The opinion
[This opinion has been published in Ohio Official Reports at 177 Ohio St.3d 498.]
COLUMBUS BAR ASSOCIATION v. RYAN.
[Cite as Columbus Bar Assn. v. Ryan, 2024-Ohio-5570.]
Attorneys—Misconduct—Violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct—
Conditionally stayed one-year suspension.
(No. 2024-1099—Submitted September 3, 2024—Decided November 27, 2024.)
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Professional Conduct of the Supreme
Court, No. 2023-039.
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The per curiam opinion below was joined by KENNEDY, C.J., and FISCHER,
DEWINE, DONNELLY, STEWART, and DETERS, JJ. BRUNNER, J., did not participate.
Per Curiam.
{¶ 1} Respondent, Corinne Noelle Ryan, of Gahanna, Ohio, Attorney
Registration No. 0066393, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 1996. On
June 2, 2015, we publicly reprimanded Ryan for neglecting two client matters and
for failing to reasonably communicate with those clients. Columbus Bar Assn. v.
Ryan, 2015-Ohio-2069, ¶ 1, 6.
{¶ 2} On November 15, 2023, relator, Columbus Bar Association, filed a
two-count complaint with the Board of Professional Conduct alleging that Ryan
had neglected a client’s divorce matter, failed to reasonably consult and
communicate with the client, knowingly made false statements of material fact to
the client, and engaged in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or
misrepresentation. Relator also alleged that after the client filed a grievance with
relator, Ryan attempted to interfere with the investigation into the alleged
misconduct.
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{¶ 3} Ryan waived a probable-cause determination, and the parties entered
into stipulations of fact, two rule violations (Prof.Cond.R. 1.3 and 1.4(a)(3)), and
aggravating and mitigating factors. The parties also jointly recommended a
sanction of a stayed suspension. After a hearing before a three-member panel of
the board, the panel issued a report finding that Ryan had committed some of the
misconduct alleged and unanimously dismissing charges involving other rule
violations. The panel unanimously dismissed charges alleging that Ryan violated
Prof.Cond.R. 1.4(a)(2) (requiring a lawyer to reasonably consult with a client about
the means by which a client’s objectives are to be accomplished), 4.1(a)
(prohibiting a lawyer from knowingly making a false statement of material fact or
law to a third person),1 and 8.4(h) (prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct
that adversely reflects on the lawyer’s fitness to practice law). The panel then
recommended that Ryan be suspended from the practice of law for one year, with
the suspension fully stayed on conditions. The board adopted the panel’s findings
of fact, conclusions of law, and recommended sanction.
{¶ 4} After a review of the record, we adopt the board’s findings of fact and
misconduct and the recommended sanction. We suspend Ryan from the practice
of law in Ohio for one year, with the suspension fully stayed on the conditions that
she (1) serve a one-year period of monitored probation in accordance with Gov.Bar
R. V(21), with monitoring focused on law-practice management, (2) complete 12
hours of continuing legal education (“CLE”) focused on law-practice management
and/or law-office technology within one year of the date of this disciplinary order,
in addition to the requirements of Gov.Bar R. X, and (3) engage in no further
misconduct.
1. The panel unanimously dismissed one charged violation of Prof.Cond.R. 4.1(a) under Count 1 of
the complaint, but it did not dismiss a second charged violation of Prof.Cond.R. 4.1(a) under Count
2 of the complaint.
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MISCONDUCT
Count 1: The Smith Matter
{¶ 5} In 2015, Monique Smith retained Ryan to represent her in her divorce.
A fee agreement that was executed between the two established that the
representation was limited to Ryan’s securing a divorce decree for Smith and did
not include postdecree work, such as orders to divide marital property.
{¶ 6} On October 13, 2017, the domestic-relations court issued the divorce
decree. In the decree, the court awarded Smith half of the marital portion of her
former husband’s interest in his Ohio Public Employees Retirement (“OPERS”)
account. However, Smith could not access her share of that account until the
domestic-relations court entered a division of property order (“DOPO”) in the
divorce action.
{¶ 7} On September 5, 2018, Smith sent a text message to Ryan requesting
that she finalize the DOPO. Ryan did not respond to that particular text. After
roughly a year of limited, intermittent communications, Ryan finally quoted Smith
$750 for the DOPO representation on November 13, 2019. Although she initially
could not afford this fee, Smith agreed to having Ryan pause her work on the case
until Smith could pay the balance that she owed. Smith mustered the necessary
funds by January 28, 2020, and Ryan sent Smith a copy of the representation
agreement for signature.
