Chaney v. Dallas Sheriff Office

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

DALLAS DIVISION

LEE ROY CHANEY, §

§

Plaintiff, §

§

V. § No. 3:22-cv-2260-E-BN

§

DALLAS SHERIFF OFFICE, ET AL., § Consolidated with:

§ No. 3:24-cv-2478-E-BN

Defendants. §

FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Plaintiff Lee Roy Chaney, while an inmate at Ellis County jail, filed a pro se

civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Dkt. No. 3. United States District Judge

Ada Brown referred Chaney’s lawsuit to the undersigned United States magistrate

judge for screening under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and a standing order of reference.

The Court granted Chaney leave to proceed in forma pauperis under the Prison

Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”). See Dkt. No. 7. And a second complaint filed by

Chaney was consolidated. See Dkt. No. 14; see also Chaney v. Ellis Cnty. Sheriff

Office, No. 3:22-cv-2478-E-BN, Dkt. No. 7 (consolidated complaint).

And, after screening his claims, as detailed below, the undersigned now enters

these findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendation that the Court should

dismiss this lawsuit under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.

Applicable Background

Under the PLRA, where prisoners (whether incarcerated or detained pending

trial) seek relief from a governmental entity or employee, a district court must, on

initial screening, identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion

of the complaint, that “is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which

relief may be granted” or “seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune

from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).

Consistent with this obligation and noting that the defendants named in

Chaney’s complaint were all non-jural entities not subject to suit, the magistrate

judge previously assigned to this case issued a screening questionnaire, providing

Chaney the opportunity to amend to name different defendants. See Dkt. No. 8 at 2.

The questionnaire required Chaney to provide specified information as to each

defendant, including “[a] brief summary of all actions taken by that defendant that

support each of your claims against him,” with “the date (month, day, and year) and

location where each of those actions took place.” Id. at 3. It also asked Chaney to state

what relief he sought. See id. at 4.

Chaney filed a verified response. See Dkt. No. 9. But rather than providing the

specific information requested in the questionnaire, he listed Dallas County, Ellis

County, multiple individuals, including at least two judges, as well as several catch-

all categories like “District Attorneys,” “All Medical Staff,” and “Wayne McCollum

Staff.” See id. at 1-2, 8. Chaney also wrote out several pages of grievances but

generally did not connect those grievances with specific individuals or otherwise

identify actions taken by particular defendants as the order required. See id. at 2, 5-

7. With respect to the question about relief sought, Chaney only answered as to claims

related to his medical care but not the litany of other claims alleged in his

questionnaire. See id. at 4.

So the previously assigned magistrate judge issued a second questionnaire

essentially repeating the first question from the earlier questionnaire but

emphasizing that Chaney needed to provide all information for each defendant with

a particular emphasis on the requirement to provide “[a] brief summary of all

actions taken by that defendant.” See Dkt. No. 10 at 2.

Chaney filed a response specifically naming five defendants – Zackry

Beauchamp of the Waxahachie Police Department, Corbin Philps of the Lancaster

Police Department, District Attorney Grossman, Judge R.H. Magnus, and Dallas

County – and setting out a summary of actions taken by each. See Dkt. No. 12.

Shortly after filing his first case, Chaney filed a second civil rights case. See

Chaney v. Ellis Cnty. Sheriff Office, No. 3:22-cv-2478-E-BN. The magistrate judge

assigned to that case issued a notice of deficiency (“NOD”) informing Chaney that his

complaint was “not in compliance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) and

requiring Chaney to file on the form prisoner civil rights complaint for this Court. See

id., Dkt. No. 6.

And Chaney filed an amended complaint related to his access to the law library

and medical services at the Wayne McCollum Detention Center in Ellis County. See

id., Dkt. No. 7. He named T. Eberhart, G. Flores, and Head Nurse Terry as

defendants. See id. After Chaney filed his amended complaint, the two cases were

consolidated. See Dkt. No. 14.

Chaney was arrested in September 2020, by officers Zachary Beauchamp and

Corbin Phillips in Lancaster, Texas. See Chany v. State, No. 05-22-00168-CR, 2023

WL 2155948, at *1 (Tex. Ct. App.—Dallas Feb. 22, 2023, pet. denied). He was charged,

and subsequently convicted of, tampering with or fabricating physical evidence and

possession of a controlled substance in Dallas County. See id. According to the

judgment of conviction from Dallas County, the judge presiding over Chaney’s trial

was Rick Magnis and the attorney for the state was James Grossman. See State v.

