Oregon’s two-year 7 personal injury statute of limitations applied to § 1983 claim rather than specialized child-abuse 8 statute which allowed actions to be commenced before a person attains age of 40
How later courts described this case
- Oregon’s two-year 7 personal injury statute of limitations applied to § 1983 claim rather than specialized child-abuse 8 statute which allowed actions to be commenced before a person attains age of 40
- court 21 must accept the allegations as true
- court must 22 construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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11 NATASHA J. RYAN, No. 2:25-cv-01245-DAD-SCR
12 Plaintiff,
13 v. ORDER
14 MILDRED SPIRO, et al.,
15 Defendants.
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18 Plaintiff is proceeding pro se in this matter, which is referred to the undersigned pursuant
19 to Local Rule 302(c)(21) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Plaintiff has filed a request for leave to
20 proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) and has submitted a declaration averring that she is unable to
21 pay the costs of this proceeding. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). The motion to proceed IFP will
22 therefore be granted. However, for the reasons provided below, the Court finds Plaintiff’s
23 complaint is legally deficient and will grant Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint.
24 I. SCREENING
25 A. Legal Standard
26 The federal IFP statute requires federal courts to dismiss a case if the action is legally
27 “frivolous or malicious,” fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks
28 monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). In
1 reviewing the complaint, the Court is guided by the requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil
2 Procedure. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are available online at www.uscourts.gov/rules-
3 policies/current-rules-practice-procedure/federal-rules-civil-procedure.
4 Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the complaint must contain (1) a “short and
5 plain statement” of the basis for federal jurisdiction (that is, the reason the case is filed in this
6 court, rather than in a state court), (2) a short and plain statement showing that plaintiff is entitled
7 to relief (that is, who harmed the plaintiff, and in what way), and (3) a demand for the relief
8 sought. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Plaintiff’s claims must be set forth simply, concisely and directly.
9 Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(1). Forms are available to help pro se plaintiffs organize their complaint in
10 the proper way. They are available at the Clerk’s Office, 501 I Street, 4th Floor (Rm. 4-200),
11 Sacramento, CA 95814, or online at www.uscourts.gov/forms/pro-se-forms.
12 A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.
13 Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). In reviewing a complaint under this standard, the
14 court will (1) accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint, unless they
15 are clearly baseless or fanciful, (2) construe those allegations in the light most favorable to the
16 plaintiff, and (3) resolve all doubts in the plaintiff’s favor. See Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327; Von
17 Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena, 592 F.3d 954, 960 (9th Cir. 2010), cert.
18 denied, 564 U.S. 1037 (2011).
19 The court applies the same rules of construction in determining whether the complaint
20 states a claim on which relief can be granted. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (court
21 must accept the allegations as true); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974) (court must
22 construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff). Pro se pleadings are held to a
23 less stringent standard than those drafted by lawyers. Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94. However, the
24 court need not accept as true legal conclusions, even if cast as factual allegations. See Moss v.
25 U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). A formulaic recitation of the elements of
26 a cause of action does not suffice to state a claim. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
27 555-57 (2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
28 To state a claim on which relief may be granted, the plaintiff must allege enough facts “to
1 state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has
2 facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
3 reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
4 678. A pro se litigant is entitled to notice of the deficiencies in the complaint and an opportunity
5 to amend, unless the complaint’s deficiencies could not be cured by amendment. See Akhtar v.
6 Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1213 (9th Cir. 2012).
7 B. The Complaint
8 Plaintiff’s complaint lists four defendants:1) Mildred Spiro of the Food Coalition; 2)
9 Chelsea Jensen, a foster parent; 3) Robert Ryan, a securities exchange lawyer; and 4) Bonnie
10 Baker, a social worker. ECF No. 1 at 2 & 6. Plaintiff appears to assert federal question
11 jurisdiction based on the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act (CAPTA) of 1978 and the
12 Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act (AACW) of 1980. ECF No. 1 at 3.
13 Plaintiff alleges that from the age of 4 to age 18 she was a “ward of the state of
14 California” and was in foster care. She alleges that Mildred Spiro was her foster parent from
15 1989 to 1996, and that Chelsea Jensen was a foster parent in 1999. ECF No. 1 at 4. Plaintiff
16 alleges that she was physically, mentally, and verbally abused by Spiro. Id. at 7. Plaintiff claims
17 that she and Defendant Jensen made an agreement to lie to the social worker about where Plaintiff
18 was living so Jensen could keep money from the state while Plaintiff was living with another
19 individual. Id. at 9. Plaintiff claims that Defendant Baker made “manipulative and false” reports
20 to the judge between 1996 and 1998. Id. at 11. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Ryan is a liar and
21 con artist and does drugs. Id. at 12. Plaintiff also alleges she has never even met Ryan. Id.
