The opinion
USCA11 Case: 24-13172 Document: 46-1 Date Filed: 06/23/2025 Page: 1 of 7
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 24-13172
Non-Argument Calendar
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NAVAL LOGISTICS, INC.,
d.b.a. Middle Point Marina,
Plaintiff-Third Party Defendant-Appellee,
versus
M/V FAMILY TIME,
in rem,
ANDREW VILENCHIK,
in personam,
Defendants-Third Party Plaintiff-Appellants.
____________________
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2 Opinion of the Court 24-13172
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 1:23-cv-22379-RNS
____________________
Before GRANT, LAGOA, and TJOFLAT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Maritime law, like any area of law, provides remedies when
obligations go unmet. When a marina furnishes services to a ves-
sel—dockage, inspections, or repairs—and the vessel’s owner fails
to pay or retrieve the vessel, the law affords a straightforward so-
lution. The marina may assert a maritime lien, arrest the vessel,
and, if necessary, seek judicial approval to sell it.
This case follows that path. The marina here—Middle Point
Marina performed services for the M/V Family Time, received no
payment, and turned to the courts for recourse. The District Court
authorized the Marina to serve as custodian of the vessel, approved
a sale to mitigate continued storage losses, and granted summary
judgment recognizing a lien. Because we find no reversible error,
we affirm all three rulings.
I. Background
In May 2023, Mr. Vilenchik delivered his vessel, the M/V
Family Time, to Middle Point Marina in Florida for an inspection
and possible repairs. He executed a Shipyard Agreement with the
Marina identifying himself as the owner and acknowledging the
potential for charges related to dockage and services. The Marina
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24-13172 Opinion of the Court 3
conducted an inspection and determined that additional repairs
were needed. Mr. Vilenchik declined to proceed with those ser-
vices.
At that point, his obligations under the agreement were
clear: he was required to either accept the services or remove the
vessel. He did neither. Instead, he left the vessel at the Marina with-
out payment. His attorney sent a “cease and desist” letter to the
Marina with instructions to stop all work on the vessel.
Faced with the vessel’s continued presence and Mr.
Vilenchik’s unpaid, accruing storage fees, the Marina initiated an
admiralty proceeding in the District Court for the Southern District
of Florida. It filed a complaint that sought a maritime lien for un-
paid services, foreclosure of that lien, and pure salvage. The Marina
then moved for an arrest of the vessel. It also moved to appoint
itself as custodian for the vessel. The District Court granted both
motions. The Marina later moved for interlocutory sale of the ves-
sel, alleging that it had incurred excessive storage fees. The Court
granted the motion, noting that
almost six months have passed since arrest (and over
eight months since the vessel has been in Middle
Point’s custody) without sign of [the owner] securing
the M/V Family Time or explanation for the delay.
Interlocutory sale is therefore appropriate due to un-
reasonable delay in the owner securing the M/V
Family Time.
Naval Logistic, Inc. v. M/V Fam. Time, No. 23-22379-CIV, 2024 WL
828124 at *2 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 27, 2024).
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II. Discussion
A. The Maritime Lien and Summary Judgment
Federal law grants a maritime lien to any person who pro-
vides “necessaries” to a vessel on the order of the owner or an au-
thorized agent. 46 U.S.C. § 31342(a). “Necessaries” include dock-
age, repairs, and inspections. Id. § 31301(4).
So “[t]o obtain a maritime lien, a person must: (1) provide
necessaries; (2) to a vessel; (3) on the order of the owner or agent.”
Galehead, Inc. v. M/V Anglia, 183 F.3d 1242, 1244 (11th Cir. 1999)
(per curiam); see also Sweet Pea Marine, Ltd., v. APJ Marine, Inc., 411
F.3d 1242, 1249–50 (11th Cir. 2005).
The Marina satisfied each requirement. It provided dockage
and inspection services—clearly “necessaries” under the statute.
Mr. Vilenchik requested these services under the Shipyard Agree-
ment, for which the Marina billed him. He did not pay. These un-
disputed facts support the authorization of the lien. The District
Court properly entered summary judgment in the Marina’s favor.
Mr. Vilenchik argues that the Marina damaged his vessel.
