Gage Peters v. Dennis J Quakenbush, II

FILED

Jun 19 2025, 10:01 am

CLERK

Indiana Supreme Court

Court of Appeals

and Tax Court

IN THE

Indiana Supreme Court

Supreme Court Case No. 25S-PL-152

Gage Peters,

Appellant (Plaintiff below)

–v–

Dennis J. Quakenbush, II, in his official capacity as

Hamilton County Sheriff, and Lloyd Arnold, in his

official capacity as Commissioner of the Indiana

Department of Correction

Appellees (Defendants below)

Argued: February 12, 2025 | Decided: June 19, 2025

Appeal from the Hamilton Superior Court

No. 29D03-2308-PL-7853

The Honorable William J. Hughes, Judge

The Honorable Andrew R. Bloch, Magistrate

On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals

No. 24A-PL-405

Opinion by Justice Goff

Chief Justice Rush and Justice Massa concur.

Justice Molter concurs in part and in the judgment with separate opinion.

Justice Slaughter concurs in the judgment with separate opinion.

Goff, Justice.

The Indiana Sex Offender Registration Act (or SORA) requires a person

to register with local law enforcement if that person is a “sex or violent

offender” who resides, works, or attends school in Indiana.1 A “sex or

violent offender” includes a person “required to register as a sex or violent

offender in any jurisdiction.”2 A person meeting that definition must

“register for the period required by the other jurisdiction or the period

described in” code section 11-8-8-19, “whichever is longer.”3 The question

here is whether such a person must register for the period required by the

other jurisdiction even though they committed no offense in the other

jurisdiction that imposed the triggering registration requirement. We

answer that question in the affirmative. But because the plaintiff here is

not currently required to register in another jurisdiction, we hold that he

need not currently register as a sex or violent offender in Indiana. We thus

reverse the trial court and remand for entry of summary judgment in

plaintiff’s favor.

Facts and Procedural History

In October 2013, Gage Peters stood convicted of criminal sexual abuse

in the State of Illinois. This conviction came with a ten-year sex-offender-

registration requirement in that state—a period beginning on October 15,

1 Ind. Code § 11-8-8-7(a).

2 I.C. § 11-8-8-5(b)(1).

3 I.C. § 11-8-8-19(f).

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2013. In August 2016, Peters moved to Indiana and complied with his

duty to register here. Soon after he settled in the state, the Department of

Correction advised Peters of his ten-year registration requirement under

the SORA. This obligation, the Department added, was “subject to

modification” should registration requirements change. App. Vol. 2, p. 18.

From September 28 through October 4, 2021, after he had moved back

to Illinois in January of that year, Peters vacationed in the State of Florida.

Florida requires a sex offender to register in that state if they take up

“temporary residence” for a period of three days or more. Fla. Stat. Ann. §

775.21(2)(n) (West 2024); id. § 775.21(6). In compliance with this law, Peters

signed a “Notice of Sexual Predator and Sexual Offender Obligations”

form in which he agreed to “maintain registration for the duration of [his]

life.” App. Vol. 2, pp. 21, 23 (citing Fla. Stat. § 943.0435(11); id. §

775.21(6)(l)). The form also advised Peters that his registration would be

published on the state’s sexual-offender website. Id. at 23. A search of that

site today lists Peters’ legal status as “Released – Subject to Registration,”

which means that Peters is “[n]o longer under any form of confinement,

supervision or any other court imposed sanction” but is “[s]till required to

register in accordance with Florida law.”4 After his vacation, Peters

returned to Illinois and continued with the requirements of his

registration there.

In May 2022, Peters moved back to Indiana and registered with the

Hamilton County Sheriff’s Department. That office’s “Sex or Violent

Offender Registration Form” initially listed the end date for Peters’

registration obligation as October 15, 2023. Id. at 28–29. But in February of

that year, the sheriff’s department notified Peters that he had to register as

a lifetime sex offender “due to the State of Florida registration laws when

[he] resided there” during his vacation. Id. at 35. In response, Peters sued

for declaratory judgment against the Hamilton County Sheriff and the

Department of Correction (collectively, the State), seeking relief from the

4Florida Department of Law Enforcement, Sexual Offenders and Predators Search,

https://offender.fdle.state.fl.us (last visited June 19, 2025).

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change in his registration requirement. The State moved for summary

judgment (converted from a motion to dismiss), which the trial court

granted after finding no issue of material fact as to whether Peters “is

required to register for life in the state of Indiana because he is required to

do so in the state of Florida.” Id. at 134.

In a split opinion, the Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that “the

plain language” of code subsection 11-8-8-19(f) (or the Jurisdiction Statute)

“compels registration for individuals with out-of-state registration

obligations regardless of the source of those obligations.” Peters v.

Quakenbush, 243 N.E.3d 1145, 1151 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024). In so holding, the

majority expressly disagreed with and declined to follow the decision in

Marroquin v. Reagle. Id. at 1149; see 228 N.E.3d 1149, 1150–51 (Ind. Ct. App.

2024), trans. denied. And in rejecting Peters’ claim that his departure from

Florida relieved him of his obligations there, the majority pointed to his

subject-to-registration status on Florida’s sex-offender website, adding

that, it matters not whether he needs to report in person there. Peters, 243

N.E.3d at 1151.