{¶ 8} Ryan failed to complete the DOPO. Despite numerous—and
sometimes desperate—pleas from Smith, Ryan continued to neglect Smith’s case
for more than two and a half years. And throughout that time, Ryan reassured Smith
that she was making progress on the DOPO, saying things like “I will get to it
today!” (December 17, 2020), “I will be able to send it later this afternoon”
(February 4, 2021), and “I am on it. I apologize for the delay. I will follow up
tomorrow.” (March 21, 2022).
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{¶ 9} By August 2022, Smith’s frustration with Ryan was apparent, as she
texted Ryan: “[I] paid for the [DOPO] 3 years ago.” Ryan’s continued inaction
eventually led Smith to file a grievance with relator on August 31, 2022. However,
less than two weeks later, Smith sought to withdraw her grievance following a
conversation she had with Ryan that led Smith to believe that Ryan could not
continue to represent her unless Smith withdrew the grievance. Relator nonetheless
continued its investigation into the matter. In a subsequent email to relator, Smith
said that she hoped to “dismiss the case” against Ryan and that she “did not agree
to waive privileges.” When Smith sent that email, she did not have a full
understanding of the implication of waiving the attorney-client privilege.
{¶ 10} Ryan finally filed a motion addressing the DOPO on October 18,
2022, but as of April 2024, the DOPO was still pending before the domestic-
relations court.
{¶ 11} Based on the evidence presented at the hearing and the stipulations
of the parties, the board found by clear and convincing evidence that Ryan violated
Prof.Cond.R. 1.3 (requiring a lawyer to act with reasonable diligence and
promptness in representing a client), 1.4(a)(3) (requiring a lawyer to keep a client
reasonably informed about the status of a matter), and 1.4(b) (requiring a lawyer to
explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary for the client to make informed
decisions regarding the representation).
Count 2: The Disciplinary Investigation
{¶ 12} As noted above, on August 31, 2022, Smith filed a grievance against
Ryan based on Ryan’s neglect and lack of communication. Then, on September 9,
2022, Smith decided to withdraw her grievance, and she sent a letter to relator
declaring: “I have been in contact with Mrs. Ryan, and she has agreed to finish
working on my case.” Then, in subsequent text messages between Smith and Ryan
concerning the DOPO, Smith stated: “You asked me to take my complaint back,
which I did the very next morning and I’m still waiting!” The text messages
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indicate what amounts to a quid pro quo with Smith: in exchange for Smith’s
withdrawing the grievance, Ryan would complete the work on her case.
{¶ 13} Nevertheless, relator continued its investigation, and Ryan initially
failed to respond to relator’s letter of inquiry regarding the grievance, as required
by Gov.Bar R. V(9)(G). When she did respond on September 16, 2022, Ryan told
relator, “I am concerned about how much of a response I can provide without
violating attorney/client privilege.” Relator replied the same day, informing Ryan
that pursuant to Prof.Cond.R. 1.6(b)(5),2 she would not violate the attorney-client
privilege if during relator’s investigation into Smith’s grievance, Ryan disclosed
information about her representation of Smith. Even so, Ryan refused to produce
documents related to the representation, insisting that relator cite to specific rules
or legal authorities that would permit her to comply without violating attorney-
client privilege. In a follow-up email to her request to withdraw the grievance she
had filed against Ryan, Smith again sought to end relator’s investigation into
Ryan’s misconduct. This time, Smith ended the letter by stating that she did “not
agree to waive privileges” and that she would not give relator “permission to
communicate” with her. Smith had added this language in accordance with Ryan’s
explicit instruction, in which Ryan had asked Smith to “update the letter to the CBA
to include a line that [Smith did] not want to waive privilege.” As Smith understood
it, her refusal to waive the attorney-client privilege was needed “to withdraw the
2. Prof.Cond.R. 1.6(b)(5) provides:
(b) A lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation of a
client, including information protected by the attorney-client privilege under
applicable law, to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary for any of
the following purposes:
...
(5) to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a
controversy between the lawyer and the client, to establish a defense to a criminal
charge or civil claim against the lawyer based upon conduct in which the client
was involved, or to respond to allegations in any proceeding, including any
disciplinary matter, concerning the lawyer’s representation of the client.
