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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
ALEXANDRIA DIVISION
DALE BROWN #53074/418906,, CIVIL DDOCKET NNO. 1:23--CV--01089
PPlaintiff SSEC P
VERSUS JUDGE EDWARDS
LA DEPT OF SAFETY & MAGISTRATE JUDGE PEREZ--MONTES
CCORRECTIONS ET AL,
Defendants
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Before the Court is a Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 31) seeking
dismissal of a civil rights Complaint (42 U.S.C. § 1983) filed by pro se Plaintiff Dale
Brown (“Brown”). Brown is incarcerated at the Raymond Laborde Correctional
Center (“RLCC”) in Cottonport, Louisiana. He alleges the denial of religious freedoms
in violation of the constitution and laws of the United States.
Because Brown cannot recover compensatory damages and Defendants are
entitled to judgment as a matter of law, the Motion for Summary Judgment should
be GRANTED.
I. Background
Brown alleges that he was notified by security that he was scheduled for a
“mandatory callout at the chapel.” ECF No. 1 at 2. Upon arrival at the chapel, he
was met by Chaplain Moore, Captain Gunn, and Col. Bordelon. Brown was
ushered into the chaplain’s office for a “Board Hearing.” Chaplain Moore handed
Brown a “revocation paper” informing Brown that his religious hair exemption had
been revoked. Brown was told that his beard would be cut off “one way or
another.” at 3.
Brown was then escorted to the showers where he was “shackled and forcibly
shaved” by Lt. Bordelon. He was written up for aggravated disobedience and
sanctioned with two days of room confinement.
Brown seeks money damages for the violation of his constitutional rights.
Brown’s claims against RLCC and James Leblanc have been denied and dismissed
with prejudice; his claims against the Department of Corrections (“DOC”) have been
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction; and his claim for the termination of employees has
been denied. ECF No. 9.
DOC Regulation No. PS-E-1 provides the policy for Religious Faith-Based
Programs and Services. ECF No. 31-4. Subsection 7.G.(1) instructs that each warden
“shall ensure that offenders have the opportunity to participate in practices of their
religious faith that are deemed essential by the faith’s governing judicatory, limited
only by documentation showing threat to the safety of persons involved in the practice
of the faith or that the practice itself disrupts order in the institution.” ECF No. 31-
4 at 5. In determining what constitutes legitimate religious practices, “the Warden
or designee shall consider whether there is a body of literature stating religious
principles that support the practices and whether the practices are recognized by a
group of persons who share common ethical, moral, or intellectual views. RLCC
adopted the DOC’s Policy. ECF No. 31-3.
Pursuant to the RLCC Offender Personal Grooming/Group Identification
Policy #03-03-004, facial hair “shall be limited to a well-groomed moustache and/or a
full beard not to exceed one half inches in length.” ECF No. 31-5 at 3. RLCC’s facial
hair policy is identical to DOC Regulation No. IS-C-4. ECF No. 31-6 at 3.
Brown requested a religious exemption seeking to grow his beard
unrestrained, without regard to length, while keeping his head shaved, purportedly
in conjunction with his identification as a Rastafarian “Beardman.”
III. Law and Analysis
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a), a court “shall grant summary
judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material
fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” The moving party
bears the initial burden of informing the court of the basis for its motion by identifying
portions of the record which highlight the absence of genuine issues of material fact.
, 954 F.2d 1125, 1132 (5th Cir. 1992); Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(c)(1) (“A party asserting that a fact cannot be . . . disputed must support the
assertion by . . . citing to particular parts of materials in the record . . . .”).
A fact is “material” if proof of its existence or nonexistence would affect the
outcome of the lawsuit under applicable law in the case. ,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute about a material fact is “genuine” if the
evidence is such that a reasonable fact finder could render a verdict for the nonmoving
party.
When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported, an adverse
party may not rest on mere allegations or denials but must set forth specific facts
showing a genuine issue for trial. , 63 F.3d 429, 433
(5th Cir. 1995).
AA. Brown may not recover compensatory damages.
Brown seeks compensatory damages under the First Amendment, enforceable
against state officials through the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Eighth
Amendment.1 However, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e) provides that no federal civil action
may be brought by a prisoner for mental or emotional injury without a prior showing
of physical injury. , 23-CV-492, 2024 WL 4575368, at *3 (W.D.