Concurring in result, Judge Bailey agreed with the court’s plain reading

of the Jurisdiction Statute but lamented “the lack of any constraint upon

blanket enforcement in this State regardless of where the crime originated

and how onerous the subsequent reporting requirements are.” Id. at 1152.

In dissent, Judge Mathias would have “adopt[ed] the reasoning set out in

Marroquin” to find the Jurisdiction Statute inapplicable when there’s “no

independent requirement to register” in the other jurisdiction. Id. (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted). Stressing Judge Bailey’s

observation that the Jurisdiction Statute places the court “in the position of

imposing a lifetime requirement of registration for conduct that is twice

removed from this jurisdiction,” Judge Mathias—invoking the absurdity

doctrine—concluded that the legislature could not have intended the

result here “based on a one-week vacation” in another state. Id. at 1152–53.

Peters petitioned for transfer, which we now grant, vacating the Court

of Appeals decision. See Ind. Appellate Rule 58(A).

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Standard of Review

When reviewing a summary-judgment ruling, this Court applies the

same standard as the trial court: summary judgment is appropriate only

when the evidence shows no genuine issue of material fact and the

moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Ballard v. Lewis, 8

N.E.3d 190, 193 (Ind. 2014). When, like here, a challenge to the summary-

judgment ruling presents only questions of statutory interpretation, we

review those issues de novo. Id.

Discussion and Decision

During the early to mid-1990s, several states enacted registry and

community-notification laws designed to protect the public from the

danger and propensity for recidivism of convicted sex offenders. Daniel

M. Filler, Making the Case for Megan’s Law: A Study in Legislative Rhetoric, 76

Ind. L.J. 315, 316–17 (2001). Indiana was no exception. And in 1994, the

General Assembly adopted “Zachary’s Law,” requiring a person

convicted of certain sex offenses to register in the state as a “sex

offender.”5 Wallace v. State, 905 N.E.2d 371, 374–75 (Ind. 2009); see Pub. L.

No. 11-1994, § 7, 1994 Ind. Acts 301, 307–10 (codified as amended at I.C. §§

11-8-8-0.2 through -23).

Since its inception, the SORA has undergone several amendments.

Under the law today, a person must “register”—i.e., “report in person” to

local law enforcement—if that person is a “sex or violent offender” who

(1) “resides in” the state, (2) works or intends to work in the state, or (3)

attends school or plans to attend school in the state. I.C. § 11-8-8-4; I.C. §

11-8-8-7(a). A “sex or violent offender” refers to a person convicted of one

of several enumerated Indiana offenses (including various sexual crimes)

5For extended background on the adoption of the Indiana Sex Offender Registration Act,

along with a summary of subsequent amendments to the Act, see Wallace v. State, 905 N.E.2d

371, 374–77 (Ind. 2009).

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or a “substantially similar offense committed in another jurisdiction.” I.C.

§ 11-8-8-5(a); I.C. § 1-1-2-4(b)(3). See also I.C. § 11-8-8-4.5(a) (setting forth

an analogous definition for a “sex offender”). The term also includes a

“person who is required to register as a sex or violent offender in any

jurisdiction.” I.C. § 11-8-8-5(b)(1). See also I.C. § 11-8-8-4.5(b)(1) (defining a

“sex offender” to include a “person who is required to register as a sex

offender in any jurisdiction”).

If a person “is required to register as a sex or violent offender in any

jurisdiction,” that person must “register for the period required by the

other jurisdiction or the period described in this section, whichever is

longer.” I.C. § 11-8-8-19(f). By imposing such a requirement, “Indiana

avoids becoming a safe haven for offenders attempting to evade their

obligation.” Tyson v. State, 51 N.E.3d 88, 96 (Ind. 2016). The parties here

dispute whether this requirement applies to a person residing, working,

or attending school in Indiana even though that person committed no

offense in the other jurisdiction that imposed the triggering registration

requirement. In Part I of our opinion, we conclude that it does. But

whether the Jurisdiction Statute applies to Peters is another question. In

Part II, we hold that, because Peters is not currently required to register in

another jurisdiction, the Jurisdiction Statute does not apply to him.

I. The Jurisdiction Statute applies to a person with

out-of-state-registration obligations, regardless of

the source of those obligations.

Peters argues that the Jurisdiction Statute does not apply to him

“because he has no independent requirement to register under Florida

law.” Appellant’s Br. at 9. In support of this proposition, Peters relies on

the Court of Appeals’ decision in Marroquin. Id. at 16–17. The defendant in

that case had been convicted of Class D felony sexual misconduct with a

minor, an offense that did not (and still does not) require him to register

as a sex offender in Indiana. 228 N.E.3d at 1150 & n.1. After moving to

Virginia, that state required him to register there for ten years—later

amended to lifetime registration—based on the Indiana conviction. Id.

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When the defendant moved back to Indiana, the sheriff informed him that

the Jurisdiction Statute required him to register in Indiana for life, just as

Virginia had required of him. Id. The defendant sued, arguing that the

Jurisdiction Statute “doesn’t apply when the requirement to register in

another jurisdiction is based entirely on the existence of an Indiana

conviction—that is, when there is no ‘independent requirement’ to

register in another jurisdiction.” Id. at 1151 (citation omitted). The Court of

Appeals agreed, reasoning that the purpose of the Jurisdiction Statute “is

to ensure that a person who is required to register in another jurisdiction

because of a sex offense in that jurisdiction cannot avoid registration by

moving to Indiana.” Id. (emphasis added).

