The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
FORT MYERS DIVISION
BRENT BUCHHOLZ,
Plaintiff,
v. Case No.: 2:25-cv-329-SPC-KCD
YANIVIS PEREZ, individually,
MEGAN NOEL, individually,
LESLIE WEIDENHAMMER,
individually,
RYAN GREENO, individually,
ANTHONY WILSON, individually,
and
JANE DOE 1,
Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court are Defendants Megan Noel and Leslie
Weidenhammer’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 17) and Defendant Anthony Wilson’s
Motion to Dismiss1 (Doc. 21). Plaintiff Brent Buchholz opposes both motions.
(Docs. 23, 24). The Court grants both motions to dismiss for the following
reasons.
1 Defendant Wilson apparently copied and pasted the title from his codefendants’ motion, so
his motion, too, is titled “Defendants Noel and Weidenhammer’s Motion to Dismiss.” (Doc.
21). The Court refers to the motion with the correct defendant’s name in this Order.
Background2
Plaintiff reported to the Collier County Sheriff’s Office (“CCSO”) that he
was the target of unlawful surveillance. Officer Noel received Plaintiff’s
reports and had “mental health concerns” about him, so she spoke to Officer
Weidenhammer about conducting welfare checks on Plaintiff. (Doc. 4 ¶ 14).
Officer Noel wrote in an email, “[i]n doing some research, it appears he is a
veteran and may need some additional assistance.” (Id.). Plaintiff alleges that
Officers Noel and Weidenhammer directed Officer Perez “to make contact with
Plaintiff to conduct a welfare check so that the ‘additional assistance’ in the
form of a Baker Act could occur.” (Id. ¶ 16).
In April 2024, Officer Perez and Officer Doe went to Plaintiff’s residence
and spoke to his family. Then they conducted a welfare check on Plaintiff at a
Costco parking lot. Officers Greeno and Wilson joined them. Allegedly, the
officers did not observe Plaintiff experiencing a medical emergency. Plaintiff
did not indicate that he wanted to hurt himself or others. He did not appear
malnourished, unable to provide for his own activities of daily living, to be
hallucinating or suffering from a psychotic episode, or otherwise suffering from
neglect. Nevertheless, Officer Perez took Plaintiff into custody under the
2 The Court “accept[s] the allegations in the complaint as true and constru[es] them in the
light most favorable to” Plaintiff. Belanger v. Salvation Army, 556 F.3d 1153, 1155 (11th Cir.
2009).
Baker Act. She completed the Report of Law Enforcement Officer Initiating
Involuntary Examination (“CF-MH 3052A”; Doc. 4-1).
According to Plaintiff, the officers lacked probable cause to deprive him
of his liberty. So he filed this civil rights action against the officers in their
individual capacity. (Doc. 4). He brings six claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for
unlawful detainment in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments
against Officer Perez (Count I), Officer Noel (Count II), Officer Weidenhammer
(Count III), Officer Greeno (Count IV), Officer Wilson (Count V), and Officer
Doe (Count VI).
Legal Standard
To survive a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) motion, a complaint
must allege “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Bare
“labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause
of action,” do not suffice. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).
A district court should dismiss a claim when a party does not plead facts that
make the claim facially plausible. See id. at 570. A claim is facially plausible
when a court can draw a reasonable inference, based on the facts pled, that the
opposing party is liable for the alleged misconduct. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
This plausibility standard requires “more than a sheer possibility that a
defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
Rule 12(b)(6) is read alongside Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a),
which requires only “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief.” Brooks v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Fla., Inc.,
116 F.3d 1364, 1368–69 (11th Cir. 1997). The rule is not designed to strike
inartistic pleadings or provide a more definite statement to answer an
apparent ambiguity, and the analysis of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is limited
primarily to the face of the complaint and its attachments. Id. (citing 5 Charles
A. Wright & Arthur Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1356 at 590–92
(1969) (Wright & Miller)).
Analysis
The Fourth Amendment provides that “[t]he right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. The
Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures
applies to civil as well as criminal investigations. Lenz v. Winburn, 51 F.3d
1540, 1548 n.7 (11th Cir. 1995).
In Florida, the Baker Act sets forth the standards for an involuntary
examination. See Fla. Stat. § 394.463. The Baker Act allows an authorized
person, such as a police officer, physician, or physician assistant, “to initiate
an involuntary examination of an individual whom the officer [or physician]
believes may have a mental illness, is substantially likely to cause serious
bodily harm to [herself] or others, and refuses a voluntary examination or is
unable to understand the need for an examination.” King v. Lee Cnty., No.
2:24-CV-375-JLB-KCD, 2025 WL 676224, at *6 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 3, 2025)
(alterations in original) (quoting Crane v. Lifemark Hosps., Inc., 898 F.3d 1130,
1133 n.1 (11th Cir. 2018)).
