The opinion
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
Marlboro Partners, :
Appellant :
:
v. : No. 84 C.D. 2024
:
Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board : Submitted: May 6, 2025
BEFORE: HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge
HONORABLE STACY WALLACE, Judge
HONORABLE MATTHEW S. WOLF, Judge
OPINION NOT REPORTED
MEMORANDUM OPINION BY
JUDGE WOLF FILED: June 20, 2025
Marlboro Partners (Licensee) appeals from the December 19, 2023
order of the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County (trial court) affirming the
February 8, 2023 decision of the Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board (Board). The
Board determined that Licensee’s Restaurant Liquor License R-18821 (License) had
been revoked by operation of Section 474.1 of the Liquor Code1 due to Licensee’s
failure to timely file a transfer application and would not be reinstated. We affirm.2
Licensee first acquired the License by transfer in 2007. The License
1
Act of April 12, 1951, P.L. 90, as amended, added by Section 21 of the Act of December
9, 2002, P.L. 1653, 47 P.S. § 4-474.1.
2
Also before the Court is Licensee’s “Praecipe to Schedule Oral Argument on Appellant’s
Brief and Reproduced Record and Appellee’s Brief in Opposition” filed May 5, 2025, which the
Court will deny.
has since been in safekeeping pursuant to Section 474.1 of the Liquor Code,3 with
the safekeeping period having been extended several times. In 2016, the Board
informed Licensee’s owner, Peter J. Laurenzano, that the safekeeping period would
expire on September 6, 2017. Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 222a. Clear Creek, LLP
(Clear Creek), of which Laurenzano is a partner, filed an application to transfer the
License from Licensee to Clear Creek on September 5, 2017. Id. at 224a. Licensee
applied for renewal of the License while the transfer application was pending. See
id. at 195a (renewal application for licensing term effective May 1, 2020).
Licensee and the Board’s Bureau of Licensing (Bureau) then engaged
in a series of communications. First, the Bureau issued a July 7, 2021 letter
informing Licensee that the renewal request had been approved and that the transfer
application had been “refused by the Board.” R.R. at 197a. The letter stated that
since the Board had refused the transfer application and Licensee’s safekeeping
period had expired on September 6, 2017, Licensee had 30 days from the date of the
3
It provides, in relevant part:
(b) The Board may hold the license in safekeeping for a period not to exceed two
consecutive years. Any license remaining in safekeeping for more than two
consecutive years shall be immediately revoked by the Bureau of Licensing unless
a transfer application or request for reissue from safekeeping has been filed prior to
the expiration of the two-year period or unless the board has approved a request to
extend the safekeeping for an additional year as set forth in subsection [474.1(g) of
the Liquor Code, 47 P.S. § 4-474.1(g) (relating to fees and procedure for extension
of safekeeping period)]. In addition, the board shall extend the period for an
additional year if, at the end of the two-year period, the licensed premises are
unavailable due to fire, flood or other similar natural disaster; no further extension
beyond one additional year shall be granted by the board regardless of whether the
licensed premises are unavailable due to fire, flood or other similar natural disaster
unless an application is made as set forth in subsection (g).
47 P.S. § 4-474.1(b).
2
letter to do one of three things: (1) file another transfer application, (2) request that
the License be reissued from safekeeping and pay the required fee, or (3) file an
application to extend the safekeeping period through January 15, 2022, and pay the
required fee. Id. The letter explained that failure to timely act regarding the
safekeeping expiration would lead to revocation of the License. Id.
Licensee did not effectively appeal that determination but Laurenzano
apparently attempted to do so on July 26, 2021, by filing a “Motion to Appeal
Decision of PLCB” in the trial court. The trial court dismissed the motion, partly on
the basis that Laurenzano, a nonlawyer, was not authorized to represent Licensee, a
business entity.
Next, in response to the attempted appeal, the Bureau issued a new
determination by August 17, 2021 letter to “correct and supplement” its earlier letter.