Chaney, Nos. F20-39327-P, F20-39331-P (203rd Jud. Dist. Ct. Feb. 9, 2022). Chaney

appealed, and the Texas Fifth Court of Appeals affirmed. See Chany, 2023 WL

2155948, at *3.

The timeline for which jail – Dallas County or Ellis County – had custody of

Chaney at any particular time is not clear from the pleadings, but based on online

records of Dallas and Ellis County, it appears that, while on bond in Dallas County,

Chaney was arrested in April 2021 in Ellis County on a charge of possession of a

controlled substance. And he pled guilty to the Ellis County charge in March 2023.

See State v. Chaney, No. 47744CR (443rd Jud. Dist. Ct. Mar. 29, 2023).

Legal Standards

As set out above, the PLRA authorizes the Court to dismiss a complaint where

it “fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1).

Because this language tracks the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(6), the Court should apply the pleading standards as set out in Bell Atlantic

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009).

Under these standards, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) does not require

that a complaint contain detailed factual allegations, but it does require “enough facts

to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.

“The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks

for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556

U.S. at 678.

So, “[w]here a complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a

defendant’s liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of

entitlement to relief.” Id. (cleaned up; quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).

On the other hand, “[a] claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads

factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.; cf. Bryant v. Ditech Fin., L.L.C.,

No. 23-10416, 2024 WL 890122, at *3 (5th Cir. Mar. 1, 2024) (“[J]ust as plaintiffs

cannot state a claim using speculation, defendants cannot defeat plausible inferences

using speculation.”).

“The burden is on the plaintiff to frame a ‘complaint with enough factual

matter (taken as true) to suggest’ that he or she is entitled to relief.” Robbins v.

Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1248 (10th Cir. 2008) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).

And, while a court must accept a plaintiff’s allegations as true, it is “not bound

to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S.

at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

In fact, “the court does not ‘presume true a number of categories of statements,

including,’” in addition to legal conclusions, “‘mere labels; threadbare recitals of the

elements of a cause of action; conclusory statements; and naked assertions devoid of

further factual enhancement.’” Armstrong v. Ashley, 60 F.4th 262, 269 (5th Cir. 2023)

(quoting Harmon v. City of Arlington, Tex., 16 F.4th 1159, 1162-63 (5th Cir. 2021)).

So, to avoid dismissal for failing to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted under Section 1915A(b)(1), plaintiffs must “plead facts sufficient to show”

that the claims asserted have “substantive plausibility” by stating “simply, concisely,

and directly events” that they contend entitle them to relief. Johnson v. City of Shelby,

Miss., 574 U.S. 10, 12 (2014) (per curiam) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)-(3), (d)(1), (e));

see also Inclusive Communities Project, Inc. v. Lincoln Prop. Co., 920 F.3d 890, 899

(5th Cir. 2019) (“‘Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief’

is ‘a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial

experience and common sense.’” (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679)).

Analysis

Other than the defendants and claims identified in response to the magistrate

judge’s second questionnaire [Dkt. No. 12] or the amended complaint in the

consolidated case [No. 3:22-cv-2478-E-BN, Dkt. No. 7], all defendants identified in

the complaint in the lead case and the magistrate judge’s first questionnaire should

be dismissed because Chaney has not made any attempt to set out the basis for his

claims against those defendants. The undersigned addresses the claims in the second

questionnaire, focusing on Dallas County defendants, and in the amended complaint

in the consolidated case, focusing on Ellis County defendants, separately.

I. Claims Alleged In Second Questionnaire Should Be Dismissed.

A. Claims against Judge Magnis are barred by judicial immunity.

“[A] judge generally has absolute immunity from suits for damages.” Davis v.

Tarrant Cnty., Tex., 565 F.3d 214, 221 (5th Cir. 2009) (citing Mireles v. Waco, 502

U.S. 9, 9-10 (1991)). “Judicial immunity is an immunity from suit, not just the

ultimate assessment of damages.” Id. (citing Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11 (citing, in turn,

Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985))).

