holding that medical providers who have ‘only an incidental or transitory relationship’ with the penal system generally are not considered state actors.”
How later courts described this case
- holding that medical providers who have ‘only an incidental or transitory relationship’ with the penal system generally are not considered state actors.”
- “[T]he mishandling of [an inmate’s] ‘grievances by persons who otherwise did not cause or participate in the underlying conduct states no claim.’”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
SPRINGFIELD DIVISION
PETER JENNINGS, )
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Case No. 24-3101
)
CLARKSON et al., )
Defendants. )
ORDER
COLLEEN R. LAWLESS, United States District Judge:
Before the Court for screening are duplicate Motions for Leave to File an Amended
Complaint (Docs. 15, 16) filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by Peter Jennings, an inmate at
Centralia Correctional Center (“Centralia”).
I. Screening Standard
The Court must “screen” Plaintiff’s Complaint and dismiss any legally insufficient
claim or the entire action if warranted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. A claim is legally insufficient if
it “(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted;
or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” Id. In
reviewing a complaint, the court accepts the factual allegations as accurate, liberally
construing them in the plaintiff’s favor. Turley v. Rednour, 729 F.3d 645, 649 (7th Cir. 2013).
However, conclusory statements and labels are insufficient. Enough facts must be
provided to “state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Alexander v. United States,
721 F.3d 418, 422 (7th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).
II. Facts Alleged
The events Plaintiff describes occurred at Western Illinois Correctional Center
(“WICC”) and are alleged against the following Defendants: Nurse Practitioners
Clarkson and Howard, Dr. William Coonrod, Dr. John Doe, Grievance Officer Eric
Wohlfeil, and Jane Doe Nurses I, II, III, and IV.
On April 3, 2023, Plaintiff suffered a two-centimeter laceration to the fifth digit
(i.e., pinky finger) of Plaintiff’s left hand. (Pl. Med. Rec. Doc. 1-1 at 11.) Plaintiff alleged
that Defendants violated his Eighth Amendment rights in the following manner: (1)
Clarkson told Doe I to break the wooden depressor Doe I used in dressing Plaintiff’s
injury in half after a corrections officer noted it was too long; (2) after challenging
Howard’s opinion that there was nothing wrong with Plaintiff’s finger, Howard
remarked, “Who needs a little finger anyways;” (3) Coonrod refused to listen to Plaintiff’s
complaints that his stitches had not been removed and the wooden depressor “busted”
his stitches open; (4) Wolfeil did not investigate the claims made in his grievance; (5) John
Doe merely told Plaintiff to keep his hand “balled-up;” and (6) Jane Does II, III, and IV
did not use common sense by taping a wooden depressor to his finger.
III. Analysis
Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File an Amended Complaint (Doc. 16) is granted.
The Clerk of the Court is directed to docket Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint (Doc. 16 at 2-
4). Plaintiff’s filing (Doc. 15) is denied as duplicative.
Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Wolfeil did not investigate the claims raised in his
grievance. However, “[o]nly persons who cause or participate in [constitutional]
violations are responsible.” George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 609 (7th Cir. 2007); see also Owens
v. Godinez, 860 F.3d 434, 438 (7th Cir. 2017) (“[T]he mishandling of [an inmate’s]
‘grievances by persons who otherwise did not cause or participate in the underlying
conduct states no claim.’”). Plaintiff does not allege that Wolfeil was personally involved
in the medical care claims at issue; thus, he fails to state a plausible claim against Wolfeil.
Plaintiff acknowledges that Defendant Coonrod was employed at Blessing Health
Mount Sterling, and Defendant John Doe was employed at Jacksonville Memorial
Hospital. In West v. Adkins, the Supreme Court held that “[a] physician who is under
contract with the State to provide medical services to inmates at a state-prison hospital
on a part-time basis acts ‘under color of state law,’ within the meaning of § 1983, when
he treats an inmate.” 487 U.S. 42, 42 (1988).
However, Plaintiff does not allege facts that establish or permit the reasonable
inference that Defendant Coonrod and Doe were acting under color of state law at the
time of the alleged violations. See Shields v. Illinois Dep’t of Corr., 746 F.3d 782, 797–98 (7th
Cir. 2014) (holding that medical providers who have ‘only an incidental or transitory
relationship’ with the penal system generally are not considered state actors.”) (quoting
Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d 816, 827 (7th Cir. 2009)) (holding that state
university physicians who examined inmate were not acting under color of state law
where physicians “had only an incidental and transitory relationship with the penal
system” and where no evidence existed that physicians “had a contract with Wexford or
the prison, that their practices focused on treating inmates, or even that they regularly
treated inmates as part of their practices”). Therefore, Plaintiff does not state a claim
against Coonrod or Doe.
“Prison officials violate the Eighth Amendment’s proscription against cruel and
unusual punishment when their conduct demonstrates ‘deliberate indifference to serious
medical needs of prisoners.’” Gutierrez v. Peters, 111 F.3d 1364, 1369 (7th Cir. 1997)
(quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)). To succeed on a claim of deliberate
indifference to a serious medical need, a plaintiff must satisfy a test that contains both an
objective and subjective component. Vance v. Peters, 97 F.3d 987, 991 (7th Cir. 1996).
Under the objective component, a plaintiff must demonstrate that his medical
condition is sufficiently severe. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). Under the
subjective component, the prison official must have acted with a “sufficiently culpable
state of mind.” Id. Thus, a plaintiff can establish deliberate indifference by showing that
a defendant “knew of a substantial risk of harm to the inmate and disregarded the risk.”