The Court of Appeals’ majority here declined to follow Marroquin,

explaining that “the plain language” of the Jurisdiction Statute “compels

registration for individuals with out-of-state registration obligations

regardless of the source of those obligations.” Peters, 243 N.E.3d at 1151.

We agree. And, though we deny transfer today in Marroquin, we expressly

disavow the court’s reasoning in that case. Indeed, the Jurisdiction Statute

says nothing of the crime’s location; rather, its plain text refers to “any

jurisdiction,” not “another jurisdiction,” as the Marroquin court interpreted

it. See I.C. § 11-8-8-19(f) (emphasis added). And as this Court stressed in

State v. Zerbe, it’s “not [the offender’s] crime that triggers his obligation to

register as a sex offender in Indiana; rather, it is [the other state’s] registry

requirement that does so.” 50 N.E.3d 368, 370 (Ind. 2016).

Our conclusion here notwithstanding, we must still decide whether the

State of Florida requires Peters to register there as a sex offender and,

thus, whether the Jurisdiction Statute applies to him. For the reasons

below, we conclude that it does not.

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II. Because Peters need not currently register in

Florida, the Jurisdiction Statute does not apply to

him.

To reiterate, when a person in Indiana “is required to register as a sex

or violent offender in any jurisdiction,” the Jurisdiction Statute requires

that person to “register for the period required by the other jurisdiction or

the period described in this section, whichever is longer.” I.C. § 11-8-8-

19(f). Peters argues that, because the Jurisdiction Statute is “written in the

present tense,” it “applies only to people who presently have a duty to

register in any other jurisdiction.” Appellant’s Br. at 17. So, once he left

Florida, he insists, he no longer had a duty to register there “because he no

longer maintains a temporary residence there.” Pet. to Trans. at 10. Peters

admits that Florida maintains—and has no obligation to remove—his

public profile from its online sex-offender registry. Appellant’s Br. at 15.

But he distinguishes a “state’s obligation to notify the community of

registrants in the state” from an offender’s “duty to register” in that state.

Id. at 13.

For its part, the State acknowledges that Peters “might not have to

update his information personally in Florida while living and remaining

in Indiana.” Resp. to Pet. to Trans. at 16. But the duty to personally

“update registration information,” the State submits, is “the only

obligation terminated” by leaving the State of Florida, “not the duty to

register.” Id. at 17. A “sex offender’s registration requirement does not

terminate when that offender moves to another jurisdiction,” the State

contends, so “Peters has a continuing obligation to register in Florida.” Id.

at 6, 11.

Based on our reading of the applicable statutes and pertinent case law,

we agree with Peters.

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A. Under the applicable Florida statute, the registration

obligations of a former Florida resident effectively

lapse, with no requirement to “reregister.”

Florida requires a sexual offender to report in person for “initial

registration” at a local sheriff’s office within forty-eight hours after

establishing permanent or temporary residence in that state. Fla. Stat.

Ann. § 943.0435(2)(a). At that “initial registration,” the offender must

report, among other things, his “address of permanent or legal residence

or address of any current temporary residence, within this state or out of

state.” Id. § 943.0435(2)(b). Beyond this “initial registration” obligation,

Florida requires a sexual offender to “report in person each year” at

specified times “to the sheriff’s office in the county in which he or she

resides or is otherwise located to reregister.” Id. § 943.0435(14)(a) (emphasis

added). Whether this “reregistration” mandate applies to Peters is a

decisive question. We conclude that it does not.

Florida defines a “sexual offender” (as relevant to the circumstances

here) as a person who “establishes or maintains a residence” in that state,

who has been designated as “any” type of sexual offender “in another

state or jurisdiction,” and who was or would be (if still living there)

“subjected to” the registration and reporting requirements in that other

state or jurisdiction.6 Id. § 943.0435(1)(h)1.b. When he returned to his home

in Illinois (and ultimately settled in Indiana), Peters no longer established or

maintained a residence in the State of Florida. And because he was no longer

a “sexual offender” in Florida, as that state defines the term, the

reregistration requirement no longer applied to him.

6 Florida also defines a “sexual offender” as a person who’s been convicted of a criminal

offense or adjudicated of a delinquent act “in another jurisdiction” that is “similar” to one of

several specific offenses proscribed by Florida statute. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 943.0435(1)(h)1.a, c, d.

The record here informs us that Peters was convicted in Illinois of “Criminal Sexual

Abuse/Force,” a misdemeanor offense. App. Vol. 2, p. 18. But the lack of further information

(e.g., a statutory citation) prevents us from determining whether the offense for which he was

convicted in Illinois is “similar” to one of the listed Florida offenses.

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Our reading of this definition harmonizes with Florida’s statutory

procedure for a “sexual offender who intends to establish a permanent . . .

residence in another state or jurisdiction.” Id. § 943.0435(7). In those

circumstances, the soon-to-be-out-of-state offender must “report in

person” to the local sheriff’s office to provide an address of “intended

residence” so that the sheriff can properly notify the other state of the

“offender’s intended residence.” Id. There is no requirement that the soon-

to-be-out-of-state offender “reregister.” Nor is there any requirement that

the offender, once he’s established an out-of-state permanent residence,

update the local sheriff’s department in Florida with any subsequent out-

of-state address changes—or any life changes for that matter (e.g., name,

hair color, tattoos, or other identifying marks).