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complaint.” Later, during her testimony at Ryan’s disciplinary hearing in April
2024, Smith confirmed that she had not had a problem with the disclosure of her
information to relator.
{¶ 14} Based on the evidence presented at the hearing and the stipulations
of the parties, the board found by clear and convincing evidence that Ryan violated
Prof.Cond.R. 4.1(a) and 8.4(c) (prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation). The panel unanimously
dismissed the charge related to Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(h) (prohibiting a lawyer from
engaging in conduct that adversely reflects on the lawyer’s fitness to practice law).
SANCTION
{¶ 15} When imposing sanctions for attorney misconduct, we consider all
relevant factors, including the ethical duties that the lawyer violated, the
aggravating and mitigating factors listed in Gov.Bar R. V(13), and the sanctions
imposed in similar cases.
{¶ 16} The parties stipulated and the board found that two aggravating
factors were present in this case: (1) prior discipline and (2) a pattern of misconduct.
See Gov.Bar R. V(13)(B)(1) and (3). As for mitigating factors, the parties
stipulated and the board found that Ryan (1) made a timely, good faith effort to
make restitution to Smith and to rectify the consequences of her misconduct, (2)
displayed a cooperative attitude toward the disciplinary proceedings before the
board, and (3) provided evidence of good character and reputation. See Gov.Bar
R. V(13)(C)(3) through (5). Further, the board considered the fact that Ryan had
subsequently worked on completing her representation of Smith without charging
her and that the delay in court proceedings in Smith’s divorce case was at least
partially attributable to the COVID-19 pandemic and Ryan’s uncertainty about her
potentially competing duties to cooperate in the disciplinary investigation while
simultaneously working to safeguard Smith’s privileged information from falling
into the hands of an adverse party (i.e., Smith’s former husband).
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{¶ 17} The board recommends that we suspend Ryan from the practice of
law for one year, with the suspension fully stayed on the conditions that she (1)
serve a one-year period of monitored probation in accordance with Gov.Bar R.
V(21), with monitoring focused on law-practice management, (2) complete 12
hours of CLE focused on law-practice management and/or law-office technology
within one year of the date of this disciplinary order, in addition to the requirements
of Gov.Bar R. X, and (3) engage in no further misconduct.
{¶ 18} In determining the appropriate sanction for Ryan’s misconduct, we
begin with the presumption that an actual suspension is warranted when an attorney
engages in a course of conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or
misrepresentation. Disciplinary Counsel v. Fowerbaugh, 1995-Ohio-261, syllabus.
We have, however, tempered this presumption in two sets of circumstances. See
Mahoning Cty. Bar Assn. v. Macala, 2024-Ohio-3158, ¶ 24. First, when the
misconduct is an isolated incident and not a course of misconduct, an otherwise
unblemished legal career may warrant a lesser sanction. See Disciplinary Counsel
v. Eisenberg, 1998-Ohio-472, ¶ 4. And second, if there is “an abundance of
mitigating evidence,” a lesser sanction may be warranted as well. Disciplinary
Counsel v. Markijohn, 2003-Ohio-4129, ¶ 8.
{¶ 19} In addition to considering the presumptive sanction from
Fowerbaugh, the board also relied on Columbus Bar Assn. v. Bulson, 2023-Ohio-
4258, and Stark Cty. Bar Assn. v. Arkow, 2022-Ohio-3209, among others, in making
its recommendation.
{¶ 20} In Bulson, a client retained Bulson to represent her in a domestic-
relations case. Bulson at ¶ 7. After the domestic-relations court issued an agreed
judgment entry in January 2013, Bulson was tasked with preparing a qualified
domestic-relations order (“QDRO”) to transfer a portion of his client’s former
husband’s 401(k) account to his client. Id. Bulson “did not take the necessary
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actions to finalize the QDRO for more than eight years notwithstanding [the
client’s] frequent inquiries and attempts to call him.” Id. at ¶ 8.
{¶ 21} We concluded that Bulson’s misconduct violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.3,
1.4(a)(2), 1.4(a)(3), and 1.4(a)(4) (requiring a lawyer to comply as soon as
practicable with a client’s reasonable requests for information). Bulson at ¶ 12.
