we list each of those statements:

1. “What you also didn’t hear was reports by law

enforcement about their attempt to interview

[defendant]. So, one of two things might have

happened. Maybe [defendant] wasn’t investi-

gated. We don’t know. We didn’t hear any tes-

timony about that.”

2. “Did you hear any of the investigators say [’]

I spoke to [defendant]?[’] The answer is no.”

3. “So, we have no admissions.”

8

Alternatively, defense counsel could have recalled Gay as a defense witness

and asked questions about whether she had interviewed defendant, and whether

he had made any admissions during that interview. Or counsel could have asked

the state to withdraw any “scope of direct” objection that it might have had

regarding this line of inquiry in lieu of recalling Gay as a defense witness.

Cite as 373 Or 750 (2025) 767

4. “You didn’t hear from the law enforcement wit-

nesses that they had interviewed [defendant].

You just didn’t hear that.”

Beginning with the first statement, the trial court

sustained the state’s objection to that statement on the basis

that it assumed facts not in evidence. The Court of Appeals

concluded that the trial court had acted within its discre-

tion, not for that reason, but because defendant’s argument

had been misleading. Defendant argues that, because he

had been unable to complete his entire statement, it was

incorrect to conclude that he had intended to mislead the

jury. While we agree with defendant that the record does not

reflect his completed thought—which would have provided a

better context for the inferences that he intended the jury to

draw—the statements that are part of the record could have

caused the jury to believe that it could affirmatively find

that defendant had not been investigated at all, when there

was no basis for that inference in the record. We agree with

the Court of Appeals that counsel may not mislead the jury

to draw inferences that have no good-faith support in the

record.9 For that reason, we conclude that the trial court did

not err in sustaining the prosecutor’s objection to defense

counsel’s first statement, as a means to protect against jury

speculation or confusion.

The second statement—“[d]id you hear any of the

investigators say [’]I spoke to [defendant]?[’] The answer is

no[ ]”—was withdrawn by defendant. We therefore need not,

and do not, discuss that statement any further.

The third statement—“So, we have no admis-

sions[ ]”—was permitted, in part, by the trial court. As noted

above, without ruling on the state’s objection, the court

9

In reaching that conclusion, the Court of Appeals relied on Blueford, 312 F3d

at 968. We acknowledge defendant’s argument that defense counsel’s statements

in this case did not rise to the problematic level of the conduct of the prosecutor

in Blueford. That case involved multiple acts of prosecutorial misconduct involv-

ing the late disclosure of tape recordings and false representations, questioning,

and argument regarding the nature of the evidence on the recordings. And the

Ninth Circuit also relied on the special duties and responsibilities of a prosecutor.

However, as we indicate above, see 373 Or at 761 n 4, the ABA Criminal Justice

Standards for the Defense Function also limit defense counsel from making argu-

ments that call for inferences that counsel knows “have no good-faith support in

the record.” ABA Standard, Defense Function, 4-7.8(a).

768 State v. Burton

conducted a discussion with counsel outside the jury’s pres-

ence. Observing that defense counsel had not asked the law

enforcement witnesses about whether they had interviewed

defendant, the court drew a distinction between statements

that “speculate as to whether or not there [were] any inter-

views of [defendant] or not” and those that point to lack of

evidence of any “admissions.” (Emphases added.) The court

advised the parties that it was “fair for [defense counsel] to

say none of the officers testified to any admissions made by

his client,” because, “we do know he [was] interviewed[,] and

I think that’s factually correct[.]” The court’s reasoning gave

defendant a fair opportunity to invoke the ultimate infer-

ence that he was seeking the jury to draw from the state’s

decision not to present evidence of the interview of defen-

dant—that is, that, because the state had not presented evi-

dence of admissions made by defendant, no such admissions

existed. The court cautioned defense counsel to “keep it to

‘you didn’t hear any testimony from the officers’ * * * of any

admissions[.]’ ” Defense counsel indicated he understood the

court’s “ground [rules].”10

However, once argument resumed, instead of point-

ing to the lack of evidence of any admissions, defense coun-

sel returned to the lack of evidence of an interview, stat-

ing, “You didn’t hear from the law enforcement witnesses that

they had interviewed [defendant]. You just didn’t hear that.”