In short, while establishing an out-of-state permanent residence does

not “de-register” the offender in Florida, as the State characterizes it, see

Appellees’ Br. at 26, the former Florida resident’s registration obligations

effectively lapse, with no requirement to “reregister.” The offender need

only “reregister” in Florida if he later returns there to take up residence—

whether permanent or temporary—for three or more days. See Fla. Stat.

Ann. § 943.0435(14); id. § 775.21(2)(k), (n).

Our reading of the Florida statute finds support in two cases cited by

the State for the opposite conclusion: Lindsey v. Swearingen, 582 F. Supp. 3d

1127 (N.D. Fla. 2022), and McGroarty v. Swearingen, 977 F.3d 1302 (11th Cir.

2020). In Lindsey, the Federal District Court for the Northern District of

Florida addressed “whether Florida may keep the individual’s Florida

registration publicly available after the individual moves out of Florida.”

582 F. Supp. 3d at 1128. The court ultimately held “that the United States

Constitution does not require Florida to purge its otherwise-public

registration records just because an offender has left the state.” Id. at 1131

(emphasis omitted). Critically, though, the court acknowledged that,

while “the prior Florida registration, including information provided

before his departure from Florida, remains publicly available,” an

offender “is no longer required to update his Florida sex-offender registration”

upon moving from the state. Id. at 1128 (emphasis added). In McGroarty,

the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals made a similar observation,

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declaring that, while an out-of-state offender’s information is subject to

“continued display” on “Florida’s sex offender registry website,” the

offender himself “has no continuing registration requirements” once he’s

moved from Florida. 977 F.3d at 1307 (emphasis added).

We find further support for our conclusion in Nichols v. United States,

578 U.S. 104 (2016). The defendant in that case, a convicted sex offender

under federal law, moved to the Philippines without notifying Kansas

authorities of his change in residence. Id. at 105. At the time, the federal

Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA) required an

offender to “register, and keep the registration current, in each jurisdiction

where the offender resides.” Id. at 107. Any change in residence required

the offender, within three days, to “appear in person in at least [one]

jurisdiction involved” and to “inform that jurisdiction” of the change. Id.

(emphasis omitted). The question before the United States Supreme Court

was whether “the State a sex offender leaves—that is, the State where he

formerly resided—qualifies as an ‘involved’ jurisdiction.” Id. (citation

omitted). The Supreme Court answered that question in the negative,

holding that the former state of residence (Kansas) was not an “involved”

jurisdiction. Id. at 109. In so holding, the Court stressed the SORNA’s use

of “the present tense” in requiring the offender to maintain his registration

in the place he “resides.” Id. “A person who moves from Leavenworth to

Manila no longer ‘resides’ (present tense) in Kansas,” the Court explained,

adding that, “although he once resided in Kansas, after his move he

‘resides’ in the Philippines.” Id. Notably, the Court rejected the

government’s argument that “once an offender registers in a jurisdiction,

that jurisdiction necessarily remains involved” simply “because the

offender continues to appear on its registry as a current resident.” Id. at

110 (internal quotation marks omitted).

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B. Even if it could be interpreted as imposing an ongoing

obligation, the Florida statute requires no in-person

registration for permanent out-of-state offenders,

rendering the Jurisdiction Statute inapplicable.

To reiterate once again, the Jurisdiction Statute requires a person to

register as a sex offender in Indiana for a specified period when he or she

“is required to register as a sex or violent offender in any jurisdiction.” I.C.

§ 11-8-8-19(f). The SORA defines the term “register” as reporting certain

information “in person” to a local law-enforcement authority. I.C. § 11-8-

8-4. The concurrence would prefer to resolve this case based on this

statutory definition alone—a purportedly “simpler, narrower approach”

than the “needlessly circuitous” path of deciding a “thorny issue of

Florida law.” Post, at 1, 3. But to reach the conclusion that “Peters need not

report ‘in person’ in Florida,” see id. at 2, one can’t simply rely on Indiana

law alone, as the concurrence tacitly acknowledges, see id. (analyzing

Florida statutes). To the contrary, we must first determine whether Florida

imposes an in-person registration requirement on its permanent out-of-

state offenders. It does not. In fact, an offender must report “in person” in

Florida only in the following circumstances: (1) for the initial registration;7

(2) when he or she intends to vacate a Florida residence;8 (3) every thirty

days while the offender maintains a transient residence;9 (4) when the

offender intends to establish a permanent, temporary, or transient

residence in another state;10 and (5) when the offender is required to

“reregister.”11

The concurrence further reasons that Indiana’s definition of “register”

suffices to resolve this case because Peters “need not provide Florida”

7 Fla. Stat. Ann. § 943.0435(2)(a).

8 Id. § 943.0435(4)(b)1.

9 Id. § 943.0435(4)(b)2.

10 Id. § 943.0435(7).

11 Id. § 943.0435(14)(a).

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with the “Indiana-specific information” required under the statute. Post, at

1, 2; see I.C. § 11-8-8-4 (citing I.C. § 11-8-8-8). But the information an

offender must report under code section 11-8-8-8 is not necessarily

“Indiana-specific.” Compare I.C. § 11-8-8-8(a) (requiring offender to report,

among other things, name, date of birth, sex, race, height, weight, hair

color, eye color, a description of the offense for which they stand

convicted, email addresses, and social-media profiles), with Fla. Stat. Ann.

§ 943.0435(2)(b), and id. § 943.0435(14)(c)(1) (requiring offender to report

substantially similar information).

To the extent that code section 11-8-8-8 enumerates specific reporting

requirements that Florida does not explicitly require of an offender, see

post, at 2, the Florida statute contains a catch-all provision that could very

well encompass that information, see Fla. Stat. Ann. § 943.0435(2)(c)

(requiring the offender to report on “any other information determined

necessary” by law enforcement). What’s more, Indiana’s SORA contains

the means to facilitate the exchange of such information between

jurisdictions. See, e.g., I.C. § 11-8-8-20(a) (allowing law enforcement to

“enter into a compact or agreement with one (1) or more jurisdictions

outside Indiana to exchange notifications”); I.C. § 11-8-8-7(j) (requiring

local law enforcement, upon an offender’s registration, to update the

national Sex Offender Registry database and to “notify every law

enforcement agency having jurisdiction in the county where the sex or

violent offender resides”).12

12The concurring opinion also seems to overlook code subsection 11-8-8-8(a)(3), which

requires an out-of-state offender who temporarily resides, works, or attends school in Indiana

to report the name and address of his or her employer and school campus, along with the

address where he or she “stays or intends to stay while in Indiana.” I.C. § 11-8-8-8(a)(3).

Florida residents (and presumably residents from most other jurisdictions) who fall into this

category must still register in person in that state. See Fla. Stat. Ann. § 943.0435(14)(a). But the

theory set forth by the concurring opinion would exempt these persons—at least those with a

criminal history similar to Peters’—from registering here during their temporary stay because

Indiana requires information that Florida expressly does not.

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In short, even if it could be interpreted as imposing an ongoing

obligation,13 the Florida statute does not require in-person registration for

permanent out-of-state offenders (like Peters), thus rendering the

Jurisdiction Statute inapplicable.14

Conclusion

For the reasons above, we hold that the Jurisdiction Statute applies to a

person with out-of-state-registration obligations, regardless of the source

of those obligations. But because Peters is not currently required to register

in Florida, we hold that the Jurisdiction Statute does not apply to him. We

thus reverse the trial court and remand for entry of summary judgment in

Peters’ favor.

Rush, C.J., and Massa, J., concur.

Molter, J., concurs in part and in the judgment with separate

13 See Fla. Stat. Ann. § 943.0435(11) (stating that a “sexual offender shall maintain registration

with the department for the duration of his or her life unless the sexual offender has received

a full pardon or has had a conviction set aside in a postconviction proceeding”). The

concurrence points to this provision to question our “conclusion that Peters is no longer a

sexual offender under Florida law.” Post, at 4. But even if Peters’ “absence from Florida does

not change his status as a ‘sexual offender’ there,” see id. at 3 (emphasis added), nothing in the

statute suggests that he has an “ongoing registration obligation there after leaving the state,”

see id. at 2. And even if there were such an obligation, the concurrence’s extended analysis of

this statute arguably follows the same “needlessly circuitous” path that we travelled. See id. at

3.

14Of course, this conclusion begs the question: what’s the purpose of the Jurisdiction Statute if

most states are like Florida in that they impose no “in person” registration requirement on

offenders who no longer live in the state? It seems the Jurisdiction Statute would still apply to

transient Indiana residents who have homes in this state and another state or who live in this

state and work, go to school, or vacation in another state. Indeed, Indiana law expressly

contemplates such scenarios. See I.C. § 11-8-8-7(a) (defining residency for sex offenders to

include a person who spends at least seven days in the state, “owns real property in Indiana

and returns to Indiana at any time,” or who works in the state for a total period exceeding

fourteen days).

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opinion.

Slaughter, J., concurs in the judgment with separate opinion.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Cara Schaefer Wieneke

Brooklyn, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES

Theodore E. Rokita

Attorney General of Indiana

James A. Barta

Solicitor General of Indiana

David A. Arthur

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

Adam S. Willfond

Assistant County Attorney

Noblesville, Indiana

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Molter, J., concurring in part and in the judgment.

I concur in the judgment and join all but footnotes 12 and 14 of the

Court’s opinion. I write separately to note that recent cases involving what

the Court refers to as the Jurisdiction Statute, Ind. Code § 11-8-8-19(f),

reveal three areas where, without further legislative clarification, courts

may continue to struggle interpreting the statute.

Timing. The Jurisdiction Statute says: “A person who is required to

register as a sex or violent offender in any jurisdiction shall register for the

period required by the other jurisdiction or the period described in this

section, whichever is longer.” Id. (emphasis added). Ambiguity emerges

from the verb tense.

One interpretation is that the statute covers only those who must

continue registering in another state even after they come to live, work, or

study in Indiana. So if someone no longer has to register in another state

because they have moved to Indiana, then they don’t have to register in

Indiana either. That is, they are not someone who is—present tense—

required to register in another jurisdiction.

