Brown v. Ventura

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

SHARON BROWN,

Plaintiff,

25-CV-3635 (LLS)

-against-

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

CASSIE VENTURA, Victim I; ALL FALSE

ACCUSERS OF SEAN DIDDY COMBS,

Defendants.

LOUIS L. STANTON, United States District Judge:

Plaintiff, who is appearing pro se, brings this action against (1) Cassie Ventura, a witness

in Sean Combs’ criminal trial, which is pending in this court, see United States v. Combs, No. 24-

CR-0542 (AS), and (2) “all false accusers of Sean Diddy Combs.” By order dated May 20, 2025,

the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), that is, without

prepayment of fees. On May 30, 2025, Plaintiff filed a proposed order to show cause for a

preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order.

For the reasons set forth in this order, the Court dismisses the complaint as frivolous and

denies Plaintiff’s motion seeking emergency relief.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Court must dismiss an IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is

frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary

relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see

Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also

dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction of the claims raised. See

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). A claim is frivolous when it “lacks an arguable basis either in law or in

fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1989), abrogated on other grounds by Bell Atl.

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007); see also Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141

F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998) (“[A]n action is ‘frivolous’ when either: (1) the factual contentions

are clearly baseless . . . ; or (2) the claim is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory.”)

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted); Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32-33 (1992)

(holding that “finding of factual frivolousness is appropriate when the facts alleged rise to the

level of the irrational or the wholly incredible”). Additionally, “a complaint will be dismissed as

‘frivolous’ when ‘it is clear that the defendants are immune from suit.’” Montero v. Travis, 171

F.3d 757, 760 (2d Cir. 1999) (quoting Neitzke, 490 U.S.at 327).

While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to

construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret

them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470

F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in

original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits –

to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the

pleader is entitled to relief.

BACKGROUND

The following facts are drawn from the complaint.1 Plaintiff states that she “read the

lawsuits of supposed ‘victims’ of Sean Combs aka Diddy etc. [and] Cassie Ventura is not a

victim.” (ECF 1, at 5.) Plaintiff believes that “there is no proof [Ventura] is a ‘victim’ but a

participant in her own words.” (Id.) Plaintiff contends that she herself is “an interested party” and

1 The Court quotes from the complaint verbatim. All spelling, grammar, and punctuation

are as in the original unless noted otherwise.

that she has been “harmed.” (Id. at 6.) For relief, Plaintiff seeks “all money Sean Combs aka

Diddy paid Cassie Ventura on every contract, royalties, video [and] void contracts.” (Id. at 6.)

DISCUSSION

A. Plaintiff’s claims are frivolous

Under the IFP statute, a court must dismiss an action if it determines that the action is

frivolous or malicious. 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2)(B)(i). Moreover, a court has “no obligation to

entertain pure speculation and conjecture.” Gallop, 642 F.3d at 368. The Court, after reviewing

Plaintiff’s complaint, where she seeks monetary relief for conduct related to Sean Combs’

criminal trial, finds that the complaint lacks any arguable basis in law or in fact. See Neitzke, 490

U.S. at 325. Plaintiff’s assertion – that she is entitled to relief from Cassie Ventura, a witness in

Combs’ trial – rises to the level of the irrational. Accordingly, because there is no legal theory on

which Plaintiff can rely to assert any claim against Ventura, or any other individual associated

with Combs’ criminal trial, the action must be dismissed as frivolous under Section

1915(e)(2)(B)(i).

B. Leave to amend denied

In deference to Plaintiff’s pro se status, the Court normally would grant Plaintiff leave to

amend her complaint, but the Court finds that the complaint cannot be cured with an amendment.

Where an amendment would be futile, leave to amend is not required. Hill v. Curcione, 657 F.3d

116, 123-24 (2d Cir. 2011); Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1988) (court may

dismiss complaint sua sponte and without providing leave to amend “where the substance of the

claim pleaded is frivolous on its face”); see, e.g., Fischman v. Mitsubishi Chem. Holdings Am.,

Inc., No. 18-CV-8188, 2019 WL 3034866, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. July 11, 2019) (declining to grant

leave to amend as to certain claims in the absence of any suggestion that additional facts could

remedy defects in the plaintiff’s pleading). Because the defects in Plaintiff’s complaint cannot be

cured with an amendment, the Court declines to grant Plaintiff leave to amend and dismisses the

action as frivolous. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i).

WARNING

The Court notes that Plaintiff, under the name “Sharon Jeter,” is barred, under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(g), from filing any federal civil action IFP while she is a prisoner, unless she is under

imminent danger of serious physical injury. See Jeter v. CNYPC, ECF 1:15-CV-6802, 6

(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 2005) (lead action). Plaintiff is barred under Section 1915(g) from filing

actions while she is a prisoner because she previously filed three or more civil actions or appeals

in a federal court that were dismissed as frivolous, malicious, or for failure to state a claim on

which relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).

It seems that Plaintiff, now that she is no longer incarcerated, has continued to file

nonmeritorious civil actions in this court under the name “Sharon Brown,” “Sharon L. Brown,”

or “Sharon Leslie Brown.” See, e.g., Brown v. World Health Org., ECF 1:24-CV-7216, 11

(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 2025) (dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, notice of appeal filed

Mar. 28, 2025); Brown v. United Nations, ECF 1:24-CV-7061, 10 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 2025)

(same, notice of appeal filed Mar. 7, 2025). Accordingly, the Court warns Plaintiff that, if she

continues to file nonmeritorious litigation in this court, the court may issue an order barring her

from filing new civil actions in this court IFP without leave of the court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1651.

CONCLUSION

The Court dismisses this action as frivolous. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i).

The Court denies Plaintiff’s request for “emergency relief” and directs the Clerk of Court

to terminate the motion at ECF 6.

The Court directs the Clerk of Court to enter judgment dismissing this action.

SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 18, 2025

New York, New York

Louis L. Stanton

U.S.D.J.