Three aggravating factors were present: prior discipline, a pattern of misconduct,
and the vulnerability of and resulting harm to the client. Id. at ¶ 14. Mitigation
included the absence of a dishonest or selfish motive and a cooperative attitude
toward the disciplinary proceedings. Id. We imposed an 18-month suspension,
with 12 months stayed on the condition that Bulson commit no further misconduct.
Id. at ¶ 33. We also ordered him to complete three hours of CLE focused on law-
office management and serve a one-year period of monitored probation. Id. Of
note, the board concluded that Bulson’s conduct warranted an actual suspension
because he had previously received a fully stayed suspension in a prior disciplinary
case. Id. at ¶ 17.
{¶ 22} In Arkow, 2022-Ohio-3209, a client paid the attorney in November
2019 to obtain a QDRO to divide her former husband’s retirement account. Id. at
¶ 5. Arkow falsely assured the client that he had submitted her information to a
company that would prepare the QDRO and was waiting for it to be processed,
delaying the matter for over a year. Id. at ¶ 6-7. Eventually, the client informed
Arkow that she was going to file a grievance against him, after which Arkow
attempted to mislead the client by backdating documents related to the QDRO. Id.
at ¶ 7. Arkow then falsely assured the relator that he had timely submitted the
client’s payment and documents for the QDRO. Id. Arkow engaged in a similar
pattern of misconduct with a second client’s QDRO beginning in March 2020. Id.
at ¶ 10.
{¶ 23} We concluded that Arkow’s misconduct violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.3,
1.4(a)(3), 1.4(a)(4), 8.1(a) (prohibiting a lawyer from knowingly making a false
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statement of material fact in connection with a disciplinary matter), and 8.4(c). Id.
at ¶ 9-10. As aggravating factors, there was prior discipline, a dishonest or selfish
motive, a pattern of misconduct, the commission of multiple offenses, and the
submission of false evidence and false statements during the disciplinary process.
Id. at ¶ 12. Mitigation included timely restitution to the affected clients, full and
free disclosure to the board, and evidence of good character. Id. at ¶ 13. We
suspended Arkow from the practice of law for two years, with one year stayed on
the conditions that he commit no further misconduct; engage in regular mental-
health treatment as recommended by a qualified healthcare professional; and
complete eight hours of CLE, with a focus on QDROs, ethics, and law-office
management. Id. at ¶ 22. Like the attorney in Bulson, Arkow had previously been
disciplined and had received a fully stayed one-year suspension. Id. at ¶ 1.
{¶ 24} In addition to the caselaw relied on by the board, Dayton Bar Assn.
v. Ellison, 2008-Ohio-1808, is also instructive here. In Ellison, the attorney never
followed through with a client’s divorce case, failing to obtain a QDRO after she
“‘kind of gave up’” on the matter when it became too complicated. Id. at ¶ 6.
Additionally, in her representation of a second client, Ellison neglected the client’s
employment-discrimination case and subsequently misled the client about the
status of the case, telling the client that she “‘didn’t know anything’” about an
adverse judgment that had been entered against the client. Id. at ¶ 7-9. Only when
directly confronted by the client did Ellison admit that she had known for months
that summary judgment had been entered against the client. Id. at ¶ 9.
{¶ 25} We concluded that Ellison’s misconduct violated former Code of
Professional Responsibility rules DR 1-102(A)(4), 1-102(A)(6), and 6-101(A)(3),
because she had failed to diligently pursue two client matters and misled one client
about the disposition in her case. Id. at ¶ 6, 12; see also Prof.Cond.R. Appendix A
(former DR 1-102(A)(4) is substantially similar to Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(c); former DR
1-102(A)(6) is substantially similar to Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(h); former DR 6-101(A)(3)
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is substantially similar to Prof.Cond.R. 1.3). We noted that Ellison had previously
been publicly reprimanded but that the discipline had been imposed nearly 20 years
earlier. Ellison at ¶ 15. Mitigating factors included cooperation in the disciplinary
process and evidence of good character and reputation. Id. at ¶ 16. We imposed a
fully stayed one-year suspension on the conditions that Ellison serve a one-year
term of monitored probation and complete a CLE course on law-office
management. Id. We declined to impose an actual suspension for her dishonest
conduct because there was sufficient mitigating evidence. Id. at ¶ 13-16 (finding
that sufficient mitigating evidence warranted a stayed suspension).
{¶ 26} In the case now before us, Ryan’s misconduct is comparable to the
ethical violations in Bulson, Arkow, and Ellison. As in other cases involving
dishonesty by an attorney, we begin with the presumption from Fowerbaugh, 1995-
Ohio-261, that an actual suspension is warranted here. Ryan violated Prof.Cond.R.
8.4(c) when she misled Smith and relator about the waiver of the attorney-client
privilege and other matters related to Smith’s grievance. Even so, as explained
above, we have recognized that a lesser sanction may be appropriate when the
attorney presents sufficient mitigating evidence. See Macala, 2024-Ohio-3158, at
¶ 24; Markijohn, 2003-Ohio-4129, at ¶ 8. And here, there is sufficient mitigating
evidence to warrant a fully stayed suspension. In addition to the mitigating factors
present here, Ryan’s delay was at least partially attributable to the COVID-19
pandemic, and she has since worked toward completing her representation of Smith
without charge.
{¶ 27} However, alongside the Fowerbaugh presumption, Bulson provides
an additional basis for an actual suspension in certain cases: an attorney’s
misconduct may warrant an actual suspension when the attorney’s sanction in a
prior disciplinary matter was a fully stayed suspension. Bulson, 2023-Ohio-4258,
at ¶ 17 (imposing an actual suspension after recognizing that the fully stayed
suspension for prior misconduct had not adequately protected the public); see also
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Arkow, 2022-Ohio-3209, at ¶ 1, 22 (sanction included an actual suspension after
prior one-year suspension that was fully stayed on conditions). By contrast, when
an attorney’s prior sanction involved only a public reprimand, a fully stayed
suspension with conditions may be appropriate in a subsequent disciplinary matter.
See, e.g., Ellison, 2008-Ohio-1808, at ¶ 15-16 (prior public reprimand and
subsequent discipline of fully stayed suspension with conditions). Ryan’s only
prior discipline is a 2015 public reprimand. Therefore, in addition to our
determination that Ryan has offered sufficient mitigating evidence to warrant a
lesser sanction in accord with the exceptions to the Fowerbaugh presumption set
out in Macala, we conclude that Ryan’s prior discipline does not warrant an actual
suspension under our holdings in Bulson and Arkow.
{¶ 28} Ryan’s misconduct included violations of Prof.Cond.R. 4.1(a) and
8.4(c) by being dishonest with her client and relator. Thus, her misconduct is most
analogous to the misconduct in Ellison, in which the attorney deceived a client in
addition to neglecting client matters. In Ellison we imposed a one-year suspension,
fully stayed on conditions. We agree with the board that the same sanction is
warranted for Ryan’s misconduct.
{¶ 29} We do not condone Ryan’s neglect of a client matter, her failure to
reasonably communicate with a client, and her false statements to her client and
relator. But in accord with our holdings in Fowerbaugh, Macala, and Bulson, we
conclude that a fully stayed one-year suspension, with the conditions recommended
by the board, will adequately protect the public from future misconduct. See
Cleveland Metro. Bar Assn. v. Mariotti, 2019-Ohio-5191, ¶ 27; see also
Disciplinary Counsel v. Carter, 2023-Ohio-3992, ¶ 31 (“The primary purpose of
attorney discipline is not to punish the offender but to protect the public against
members of the bar who are unworthy of the trust and confidence essential to the
attorney-client relationship.”).
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CONCLUSION
{¶ 30} Accordingly, Corinne Noelle Ryan is suspended from the practice of
law in Ohio for one year, with the suspension stayed in its entirety on the conditions
that she (1) serve a one-year period of monitored probation in accordance with
Gov.Bar R. V(21), with monitoring focused on law-practice management, (2)
complete 12 hours of CLE focused on law-practice management and/or law-office
technology within one year of the date of this disciplinary order, in addition to the
requirements of Gov.Bar R. X, and (3) engage in no further misconduct. If Ryan
fails to comply with any condition of the stay, the stay will be lifted and she will
serve the full one-year suspension. Costs are taxed to Ryan.
Judgment accordingly.
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Holly Wolf and Kent R. Markus, Bar Counsel; Vorys, Sater, Seymour and
Pease, L.L.P., and Elizabeth Thym Smith; and The Piacentino Law Group and Gina
M. Piacentino, for relator.
Montgomery Jonson, L.L.P., George D. Jonson, and Lindsay M. Upton, for
respondent.
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