That is typically how we understand the legislature’s use of the present

tense verb “is.” And that is how footnote 14 of the Court’s opinion

interprets the statute. But as the footnote discussion shows, that

interpretation gives the statute short reach. The statute would cover only

offenders with a dual presence in Indiana and another state, such as

someone who lives, works, or studies in Indiana while working, studying,

or maintaining a second home in another state.

Yet the legislature was aiming much further. As the Court’s opinion

explains, the statute’s purpose is to keep Indiana from becoming a haven

for sex offenders to escape other states’ registration laws. Ante, at 6. So the

General Assembly was even more concerned with an offender’s

registration requirements before they came to Indiana. After all, there are

limits to another state’s power to regulate people after they move here

anyway. See Am. Charities for Reasonable Fundraising Regul., Inc. v. Pinellas

Cnty., 221 F.3d 1211, 1216 (11th Cir. 2000) (“A state’s legislative

jurisdiction is circumscribed by the Due Process Clause: There must be at

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least some minimal contact between a State and the regulated subject

before it can, consistently with the requirements of due process, exercise

legislative jurisdiction.” (quotations omitted)).

That said, it still may be too imprecise to say the legislature was

concerned with other states’ registration requirements any time before an

offender came to live, work, or study in Indiana. As this case illustrates,

offenders may travel through multiple states over time, and the General

Assembly may not wish to impose a registration requirement in Indiana

that parallels the requirements of every state through which the offender

has ever traveled since their conviction. The best understanding, then,

may be that the General Assembly’s concern was the offender’s

registration requirements in another state both after and immediately before

coming to live, work, or study in Indiana. With that view, the Jurisdiction

Statute seems to instruct that whatever an offender’s registration

requirements were immediately before coming to Indiana, those

requirements effectively travel with the offender when they arrive here.

Fortunately for today, we don’t have to choose between these (or other)

competing interpretations because Peters prevails either way. As both the

Court’s and Justice Slaughter’s opinions explain, Peters doesn’t have a

current obligation to register in Florida. He also didn’t have a duty to

register in Florida immediately before moving to Indiana because he

moved here from Illinois, not Florida (and Illinois didn’t impose any

registration requirement immediately before Peters moved to Indiana

either). But there are likely many cases where a registration obligation will

turn on this question of statutory interpretation.

Definition of “Register.” The General Assembly used a single

definition for “register” throughout the Sex Offender Registration chapter,

which is “to report in person to a local law enforcement authority and

provide the information required under” Indiana Code section 11-8-8-8.

I.C. § 11-8-8-4. It certainly makes sense to use the same definition for all

references to Indiana’s registry. But using that same definition for other

states’ registries poses at least three problems.

First, the definition refers only to registering “in person.” Other states

may not require in-person registration.

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Second, the definition says that “register” means reporting in person

“to a local law enforcement authority,” I.C. § 11-8-8-4, which is defined as

“the: (1) chief of police of a consolidated city; or (2) sheriff of a county that

does not contain a consolidated city,” I.C. § 11-8-8-2. Other states may

require offenders to report to someone other than the county sheriff or the

police chief in a consolidated city.

Third, the General Assembly defined “register” to mean providing “the

information required under” Indiana Code section 11-8-8-8, and that

section identifies dozens of specific data points. No doubt, every state’s

registry includes some of section 8’s data points, like name and address.

But other states may not require some other data points, like the vehicle

information Justice Slaughter discusses in his opinion. Post, at 2.

The State argues this ambiguity should be resolved by giving “register”

its colloquial meaning rather than its statutory definition. But while the

State’s proposed interpretation is sensible, it contradicts the General

Assembly’s direction that the statutory definition of “register” applies to

every reference in the sex offender registration chapter, including the

Jurisdiction Statute. I.C. § 11-8-8-4 (defining “register” “[a]s used in this

chapter”). And we typically don’t ignore the General Assembly’s statutory

definitions, especially when that would require us to define the same term

differently in the same part of the Indiana Code. See Allen v. Allen, 54

N.E.3d 344, 347 (Ind. 2016) (“The legislative definition of certain words in

one statute, while not conclusive, is entitled to consideration in construing

those same words in another statute.”).

Indiana Offenses. The Court’s opinion notes that we have denied

transfer but still disavow the reasoning in Marroquin v. Reagle, 228 N.E.3d

1149, 1151 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024). Ante, at 7. “Marroquin was convicted of

Class D felony sexual misconduct with a minor, which is not (and has

never been) a crime that requires sex-offender registration in Indiana.”

Marroquin, 228 N.E.3d at 1149. But then he moved to Virginia, which

imposed a lifetime registration requirement based solely on the Indiana

conviction. Id. at 1150. And when Marroquin moved back to Indiana, the

State claimed that the Jurisdiction Statute required him to register for life

here too. Id. Even though Indiana did not originally require registration,

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the State argued, Marroquin’s travel through Virginia meant that when he

returned to Indiana, Virginia’s lifetime registration obligation based on

the Indiana conviction effectively came back with him.

The Court of Appeals disagreed, holding that the Jurisdiction Statute

doesn’t apply “when the requirement to register in another jurisdiction is

based entirely on the existence of an Indiana conviction.” Id. at 1151. But

our Court agrees with the State that the Marroquin panel mistakenly read

those words into the statute. Ante, at 7. The Court of Appeals panel in this

case reached the same conclusion we do, but it acknowledged this issue

“might be worthy of the legislature’s consideration.” Peters v. Quakenbush,

243 N.E.3d 1145, 1151 n.3 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024).

The Marroquin oral argument in our Court revealed that by disavowing

the Court of Appeals’ panel reasoning here, we might be swapping a

statutory interpretation question for a constitutional interpretation

question. Under the State’s view, two Hoosiers could be convicted of the

same Indiana crime—the offense Marroquin committed—with only one

required to register: the one who moved to a state with more rigorous

registration requirements (like Virginia) before moving back to Indiana.

The Indiana Constitution’s Privileges and Immunities Clause provides

that the “General Assembly shall not grant to any citizen, or class of

citizens, privileges or immunities, which, upon the same terms, shall not

equally belong to all citizens.” Ind. Const. art. 1, § 23. We have understood

the prohibition on unequal privileges to encompass unequal burdens, and

we have understood this to mean that when the legislature treats groups

differently, the distinction it makes between the groups must be related to

the subject matter of the legislation. Collins v. Day, 644 N.E.2d 72, 77–78, 80

(Ind. 1994).

So, for example, Evansville’s smoking ban was unconstitutional

because it applied to bars and restaurants but not riverboat casinos, and

nothing distinguishing riverboat casinos from bars and restaurants relates

to protecting against health risks like lung disease, which is the point of a

smoking ban. Paul Stieler Enters., Inc. v. City of Evansville, 2 N.E.3d 1269,

1275 (Ind. 2014) (“In comparing the disparate treatment (prohibiting and

permitting smoking) to the inherent differences of the two classes

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(whether floating and whether gambling is conducted under the

Riverboat Gambling statutes), the legislative purpose for consideration is

public health, not economic advantage to the City.”). Here, there may be a

question about how the distinction between (a) Hoosiers who relocated to

a state like Virginia (with greater registration requirements for Indiana

convictions) before returning, and (b) Hoosiers who have not left the state,

relates to the subject matter of our sex offender registration laws, which

“protect the public from the danger and propensity for recidivism of

convicted sex offenders.” Ante, at 5. Of course, in a case where the issue is

properly preserved and presented (unlike in Marroquin), the State may

very well be able to demonstrate the propriety of applying the statute to

circumstances like those in Marroquin. But this concern may further

explain why courts are struggling to implement the statute in contexts the

General Assembly likely did not envision when enacting the Jurisdiction

Statute. Cf. Peters, 243 N.E.3d at 1152 (Bailey, J., concurring in result) (“But

I am troubled by the lack of any constraint upon blanket enforcement in

this State regardless of where the crime originated and how onerous the

subsequent reporting requirements are.”).

***

Our courts have been grappling with these and adjacent questions, and

reasonable minds have differed. At the end of the day, though, these are

primarily statutory interpretation questions, and the General Assembly

remains free to revise its statutes to provide more clarity.

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Slaughter, J., concurring in the judgment.

I concur with the Court’s judgment that Peters need not register for life

in Indiana. I write separately to note that I am unable to join the Court’s

opinion, which concludes that Peters is no longer a “sexual offender” un-

der Florida law. The Court decides a question of Florida law I believe to

be unnecessary to resolve this case. I prefer the simpler, narrower ap-

proach of basing our decision on the meaning of “register”, as Indiana’s

statute defines it.

A

Among those who must register as a sex offender in Indiana is any “sex

or violent offender who resides in Indiana”. Ind. Code § 11-8-8-7(a)(1). A

“sex or violent offender” includes “a person who is required to register as

a sex or violent offender in any jurisdiction”. Id. § 11-8-8-5(b)(1). A person

required to register elsewhere under the “any jurisdiction” provision

“shall register for the period required by the other jurisdiction or the pe-

riod described” by Indiana law, “whichever is longer.” Id. § 11-8-8-19(f).

This case turns on whether (and, if so, for how long) Peters “is required to

register” in Florida as Indiana defines “register”. Ibid.

Our legislature has defined what it means to “register” under Indiana’s

statute. “When the General Assembly has defined a statutory term, we are

bound by its definition.” WTHR-TV v. Hamilton Se. Schs., 178 N.E.3d 1187,

1191 (Ind. 2022). Indiana defines “register” thus: “As used in this chapter,

‘register’ means to report in person to a local law enforcement authority

and provide the information required under section 8 of this chapter.”

I.C. § 11-8-8-4 (emphasis added). This definition of “register” has two key

aspects: (1) the offender must report “in person”, and (2) he must provide

all the Indiana-specific information “required under section 8” of Indiana

Code chapter 11-8-8. In other words, “register” requires reporting in per-

son to local law enforcement and providing Indiana-specific information.

The definition’s introductory clause—“As used in this chapter”—

means that “register” has this same meaning throughout the entire sex-

offender-registration statute, including the “any jurisdiction” provision of

section 5(b)(1). Ibid. “The legislature knows how to apply a statutory

definition broadly.” Rainbow Realty Grp., Inc. v. Carter, 131 N.E.3d 168, 174

(Ind. 2019). Indeed, “[e]xamples abound of the legislature’s applying a

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 25S-PL-152 | June 19, 2025 Page 1 of 4

definition throughout the entire code, as well as throughout a title, article,

or chapter.” Ibid. (cleaned up). When the legislature “takes the trouble to

define the terms it uses, a court must respect its definitions as ‘virtually

conclusive.’” Dep’t of Agric. Rural Dev. Rural Hous. Serv. v. Kirtz, 601 U.S.

42, 59 (2024) (quoting Sturgeon v. Frost, 587 U.S. 28, 56 (2019)). Thus, when

our sex-offender registration statute requires a person to “register” in

Indiana if he must “register as a sex or violent offender in any jurisdic-

tion”, I.C. § 11-8-8-5(b)(1), we must apply our legislature’s definition of

what it means to “register”.

I agree with the Court that Peters does not have to “register” in Florida

under Indiana’s definition. Ante, at 12–14 (Part II.B). First, Peters need not

report “in person” in Florida, even assuming he has an ongoing registra-

tion obligation there after leaving the state. As the Court notes, the only

source for an ongoing, in-person registration requirement is Florida’s

“reregistration” provision. Id. at 12 n.11 (citing Fla. Stat. § 943.0435(14)(a)).

This provision requires a registrant to “report in person” several times a

year “in the county in which he or she resides or is otherwise located to

reregister.” Fla. Stat. § 943.0435(14)(a) (emphasis added). This provision

presumes the registrant resides in Florida and directs him to reregister

with the sheriff in his county of residence or location. Ibid. Of course,

Peters does not currently reside in Florida, and he is not currently located

there. Thus, Florida’s reregistration provision does not apply to Peters.

This approach alone resolves the case for Peters. He does not satisfy Indi-

ana’s first element of “register” because he need not report in person in

Florida.

What is more, Peters does not satisfy Indiana’s second element of

“register” because he need not provide Florida with “the information re-

quired under section 8” of our registration statute. As just one example,

Indiana requires registrants to submit information for “any vehicle the sex

or violent offender owns or operates on a regular basis”. I.C. § 11-8-8-

8(a)(1) (emphasis added). Florida, in contrast, requires registrants to sub-

mit information only for “all vehicles owned”. Fla. Stat. § 943.0435(2)(b)

(emphasis added); see id. § 775.21(2)(p) (defining “Vehicles owned”). This

required-information mismatch means registrants like Peters would never

have to provide Florida with all the information “required under section

8” of the Indiana statute.

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This result highlights the problem with the State’s argument against

Peters. Our legislature applies the same, two-prong meaning of “register”

throughout the entire chapter, including the “any jurisdiction” provision

of section 5(b)(1). What follows is the counterintuitive result that Indiana’s

“any jurisdiction” provision does not turn on whether the offender must

register elsewhere under the law of the other jurisdiction. It turns, instead,

on whether the offender must register elsewhere under Indiana’s defini-

tion of register, which does not ask whether the offender is registered or

must register elsewhere under the law of the other jurisdiction. Though

this outcome may not be what our legislature had in mind, the wisdom of

the legislature’s broad definition of “register” is not before us. “If a stat-

ute’s text compels a particular result, judges must not second-guess the

outcome”. State v. Neukam, 189 N.E.3d 152, 155 (Ind. 2022).

Because Peters has no duty to “register” in Florida, as Indiana defines

the term, he has no present duty under section 5(b)(1) to register here at

all, much less a duty to register here for life.

B

The above analysis illustrates how my view of resolving this case

differs from the Court’s. Respectfully, the Court’s approach gives short

shrift to Indiana’s definition of register. And in doing so, the Court de-

cides a thorny issue of Florida law it need not. Though the Court ulti-

mately reaches the right destination, its path is needlessly circuitous. I

prefer a shorter and straighter route—one that avoids having to decide

Peters’s “sexual offender” status under Florida law.

It is far from clear, in any event, that the Court’s analysis of Peters’s

status in Florida is correct. The Court notes Peters’s “sexual offender”

status in Florida is premised on a prior Illinois conviction. Ante, at 9 (cit-

ing Fla. Stat. § 943.0435(1)(h)1.b.). The Court then holds that Peters is no

longer a “sexual offender” because he does not currently live in Florida.

Ibid. But Peters’s absence from Florida does not change his status as a

“sexual offender” there. Florida presumes that “a sexual offender shall

maintain registration with the [Florida Department of Law Enforcement,

Fla. Stat. § 943.02(1)] for the duration of his or her life”, id. § 943.0435(11),

regardless of his residence. Despite this lifetime presumption, the Florida

legislature established one avenue for Peters to remove his designation as

a “sexual offender” in Florida. To remove his Florida status, Peters must

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provide Florida’s law-enforcement department with an order from the

Illinois court that “designated” him as a sexual offender in Illinois. Id. §

943.0435(11)(b). And the Illinois order must state that “such designation

has been removed” there. Ibid. Here, the record contains no evidence that

the Florida department received or acted on such an order from Illinois.

Thus, I see no basis for our Court’s conclusion that Peters is no longer a

sexual offender under Florida law. Ante, at 9.

My point is not that the Court may be misreading or misapplying

Florida law, though I think it is. My point, rather, is that my alternative

path of rooting our analysis in Indiana’s definition of “register” avoids a

messy Florida-law question the parties neither briefed nor argued.

* * *

For these reasons, I concur only in the Court’s judgment.

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