(Emphasis added.) At that point, the state objected again,

and the trial court sustained the objection.

We note that, although defense counsel did not

immediately turn to the lack of any evidence of admissions,

the statement that defense counsel did make nonethe-

less correctly summarized the evidence that the jury had

heard—viz., that the law enforcement witnesses had not tes-

tified that they had interviewed defendant. Detective Gay

testified about her overall investigation, including that it

had been difficult to locate defendant, but the prosecutor did

not ask about her interview with defendant, and Gay did not

otherwise testify about any interview or statements made

by defendant. The state made a tactical choice not to present

that evidence, but only after defense counsel had already

10

The trial court never clearly ruled on the state’s objection.

Cite as 373 Or 750 (2025) 769

referred to it in his opening statement, noting that defendant

had made no admissions. And although defendant was enti-

tled to cross-examine Detective Gay about her investigation,

he was under no obligation to do so or to prove or disprove

anything to the jury. To summarize, defense counsel was

entitled to point accurately to an absence of evidence of any

interview in making argument to the jury, especially when

it was the state’s choice to not introduce that evidence. And

counsel’s statement did just that: The statement reminded

the jury that they “didn’t hear from the law enforcement

witnesses that they had interviewed [defendant].” That was

a factual statement about the evidence, and, unlike defense

counsel’s first statement, which could have been understood

to suggest that the jury could make a finding for which there

was no good-faith support in the record, it simply pointed to

the absence of evidence in the record. Therefore, the trial

court erred when it sustained the state’s objection to defense

counsel’s fourth statement to the jury.

Having concluded that the trial court erred in sus-

taining the state’s fourth objection, we turn to the question

of whether the court’s error was harmless. Errors that have

little likelihood of affecting a verdict are harmless and do

not require reversal. See State v. Davis, 336 Or 19, 32, 77

P3d 1111 (2003) (framing inquiry for affirmance in criminal

cases, despite error); see also State v. Thompson, 370 Or 273,

294, 518 P3d 923 (2022) (“Although an error occurred in the

trial court, we will affirm if there is little likelihood that the

particular error affected the verdict.” (Internal quotation

marks omitted.)). “In making a determination of harmless-

ness, the court does not ask whether the evidence of guilt

is substantial or compelling, but rather whether the trial

court’s error was likely to have influenced the verdict.” State

v. Henley, 363 Or 284, 307, 422 P3d 217 (2018). In evaluating

the harmlessness of the error, we consider both the nature

and the context of the error. Thompson, 370 Or at 295 (citing

Davis, 336 Or at 32-33). Here, the nature of the error is the

limiting of defense counsel’s statement to the jury that they

had not heard any testimony that defendant had been inter-

viewed. The context of the error is that the statement was

part of defense counsel’s overall argument to the jury that

the state’s investigation had been inadequate.

770 State v. Burton

Defendant asserts that the trial court had “under-

cut [his] ability to defend himself” because his closing argu-

ment would have served two essential purposes: first, the

argument would have supported the inference of his inno-

cence, and, second, it would have explained why the pre-

sented evidence did not align with his opening statement.

We recognize that the state’s purportedly minimal investi-

gation and the absence of any evidence in the record regard-

ing a law enforcement interview with, or admissions by,

defendant were core components of defendant’s defense.

However, in his closing argument, defense counsel

had been permitted to argue about “no DNA, no hospital

records, no immediate reporting, no rape kit, nothing. No

police investigation until much later in time.” Additionally,

the trial court had permitted him to proceed with state-

ments relating to the additional inference to be drawn from

the lack of evidence of an interview—that defendant had

made no admissions. And the state, in its rebuttal closing

argument, did not put law enforcement’s phone interview

or defendant’s lack of admissions into issue; instead, it

directed the jury back to the testimony that it had, in fact,

heard, and argued generally that that testimony had not

been disputed in any way. We conclude that the trial court’s

error had little likelihood of affecting the verdict, given the

context of the arguments that defendant was permitted to—

and did—make.

In sum, after reviewing the record and considering

defense counsel’s statement at issue, we are persuaded that

the trial court’s error was harmless. We therefore proceed to

the second issue: the court’s sua sponte jury instruction and

whether defendant sufficiently preserved his argument as to

that instruction.

C. Trial Court’s Sua Sponte Jury Instruction

Again, the trial court instructed the jury, sua sponte,

that it was not to “speculat[e] about whether [there] were

* * * any interviews” with defendant because that fact was

“not important.” As noted, the Court of Appeals determined

that defendant’s argument was not preserved and therefore

did not consider it. Burton, 326 Or App at 816. Before this

Cite as 373 Or 750 (2025) 771

court, defendant acknowledges that he made no objection,

but argues that the full exchange leading up to that instruc-

tion supports his argument that it was all part and par-

cel of defense counsel’s attempts to call the jury’s attention

to the failure of the state to present evidence—something

that he should have been permitted to do under the “miss-

ing evidence” inference—and that it would have been futile

by that point for defense counsel to have lodged a further

objection to the jury instruction. Defendant relies on case

law explaining that our preservation requirements “do not

demand that parties make what the record demonstrates

would be futile gestures.” State v. George, 337 Or 329, 339,

97 P3d 656 (2004); see also State v. Olmstead, 310 Or 455,

461, 800 P2d 277 (1990) (“When the trial court excludes an

entire class of evidence by declaring, in advance, that it is

inadmissible as a matter of law, the ruling renders a further

offer futile.”).11

We are not persuaded that it would have been futile

for defendant to have taken exception to the trial court’s

sua sponte instruction or to have requested a supplemental

instruction to mitigate any impact of the language used in

the court’s instruction. Based on the court’s colloquy with

counsel outside the presence of the jury, in which the court

explained three times that defense counsel was permitted

to argue that law enforcement had not testified about any

admissions, it is apparent that the court was interested in

giving defendant a fair opportunity to make his case by call-

ing the jury’s attention to the lack of admissions by defen-

dant—the ultimate inference that defendant would have

sought under the “missing evidence” inference.

As we said in State v. Skotland, “[s]ometimes, the

winds of preservation can be gauged by looking to the

weathervane of trial court surprise: Would the trial court

be taken aback to find itself reversed on this issue, for this

reason?” 372 Or 319, 329, 549 P3d 534 (2024) (emphasis in

original). There, we noted that the record showed that the

11

Defendant has not alternatively requested plain error review, and we

therefore do not undertake that analysis in this case. See Peeples v. Lambert,

345 Or 209, 219, 191 P3d 637 (2008) (“The principal exception to preservation

requirements is for so-called ‘plain error’—that is, an error apparent on the

record, about which there is no reasonable dispute.”).

772 State v. Burton

trial court thought that it had ruled in defendant’s favor,

and that, from that court’s perspective, “once the prosecu-

tor’s closing argument then proceeded without objection

from defendant, the Court of Appeals’ subsequent reversal

would have come out of the blue; objectively, the trial court

had been given no reason to think that its ruling had been

controversial, contested, or exceeded.” Id. at 329-30. Here,

as in Skotland, had defendant alerted the trial court to his

concern that the court’s instruction impermissibly com-

mented on the evidence, we have no reason to think, based

on the record before us, that the court would not have ade-

quately addressed defendant’s concern. We therefore decline

to reach the merits of the second issue, relating to the trial

court’s sua sponte instruction.

III. CONCLUSION

In sum, we conclude that the trial court did not err

in sustaining the state’s objection to defendant’s first state-

ment because it improperly suggested to the jury an infer-

ence that could have been understood to suggest that the

jury could make a finding for which there was no good-faith

support in the record. However, we conclude that the court

did err when it sustained the state’s objection to defendant’s

fourth statement, but, because that error had little likeli-

hood of affecting the verdict, it was harmless. Further, we

conclude that defendant did not properly preserve his argu-

ment challenging the court’s sua sponte jury instruction and

thus decline to consider it. We therefore affirm defendant’s

judgment of conviction.

The decision of the Court of Appeals and the judg-

ment of the circuit court are affirmed.