But even if true, that allegation would not invalidate the lien. The
appropriate remedy would be a counterclaim or separate action. 1
1 The vessel sought to file a counterclaim, but the District Court denied the
request as untimely. See Naval Logistic, Inc. v. M/V Fam. Time, No. 23-22379-
CIV, 2024 WL 1071965 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 12, 2024). The Court explained that the
defendant offered no justification beyond its own lack of diligence. Id. at *2.
To the extent the defendants challenge that ruling, we see no abuse of discre-
tion in that decision.
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24-13172 Opinion of the Court 5
The alleged damage does not raise a genuine dispute of material
fact as to whether the Marina’s lien exists. 2
B. Appointment of a Substitute Custodian
Ordinarily, the U.S. Marshal takes custody of an arrested
vessel. See Donald D. Forsht Assocs., Inc. v. Transamerica ICS, Inc., 821
F.2d 1556, 1560 (11th Cir. 1987). But Marshal custody can be costly.
To reduce expenses and safeguard the vessel, courts often appoint
a substitute custodian. See id.; Fed. R. Civ. P. Supp. R. E(4)(b). In
fact, the Southern District of Florida has a local rule noting that “it
is the practice of the Marshal to not take custody of any arrested
vessel or execute an arrest warrant until [a] substitute custodian is
in place.” S.D. Fla. L. Admir. R. E(10)(a).
A substitute custodian assumes responsibility for safekeep-
ing the vessel, subject to court supervision. See Donald D. Forsht As-
sociates, Inc., 821 F.2d at 1560. To qualify, the proposed custodian
must accept full responsibility, carry appropriate insurance, and
agree to hold the United States and the Marshal harmless from any
liability arising during the custody. Id.
2 Mr. Vilenchik also argues that summary judgment was improper because he
is not the vessel’s true owner and did not authorize the services. But the record
defeats that claim. He personally delivered the vessel to the Marina, signed the
Shipyard Agreement identifying himself as the owner, and remained the sole
point of contact throughout their dealings. Even if Commercial Holdings
Group, Inc. held title, Vilenchik acted with apparent authority to procure ser-
vices. That is enough to support a lien under 46 U.S.C. § 31342(a). See Galehead,
Inc. v. M/V Anglia, 183 F.3d 1242, 1244 (11th Cir. 1999) (per curiam).
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The Marina satisfied those conditions. It already had custody
of the M/V Family Time, was experienced in vessel care, and main-
tained proper insurance. The Marina formally agreed to the custo-
dianship terms, and the District Court found no reason to doubt its
ability to safeguard the vessel.
Mr. Vilenchik objected to that appointment, but his objec-
tions lacked substance. He pointed to no specific risk, conflict, or
inadequacy in the Marina’s qualifications. Without more, his disa-
greement did not require the Court to reject the appointment. We
find no error in the Court’s decision.
C. The Interlocutory Sale
Federal courts have authority to order the sale of an arrested
vessel before final judgment—known as an interlocutory sale—un-
der certain circumstances. See Fed. R. Civ. P. Supp. R. E(9). That
relief is appropriate where “the attached or arrested property is per-
ishable, or liable to deterioration, decay, or injury by being de-
tained in custody pending the action” or where “the expense of
keeping the property is excessive or disproportionate.” See id.
Here, all factors supported sale. By the time the District
Court considered the issue, the Marina had incurred over $25,000
in storage fees. Meanwhile, Mr. Vilenchik had not posted bond,
filed a verified claim, or sought to recover the vessel despite receiv-
ing notice of the arrest. Courts are not required to let storage costs
accumulate indefinitely in the hope that the owner might eventu-
ally act. See id. When a vessel’s continued detention imposes
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substantial costs and the owner remains absent, an interlocutory
sale preserves the vessel’s value and mitigates waste.
The District Court considered the relevant factors and con-
cluded that sale was warranted. We find no error in that decision.
III. Conclusion
Federal maritime law provides a clear and orderly process
for enforcing liens and resolving disputes involving vessels. The
District Court followed that process. It found a valid lien, ap-
pointed an appropriate custodian, and approved a sale to avoid un-
necessary costs. Each decision was grounded in the record and con-
sistent with established legal principles. Mr. Vilenchik has identi-
fied no reversible error. We affirm.
AFFIRMED.