22 Plaintiff pleads that she is aware she must file this lawsuit before she turns age 41, and
23 that she turned 41 in January 2025. Id. at 13. This lawsuit was not filed until April 30, 2025.
24 Plaintiff attaches to her complaint a few pages of what appears to be portions of a California state
25 court opinion from 1996. ECF No. 1 at 15-18.
26 C. Analysis
27 Plaintiff’s complaint fails to comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8. There is not
28 a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R.
1 Civ. P. 8(a)(2). There is no clear statement of the asserted legal claims or causes of action.
2 Plaintiff appears to seek monetary relief, as she states the amount in controversy is 6.6 million
3 dollars and the relief requested section states: “I am seeking assistance and enforcement of
4 retrieving this monetary award.” ECF No. 1 at 5. Plaintiff asserts jurisdiction based on two
5 federal statutes, but it is not clear that either confers jurisdiction. “The Federal Child Abuse
6 Prevention and Treatment Act authorizes the Secretary of HHS to execute and coordinate
7 activities of national significance related to child abuse prevention and treatment. Nowhere does
8 the act provide for federal civil remedies by private individuals for alleged child abuse.” Taleff v.
9 Taleff, 2018 WL 6418541, *1 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 6, 2018). Some rights under the AACW are
10 privately enforceable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Henry A. v. Willden, 678 F.3d 991 (9th Cir.
11 2012). However, it is unclear from the complaint what claims Plaintiff is attempting to assert.
12 Plaintiff’s complaint nowhere mentions 42 U.S.C. § 1983. “[Section] 1983 ‘is not itself a
13 source of substantive rights,’ but merely provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights
14 elsewhere conferred.’” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393–94 (1989). A plaintiff alleging a
15 claim under § 1983 must plead that (1) the defendants acting under color of state law (2) deprived
16 plaintiffs of rights secured by the Constitution or federal statutes. Benavidez v. County of San
17 Diego, 993 F.3d 1134, 1144 (9th Cir. 2021).
18 If Plaintiff is attempting to enforce alleged rights under other statutes by way of 42 U.S.C.
19 § 1983, there are two significant hurdles to such recovery. The first is the statute of limitations.
20 “Section 1983 does not contain its own statute of limitations.” Flynt v. Shimazu, 940 F.3d 457,
21 461 (9th Cir. 2019) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Because § 1983 contains no
22 specific statute of limitations, federal courts borrow state statutes of limitations for personal
23 injury actions in § 1983 suits. See Nance v. Ward, 597 U.S. 159, 174 (2022) (“[A]ll § 1983 suits
24 must be brought within a State’s statute of limitations for personal-injury actions.”). In California
25 that period of limitations is two years. See Holt v. County of Orange, 91 F.4th 1013, 1018 (9th
26 Cir. 2024). Plaintiff primarily complains of actions occurring between 1996 and 2000, nearly 25
27 years prior to her filing suit.
28 Plaintiff makes reference to a belief that she has until age 41 to bring this suit, but does
1 not cite a statute. It may be that Plaintiff is referring to California Assembly Bill 218. In 2019,
2 California Assembly Bill 218 “amended the California Code of Civil Procedure to allow for
3 victims of ‘childhood sexual abuse’ to file civil claims related to the abuse at any time up until the
4 age of 40.” E.M. v. Varsity Brands, LLC, 2024 WL 2808183, *3 (C.D. Cal. May 31, 2024). This
5 California statute does not extend the time for Plaintiff to bring an action under § 1983. See
6 Bonneau v. Centennial School Dist., 666 F.3d 577, 579-80 (9th Cir. 2012) (Oregon’s two-year
7 personal injury statute of limitations applied to § 1983 claim rather than specialized child-abuse
8 statute which allowed actions to be commenced before a person attains age of 40); Franco v.
9 Mesa Police Dep’t, 2022 WL 3136949, *1 (9th Cir. 2022) (Arizona state statute allowing
10 survivors of child sexual abuse until age 30 to file state tort claims, does not apply to federal
11 claims). Even if California’s statute did apply, Plaintiff concedes that she waited until age 41 to
12 file suit.
