The opinion
[This opinion has been published in Ohio Official Reports at 178 Ohio St.3d 114.]
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLANT, v. DUNLAP, APPELLEE.
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLANT, v. LEWIS, APPELLEE.
[Cite as State v. Dunlap, 2024-Ohio-4821.]
Criminal law—Fourth Amendment to United States Constitution—Whether officer
violated Fourth Amendment by asking driver for license after realizing that
driver was not car’s owner—Court of appeals’ judgments reversed and trial
court’s judgments reinstated.
(Nos. 2022-1227, 2022-1229, 2022-1237, and 2022-1238—Submitted October
25, 2023—Decided October 9, 2024.)
APPEAL from and CERTIFIED by the Court of Appeals for Geauga County,
Nos. 2021-G-0034 and 2021-G-0037, 2022-Ohio-3006 and 2022-Ohio-3007.
__________________
DEWINE, J., announced the judgment of the court, with an opinion joined
by FISCHER and DETERS, JJ. DONNELLY, J., concurred in judgment only, with an
opinion. STEWART, J., concurred in judgment only, with an opinion. KENNEDY,
C.J., dissented, with an opinion joined by BRUNNER, J.
DEWINE, J., announcing the judgment of the court.
{¶ 1} A police officer pulled over a car because he had information that the
car’s owner had a suspended driver’s license. But when he walked up to the car,
the officer realized that the car was not being driven by its owner. The officer asked
the driver for his license and discovered that he also did not have a valid driver’s
license. Ultimately, an illegal firearm was found in the vehicle and the driver and
a passenger were arrested.
{¶ 2} No one disputes that the police officer had probable cause to initiate
the stop. The question we confront in this case is whether the officer violated the
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Fourth Amendment by asking the driver for his license after he realized that the
driver was not the car’s owner. We conclude that he did not. Under controlling
United States Supreme Court precedent, an officer who has properly executed a
traffic stop may make ordinary inquiries necessary to complete the mission of the
traffic stop—including confirming that the driver has a valid driver’s license. See
Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 355 (2015).
{¶ 3} The Eleventh District Court of Appeals held in these consolidated
cases that the trial court erred in not suppressing evidence that was found in the car.
Because we disagree, we reverse the judgments of the court of appeals and reinstate
the judgments of the trial court.
I. Background
A. An officer stops a suspected unlicensed driver
{¶ 4} Officer Andrew Centrackio sat in a parking lot running registration
checks on the license plates of passing vehicles using the Law Enforcement
Automated Data System (more commonly known as “LEADS”). Among the cars
he checked was a Kia Forte with a rear temporary tag. The inquiry revealed that
the Kia’s owner, Jessica Dunlap, had a suspended driver’s license. LEADS also
provided some of Dunlap’s identifying traits, including her gender, height, age, and
weight.
{¶ 5} Acting on the information from LEADS, Officer Centrackio pulled
the Kia over based on his suspicion that a suspended driver was behind the wheel.
It was not until he walked up to the driver-side window that he realized that the car
was not being driven by its owner: Jessica Dunlap is a white female, but the driver,
later identified as Je’Brel Lewis, was an African American male. Dunlap was a
passenger in the vehicle.
{¶ 6} Officer Centrackio informed Lewis that he had pulled the car over
because the registered owner had a suspended license. Referencing Dunlap, Lewis
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responded that “she got court for that.” Officer Centrackio then asked Lewis if his
license was valid. Lewis responded, “I believe I’m valid. If not, she’s valid.”
{¶ 7} At that point, Officer Centrackio asked Lewis for his license. Lewis
instead pulled out a state-issued identification card. While walking back to the
patrol car, Officer Centrackio said, “If you’re valid, you guys are good to go.” After
running the information in LEADS, Officer Centrackio learned that Lewis also had
a suspended license. Because neither Lewis nor Dunlap had a valid driver’s license,
he called for a tow truck and prepared to conduct an inventory search.
{¶ 8} From LEADS, Officer Centrackio knew that Lewis had active arrest
warrants and that his prior charges included improper handling of firearms in a
motor vehicle. He asked Lewis whether there were any weapons in the vehicle.
Lewis stated that there was an unloaded firearm located in the front passenger-side
door and gave the officer permission to search the car. The search revealed the
firearm in the front passenger-side door and a loaded magazine on the floor of the
back seat.
B. The court of appeals rules that the evidence found in the car should be
suppressed
{¶ 9} Dunlap and Lewis were each indicted on one count of improperly
handling firearms in a motor vehicle. They both filed motions to suppress the
evidence discovered in the car, arguing that the officer had unlawfully prolonged
the stop after he realized that Dunlap was not driving.