R.R. at 200a. The August 17 letter contained the same determinations (that the
Board had approved the renewal and refused the transfer to Clear Creek) but updated
the compliance period. Id. It stated that the safekeeping period had expired October
6, 2017, so Licensee had 30 days from the date of the letter (i.e., until September 16,
2021) to file a transfer, request for reissuance with fee, or apply to extend the
safekeeping period with fee. Id. The letter gave more detail than the earlier letter
about the effect of a timely transfer application. It explained that if Licensee elected
to pursue a transfer, “the [transfer] application [must be] in line for approval upon
receipt of the investigative report,” or else the transfer application would not toll the
safekeeping period, and Licensee would need to formally apply to extend the
safekeeping period, including by paying a $140,000.00 fee. Id. The letter again
warned Licensee that failure to submit a transfer application, release request, or
extension request would lead to revocation. Id.
3
On September 20, 2021, counsel for the Board informed Laurenzano
via email that the Board had voluntarily extended the deadline to file a transfer
application to October 5, 2021. R.R. at 203a. The email gave contact information
for Timothy LaMark, a Board employee, and directed Licensee to contact him if it
encountered technical problems with PLCB+, the Board’s online application portal.
Id.
Finally, by October 18, 2021 letter, the Bureau stated that no
application for transfer, reissuance, or extension had been filed, and the safekeeping
period was not extended so the License was revoked effective October 6, 2021, by
operation of Section 474.1. Id. at 206a. Licensee then timely appealed the October
18, 2021 determination.
A Board hearing examiner held an administrative hearing on September
16, 2022. Laurenzano testified that he attempted to file a transfer application but
could not complete it because PLCB+ contained erroneous information about the
License. He acknowledged that the Board, through counsel, extended the time for
filing the application through the first week of October 2021, but testified that the
transfer application still “[could] not be submitted” due to technical problems. R.R.
at 180a.
The hearing examiner filed an opinion recommending that the Board
find the License was properly revoked because no transfer application was timely
filed. Id. at 117a-18a. The Board, in its February 8, 2023 Order, determined that
the License was properly revoked and would not be reinstated. Id. at 106a. Licensee
timely appealed to the trial court.
The trial court held a de novo hearing on June 28, 2023. Laurenzano
testified that in response to the August 17, 2021 letter, he chose to submit a transfer
4
application. He explained that he and Stuart Mostinsky had agreed to terms for
Mostinsky to purchase the License. Laurenzano stated that he repeatedly tried to
complete the transfer application through PLCB+ beginning on July 13, 2021. He
showed documentary evidence of a notification from PLCB+ that “the [license
identification number] entered is not valid.” R.R. at 392a-93a. He attempted to
contact the numbers provided for technical assistance in the July 7, 2021 letter but
they were not working numbers. He testified he eventually spoke with someone at
the Board, who told him the application could only be completed through PLCB+,
not on paper.
After the August 17, 2021 letter, Laurenzano explained, he tried several
times again to submit the application and received the same error message, so he
contacted the Board and its counsel. In response, the Board extended the deadline
for filing until October 5, 2021. Laurenzano acknowledged that Board counsel’s
September 20, 2021 email gave LaMark’s email address for help with technical
difficulties. But Laurenzano stated he never attempted to contact LaMark because
“[Mostinsky] had instructed [Laurenzano] to tell him when the system was operating
properly” and “until it was proper, he couldn’t submit the application.” R.R. at 412a;
see id. at 437a-38a, 454a. He gave no further explanation.
Mostinsky gave similar testimony that he also made several attempts to
complete a transfer application on PLCB+ but was unable to do so. Id. at 465a-66a.