13 Second, a claim under section 1983 requires that a defendant was acting under color of
14 state law. Defendant Ryan is not alleged to be a state actor, but rather is alleged to be a lawyer
15 and Plaintiff’s father. Defendants Spiro and Jensen were alleged to have served as foster parents.
16 “Merely serving as a foster parent does not transform a private party into a state actor.” Ismail v.
17 County of Orange, 693 F.App’x 507, 512 (9th Cir. 2017) (relying on cases from the Third,
18 Fourth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits). The fourth defendant, Baker, is alleged to be a social
19 worker and is likely a state actor. However, Baker may be entitled to some measure of immunity,
20 particularly as Plaintiff complains of reports that Baker made to a judicial officer. “[S]ocial
21 workers have absolute immunity when they make ‘discretionary, quasi-prosecutorial decisions to
22 institute dependency proceedings to take custody away from parents.’” Beltran v. Santa Clara
23 County, 514 F.3d 906, 908 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc). However, for other tasks, social workers
24 have only qualified immunity. See Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889, 898 (9th Cir. 2003) (en
25 banc).
26 The Court concludes that Plaintiff fails to state a claim. It is not clear what legal claims or
27 causes of action she seeks to assert. It also appears that given the actions complained of occurred
28 approximately 25 years ago, that the action is time-barred. However, given the lack of clarity in
1 the alleged claims, it is not absolutely clear that leave to amend would be futile. Plaintiff is
2 proceeding pro se and “[a] district court should not dismiss a pro se complaint without leave to
3 amend unless it is absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by
4 amendment.” Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212 (9th Cir. 2012). Rather than recommending
5 dismissal of the action, the undersigned will provide Plaintiff an opportunity to amend the
6 complaint to attempt to cure these defects.
7 II. AMENDING THE COMPLAINT
8 If plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, the amended complaint must allege facts
9 establishing the existence of federal jurisdiction. In addition, it must contain a short and plain
10 statement of Plaintiff’s claims. The allegations of the complaint must be set forth in sequentially
11 numbered paragraphs, with each paragraph number being one greater than the one before, each
12 paragraph having its own number, and no paragraph number being repeated anywhere in the
13 complaint. Each paragraph should be limited “to a single set of circumstances” where
14 possible. Rule 10(b). As noted above, forms are available to help plaintiffs organize their
15 complaint in the proper way. They are available at the Clerk’s Office, 501 I Street, 4th Floor
16 (Rm. 4-200), Sacramento, CA 95814, or online at www.uscourts.gov/forms/pro-se-forms.
17 The amended complaint must not force the Court or the Defendant to guess at what is
18 being alleged against whom. See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1177-80 (9th Cir. 1996)
19 (affirming dismissal of a complaint where the district court was “literally guessing as to what
20 facts support the legal claims being asserted against certain defendants”). The amended
21 complaint should contain specific allegations as to the actions of each named defendant rather
22 than making conclusory allegations that the defendants collectively violated plaintiff’s rights.
23 Also, the amended complaint must not refer to a prior pleading in order to make plaintiff’s
24 amended complaint complete. An amended complaint must be complete in itself without
25 reference to any prior pleading. Local Rule 220. This is because, as a general rule, an amended
26 complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Pacific Bell Tel. Co. v. Linkline
27 Communications, Inc., 555 U.S. 438, 456 n.4 (2009) (“[n]ormally, an amended complaint
28 supersedes the original complaint”) (citing 6 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice &
1 || Procedure § 1476, pp. 556-57 (2d ed. 1990)). Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an
2 || original complaint, each claim and the involvement of each defendant must be sufficiently
3 | alleged.
4 Plaintiff's amended complaint must address the issues set forth herein. Plaintiff should
5 || clearly identify what claims/causes of action she seeks to bring and set forth the facts supporting
6 || each claim. Plaintiff should also plead any facts in support of an argument that her claims are
7 || timely or that the statute of limitations can be tolled. !
8 Ill. CONCLUSION
9 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
10 1. Plaintiffs request to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 2) is GRANTED.
11 2. Plaintiff shall have 30 days from the date of this order to file an amended complaint
12 that addresses the defects set forth above. If Plaintiff fails to timely comply with this
13 order, the undersigned may recommend that this action be dismissed.
14 3. Alternatively, if Plaintiff no longer wishes to pursue this action, Plaintiff may file a notice
15 of voluntary dismissal of this action pursuant to Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Civil
16 Procedure.
17 SO ORDERED.
18 | DATED: June 20, 2025
19 md
20 SEAN C. RIORDAN
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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