There are only two circumstances under which judicial immunity may

be overcome. “First, a judge is not immune from liability for nonjudicial

actions, i.e., actions not taken in the judge’s judicial capacity.” Mireles,

502 U.S. at 11 (citations omitted). “Second, a judge is not immune for

actions, though judicial in nature, taken in the complete absence of all

jurisdiction.” Id. (citations omitted). Allegations of bad faith or malice

are not sufficient to overcome judicial immunity. Id.

Id.; see also Clay v. Allen, 242 F.3d 679, 682 (5th Cir. 2001) (“Court [employees] ‘have

absolute immunity from actions for damages arising from acts they are specifically

required to do under court order or at a judge’s discretion.’” (quoting Tarter v. Hury,

646 F.2d 1010, 1013 (5th Cir. Unit A June 1981))); Mitchell v. McBryde, 944 F.2d 229,

230-31 (5th Cir. 1991) (“[T]he judge’s law clerk, when assisting the judge in carrying

out the former’s judicial functions, is likewise entitled to absolute immunity.”

(citations omitted)).

There is nothing in the complaint to indicate that any of Judge Magnis’s

interactions with Chaney were not in his judicial capacity or that there was an

absence of jurisdiction. So the claims against Judge Magnis should be dismissed

because they are barred by judicial immunity.

B. Claims against Assistant District Attorney Grossman are barred by

prosecutorial immunity.

Similarly, a prosecutor is entitled to absolute immunity “for actions ‘initiating

a prosecution and … presenting the State’s case’ and those ‘intimately associated with

the judicial phase of the criminal process.’” Esteves v. Brock, 106 F.3d 674 (5th Cir.

1997) (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430-31 (1976)). Absolute immunity

extends to claims of suppression of evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland and

even “[w]ilful or malicious prosecutorial misconduct … in the exercise of their

advocatory function.” Cousin v. Small, 325 F.3d 627, 635 (5th Cir. 2003) (citing

Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430).

Although a prosecutor is entitled only to qualified immunity for certain

administrative activities, see Van de Camp v. Goldstein, 555 U.S. 335, 343 (2009),

nothing in the complaint indicates that the allegations address anything other than

the initiation and prosecution of the State’s case against Chaney. So his claims

against Assistant District Attorney Grossman are barred by prosecutorial immunity.

C. Claims against Officers Beauchamp and Phillips are conclusory or, in

the alternative, are barred by Heck.

The claims set out in response to the magistrate judge’s second questionnaire

against Officers Beauchamp and Phillips amount to a laundry list of labels and

conclusory statements without any factual support and should be dismissed for

failure to state a claim. See Dkt. No. 12 at 2-3. But, to the extent that any of the

claims against the officers could plausibly state a claim, they are barred by Heck v.

Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994).1

A Section 1983 claim that “falls under the rule in Heck is legally frivolous

unless the conviction or sentence at issue has been reversed, expunged, invalidated,

or otherwise called into question.” Hamilton v. Lyons, 74 F.3d 99, 102 (5th Cir. 1996)

(citation omitted).

As to whether a particular civil claim is subject to the rule in Heck,

[i]t is well settled under Heck that a plaintiff who has been convicted of

a crime cannot recover damages for an alleged violation of his

constitutional rights if that “violation arose from the same facts

attendant to the charge for which he was convicted, unless he proves

‘that his conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal,

expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal

authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a

federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.’”

Bush v. Strain, 513 F.3d 492, 497 (5th Cir. 2008) (quoting Ballard v. Burton, 444 F.3d

391, 396 (5th Cir. 2006) (quoting, in turn, Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87)); accord Magee v.

Reed, 912 F.3d 820, 822 (5th Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (“In Heck, the Supreme Court

held that if a plaintiff’s civil rights claim for damages challenges the validity of his

criminal conviction or sentence, and the plaintiff cannot show that such conviction or

sentence has been reversed, invalidated, or otherwise set aside, the claim is not

cognizable under § 1983.” (citing Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87)).

Though it is not clear what relief Chaney seeks as to his claims attacking his

Dallas County convictions, while Heck generally applies to claims for damages, it

1 These arguments would also apply to the claims against Judge Magnis and Assistant

District Attorney Grossman to the extent that they are not entitled to immunity as to any

of the claims. See Boyd v. Biggers, 31 F.3d 279, 284 (5th Cir. 1994) (Absolute immunity is

“threshold matter” that “is appropriate for the district courts to resolve before reaching the

Heck analysis when feasible.”).

applies equally where a suit seeks injunctive relief. See, e.g., O’Donnell v. Harpstead,

No. 21-cv-0177 (ECT/TNL), 2021 WL 1200671, at *2 (D. Minn. Feb. 26, 2021)

(“[A]lthough Heck discusses only claims brought for monetary damages, the

principles of that case apply to all claims brought in civil litigation that necessarily

imply the invalidity of detention, including claims for injunctive relief.” (citing Jones-

El v. Joyce, No. 4:09-CV-1972, 2009 WL 5217006, at *2 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 30, 2009)

(collecting cases))), rec. accepted, 2021 WL 1195863 (D. Minn. Mar. 30, 2021).

“That is because ‘civil tort actions are not appropriate vehicles for challenging

the validity of outstanding criminal judgments.’” Ray, 2022 WL 16945898, at *2

(quoting Colvin v. LeBlanc, 2 F.4th 494, 498 (5th Cir. 2021) (quoting, in turn, Heck,

512 U.S. at 486)).

Put differently, “Heck does not allow a civil rights lawsuit to be an alternative

vehicle to a criminal case for challenging law enforcement decisions that resulted in

arrest or prosecution unless the criminal case was resolved ‘in favor of the accused.’”

Morris v. Mekdessie, 768 F. App’x 299, 301 (5th Cir. 2019) (cleaned up; quoting Heck,

512 U.S. at 484).

Other than conclusory assertions of medical neglect, the allegations set out in

response to the second questionnaire focus on the validity of Chaney’s Dallas County

conviction. See Dkt. No. 12. But Chaney does not show that conviction has been

reversed, invalidated, set aside, or otherwise resolved in his favor. In fact, the

conviction was affirmed on appeal. See Chany, 2023 WL 2155948, at *3. So claims

against Officers Beauchamp and Phillips are barred by Heck and not cognizable.

D. Claims against Dallas County should be dismissed for failure to state a

claim for municipal liability under Monell.

A county “cannot be held liable under § 1983 unless ‘execution of a

government’s policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose

edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury.’”

Martinez v. Nueces Cnty., 71 F.4th 385, 389 (5th Cir. 2023) (quoting Monell v. Dep’t

of Soc. Servs. of City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978)). A plaintiff may proceed on a

Monell claim only by

identify[ing] “(1) an official policy (or custom), of which (2) a policy maker

can be charged with actual or constructive knowledge, and (3) a

constitutional violation whose moving force is that policy (or custom).”

Pineda v. City of Hous., 291 F.3d 325, 328 (5th Cir. 2002) (cleaned up).

Municipalities are not liable “on the theory of respondeat superior” and

are “almost never liable for an isolated unconstitutional act on the part

of an employee.” Peterson v. City of Fort Worth, 588 F.3d 838, 847 (5th

Cir. 2009).

Hutcheson v. Dall. Cnty., 994 F.3d 477, 482 (5th Cir. 2021); see also Brown v. Tarrant

Cnty., 985 F.3d 489, 497 & n.11 (5th Cir. 2021) (noting that where a plaintiff’s claim

fails as to one prong, a court “need not consider whether [his] claim also fails the other

two Monell prongs” (citing Zarnow v. City of Wichita Falls, 614 F.3d 161, 168-69 (5th

Cir. 2010))).

Chaney’s claim against Dallas County asserts that he was injured, required to

work while injured, and was not taken to the hospital. See Dkt. No. 12 at 5. But no

official policy or custom is identified. Chaney’s claims instead attempt to state a claim

against Dallas County based on the actions of its employees under respondeat

superior, which is not sufficient to state a claim. So the claims against Dallas County

should be dismissed.

II. Claims Alleged In Consolidated Amended Complaint Should Be

Dismissed.

The amended complaint in the consolidated case alleges claims against three

individuals related to law library access and medical care. See No. 3:22-cv-2478-E-

BN, Dkt. No. 7 at 3-4. The defendants named are T. Eberhart who Chaney asserts is

“over Wayne McCollum Det[e]ntion Center,” G. Flores who is alleged to be a corporal

presumably at Wayne McCollum Detention Center, and Terry who is alleged to the

be head nurse at Wellpath. See id. at 4.

A. Claim for denial of access to law library should be dismissed.

Chaney asserts that he was not permitted to go to the law library when he

asked and that, as a pretrial detainee, he “should have access to up to date law

library” so he could fight his criminal case in Ellis County. Id. at 3. But the docket for

his Ellis County criminal case reflects that Chaney was represented by counsel. See

State v. Chaney, No. 47744CR (443rd Jud. Dist. Ct.).

“[P]rison law libraries and legal assistance programs are not ends in

themselves, but only the means for assuring ‘a reasonably adequate opportunity to

present claimed violations of fundamental constitutional rights to the courts.’” Lewis

v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351 (1996) (quoting Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 825

(1977)). So a prisoner claiming denial of access to a law library or legal assistance

program must “demonstrate an actual injury.” Mendoza v. Strickland, 414 Fed. App’x

616, 618 (5th Cir. 2011) (per curiam); see also Hopkins v. Ogg, 783 F. App’x 350, 354

(5th Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (“A prisoner’s right of access to the courts is limited to

‘the ability of an inmate to prepare and transmit a necessary legal document to a

court.’” (citing Eason v. Thaler, 73 F.3d 1322, 1328 (5th Cir. 1996); Terry v. Hubert,

609 F.3d 757, 761-62 (5th Cir. 2010)).

Chaney cannot demonstrate such an injury “because he was represented by

counsel and, therefore, his right to access the courts had not been infringed.” Id.; see

also Tarter v. Hury, 646 F.2d 1010, 1014 (5th Cir.1981) (“As long as a criminal

defendant is represented by counsel, he will be able to present matters for decision to

the court through motions filed by his attorney.”).

And, even if that were not the case, Chaney did not “show that ‘his position as

a litigant was prejudiced by his denial of access to the courts.’” Hopkins, 783 F. App’x

at 354 (quoting Eason, 73 F.3d at 1328). Specifically, “he does not explain how he

would have proceeded with access to a law library, what claims he would have raised,

or how those claims would have been meritorious.” Id.

So Chaney fails to plausibly allege a constitutional violation related to access

to a law library, and those claims should be dismissed.

B. Claim for medical neglect should be dismissed.

As to the claim related to medical neglect, Chaney alleges that he “came in

with a broken ankle and a bone comeing [sic] out the side of [his] leg the first 2 month

I was refused medical.” No. 3:22-cv-2478-E-BN, Dkt. No. 7 at 3. There is little

additional detail in the consolidated amended complaint to assist in screening.

But, while they are not linked to any particular defendant, allegations in other

filings provide additional information about Chaney’s injury and medical treatment.

In the complaint in the lead case, Chaney alleges that, as of October 2022, a bone had

been “pruseing out the side of [his] leg … for over 2 yrs.” Dkt. No. 3 at 8. The original

injury was allegedly either caused by harassment by Lancaster police or working in

an oil field and then was allegedly “rebroken on the floor at Cook Chill where they

made me go to work.” Id.

The Cook Chill injury took place while Chaney was incarcerated in Dallas

County jail, and he alleges that he was not taken to the hospital at the time. See Dkt.

No. 12 at 5. He alleges that he was waiting for an operation when he was bonded and

had to start again with his blood flow checks. See Dkt. No. 3 at 8. Chaney asserts that

the injury did not heal properly due to “unproper medical attention.” See Dkt. No. 9

at 4.

At no point in the various allegations does Chaney clarify the timeline of when

the injury occurred, when he was transferred to McCollum Detention Center in Ellis

County, or specifically how Nurse Terry or any other personnel at Ellis County

contributed to his injury beyond not providing the operation that Chaney contends is

necessary to fix his leg. And his allegations indicate that there was a period of time

between his injury and his incarceration at McCollum when Chaney was out on bond

and did not obtain the medical care that he claims should have been provided to him

in prison.

“In the context of medical care, a prison official violates the Eighth Amendment

when he acts with deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious medical needs.”

Domino v. Tex. Dep’t of Criminal Justice, 239 F.3d 752, 754 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing

Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105-06 (1976)).

“‘Deliberate indifference is an extremely high standard to meet’ but can be

satisfied by a ‘wanton disregard for [an inmate’s] serious medical needs.’” Cope v.

Cogdill, 3 F.4th 198, 207 (5th Cir. 2021) (quoting Domino, 239 F.3d at 756).

Put another way, “[d]eliberate indifference is a degree of culpability beyond

mere negligence or even gross negligence; it must amount to an intentional choice,

not merely an unintentionally negligent oversight.” Alvarez v. City of Brownsville,

904 F.3d 382, 391 (5th Cir. 2018) (en banc) (quoting James v. Harris Cnty., 577 F.3d

612, 617-18 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting, in turn, Rhyne v. Henderson Cnty., 973 F.2d 386,

392 (5th Cir. 1992))); see also Kelson v. Clark, 1 F.4th 411, 417 (5th Cir. 2021)

(“[D]eliberate indifference cannot be inferred merely from a negligent or even a

grossly negligent response to a substantial risk of serious harm. Rather, the plaintiff

must show that the officials refused to treat him, ignored his complaints,

intentionally treated him incorrectly, or engaged in any similar conduct that would

clearly evince a wanton disregard for any serious medical needs.” (cleaned up)).

Alone, a disagreement with medical treatment or a failure to provide

additional medical treatment does not constitute deliberate indifference. See Domino,

239 F.3d at 756; Norton v. Dimazana, 122 F.3d 286, 292 (5th Cir. 1997); see also Smith

v. Allen, 288 F. App’x 938, 939 (5th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (determination that a

prisoner was not a candidate for further surgery after two prior surgeries were not

successful “is insufficient to establish a constitutional violation” (citations omitted)).

Chaney alleges claims for medical neglect against two defendants in the

consolidated amended complaint. The first is Corporal Flores, but there are no

allegations to explain how he acted with deliberate indifference beyond an assertion

of “neglect to medical needs.” As to the second defendant, Nurse Terry, Chaney

alleges that she is the head nurse for Wellpath, but “[u]nder section 1983, supervisory

officials are not liable for the actions of subordinates on any theory of vicarious

liability.” Thompkins v. Belt, 828 F.2d 298, 303 (5th Cir.1987). So to the extent that

Chaney seeks to hold her responsible for the actions of all medical personnel at

McCollum, he has not sufficiently pled a claim. And the limited allegations about

Nurse Terry specifically within the context of all the allegations about his injury and

treatment also do not state a claim. Failure to provide the surgical treatment Chaney

sought for an old injury does not meet the extremely high standard for deliberate

indifference to an inmate’s serious medical needs.

So Chaney fails to plausibly allege a constitutional violation related to his

assertions of medical neglect, and those claims should be dismissed.

Leave to Amend

Chaney has been given multiple opportunities in the consolidated cases to

amend or to provide additional details through responding to questionnaires but still

has not been able to plausibly allege a coherent claim. That said, if Chaney believes

that he has not yet stated his best case as to any claim discussed above – which

means, after considering the notice provided above, Chaney believes he knows of more

facts that he can assert to allege a plausible claim – the time to file objections (further

explained below) allows him an opportunity to explain how he would cure the

deficiencies identified above and thus show the Court that his case should not be

dismissed with prejudice at this time and that the Court should instead grant him

leave to amend his claims. See Scott v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 16 F.4th 1204, 1209

(5th Cir. 2021) (per curiam) (“A court should freely give leave to amend when justice

so requires, FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a)(2)), but a movant must give the court at least some

notice of what his or her amendments would be and how those amendments would

cure the initial complaint’s defects.”). But if Chaney cannot show that leave should

be granted, the Court should dismiss this case with prejudice other than the claims

against Judge Magnis and District Attorney Grossman which should be dismissed as

barred by absolute immunity.

Recommendation

The Court should dismiss claims against Judge Magnis and District Attorney

Grossman as barred by judicial and prosecutorial immunity respectively and should

dismiss the remainder of the claims in the consolidated cases with prejudice under

28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).

A copy of these findings, conclusions, and recommendation shall be served on

all parties in the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of these

findings, conclusions, and recommendation must file specific written objections

within 14 days after being served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED. R. CIV.

P. 72(b). In order to be specific, an objection must identify the specific finding or

recommendation to which objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and

specify the place in the magistrate judge’s findings, conclusions, and recommendation

where the disputed determination is found. An objection that merely incorporates by

reference or refers to the briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure

to file specific written objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the

factual findings and legal conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or

adopted by the district court, except upon grounds of plain error. See Douglass v.

United Servs. Auto. Assn, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996).

DATED: May 21, 2025

DAVIDL.HORAN }©— □

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

-18-