LaMark, the Board’s Chief of Licensing Systems, Program
Management Division, testified that he oversees PLCB+, the online regulatory
system used since 2016 to renew and transfer liquor licenses. He explained he and
his department are available by phone and email to assist PLCB+ users with
technical problems. He was aware that Board counsel provided his contact
5
information to Laurenzano in September 2021, and he testified that no one “from
[Licensee] or [any] potential transferee or applicant” contacted him about this case
from that time forward. R.R. at 354a.
The trial court affirmed the Board’s order. It found as fact that no
transfer application (or other application contemplated in the letters to Licensee) was
timely filed. R.R. at 529a-30a. The trial court reasoned as follows:
[Licensee] has not established that its efforts were
exhaustive. [Licensee] had other options available and
chose not to pursue them. To direct one’s efforts solely in
one direction and only that one direction regarding the
process under the PLCB+ was not sufficient to establish
that full compliance was impossible for reasons beyond
[Licensee]’s control. Telephone numbers and emails were
provided for assistance. These avenues were not
sufficiently pursued by [Licensee]. Those avenues were
well within [Licensee]’s control to pursue. As such, this
court cannot deem that it was impossible for [Licensee] to
comply with any of the options it had before it.
Credible testimony was presented by LaMark that
he and his team were available, upon calling a phone
number or emailing, to assist people trying to use PLCB+
and make corrective measures to ensure that they are able
to file what they want to file.
While the transfer applications were required to be
filed through PLCB+, there were clear personal conduits
in place to assist applicants in the event of electronic
complications or barriers. Laurenzano acknowledged this.
R.R. at 531a-32a. Based on those findings, the trial court concluded that Licensee
failed to prove it had fully attempted to comply with Section 474.1(b), and the
License was properly revoked. Licensee appealed to this Court.
6
On appeal,4 Licensee argues the License should not be considered
revoked by operation of Section 474.1(b). Licensee claims it made good faith efforts
to file the transfer application and was unable to complete the application process
through no fault of its own, solely because the PLCB+ filing system malfunctioned.
Licensee cites cases where the Board has allowed additional time to submit a transfer
application if timely compliance was not possible, and it erred in not doing that here.
Licensee argues the trial court erred in finding Licensee did not engage in
“exhaustive” efforts to complete the application, both because that is the wrong
standard (it should have focused on good faith, not “exhaustive,” efforts) and
because the record would support a finding that Licensee made good faith efforts to
complete the application. In support, Licensee cites our decision in Club 530, Inc.
v. Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 855 C.D. 2016, filed Mar.
29, 2017), slip op. at 11, 2017 WL 1162448,5 where we affirmed a trial court’s use
of its discretion to find a license should not have been revoked under Section 474.1.
The Board responds that Licensee merely seeks to relitigate the facts
before this Court.6 The Board argues that the trial court acted within its discretion
to find that Licensee had not engaged in sufficient good faith efforts at filing a
4
Our review in a liquor license revocation case determines whether the trial court’s
findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence and whether the trial court committed an
error of law or abused its discretion. Pa. Liquor Control Bd. v. Bartosh, 730 A.2d 1029 (Pa.
Cmwlth. 1999).
5
Unreported opinions of this Court filed after January 15, 2008, may be cited for their
persuasive value. Pa.R.A.P. 126(b); 210 Pa. Code § 69.414(a).
6
On this basis, the Board claims Licensee has so misunderstood the proper standard of
appellate review that Licensee has waived any issue it could raise on appeal. See Board’s Br. at
14-16. While that could be a basis for rejecting Licensee’s arguments after considering them, it is
not a basis for finding waiver. Licensee frames the issue clearly, fully develops arguments, and
cites the Liquor Code and this Court’s caselaw. We reject the Board’s waiver argument.
7
transfer application to warrant any discretionary relief or extension of time. The
Board also relies on Club 530, and emphasizes that there, we deferred to the trial
court’s finding that the licensee had engaged in sufficient good faith efforts, whereas
here the trial court found the opposite, and we should also defer. The Board
emphasizes that it is not the label the trial court affixed to its decision (i.e.,
“exhaustive” efforts versus good faith efforts) which controls, but rather the trial
court’s supported finding that Licensee had courses of action available that it never
took, such as contacting LaMark for assistance.