Greeno v. Daley, 414 F.3d 645, 653 (7th Cir. 2005).
“A medical professional acting in his professional capacity may be held to have
displayed deliberate indifference only if the decision by the professional is such a
substantial departure from accepted professional judgment, practice, or standards, as to
demonstrate that the person responsible actually did not base the decision on such a
judgment.” Rasho v. Elyea, 856 F.3d 469, 476 (7th Cir. 2017) (quoting Sain v. Wood, 512 F.3d
886, 895 (7th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Plaintiff alleges Defendant Clarkson violated his constitutional rights by
instructing Defendant Doe I to break a wooden tongue depressor used in changing his
wound dressing in half after a corrections officer noted it was too long. Plaintiff next
asserts that Defendant Howard disregarded his medical concerns regarding his finger.
The inference taken from Plaintiff’s assertions against Defendants Doe I, II, III, and IV is
that they continued to break the wooden depressor in half despite observing wooden
splinters in his wound.
The Court concludes that Plaintiff states Eighth Amendment deliberate
indifference claims against Defendants Clarkson, Howard, and Does I, II, III, and IV
based on the specific allegations noted above. However, because the Court cannot effect
service of process upon a Doe Defendant, the Court advises that Plaintiff should attempt
to determine, through the discovery process, the identity of the individual Does
personally involved in violating his constitutional rights. Plaintiff should then seek leave
to file an amended Complaint to add these individuals as Defendants. The Court will
explain this process in more detail in its Scheduling Order that the Court will enter after
Defendants have been served and filed their Answer to Plaintiff’s pleading.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:
1) Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File an Amended Complaint (Doc. 16) is
GRANTED.
2) Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File an Amended Complaint (Doc. 15) is DENIED.
3) The Clerk of the Court is DIRECTED to docket Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint
(Doc. 16 at 2-4) and TERMINATE William Coonrod, John Doe, and Eric Wohlfeil
as Defendants.
4) According to the Court’s screening of Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint (Doc 8-1)
under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, Plaintiff has alleged enough facts to proceed with Eighth
Amendment conditions of confinement claim against Defendants Clarkson,
Howard, and Jane Doe I, II, III, and IV. Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants
proceed in their individual capacity only. Additional claims shall not be included
in the case, except at the Court’s discretion on motion by a party for good cause
shown or under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15.
5) This case is now in the process of service. The Court advises Plaintiff to wait until
counsel has entered an appearance before filing any motions to give Defendants
notice and an opportunity to respond to those motions. Motions filed before
counsel has filed an appearance will be denied as premature. Plaintiff need not
submit evidence to the Court unless otherwise directed by the Court.
6) The Court will attempt service on Defendants by mailing a waiver of service.
Defendant has sixty days from service to file an Answer. If Defendant has not
filed an Answer or appeared through counsel within ninety days of the entry of
this Order, Plaintiff may file a motion requesting the status of service. After
service of process, the Court will enter an order setting discovery and dispositive
motion deadlines.
7) Concerning a Defendant who no longer works at the address provided by
Plaintiff, the entity for whom that Defendant worked while at that address shall
submit to the Clerk said Defendant’s current work address or, if not known, said
Defendant’s forwarding address. This information shall be used only for
effectuating service. Documentation of forwarding addresses shall be retained
only by the Clerk and shall not be maintained in the public docket nor disclosed
by the Clerk.
8) Defendants shall file an Answer within sixty days of the date the Clerk sends the
waiver. A motion to dismiss is not an answer. The Answer should include all
defenses appropriate under the Federal Rules. The Answer and subsequent
pleadings shall be to the issues and claims stated in this Order. In general, an
answer sets forth Defendants’ positions. The Court does not rule on the merits of
those positions unless and until Defendants file a motion. Therefore, no response
to the Answer is necessary or will be considered.
9) This District uses electronic filing, which means that after Defendants’ counsel
has filed an appearance, Defendants’ counsel will automatically receive
electronic notice of any motion or other paper filed by Plaintiff with the Clerk.
Therefore, Plaintiff does not need to mail copies of motions and other documents
that Plaintiff has filed with the Clerk to Defendants’ counsel. However, this does
not apply to discovery requests and responses. Discovery requests and responses
are not filed with the Clerk. Instead, Plaintiff must mail his discovery requests
and responses directly to Defendants’ counsel. Discovery requests or responses
sent to the Clerk will be returned unfiled unless they are attached to and the
subject of a motion to compel. Discovery does not begin until Defendants’
counsel has filed an appearance, and the Court has entered a scheduling order,
which will explain the discovery process in more detail.
10) Defendants’ counsel is granted leave to depose Plaintiff at his place of
confinement. Defendants’ counsel shall arrange the time for the deposition.
11) Plaintiff shall immediately notify the Court, in writing, of any change in his
mailing address and telephone number. Plaintiff’s failure to inform the Court of
a change in mailing address or phone number will result in the dismissal of this
lawsuit with prejudice.
12) If a Defendant fails to sign and return a waiver of service to the Clerk within
thirty days after the waiver is sent, the Court will take appropriate steps to effect
formal service through the U.S. Marshals service on that Defendant and will
require that Defendant to pay the total costs of formal service under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 4(d)(2).
13) The Court directs the Clerk to enter the standard qualified protective order under
the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act.
14) The Court directs the Clerk to attempt service on Defendants under the standard
procedures.
ENTERED June 20, 2025.
s/ Colleen R. Lawless
____________________________________
COLLEEN R. LAWLESS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE