The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
JEFFERSON PARISH FIREFIGHTERS CIVIL ACTION
ASSOCIATION
VERSUS NO. 24-2139
LOUISIANA BOARD OF ETHICS, ET AL. SECTION: D(2)
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is a Motion to Stay Order Pending Appeal filed by Defendants
LaKoshia R. Roberts, Jose I. Lavastida, Anne P. Banos, Camille R. Bryant, Paul Harvey
Colomb, Sarah S. Couvillon, Mark A. Ellis, Robert W. Grand, William D. Grimley,
Jacqueline A. Scott, and Alfred W. Speer, all in their official capacities as Board Members
of the Louisiana Board of Ethics (collectively, the “Board Members”).1 Plaintiff Jefferson
Parish Firefighters Association (the “Union”) opposes the Motion.2 The Board Members
filed a reply.3 After careful consideration of the parties’ memoranda, the record, and the
applicable law, the Motion is DENIED.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND4
The Louisiana Civil Service Law requires that municipalities, parishes, and fire
protection districts establish a Civil Service Board, which is to be responsible for addressing
issues among firefighters, emergency responders, and law enforcement and their
employers.5 On March 8, 2024, the Louisiana Ethics Board issued a declaratory opinion
1 R. Doc. 44.
2 R. Doc. 50.
3 R. Doc. 51.
4 The Court has previously provided a detailed factual background of this matter. R. Doc. 40 at 2-5. Therefore,
the Court details only those facts relevant to the disposition of the instant Motion.
5 R. Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 4, 23 (citing LA. R.S. § 33:2536(A)).
(the “Declaratory Opinion”) stating that the Union, a labor organization for firefighters,
which has historically paid for its members’ legal representation in proceedings before the
Civil Service Board, is prohibited from paying attorneys to represent Union members before
the Civil Service Board while a Union trustee or officer is a member of the Civil Service
Board.6 The Union appealed the Declaratory Opinion to Louisiana’s First Circuit Court of
Appeal on April 10, 2024, and that appeal remains pending.7
On August 29, 2024, the Union filed this lawsuit in this Court, arguing that
Defendants’ conduct constitutes a violation of the Union’s rights pursuant to the First and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.8 The following day, the Union
filed a Motion for Preliminary Injunction seeking to enjoin the Declaratory Opinion.9
During the briefing on the Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Defendants filed a
Consolidated Motion to Dismiss and Motion to Stay Under Pullman Abstention.10 In short,
Defendants argued that the Union’s claims are barred by sovereign immunity or,
alternatively, should be stayed under the Younger and Pullman abstention doctrines.11 In
the event the Union’s claims survive those attacks, Defendants argued, the Union’s claims
fail on the merits because the State has a compelling interest in maintaining ethical
government operations.12
6 Id. at ¶¶ 4, 8.
7 R. Doc. 22–6. Louisiana law allows an order by the Board of Ethics to be appealed to Louisiana’s First Circuit
Court of Appeal. LA. R.S. § 42:1142.
8 R. Doc. 1 at ¶ 54. The Union also raises a claim for “Injunctive Relief.” Id. at ¶ 61. But as Defendants point
out, injunctive relief is not an independent claim.
9 R. Doc. 4.
10 R. Doc. 22.
11 R. Doc. 22-1 at 10-14.
12 Id. at 14-20.
On March 7, 2025, the Court held oral argument as to both Motions,13 and on April
15, 2025, the Court issued an Order and Reasons granting in part and denying in part
Defendants’ Consolidated Motion to Dismiss and Motion to Stay Under Pullman
Abstention.14 The Court found that the Union’s claims against the Ethics Board itself are
barred by sovereign immunity and dismissed those claims for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction.15 The Court denied the Motion in its entirety as to the Union’s claims against
the Board Members themselves.16 Finally, the Court found that the Union had successfully
met all of the requisite prongs under the preliminary injunction analysis, and the Court
granted the Union’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction and issued an order enjoining the
Board Members from enforcing the March 8, 2024 Declaratory Opinion as applied to the
Union.17
On May 15, 2025, the Board Members filed a Notice of Appeal,18 as well as a Motion
to Stay Order Pending Appeal.19 In their Motion, the Board Members argue that they are
likely to succeed on appeal because this case is a strong candidate for dismissal or a stay
under the Pullman and/or Younger abstention doctrines and because the Union is unlikely
to prevail on the merits of its First Amendment claim.20 The Board Members ask the Court
to “grant a stay of its preliminary-injunction order pending appeal” and ask that “[i]f the
13 R. Doc. 37.
14 R. Doc. 40.
15 Id. at 12-17.
16 Id. at 38-39.
17 Id. at 39.
18 R. Doc. 43.
19 R. Doc. 44.
20 R. Doc. 44-1 at 3-5.
Court is not so inclined,” that the Court issue “a prompt denial so that it may seek relief
from the appellate court.”21
In its opposition, the Union argues Defendants are re-litigating the same arguments
they advanced in their initial briefs and at oral argument and the Court should “reject
Defendants’ attempt at a second bite of the apple.”22 The Union further contends that that
none of the relevant factors weigh in favor of staying the injunction. The Union first argues
that the “balance of equities—irreparable injury to the movant absent stay, substantial
injury to other interested parties should a stay be granted, and the public interest—weigh
decidedly against granting a stay.”23 The Union argues that a stay will irreparably harm it
as it will be unable to exercise its First Amendment right to provide an attorney for its
members appearing before the Civil Service Board.24 The Board Members, the Union
argues, will face no similar harm from “a preliminary injunction precluding the enforcement
of an unconstitutional declaratory opinion.”25 The Union further argues that the public
interest weighs against granting a stay because the public interest is not advanced by
21 Id. at 5. On April 27, 2025, the Board Members filed a parallel, albeit more robust, Motion to Stay Pending
Appeal in the Fifth Circuit pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 8(a)(1). See Local 1374, Jefferson
Parish v. Roberts, No. 25-CV-30305 (5th Cir.). Rule 8(a)(1) requires that a party seeking a stay pending appeal
must move first in the district court. Such a motion may be made to the court of appeals if the moving party
shows that a motion has been made in the district court and the district court denied the motion or failed to
afford the relief requested. Id. at (a)(2)((A)(i)-(ii). The Court notes that while the Board Members filed the
instant Motion on April 15, 2025, approximately twelve days prior to the date it filed its parallel motion before
the Fifth Circuit, the Board Members noticed the instant Motion for submission on July 8, 2025. See R. Doc.
44-2. During a May 28, 2025 status conference, the Court inquired why the Board Members had not chosen
an earlier submission date, and counsel for the Board Members indicated that they believed July 8, 2025 to be
the Court’s earliest submission date. The Court notified counsel that they were incorrect and that even if July
8, 2025 had been the Court’s earliest submission date, the Board Members could have filed a motion for
expedited consideration. The Court then sua sponte expedited the briefing schedule and reset the submission
date for June 9, 2025.
22 R. Doc. 50 at 5.
23 Id. at 7.
24 Id. at 7-8.
25 Id. at 7.
allowing unconstitutional laws to take or remain in effect.26 Second, the Union argues that
the Board Members fail to show that they will succeed on appeal and simply rehash the
same arguments that this Court rejected in denying the Board Members’ Consolidated
Motion to Dismiss and Motion to Stay Under Pullman Abstention.27 The Union contends
that Defendants have not shown that they are substantially likely to succeed.28
II. LAW AND ANALYSIS
Motions to stay proceedings pending an interlocutory appeal are made pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 62. Rule 62(c) provides that “[w]hile an appeal is pending
from an interlocutory order or final judgment that grants, dissolves, or denies an injunction,
the court may suspend, modify, restore, or grant an injunction on terms for bond or other
terms that secure the opposing party’s rights.”29
“The factors to be considered in deciding whether to stay an order pending appeal are
‘virtually the same’ as the factors used by a court in deciding whether to issue a preliminary
injunction.”30 The relevant factors are: “(1) whether the stay applicant has made a strong
showing that he is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) whether the applicant will be
irreparably injured absent a stay; (3) whether issuance of the stay will substantially injure
the other parties interested in the proceeding; and (4) where the public interest lies.”31 “The
26 Id. at 8.
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 FED. R. CIV. P. 62(c).
30 Monumental Task Comm., Inc. v. Foxx, No. 15-CV-6905, 2016 WL 430450, at *1 (E.D. La. Feb. 4, 2016).
31 Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 776 (2009).
first two factors of the traditional standard are the most critical.”32 The moving party bears
the burden of showing that a stay is warranted.33
The Court does not find that any of the relevant factors weigh in favor of granting a
stay. The first factor—the only factor the Board Members address—requires the Board
Members to “make ‘a strong showing that [they] are likely to succeed on the merits.’”34 The
Board Members argue that they will succeed on Pullman grounds because the question of
whether the state statute on which the declaratory judgment is based prohibits a Union
trustee from simultaneously adjudicating employment disputes involving Union-funded
counsel “is the very question currently pending before the Louisiana First Circuit in the
Union’s direct appeal of the Board’s declaratory opinion.”35 The Board Members likewise
argue that Younger abstention is appropriate because “state ethics enforcement proceedings
. . . are ‘judicial in nature’ and fall squarely within Younger’s domain.”36 Finally, the Board
Members argue that they are likely to succeed on their Rule 12(b)(6) attack because the
State’s compelling state interest in ensuring Civil Service Board proceedings are free from
conflicts of interest defeats the Union’s First Amendment claim.37 These are precisely the
arguments that the Board Members raised in their Consolidated Motion to Dismiss and
Motion to Stay Under Pullman Abstention and that the Court rejected in ruling on the
Motion. The Board Members have offered no new grounds for success on the merits, and
the Court maintains that the law compels the conclusions reached in its Order and Reasons.
32 Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 434 (2009).
33 Patino v. City of Pasadena, 677 F. App’x 950, 951 (5th Cir. 2017) (citing Nken, 556 U.S. at 433-34).
34 Moore, 507 F. App’x at 392-93 (quoting Hilton, 481 U.S. at 776).
35 R. Doc. 44-1 at 3.
36 Id. at 4.
37 Id. at 4-5.
Nor have the Board Members met their burden as to the remaining factors. The
Board Members have not addressed the equities in the context of a stay pending appeal,
and the Court cannot see any reason why a finding as to the equities in this context would
meaningfully differ from the Court’s analysis as to the equities in the preliminary injunction
context. Indeed, the Union will be substantially harmed if the injunction is stayed during
the pendency of the appeal. “It has long been recognized that ‘the loss of First Amendment
freedoms, even for minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable
injury.”°8 And “any harm to the Board Members... is... undercut because “injunctions
protecting First Amendment freedoms are always in the public interest,’ and the
‘government’s interest is the public interest.”°9 As the Court explained in ruling on the
Union’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction, the equities plainly favor an injunction, and for
the same reasons, they weigh against a stay in this context.
Hil. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons,
IT IS ORDERED that the Motion to Stay Order Pending Appeal is DENIED.
New Orleans, Louisiana, June 20, 2025.
(nd B Vottic
WENDY B. VITTER
United States District Judge
38 R. Doc. 40 at 37 (quoting Opulent Life Church v. City of Holly Springs, Miss., 697 F.3d 279, 295 (2012))
(brackets omitted).
389 Id. at 38 (quoting Opulent Life Church, 697 F.3d at 298) (brackets omitted).