{¶ 10} At a consolidated hearing on the suppression motions, Officer
Centrackio testified that he asked Lewis for his license to “determine if he was
valid” and “legally able to drive the vehicle.” He also said that he asked for
identification in order to document Lewis’s identity in an incident report that is
generated each time he stops a vehicle.
{¶ 11} The trial court denied the motions to suppress. Both defendants pled
no contest and appealed to the Eleventh District. On appeal, they argued that
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although the initial stop was justified, the officer violated the Fourth Amendment
by continuing the stop after he realized that Dunlap was not driving the car.
{¶ 12} The Eleventh District reversed the trial court’s denial of the motion
to suppress in both cases. State v. Dunlap, 2022-Ohio-3007 (11th Dist.); State v.
Lewis, 2022-Ohio-3006 (11th Dist.). It held that once Officer Centrackio realized
that Dunlap was not the driver, he no longer had reasonable suspicion for the stop.
Dunlap at ¶ 19; Lewis at ¶ 19. Therefore, the court reasoned, it was impermissible
for the officer to continue the stop to ask Lewis for identification. See Dunlap at
¶ 19; Lewis at ¶ 19. Because “the extension of the stop was improper once [Officer]
Centrackio recognized Dunlap was not the driver,” the court of appeals held that
the firearm that was discovered as a result of the continued detention must be
suppressed. Lewis at ¶ 29; see also Dunlap at ¶ 29.
{¶ 13} The Eleventh District acknowledged that its decisions were in
conflict with the Ninth District’s decision in State v. Graves, 1993 WL 261562 (9th
Dist. July 14, 1993), and certified the conflicts to this court. In Graves, an officer
stopped a car because its owner had an outstanding warrant, but after executing the
stop the officer realized the car’s owner was not the person driving the car.
Nonetheless, the Ninth District found that it was permissible for the officer to ask
the driver for identification, explaining that “once a motor vehicle is legitimately
stopped, . . . the slight intrusion of asking the driver for identity is neither
unwarranted, nor prohibited.” Id. at *2, citing Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420,
439 (1984).
{¶ 14} This court accepted both appeals, determined that the conflicts did
exist, and consolidated all four cases for review. 2022-Ohio-4670.
II. We Reverse the Court of Appeals and Reinstate the Convictions
{¶ 15} The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects
the “right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures.” The Ohio Constitution also prohibits
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“unreasonable searches and seizures.” Ohio Const., art. I, §14. But in this court
and in the proceedings below, Lewis and Dunlap have framed their argument under
the Fourth Amendment and have failed to assert that the Ohio Constitution provides
any greater protections. Thus, we are constrained to consider only whether Lewis’s
and Dunlap’s rights under the Fourth Amendment were violated. See State v.
Burroughs, 2022-Ohio-2146, ¶ 11.
A. The officer had reasonable suspicion to make the stop
{¶ 16} The United States Supreme Court has held that the reasonableness
of a traffic stop under the Fourth Amendment should be evaluated in a manner more
akin to the brief detention of a permissible Terry stop than to a formal arrest. See
Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 439, citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). As is true of a
Terry stop, an officer initiating a traffic stop must have reasonable suspicion—or,
in other words, a “‘particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular
person stopped of criminal activity,’” Kansas v. Glover, 589 U.S. 376, 380 (2020),
quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-418 (1981).1
{¶ 17} Officer Centrackio had reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle. The
United States Supreme Court has recently made clear that an officer does not violate
the Fourth Amendment “by initiating an investigative traffic stop after running a
vehicle’s license plate and learning that the registered owner has a revoked driver’s
license,” id. at 378. Such a stop is reasonable as long as “the officer lacks
information negating an inference that the owner is the driver of the vehicle.” Id.
Thus, Officer Centrackio was entitled to make the traffic stop based on the
1. The dissent purports to find support for its rationale in Glover, asserting that the United States
Supreme Court’s discussion in that case about circumstances in which an officer lacks reasonable
suspicion to engage in a traffic stop “supports the conclusion that . . . Officer Centrackio . . . lacked
authority to continue to detain the driver.” Dissenting opinion, ¶ 46. But as the dissent concedes,
Glover dealt solely with an officer’s initial authority to make a traffic stop, not the scope of
appropriate inquiries once an officer has made a lawful stop. Quite simply, nothing in Glover
addresses or bears upon the issue in this case of an officer’s permissible scope of inquiry after
engaging in a lawful traffic stop.
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information acquired from LEADS indicating that the owner of the vehicle did not
have a valid driver’s license.
B. Officer Centrackio did not violate the Fourth Amendment by asking Lewis if
he had a valid driver’s license
{¶ 18} Everyone agrees that the stop was legal. Nor is there any dispute
that after Lewis produced a state-issued identification card rather than a driver’s
license, Officer Centrackio had cause to detain him on suspicion of operating a
vehicle without a license. So the question before us is whether the officer
committed a constitutionally impermissible seizure by asking Lewis if he had a
valid driver’s license. The United States Supreme Court’s decision in Rodriguez v.
United States makes clear that he did not. 575 U.S. 348 (2015).
{¶ 19} In Rodriguez, an officer detained a driver after completing a traffic
stop in order to conduct a canine search of his vehicle. Id. at 348. The court held
that absent reasonable suspicion, police may not extend an otherwise completed
traffic stop to conduct a dog sniff. Id. at 355. Importantly, though, the court held
that “the tolerable duration of police inquiries in the traffic-stop context is
determined by the seizure’s ‘mission’—to address the traffic violation that
warranted the stop, . . . and attend to related safety concerns.” (Citation omitted.)
Id. at 354, quoting Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407 (2005). The Court
explained that “[b]eyond determining whether to issue a traffic ticket, an officer’s
mission includes ‘ordinary inquiries incident to [the traffic] stop.’” Id. at 355,
quoting Caballes at 408. “Typically such inquiries involve checking the driver’s
license, determining whether there are outstanding warrants against the driver, and
inspecting the automobile’s registration and proof of insurance.” Id. Actions
outside the mission would cause the stop to become unlawful if they “‘measurably
extend the duration of the stop,’” id., quoting Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323,
333 (2009).
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{¶ 20} The Court explained that ordinary inquiries—such as checking a
driver’s license—are within a stop’s mission because they serve the same objective
as the initial stop: to enforce the traffic code and to “ensur[e] that vehicles on the
road are operated safely and responsibly.” Id. at 355. In addition to furthering the
interests of traffic enforcement, these ordinary inquiries also protect officers. Id. at
356. Because “[t]raffic stops are ‘especially fraught with danger to police officers,’
. . . an officer may need to take certain negligibly burdensome precautions in order
to complete his mission safely.” Id., quoting Johnson at 330.
{¶ 21} Thus, completing the mission of the traffic stop in this case allowed
Officer Centrackio to make the “ordinary inquiries” of such a stop, including
“checking the driver’s license,” Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 355, 356. Officer
Centrackio stopped the car because he had a reasonable suspicion that the driver
did not have a valid license. His question—“Are you valid?”—was also consistent
with the stop’s mission of ensuring that the vehicle was being operated by a
properly licensed driver. See id.; see also Glover, 589 U.S. at 381 (“empirical
studies demonstrate what common experience readily reveals: Drivers with
revoked licenses frequently continue to drive and therefore to pose safety risks to
other motorists and pedestrians”).
{¶ 22} In arguing to the contrary, the dissent swings at a straw man,
claiming that “[u]nder the lead opinion’s reasoning, every officer has the authority
to require a driver to produce a license—in any context—simply because any driver
on the road could potentially have a suspended license,” dissenting opinion, ¶ 61.
But of course, that is nothing close to what we have said. Rather, we simply
conclude that when an officer permissibly engages in a traffic stop based on a
reasonable suspicion that a car is not being operated by a validly licensed driver,
the officer may ask the driver of the car if he has a valid license.
{¶ 23} There is nothing novel about this conclusion. It follows precisely
what the United States Supreme Court pronounced in Rodriguez—that once an
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officer has initiated a lawful stop, the officer may make ordinary inquiries incident
to the stop, including checking the driver’s license status. Rodriguez at 355. And
numerous lower courts have read Rodriguez the same way we do.
{¶ 24} Subsequent to Rodriguez, courts have widely concluded that part of
the permissible mission of a lawful traffic stop is to ensure that a car is operated by
a properly licensed driver and have thus upheld officers’ requests for licenses even
after the initial reason for the stop was resolved. See, e.g., People v. Cummings,
2016 IL 115769, ¶ 20 (“The United States Supreme Court’s decision in Rodriguez
makes clear that a driver’s license request of a lawfully stopped driver is
permissible irrespective of whether that request directly relates to the purpose for
the stop.”); State v. Smith, 2018 WI 2, ¶ 2 (“We hold that when an officer conducts
a valid traffic stop, part of that stop includes checking identification, even if the
reasonable suspicion that formed the basis for the stop in the first place has
dissipated.”); United States v. Nault, 41 F.4th 1073 (9th Cir. 2022) (officer who
stopped car because owner had an active warrant was entitled to ask driver for
license even after it was clear that the car’s owner was not the driver); United States
v. Yancey, 928 F.3d 627, 628, 631 (7th Cir. 2019) (when driver was arrested and
passenger sought to leave with vehicle, mission of traffic stop included checking
passenger’s driver’s license to ensure that he could legally drive); United States v.
Vargas, 848 F.3d 971 (11th Cir. 2017) (determining whether potential driver had a
license is part of mission of the stop).
{¶ 25} In holding otherwise, the Eleventh District did not mention the
United States Supreme Court’s decision in Rodriguez. Instead, it premised its
holding on State v. Chatton, 11 Ohio St.3d 59 (1984), a decision of this court
construing the Fourth Amendment that predates Rodriguez. The dissent also relies
on Chatton, reasoning that Rodriguez does not control because of dissimilar facts.
But Chatton also involved different facts—facts that are legally distinguishable
from those at bar.
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{¶ 26} In Chatton, an officer initiated a traffic stop after observing a vehicle
without a front or back license plate. Id. at 59. As the officer walked toward the
car, he saw a temporary tag on the rear of the vehicle. Id. Nevertheless, the officer
continued walking to the driver-side window and completed the stop. Id. We
concluded that once the officer saw the temporary tag, he had no further authority
to detain the driver. Id. at 61.
{¶ 27} This case is factually distinguishable from Chatton in that Chatton
involved a car’s registration status while this case involves a driver’s license status.
As the state explains, once the officer saw the temporary tag, the entire mission of
the stop—confirming that the car was registered—was completed.
{¶ 28} In contrast, the mission of the stop in this case was to ensure that a
licensed driver was behind the wheel. Unlike in Chatton, information was not
presented prior to the officer’s approach that dispelled the suspicion and resolved
the mission of the stop. Here, Officer Centrackio’s mission was not completed until
he ascertained whether the driver of the vehicle had a valid license. Whether
Dunlap or any other driver was operating the vehicle, completing the mission of the
stop included the “‘ordinary inquir[y] incident’” to the stop of checking the driver’s
license. Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 355, quoting Caballes, 543 U.S. at 408.
{¶ 29} Though the facts here are different than those in Chatton, our
disposition of this case does not depend solely on that distinction. When it comes
to the interpretation of the Fourth Amendment, we are bound to defer to the United
States Supreme Court. See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) (United States
Supreme Court’s interpretation of the federal Constitution “is the supreme law of
the land, and Art. VI of the Constitution makes it of binding effect on the States”).
And that court has made it clear that once a police officer has lawfully initiated a
traffic stop, the mission of the stop includes asking the driver for a driver’s license.
To the extent that Chatton could be read to suggest otherwise, it has been
superseded by the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Rodriguez.
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III. Conclusion
{¶ 30} We reverse the judgments of the Eleventh District Court of Appeals
and reinstate the judgments of the trial court.
Judgments reversed.
__________________
DONNELLY, J., concurring in judgment only.
{¶ 31} I concur in the majority’s judgment, but I believe that the specific
facts of this case warrant a narrower holding than the one suggested by the lead
opinion. This court need not hold that a police officer may extend any valid traffic
stop to check the driver’s license, even in the absence of continued reasonable
suspicion, because that is not what happened when Officer Andrew Centrackio
stopped appellants, Je’Brel Lewis and Jessica Dunlap. Instead, the matter should
be resolved by holding that when a police officer has reasonable suspicion to stop
a vehicle and that suspicion is not dispelled until the officer is standing next to the
driver’s window, the officer may briefly interact with the driver without violating
the Fourth Amendment. And if, as here, the driver’s statements give rise to a
reasonable suspicion that the driver does not have a valid license, the officer may
extend the stop to check the validity of the driver’s license.
{¶ 32} Officer Centrackio stopped the vehicle at issue in this case because
he believed that the vehicle’s owner, Dunlap, was committing the crime of driving
with a suspended license. Only after the officer walked up to the driver’s window
did he see that Dunlap was not the driver. The officer then engaged in
approximately ten seconds of conversation with the driver and passenger, during
which he greeted them, explained that he had stopped the vehicle because Dunlap’s
license was suspended, inferred that Dunlap was the passenger, asked the driver,
Lewis, if he had a valid driver’s license, and received a suspicious answer: “I
believe I’m valid. If not, she’s valid.” In addition to being illogical, Lewis’s answer
was clearly untrue given that the officer had just said that Dunlap’s license was not
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currently valid. At that point, Officer Centrackio asked for Lewis’s license to verify
its validity.
{¶ 33} The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution does not
allow for warrantless, suspicionless traffic stops in order to verify the validity of a
driver’s license. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979). However, when
a vehicle has been properly stopped, a police officer may briefly question the
vehicle’s occupants—even after the purpose of the stop has ended—under certain
circumstances. See State v. Robinette, 1997-Ohio-343, ¶ 24.
{¶ 34} In Robinette, a police officer stopped Robinette for speeding, gave
him a warning, and then asked him if he had any contraband in the car such as drugs
or weapons. Id. at ¶ 1. After Robinette answered no, the officer asked to search
the car and ultimately seized a container of illegal drugs. Id. Although this court
held that the search was invalid, we held that the officer’s initial questions were
constitutionally permissible. Id. at ¶ 25-29. We indicated that a suspicionless
extension of a traffic stop is permissible so long as the detention is brief, the
questioning is minimally intrusive, and the questioning serves the public interest.
Id. at ¶ 25.
{¶ 35} In this case, the parties do not dispute that Officer Centrackio validly
initiated a traffic stop. After the original reasonable suspicion for the stop was
dispelled, the officer prolonged the suspicionless portion of the stop for a mere ten
seconds and asked only two questions: “How’s it going?” and “Are you valid?”
The latter question served the same interest that justified the stop in the first place:
to keep suspended drivers off Ohio roads. Like the questioning in Robinette, the
brief questioning in this case was valid. But in contrast to Robinette, Lewis’s
answer in this case gave rise to the reasonable suspicion that he did not have a valid
driver’s license. Based on Lewis’s suspicious answer, Officer Centrackio was
justified in extending the traffic stop to check the validity of Lewis’s license.
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{¶ 36} Under these specific circumstances, Officer Centrackio did not
violate Lewis’s or Dunlap’s Fourth Amendment rights. Thus, the evidence
obtained after the license verification did not need to be suppressed. Accordingly,
I concur in the majority’s judgment reversing the Eleventh District Court of
Appeals’ judgments and reinstating the trial court’s judgments denying the motions
to suppress. Because I would base this judgment on narrower grounds than the lead
opinion, I concur in judgment only.
__________________
STEWART, J., concurring in judgment only.
{¶ 37} Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348 (2015), does not resolve
the question before us. Nonetheless, I would reverse the judgments of the Eleventh
District Court of Appeals and reinstate the judgments of the trial court—but on
grounds different from the lead opinion. For these reasons, I concur in judgment
only.
{¶ 38} I agree with the lead opinion that there is no dispute that the officer
had reasonable suspicion to initiate the traffic stop based on the information he
received that the vehicle’s owner had a suspended driver’s license. The more
specific question presented here, however, is whether that reasonable suspicion
terminated when the officer realized as he approached the vehicle, based on the
outward appearance of the driver, that the car was not being driven by its owner.
This particular question was not present in Rodriguez.
{¶ 39} The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits
unreasonable searches and seizures. And driving a vehicle on public roadways is
a privilege for which the state issues and requires licensure. See R.C. 4507.35(A)
(requiring that the operator of a motor vehicle “furnish satisfactory proof that the
operator has a driver’s license, upon demand of any peace officer”). Additionally,
this court has held that a driver’s-license checkpoint program does not necessarily
violate the Fourth Amendment; the court evaluated such a checkpoint under the
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following three-prong analysis: (1) the checkpoint’s intrusion on privacy, (2) the
state’s interest in maintaining the checkpoint, and (3) the extent to which the
checkpoint advances the state’s interest. State v. Orr, 2001-Ohio-50, ¶ 10. In so
holding, this court reasoned that such checkpoints advance the State’s interest in
“ensuring that only those qualified to do so are permitted to operate motor vehicles
and hence that licensing requirements are being observed” and require only a
minimal intrusion on privacy. Id. at ¶ 12. In Orr, we described the checkpoint
procedure as follows:
Drivers who were unable to produce a valid driver’s license
had their names, dates of birth, and Social Security numbers entered
into the officers’ computers to check whether they possessed a valid
license. If the computer showed that a driver was properly licensed
and was not wanted by the police for any reason, the driver [was]
given the pamphlet, thanked, and released back into traffic. This
entire process [took] an additional two minutes or so to complete.
Drivers without a valid license were cited for the violation, which
added approximately ten minutes to the overall length of detention.
Id. at ¶ 3.
{¶ 40} Similar to the minimal intrusion involved in advancing the state’s
interest in Orr, as the lead opinion points out here, the officer told the driver, Je’Brel
Lewis, while walking back to the patrol car to check Lewis’s identification card,
“If you’re valid, you guys are good to go.” Lead opinion, ¶ 7. This demonstrates
that the scope of the officer’s inquiry was to determine whether a licensed driver
was operating the vehicle. The United States Supreme Court held in Delaware v.
Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979), that the Fourth Amendment prohibits arbitrary
police stops for the purpose of checking a driver’s license and registration. But
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here, the stop was not arbitrary. As discussed above, the officer had reasonable
suspicion to initiate the stop. Thus, I would find that the specific circumstances of
this case are more analogous to Orr than to Prouse or Rodriguez.
{¶ 41} Based on the foregoing, I conclude that the trial court properly
denied the motions to suppress. Accordingly, I concur in the majority’s judgment
reversing the Eleventh District Court of Appeals’ judgments reversing the trial
court. But because my reasoning differs from the lead opinion’s, I concur in
judgment only.
__________________
KENNEDY, C.J., joined by BRUNNER, J., dissenting.
{¶ 42} Officer Andrew Centrackio ran a vehicle’s license plate through a
law-enforcement database. That vehicle was registered to an owner, appellee
Jessica Dunlap, whose operator’s license was suspended. Without having seen the
driver to determine whether the driver matched the physical description of the
owner, Officer Centrackio stopped the vehicle.
{¶ 43} In Kansas v. Glover, the United States Supreme Court declared that
“the Fourth Amendment permits an officer to initiate a brief investigative traffic
stop when he has ‘a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular
person stopped of criminal activity.’” 589 U.S. 376, 380 (2020), quoting United
States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-418 (1981). This is the reasonable-suspicion
standard. See United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989), citing Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968). Based on the standard set forth in Glover, because Officer
Centrackio had not seen the driver’s physical characteristics, he had a reasonable
suspicion that the registered owner was engaged in the criminal activity of driving
with a suspended license.
{¶ 44} However, the reasonable-suspicion standard “‘takes into account the
totality of the circumstances,’” Glover at 386, quoting Navarette v. California, 572
U.S. 393, 397 (2014), so “the presence of additional facts might dispel reasonable
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suspicion,” id. In this case, Officer Centrackio’s suspicion was dispelled as he
approached the vehicle because he saw that Dunlap was not driving—something
that he admitted on both the dash-camera video and at the suppression hearing. At
that moment, Officer Centrackio no longer had reasonable suspicion that Dunlap
had committed a crime.
{¶ 45} But this case is not about the initial stop. And contrary to the lead
opinion’s characterization, this case is not about an extended stop. Rather, it falls
between the bookends of the United States Supreme Court’s precedent in Glover
(setting forth when an officer has reasonable suspicion to initiate a traffic stop) and
in Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348 (2015) (setting forth when an officer
has reasonable suspicion to extend a traffic stop and make inquiries). And the
question presented by this case is straightforward: When a law-enforcement officer
obtains information after initiating a stop that dispels the officer’s reasonable
suspicion for the stop, is the officer justified in continuing to detain the driver of
the vehicle?
{¶ 46} The answer is no, and the language in Glover narrowing the scope
of the Supreme Court’s holding informs this answer. That language supports the
conclusion that when Officer Centrackio obtained further information establishing
that the suspected crime that had given him reasonable suspicion to initiate the stop
had not been committed, he then lacked authority to continue to detain the driver.
Accordingly, I dissent and would affirm the judgments of the Eleventh District
Court of Appeals.
Kansas v. Glover
{¶ 47} At the outset, it is important to recognize the limits of the United
States Supreme Court’s holding in Glover. In that case, the Court focused on the
validity of the stop and considered only the “information possessed by the officer
at the time of the stop” (emphasis omitted), Glover, 589 U.S. at 386, fn. 2. The
Court therefore did not address the issue before this court today: whether a seizure
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is reasonable when an officer’s reasonable suspicion for initiating a stop is dispelled
by information obtained after the stop occurred but prior to further inquiries.
{¶ 48} “It is a rule of universal application that general expressions used in
a court’s opinion are to be taken in connection with the case under consideration.”
Bramwell v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 269 U.S. 483, 489 (1926). Therefore, because
the Court in Glover considered only the reasonableness of the initial stop, Glover
does not control when this court is determining the reasonableness of actions taken
after the initial stop has been made.
{¶ 49} In Glover, the Supreme Court considered “whether a police officer
violat[ed] the Fourth Amendment by initiating an investigative traffic stop after
running a vehicle’s license plate and learning that the registered owner [had] a
revoked driver’s license.” Glover at 378. The Court held that as long as “the officer
lacks information negating an inference that the owner is the driver of the vehicle,
the stop is reasonable,” id. Or phrased differently, in those circumstances, an
officer no longer has reasonable suspicion to stop a vehicle if the officer learns that
the owner of the vehicle (i.e., the person known to have a suspended license) is not
driving. Despite concluding that the stop at issue in that case was reasonable, the
Court provided an example of when an officer’s reasonable suspicion would be
dispelled prior to initiating a stop. Id. at 386. “[I]f an officer knows that the
registered owner of [a] vehicle is in his mid-sixties but observes that the driver [of
the vehicle being stopped] is in her mid-twenties, then the totality of the
circumstances would not ‘raise a suspicion that the particular individual being
stopped is engaged in wrongdoing.’” Id., quoting Cortez, 449 U.S. at 418.
Rodriguez v. United States
{¶ 50} The United States Supreme Court has also considered when it is
reasonable for an officer to extend a traffic stop. In Rodriguez, 575 U.S. 348, the
Court considered whether it was reasonable for a police officer to extend a traffic
stop for a moving violation to conduct a dog sniff of a vehicle. Id. at 350. The
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Court held that absent reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, an extension is
unreasonable. See id. at 355. It stated that “the tolerable duration of police inquiries
in the traffic-stop context is determined by the seizure’s ‘mission’—to address the
traffic violation that warranted the stop . . . and attend to related safety concerns.”
Id. at 354.
{¶ 51} The Court further explained that “a police stop exceeding the time
needed to handle the matter for which the stop was made violates the Constitution’s
shield against unreasonable seizures.” Id. at 350. “Authority for the seizure thus
ends when tasks tied to the traffic infraction are—or reasonably should have been—
completed.” (Emphasis added.) Id. at 354. The Court also explained that checking
the driver’s license was an ordinary inquiry incident to the mission of the stop. See
id. at 355-356.
{¶ 52} The decisions of the United States Supreme Court are binding on this
court. See State v. Burnett, 2001-Ohio-1581, ¶ 16. However, the Supreme Court
has never directly addressed the reasonableness of a seizure in which the officer’s
reasonable suspicion for initiating the stop is dispelled by evidence obtained prior
to the officer’s extending the stop to make informational inquiries. What the Court
wrote in Glover should inform this court’s decision today. But so should another
case: State v. Chatton, 11 Ohio St.3d 59 (1984).
State v. Chatton
{¶ 53} In Chatton, this court considered “whether [a] police officer, having
detained [a driver] for a suspected traffic violation, continued to possess the
authority to detain [the driver] . . . once the officer no longer had reason to suspect
that [the driver] was committing any traffic violation.” Id. at 60. In Chatton, the
officer initiated a traffic stop based on a reasonable suspicion that the driver’s
vehicle was not properly licensed or registered. Id. at 59, 63. After initiating the
stop, the officer approached the vehicle and realized that the proper vehicle
registration was present in the rear window. Id. This court explained that “because
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the police officer no longer maintained a reasonable suspicion that [the driver’s]
vehicle was not properly licensed or registered, to further detain [the driver] and
demand that he produce his driver’s license [was] akin to the random detentions
struck down by the [United States] Supreme Court in Delaware v. Prouse[, 440
U.S. 648 (1979)].” Chatton at 63.
{¶ 54} The lead opinion says that Rodriguez overrules Chatton, but that is
wrong. Chatton sits in the space between Glover—which addresses when an initial
traffic stop of a registered vehicle belonging to an owner who is under a license
suspension is valid—and Rodriguez—which held that an officer may not prolong a
traffic stop to investigate potential criminality unrelated to the stop once its mission
has been completed. Importantly, the mission for the stop in Rodriguez, a traffic
infraction for a moving violation, had not been completed at the time the officer
asked the driver to produce his driver’s license. Because Chatton has not been
undermined by either decision and is on point, this court should adhere to and apply
it today. See id.
Application to This Case
{¶ 55} In applying Glover, Rodriguez, and Chatton, this court must
determine where the case before us sits in the framework of how the Fourth
Amendment applies to traffic stops. According to the United States Supreme Court,
“‘[e]ach case is to be decided on its own facts and circumstances.’” Ornelas v.
United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696 (1996), quoting Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23,
33 (1963).
{¶ 56} Like the officer in Glover, Officer Centrackio had reasonable
suspicion to initiate a traffic stop of a vehicle because he had no information to
dispel his suspicion that the driver lacked a license. Running a license-and-
registration check in the Law Enforcement Automated Data System (“LEADS”)
showed Officer Centrackio that the registered owner of the passing vehicle had a
suspended license. Since Officer Centrackio did not see the driver, his suspicion
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that the registered owner was engaged in the criminal activity of driving with a
suspended license was reasonable.
{¶ 57} However, when Officer Centrackio encountered the driver of the
vehicle, he observed that the driver, appellee Je’Brel Lewis, did not match the
description of the registered owner, Dunlap. The LEADS report described the
physical characteristics of the registered owner, and Officer Centrackio knew that
the registered owner was a white female. Lewis is a black male. On the dash-
camera video, Officer Centrackio admits, “As soon as I got to the car, I realized it
wasn’t her.” At that moment, he learned information that negated his initial
inference that Dunlap was engaged in the criminal activity of driving with a
suspended license. Therefore, as was the case for the officer in Chatton, Officer
Centrackio’s reasonable suspicion to make the stop was dispelled.
{¶ 58} In an attempt to avoid the holding in Chatton, the lead opinion
asserts that the mission of the stop in this case was to “ensure that a licensed driver
was behind the wheel,” lead opinion, ¶ 28. But by characterizing the mission so
broadly, the lead opinion expands the officer’s actual and more nuanced basis for
effecting the stop. There is no constitutionally valid explanation for the mission
being to ensure that any driver of the vehicle was licensed when the officer’s
suspicion—the constitutional foundation of the stop—was that a specific individual
was driving without a license. Officer Centrackio testified at the suppression
hearing that he performed the traffic stop “solely because of the registered owner
not being licensed.” The mission of the stop therefore ended when Officer
Centrackio learned that Dunlap was not driving the vehicle. To allow a police
officer to continue to detain a driver when reasonable suspicion of criminal activity
no longer exists is tantamount to allowing a police officer to approach any car and
request that its driver produce a license to ensure that a licensed driver is behind
the wheel. Officer Centrackio’s true mission here was to determine whether Dunlap
was driving. She was not.
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{¶ 59} The lead opinion also attempts to distinguish Chatton by arguing that
in this case, “[u]nlike in Chatton, information was not presented prior to the
officer’s approach that dispelled the suspicion,” lead opinion at ¶ 28. This distance-
from-the-driver rule is unpersuasive—it does not make a difference that the
reasonable suspicion in Chatton evaporated when the officer reached the rear
window of the car while Officer Centrackio lost reasonable suspicion upon reaching
the driver’s-side window. Importantly, in Chatton, the officer’s suspicion was
dispelled “as he reached . . . the vehicle . . . [and] observed a temporary license
placard . . . on the rear deck of the vehicle directly beneath the rear window.”
Chatton, 11 Ohio St.3d at 59. Here, the officer’s suspicion was dispelled when he
reached the driver’s-side window and observed that Dunlap was not the driver. In
both Chatton and this case, the officer’s suspicion was dispelled after the initial
stop but prior to any additional inquiries. At that time, there was nothing left for
the officer to investigate.
{¶ 60} The lead opinion is wrong when it asserts that this case is controlled
by Rodriguez. Unlike in Rodriguez, the reasonable suspicion of criminal activity
in this case was dispelled before the officer made additional inquiries. Here, the
traffic infraction that Officer Centrackio believed Dunlap had committed was
driving with a suspended license. The facts show that Officer Centrackio knew that
Dunlap was not the driver as soon as he reached the car’s window, before he asked
for identification. Since the physical descriptions of Lewis and Dunlap were so
different, it was not reasonable for Officer Centrackio to ask for Lewis’s driver’s
license as an “‘ordinary inquir[y] incident to [the traffic] stop’” (bracketed text
added in Rodriguez), Rodriguez at 355, quoting Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405,
408 (2005), because he already knew that the traffic infraction he was investigating
had not occurred. That is in contrast to Rodriguez, in which the mission of the
traffic stop had not yet been completed when the officer requested the driver’s
identification.
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{¶ 61} Only if Officer Centrackio possessed a reasonable suspicion that
Lewis was engaged in criminal activity could he have lawfully extended the stop to
ask for identification. The lead opinion’s conclusion that Officer Centrackio was
authorized to continue to detain the driver—notwithstanding the fact that the
reasonable suspicion that had prompted the stop had been dispelled—solely for the
purpose of “ensur[ing] that a licensed driver was behind the wheel,” lead opinion
at ¶ 28, turns the constitutional protections against unreasonable search and seizure
into a hollow reed. Under the lead opinion’s reasoning, every officer has the
authority to require a driver to produce a license—in any context—simply because
any driver on the road could potentially have a suspended license. That is not the
law in this country.
Conclusion
{¶ 62} Officer Centrackio violated the Fourth Amendment to the United
States Constitution when he continued to detain Lewis and Dunlap after discovering
that Dunlap was not driving. Relying on Glover and Chatton, I would hold that the
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity that Officer Centrackio possessed when
he initiated the traffic stop was dispelled when he learned information that negated
his belief that Dunlap was driving with a suspended license. He therefore could not
detain Dunlap and Lewis after he learned that information. For this reason, I would
affirm the judgments of the Eleventh District Court of Appeals. Because the
majority does otherwise, I dissent.
__________________
James R. Flaiz, Geauga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Nicholas A.
Burling, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant.
Elizabeth Miller, Ohio Public Defender, and Kathleen Evans, Assistant
Public Defender, for appellee Jessica Dunlap.
Rachel A. Kopec, for appellee Je’Brel Lewis.
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Dave Yost, Ohio Attorney General, Benjamin M. Flowers, Solicitor
General, Stephen Carney, Deputy Solicitor General, and Amanda L. Narog, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, urging reversal for amicus curiae, Ohio Attorney
General Dave Yost.
__________________
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