The trial court is the ultimate factfinder in appeals from the Board.
We have explained:
Pursuant to Section 464 of the Liquor Code, a trial
court conducts de novo review of the [Board]’s grant or
denial of a license. 47 P.S. § 4-464. As such, it may
“sustain or over-rule the action of the [Board] and either
order or deny the issuance of a new license[.]” Id. A de
novo review “contemplates an independent evaluation of
the evidence.” Domusimplicis, LLC v. [Pa. Liquor Control
Bd.], 202 A.3d 836, 841 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2019). When the
trial court conducts a de novo review, it “is not restricted
to reviewing the established record and may hear new
evidence and make independent findings of fact and
conclusions of law.” Id.
Myles Dev. Co., LLC v. Pa. Liquor Control Bd., 224 A.3d 1119, 1124 (Pa. Cmwlth.
2020) (footnote omitted). The trial court “is empowered to determine the weight
and credibility of the evidence[ and] resolve conflicts in the evidence, and is free to
reject even uncontradicted testimony.” 770 Ameribeer, Inc. v. Pa. Liquor Control
Bd., 318 A.3d 998, 1009 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2024). On appeal, this Court does not re-
weigh evidence or reassess credibility. Id. at 1010.
We agree with the Board that the trial court acted within its discretion
8
to conclude the License was properly revoked. The trial court found as fact that
when Licensee communicated with the Bureau about the technical difficulties it
experienced, the Bureau offered an extension of time and LaMark’s contact
information with direction to contact him about future technical problems. The trial
court also found that Licensee did not avail itself of that assistance and did not file a
transfer application. That finding is plainly supported by both Laurenzano’s and
LaMark’s testimony. Finally, the trial court concluded that Licensee could have
reasonably undertaken further efforts to assure the filing of a timely transfer
application—including by contacting LaMark—but did not do so, and that this fell
below the standard of good faith. This is supported by Laurenzano’s testimony,
which gave no coherent explanation of why he could not have contacted LaMark.
Licensee’s reliance on Club 530 is misplaced. There, “the trial court
determined that [the l]icensee made every good faith effort to successfully reinstate
its License but failed to do so for reasons beyond its control,” so it held that the
license could not be considered revoked by operation of Section 474.1(b). Slip op.
at 11 (emphasis added). We affirmed because the trial court had acted within its
discretion. Id. Here, although the trial court used a different word—“exhaustive”—
it made the opposite factual finding: that there were further, reasonable things
Licensee could have done to act timely and it did not do those things, so the failure
to timely file was not beyond Licensee’s control.
As we have recently put it, “having accepted the privilege of licensure,
Licensee was responsible for complying with all applicable statutory filing
deadlines,” and it must “act with ‘the highest degree of responsibility’ to maintain
that privilege.” Am. Truck Plazas, LLC v. Pa. Liquor Control Bd., 332 A.3d 875,
882 (emphasis added) (quoting 770 Ameribeer, 318 A.3d at 1005). The trial court’s
9
adequately supported findings here amount to a conclusion that the failure to file a
timely transfer application was not due to factors beyond Licensee’s control. We
cannot conclude that the trial court erred or abused its discretion in so finding.
Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s order.
_____________________________________
MATTHEW S. WOLF, Judge
10
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
Marlboro Partners, :
Appellant :
:
v. : No. 84 C.D. 2024
:
Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board :
ORDER
AND NOW, this 20th day of June 2025, the December 19, 2023 order
of the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County is AFFIRMED.
Further, Appellant’s “Praecipe to Schedule Oral Argument on
Appellant’s Brief and Reproduced Record and Appellee’s Brief in Opposition” is
DENIED.
_____________________________________
MATTHEW S. WOLF, Judge