Fleischman v. Polk County, Florida

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

TAMPA DIVISION

DANIEL FLEISCHMAN,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 8:25-cv-1548-TPB-SPF

POLK COUNTY, FLORIDA, et al.

Defendants.

__________________________________/

ORDER DISMISSING CASE

This matter is before the Court sua sponte on the complaint, filed pro se on June

13, 2025. (Doc. 1). After reviewing the complaint, court file, and the record, the Court

finds as follows:

Plaintiff Daniel Fleischman filed this suit against several Defendants, including

state court judges, local law enforcement, attorneys, a school, a principal, and others.

The complaint is lengthy and rambling, but it appears that the instant lawsuit is related

to an ongoing custody dispute in the Tenth Judicial Circuit in and for Polk County,

Florida. According to Plaintiff, Defendant Randall Seth Richey violated an ex parte order

“designed to protect” his minor son, but the order has not been enforced. Plaintiff also

claims that he has been retaliated against for whistleblowing and his otherwise lawful

efforts to obtain protection for his son. As a result, Plaintiff claims to have experienced

“systemic violations” of the First, Second, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments.

Plaintiff asserts claims against Judge Gerald P. Hill, II, and Judge Melissa Gravitt

of the Tenth Judicial Circuit based on their rulings in the custody case. However, these

claims are barred by the judicial immunity doctrine. As the Eleventh Circuit has

explained:

“Judges are entitled to absolute judicial immunity from

damages for those acts taken while they are acting in their

judicial capacity unless they acted in the ‘clear absence of all

jurisdiction.’ ” Bolin v. Story, 225 F.3d 1234, 1239 (11th Cir.

2000) (citations omitted). Judges are also generally immune

from injunctive and declaratory relief unless (1) a declaratory

decree was violated or (2) declaratory relief is unavailable.

Id. at 1242. “A judge enjoys immunity for judicial acts

regardless of whether he made a mistake, acted maliciously, or

exceeded his authority.” McCullough v. Finley, 907 F.3d 1324,

1331 (11th Cir. 2018).

McCree v. Griffin, No. 19-14646-A, 2020 WL 2632329, at *1 (11th Cir. May 20, 2020).

Importantly, “judicial immunity is an immunity from suit, not just from ultimate

assessment of damages.” Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991) (citing Mitchell v.

Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985)).

Considering the allegations in the complaint, the Court finds that Judge Hill and

Judge Gravitt are entitled to absolute judicial immunity. See, e.g., McCree, 2020 WL

2632329, at *1-2 (holding that judge was entitled to absolute judicial immunity from

injunctive relief and money damages where plaintiff alleged that judge violated his

constitutional rights by arbitrarily denying motion); Bolin, 225 F.3d at 1239-40 (holding

that federal judges are entitled to absolute judicial immunity from injunctive relief and

money damages for acts taken in their judicial capacity unless jurisdiction is clearly

absent); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57 (1978) (explaining that judge will not

authority, and he is only subject to liability in the clear absence of all jurisdiction);

Austin v. McCann, No. 22-12157, 2023 WL 3335312, at *2-3 (11th Cir. May 10, 2023)

(holding that hearing officer appointed by the chief judge of the judicial circuit was

entitled to absolute judicial immunity); Hutcheson v. Campbell, No. 8:23-cv-105-TPB-

SPF, 2023 WL 2352845, at *3-4 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 13, 2023) (holding that state court child

support hearing officer was entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity), report and

recommendation adopted, 2023 WL 2351691, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 3, 2023) (dismissing

case). Because Plaintiff’s allegations emanate from actions taken by these judges in their

official judicial capacities during proceedings over which they had jurisdiction, or

instances of the judges taking no action at all, the judges are absolutely immune from

civil liability.

Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Plaintiff’s complaint also suffers from several critical jurisdictional defects. First,

the complaint appears to possibly take issue with state court rulings, orders, and

judgments, including a parenting plan implemented and enforced by the state court and

contempt proceedings. His claims are therefore likely barred by the Rooker-Feldman

doctrine. “It is well-settled that a federal district court lacks jurisdiction to review,

reverse, or invalidate a final state court decision.” Dale v. Moore, 121 F.3d 624, 626 (11th

Cir. 1997) (citations omitted). This jurisdictional bar “extends not only to constitutional

claims presented or adjudicated by a state court, but also to claims that are ‘inextricably

intertwined’ with a state court judgment.” Incorvaia v. Incorvaia, 154 F. App’x 127, 128

Cir. 2001)).

Second, to the extent that Plaintiff is asking the Court to intervene in an ongoing

state court proceeding, the Court would abstain from doing so under the Younger

abstention doctrine.1 Under the Younger abstention doctrine, “federal courts ordinarily

must refrain from deciding the merits of a case when (1) there is a pending state judicial

proceeding; (2) the proceeding implicates important state interests; and (3) the parties

have an adequate opportunity to raise any constitutional claims in the state proceeding.”

See Newsome v. Broward Cty. Pub. Defenders, 304 F. App’x 814, 816 (11th Cir. 2008)

(citing Middlesex Cty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982)).

Upon consideration of these factors, the Court finds that abstention is warranted to the

extent that any of the state court proceedings referenced in the complaint remain active

and pending. The Court notes that it appears the parenting plan remains in effect and is

being enforced by the state court, and if Plaintiff believes that Defendants are interfering

with or obstructing the plan, he may raise those claims in the state proceeding.

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, this action appears to fall within the

domestic relations exception to federal court jurisdiction. See Moussignac v. Ga. Dep’t of

Human Res., 139 F. App’x 161, 162 (11th Cir. 2005) (“The federal judiciary has

traditionally abstained from deciding cases concerning domestic relations. As a result,

federal courts generally dismiss cases involving divorce and alimony, child custody,

visitation rights, establishment of paternity, child support, and enforcement of

1 401 U.S. 37 (1971) (holding that a federal court should decline to intervene in a state criminal

prosecution absent a showing of bad faith, harassment, or a patently invalid state statute).

Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 703 (1992) (the subject of domestic relations belongs to the

States); Cox v. 10th Judicial Circuit, 8:22-cv-75-CEH-JSS, 2022 WL 1005279, at *1-2

(M.D. Fla. Mar. 10, 2022) (explaining domestic relations exception and recommending

dismissal of complaint related to parenting plan), report and recommendation adopted,

2022 WL 1001498 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 4, 2022); Weiner v. Campbell, No. 8:16-cv-3412-T-

36TGW, 2016 WL 7708540, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 22, 2016) (noting that “federal courts

lack jurisdiction to determine issues of parental time-sharing” and recommending

dismissal of the complaint), report and recommendation adopted, 2017 WL 89076 (M.D.

Fla. Jan. 10, 2017).

For all of the different reasons discussed above, this action is dismissed for lack of

subject matter jurisdiction. Courts possess authority to sua sponte dismiss an action but

are generally required to provide a plaintiff with notice of the intent to dismiss and give

them an opportunity to respond. Quire v. Smith, No. 21-10473, 2021 WL 3238806, at *1

(11th Cir. July 30, 2021) (citing Tazoe v. Airbus S.A.S., 631 F.3d 1321, 1336 (11th Cir.

2011)). “An exception to this requirement exists, however, when amending the complaint

would be futile, or when the complaint is patently frivolous.” Id. (citing Tazoe, 631 F.3d

at 1336). Because amendment would be futile, the case is dismissed without leave to

amend.

Accordingly, it is

ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED:

(1) Plaintiff’s claims against Judge Gerald P. Hill, II, and Judge Melissa Gravitt are

DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

(2) The remaining claims in the complaint (Doc. 1) are DISMISSED for lack of

subject matter jurisdiction

(3) The Clerk is directed to terminate any pending motions and deadlines, and

thereafter close this case.

DONE and ORDERED in Chambers, in Tampa, Florida, this 20th day of June,

2025.

TOM BARBER

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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