In the Eleventh Circuit, “[t]o establish § 1983 liability, a plaintiff must
show ‘proof of an affirmative causal connection’ between a government actor’s
acts or omissions and the alleged constitutional violation, which ‘may be
established by proving that the official was personally involved in the acts that
resulted in the constitutional deprivation.’” Brown v. City of Huntsville, Ala.,
608 F.3d 724, 737 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting Zatler v. Wainwright, 802 F.2d 397,
401 (11th Cir. 1986)). “Merely being present with the arresting officers at the
scene is not enough, unless the plaintiff can show that the defendant officer
was part of the chain of command authorizing the arrest action.” Id.
First, the claims against Officers Noel and Weidenhammer. Plaintiff
alleges:
14. On March 29, 2024, Defendant NOEL having spoken to
another officer of the CCSO regarding his “mental health
concerns” of the Plaintiff after receiving Plaintiff’s reports,
spoke to Defendant WEIDENHAMMER about conducting
welfare checks on Plaintiff, and stated in an email “In
doing some research, it appears he is a veteran and may
need some additional assistance.”
16. Defendants NOEL and WEIDENHAMMER acted in
concert with one another, and in concert with Defendant
PEREZ directing her to make contact with Plaintiff to
conduct a welfare check so that the “additional assistance”
in the form of a Baker Act could occur.
(Doc. 4 ¶¶ 14, 16; Doc. 17 at 6; Doc. 23 at 3). These allegations are insufficient
to state a Fourth Amendment claim. Plaintiff does not allege that either officer
was present at the scene of Plaintiff’s seizure. And even if he had, that is not
enough to establish a causal connection unless he can demonstrate “that the
defendant officer was part of the chain of command authorizing the arrest
action.” Brown, 608 F. 3d at 736–37. Plaintiff does not do so. The Court agrees
with Defendants that “[a]t worst, Plaintiff’s allegations against [them] suggest
that their intention was to conduct a welfare check on the Plaintiff which of
course . . . would not implicate the Fourth Amendment.” (Doc. 17 at 6).
To the extent Plaintiff argues that the alleged “additional assistance”
was detention under the Baker Act, his allegation lacks factual support. (Doc.
23 at 4). The logical inference that Plaintiff makes—that additional assistance
necessarily means detention under the Baker Act—is too great for the Court
to make, even at the Rule 12 stage of this litigation. There is also no factual
support for Plaintiff’s argument that Officers Noel and Weidenhammer were
part of the chain of command authorizing Plaintiff’s detention. (Id.). All
Plaintiff alleges is that the two officers were concerned about Plaintiff’s mental
health, thought he might need additional assistance, and directed Officer Perez
to make contact to conduct a welfare check. (Doc. 4 ¶¶ 14, 16). With the facts
alleged, to assume more is a bridge too far. Thus, the Court dismisses the
claims against Officers Noel and Weidenhammer.
The claim against Officer Wilson fares no better. Plaintiff alleges that
Officer Wilson, along with Officer Greeno, met Officer Perez at Costco to
conduct the welfare check. (Doc. 4 ¶ 21). Plaintiff does not specifically allege
any personal participation by Officer Wilson in Plaintiff’s seizure. He does not
allege that Officer Wilson decided to detain Plaintiff or that he was part of the
chain of command authorizing the detention. All he alleges is that Officer
Wilson was at the scene when he was detained. (Id.). This is not enough. See
Brown, 608 F.3d at 731, 736.
In his response, Plaintiff argues that the body camera footage shows that
Officer Wilson physically detained Plaintiff.3 (Doc. 24 at 4 (citing Doc. 4 ¶ 58)).
This argument also fails. In Brown, while Officer Anderson pulled the plaintiff
out of the vehicle, placed her face-down on the ground, and handcuffed her, the
Eleventh Circuit held that Anderson could not be liable for false arrest because
Anderson did not make the decision to arrest the plaintiff and the plaintiff
3 Plaintiff states that the body camera footage is not included in the Amended Complaint.
(Doc. 24 at 4). The Court does not have any body camera footage and therefore considers
none.
failed to identify conduct that would support a false arrest claim. Brown, 608
F.3d at 731, 736.
The same reasoning applies to Officer Wilson. Officer Perez, not Officer
Wilson, allegedly made the decision to detain Plaintiff. (Doc. 4 ¶ 35). Whatever
assistance Officer Wilson rendered to Officer Perez during the detainment does
not support an unlawful detainment claim under § 1983. See Slade v.
Forehand, No. 3:16-CV-59-RV-MJF, 2019 WL 1430401, at *9 (N.D. Fla. Feb.
28, 2019) (recommending granting summary judgment on unlawful arrest
claim under § 1983 where officer did not make decision to arrest plaintiff but
may have rendered some assistance in the arrest), report and recommendation
adopted, No. 3:16-CV-59-RV/MJF, 2019 WL 1434581 (N.D. Fla. Mar. 29, 2019).
Thus, the Court dismisses the claim against Officer Wilson.
Accordingly, it is now:
ORDERED:
1. Defendants Megan Noel and Leslie Weidenhammer’s Motion to Dismiss
(Doc. 17) is GRANTED.
2. Defendant Anthony Wilson’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 21) is GRANTED.
3. Counts II, III, and V of Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint (Doc. 4) are
DISMISSED without prejudice.
DONE and ORDERED in Fort Myers, Florida on June 20, 2025.
tit WOblatet he
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Copies: All Parties of Record