La. 2024), , 2024 WL 4573601 (W.D. La. 2024)
(citing 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e)). This requirement applies to all federal civil actions in
which a prisoner alleges a constitutional violation, including First Amendment claims
that are not usually accompanied by physical injury. (citing , 404
F.3d 371, 374-75 (5th Cir. 2005)) (“Section 1997e(e) applies to all federal civil actions
in which a prisoner alleges a constitutional violation, making compensatory damages
for mental or emotional injuries non-recoverable, absent physical injury.”);
, 529 F.3d 599, 605–06 (5th Cir. 2008);
, 277 F. App’x 491 (5th Cir. 2008). Brown does not allege that
he suffered any physical injury when his beard was shaved.
1 Because the Court has dismissed his request that Defendants’ employment be terminated
(ECF No. 9), Brown’s claim for compensatory damages is all that remains.
Even if his claim was not barred by § 1997e(e), Defendants would be entitled
to judgment as a matter of law. A prison policy or practice will not be found in
violation of the First Amendment if it is reasonably related to a legitimate penological
objective of the facility. , 21-CV-
733, 2022 WL 4593085, at *2 (M.D. La. 2022), , 82 F.4th 337 (5th Cir. 2023) (citing
, 834 F.2d 481, 487–87 (5th Cir. 1987)). This general statement of
the law has been applied to regulations that required Rastafarians to cut their hair,
even though keeping one’s hair unshorn and unwashed is a tenet of the Rastafari
religion. , 961 F.2d 77 (5th Cir. 1992);
, 69 F.3d 22, 25 (5th Cir. 1995).
Furthermore, according to a sworn statement of Chaplain Kenneth Moore,
Brown was provided multiple opportunities to provide documentation, a letter, or
communication from any recognized authority or group to establish that shaving his
head while growing a beard was a legitimate exercise of the Rastafarian religion.
ECF No. 31-8 at 2. Brown provided no authority.
Nor does Brown provide the Court with any religious authority for his
proclaimed religious belief. He cites an article that he “found on Westlaw” that
references “Beardmen” as a Rastafarian subgroup. ECF No. 37 at 1. However, the
article states that “Beardmen” “may trim” their beards. Melissa R. Johnson,
, 34 New Eng. J. on Crim. & Civ. Confinement 391, 397 (2008). The article
further provides that “Beardmen” “believe that the beard aand long hair are important
to the Rastafarian tradition but should be clean and neat.” (emphasis added).
Therefore, the journal article undermines Brown’s argument that his religious belief
allows him to shave his head while maintaining a long beard.
Finally, under Local Rule 56.2, a memorandum in opposition to a motion for
summary judgment must contain: (1) the material facts that the opponent contends
are genuinely disputed; and (2) a pinpoint reference to the document or other exhibit
establishing that each such fact is genuinely disputed. It is undisputed that Brown
failed to provide Defendants with documentation to substantiate his stated religious
observance of shaving his head bald and growing a beard as a legitimate exercise of
the Rastafarian faith. ECF No. 3-2 at 4. It is also undisputed that Brown was not
physically injured in any manner.
Because Brown suffered no physical injury, he may not recover compensatory
damages. Furthermore, the material facts are undisputed, and Defendants are
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
IIII. Conclusion
Because Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law, IT IS
RECOMMENDED that the Motion (ECF No. 31) be GRANTED, and the civil action
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(c) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), a party may file
written objections to this Report and Recommendation within 14 days of service,
unless the Court grants an extension of time to file objections under Fed. R. Civ. P.
6(b). A party may also respond to another party’s objections to this Report and
Recommendation within 14 days of service of those objections, again unless the Court
grants an extension of time to file a response to objections.
No other briefs may be filed without leave of court, which will only be granted
for good cause. A party’s failure to timely file written objections to this Report and
Recommendation will bar a party from later challenging factual or legal conclusions
adopted by the District Judge, except if the challenge asserts “plain error.”
SIGNED on Thursday, May 22, 2025.
THU
JOSEPH H.L. PEREZ-MONTES
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE