Rijos v. Sanare Energy Partners, LLC

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

CARLOS RIJOS CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS NO. 24-2214

SANARE ENERGY PARTNERS, LLC, ET AL. SECTION “O”

ORDER AND REASONS

Before the Court in this admiralty case is Plaintiff Carlos Rijos’s motion1 to

remand. Rijos was a passenger in a fishing boat that allided with an oil-and-gas

platform owned by Defendant Sanare Energy Partners, LLC and affixed to the outer

Continental Shelf (“OCS”). Rijos sued Sanare and others for negligence in state

court. Sanare in turn removed the case based on the “straightforward and broad,” In

re Deepwater Horizon, 745 F.3d 157, 163 (5th Cir. 2014), jurisdictional grant of the

Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (“OCSLA”), 43 U.S.C. § 1349(b)(1). Rijos now

moves to remand, contending the Court lacks OCSLA jurisdiction. But he is

mistaken. OCSLA jurisdiction obtains where, as here, the dispute arises from an

allision with an on-OCS platform that is or was involved in the exploration,

development, or production of OCS minerals. See Tenn. Gas Pipeline v. Hous. Cas.

Ins. Co., 87 F.3d 150, 154–55 (5th Cir. 1996). Because Tennessee Gas Pipeline compels

the conclusion that this case arises out of or in connection with “any” OCS

“operation,” Section 1349(b)(1)’s “undeniably broad” terms supply subject-matter

jurisdiction. EP Operating Ltd. P’ship v. Placid Oil Co., 26 F.3d 563, 569 (5th Cir.

1994). Accordingly, for these reasons and those that follow, the motion is DENIED.

1 ECF No. 9.

I. BACKGROUND

This admiralty case arises from an allision between a sport-fishing vessel in

which Carlos Rijos was riding as a passenger and an oil-and-gas platform in the Gulf

of Mexico owned by Sanare and permanently affixed to the OCS.2

The facts material to Rijos’s motion to remand are straightforward and few.

Rijos was a passenger aboard a sport-fishing vessel owned by Linedout Pro Fishing,

LLC and operated by Gerald Mitchell Mosely.3 Early one morning, the vessel left a

marina in Cocodrie, Louisiana to participate in a fishing tournament off the coast of

Louisiana.4 Later that same morning, the vessel allided with an unmarked, unlit

platform in the Gulf of Mexico.5 The platform was owned by Sanare, an oil-and-gas

exploration and production company,6 and permanently affixed to the OCS.7

Claiming “serious injuries,” Rijos brought an admiralty-and-maritime claim

against Sanare, Linedout Pro Fishing, and Mosely in Louisiana state court.8 He

alleges that Sanare was negligent or negligent per se in these ways (among others)—

• “Creat[ing] . . . an unreasonably dangerous condition on the platform

in question;”9

2 See generally ECF No. 3-2.

3 Id. at ¶¶ VIII–IX. The other passenger in the sport-fishing vessel that morning, Claude

Royster, allegedly ejected from the vessel and died as a result of the allision. See Complaint at ¶ 8,

Royster v. Sanare Energy Partners, Inc., No. 24-CV-1627 (E.D. La. June 26, 2024), ECF No. 1. Royster’s

widow brought a separate wrongful-death suit in this Court against Sanare, Linedout Pro Fishing,

and Mosely, invoking OCSLA jurisdiction over her cause of action against Sanare. See id. at ¶ 12. A

third case arising from the same allision was recently removed to this Court. See Notice of Removal,

Royster v. Sanare Energy Partners, LLC, No. 25-CV-968 (E.D. La. May 14, 2025), ECF No. 1.

4 ECF No. 3-2 at ¶ IX.

5 Id. at ¶ X.

6 Id. at ¶¶ III & X.

7 ECF No. 3-3 at ¶ 5.

8 ECF No. 3-2 at ¶ X.

9 Id. at ¶ XI(h).

• “Failing to properly light the platform as required by law;”10

• “Failing to have the sufficient number and type of aids to navigation

on the platform;”11

• “Failing to equip the platform with proper fog horns;”12

• “Failing to mark the platform on the relevant [National Oceanic and

Atmospheric Administration] paper or electronic charts;”13

• “Failing to comply with its obligations to maintain, inspect and

ensure working aids to navigation” under federal regulations;14

• “Failing to comply with permits issued by the Army Corps of

Engineers;”15

• “Failing to eliminate the known unreasonably dangerous condition(s)

on the platform in question;”16 and

• “Violat[ing] numerous industry standards, federal statutes and/or

regulations including but not limited to failing to properly mark its

platform on the relevant navigational charts and failure to equip the

platform with the proper and required Aids to Navigation as required

by” federal regulations.17

Rijos also invoked the Saving to Suitors Clause of the jurisdictional statute

governing admiralty-and-maritime claims.18 See 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1). Because Rijos

invoked the Saving to Suitors Clause, this case may not be removed based on

admiralty-and-maritime jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1); it “may only be

removed when original jurisdiction is based on another jurisdictional grant,” like

10 Id. at ¶ XI(i).

11 Id. at ¶ XI(j).

12 Id. at ¶ XI(k).

13 Id. at ¶ XI(l).

14 Id. at ¶ XI(m).

15 Id. at ¶ XI(n).

16 Id. at ¶ XI(o).

17 Id. at ¶ XII.

18 Id. at ¶ V.

OCSLA jurisdiction under Section 1349(b)(1). Barker v. Hercules Offshore, Inc., 713

F.3d 208, 219 (5th Cir. 2013) (citing In re Dutile, 935 F.2d 61, 63 (5th Cir. 1991)).

Sanare timely removed the case to this Court, invoking original jurisdiction

under only Section 1349(b)(1) of OCSLA.19 See 43 U.S.C. § 1349(b)(1). The notice of

removal asserts that the Court has OCSLA jurisdiction under Section 1349(b)(1)

because the case arises from Sanare’s oil-and-gas drilling operations on the OCS.20

Rijos now moves to remand.21 Sanare opposes.22

II. ANALYSIS

Rijos moves the Court to remand this allision case to state court because he

says the Court lacks OCSLA jurisdiction. Sanare rejoins that the Court has OCSLA

jurisdiction because the case arises out of or in connection with any on-OCS oil-and-

gas operation. See 43 U.S.C. § 1349(b)(1)(A). The Court agrees.

Sanare may remove a case from state court to this Court if this Court would

have original jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). As the removing party, Sanare

“bears the burden of showing that federal jurisdiction exists and that removal was

proper.” Manguno v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 276 F.3d 720, 723 (5th Cir.

2002) (citations omitted). “The removal statute is strictly construed, with doubts

‘resolved in favor of remand.’” Pace v. Cirrus Design Corp., 93 F.4th 879, 888–89 (5th

Cir. 2024) (quoting Gutierrez v. Flores, 543 F.3d 248, 251 (5th Cir. 2008)).

19 ECF No. 3.

20 Id. at ¶ 16.

21 ECF No. 9.

22 ECF No. 10.

The basis for original jurisdiction is Section 1349(b)(1) of OCSLA. See 43

U.S.C. § 1349(b)(1). Congress passed OCSLA “to establish federal ownership and

control over the mineral wealth of the OCS and to provide for the development of

those natural resources.” EP Operating, 26 F.3d at 566 (citation omitted). “Congress

intended for the judicial power of the United States to be extended to the entire range

of legal disputes that it knew would arise relating to resource development on the

[OCS].’” Id. at 569 (quotation omited). Consistent with congressional intent, OCSLA

has a “broadly worded grant of original jurisdiction,” id. at 567, in Section 1349(b)(1):

[T]he district courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction of cases

and controversies arising out of, or in connection with . . . any operation

conducted on the [OCS] which involves exploration, development, or

production of the minerals, of the subsoil and seabed of the [OCS], or

which involves rights to such minerals . . . .

43 U.S.C. § 1349(b)(1)(A).

Section 1349(b)(1) uses “undeniably broad” terms. EP Operating, 26 F.3d at

569.23 One of them, “operation,” is not defined in OCSLA, but the Fifth Circuit has

interpreted it broadly to include both “the doing of some physical act on the OCS”

and “the cessation of physical acts” on the OCS. Id. at 567. (citation omitted). Under

23 The Fifth Circuit has underscored the breadth of OCSLA’s jurisdictional grant under

Section 1349(b)(1) again-and-again in published opinions that span almost three decades. See, e.g., In

re Deepwater Horizon, 745 F.3d at 163 (describing OCSLA’s jurisdictional grant as “straightforward

and broad” (citation omitted)); Petrobras Am., Inc. v. Vicinay Cadenas, S.A., 815 F.3d 211, 215 (5th

Cir. 2016) (OCSLA’s jurisdictional grant “is straightforward and broad.” (quotation and citation

omitted)); Barker, 713 F.3d at 213 (“The jurisdictional grant in OCSLA is broad, covering a wide

range of activity occurring beyond the territorial waters of the states.” (quotation omitted)); Total E &

P USA Inc. v. Kerr-McGee Oil & Gas Corp., 719 F.3d 424, n.5 (5th Cir. 2013) (Section 1349(b)(1) is a

“broad jurisdictional grant . . . .” (citations omitted)); Tenn. Gas Pipeline, 87 F.3d at 154 (OCSLA’s

jurisdictional grant “is very broad.”); EP Operating, 26 F.3d at 569 (“[A] broad reading of the

jurisdictional grant of [OCSLA] is supported by the expansive substantive reach of the OCSLA.”);

Recar v. CNG Producing Co., 853 F.2d 367, 369 (5th Cir. 1988) (“The reach of OCSLA is broad . . . .”).

the Fifth Circuit’s “broad view of the term,” an “operation” does not require “current

activity on the facilities erected on the OCS.” Id. at 568. It is enough to qualify as an

“operation” if “offshore facilities were erected on the OCS, they were used to

transport minerals in the past, they may be used to transport minerals in the future,

and they will eventually have to be removed pursuant to federal regulations.” Id.

The terms “exploration,” “development,” and “production” in Section 1349(b)(1)

are “defined broadly in the statutes to encompass the full range of oil and gas

activity[,] from locating mineral resources through the construction, operation,

servicing[,] and maintenance of facilities to produce those resources.” Id. at 568

(footnote omitted); see also 43 U.S.C. § 1331(k) (defining “exploration”); 43 U.S.C.

§ 1331(l) (defining “development”); 43 U.S.C. § 1331(m) (defining “production”).

The phrase “arising out of, or in connection with” in Section 1349(b)(1) is

“undeniably broad in scope.” EP Operating, 26 F.3d at 569. Because “arising out of”

and “in connection with” are not defined in OCSLA, the Court gives those terms their

ordinary meaning. See Taniguchi v. Kan Pac. Saipan, Ltd., 566 U.S. 560, 566 (2012)

(“When a term goes undefined in a statute, we give the term its ordinary meaning.”).

“Arising out of” ordinarily means “originating from, having its origin in, growing out

of or flowing from, or in short, incident to, or having connection with.” Hamilton v.

United Healthcare of La., Inc., 310 F.3d 385, 391 (5th Cir. 2002) (brackets, quotation,

and citation omitted). And “connection” ordinarily means a “relationship or

association in thought (as of cause and effect, logical sequence, mutual dependence

or involvement)[;]” “[t]he condition of being related to something else by a bond of

interdependence, causality, logical sequence, coherence, or the like[;]” or a “relation

between things one of which is bound up with, or involved in, another.” United States

v. Am. Com. Lines, L.L.C., 875 F.3d 170, 175 (5th Cir. 2017) (citations omitted).

The Fifth Circuit has found Section 1349(b)(1)’s “arising out of, or in connection

with” test met in a “broad range of legal disputes.” EP Operating, 26 F.3d at 569. In

EP Operating, for example, a panel reversed a district court’s Rule 12(b)(1) dismissal

of a partition suit to determine ownership rights to on-OCS property and held that

OCSLA jurisdiction obtained over the suit. Id. at 570. Although there was “no

current production from the offshore facilities involved,” id. at 568, and the partition

suit did not “involve actions on the OCS,” id. at 569, the panel still held that the suit

was “sufficiently connected with the operation of those offshore facilities to come

within the broad phrase ‘arising out of, or in connection with.’” Id. (quoting 43 U.S.C.

§ 1349(b)(1)(A)). The panel reasoned that Section 1349(b)(1)’s test was met because

resolving the ownership rights would facilitate the reuse, sale, or salvage of offshore

facilities, which would in turn “affect the efficient exploitation of resources from the

OCS and/or threaten the total recovery of federally-owned resources.” Id. at 570.

The Fifth Circuit has found Section 1349(b)(1)’s test met in other cases “one

step removed from the actual transfer of minerals to the shore.” United Offshore Co.

v. S. Deepwater Pipeline Co., 899 F.2d 405, 406–07 (5th Cir. 1990). For example, one

panel called it “clear” that OCSLA jurisdiction obtained over “a contractual dispute

over the control of an entity which operates a gas pipeline.” Id. at 407. Another panel

held that a contract dispute involving the building of a platform on the OCS was

“squarely encompass[ed]” by Section 1349(b)(1)’s broad language. Laredo Offshore

Constructors, Inc. v. Hunt Oil Co., 754 F.2d 1223, 1227 (5th Cir. 1985). And a third

panel more recently held that a suit to recover penalties under a Louisiana wildlife

statute satisfied Section 1349(b)(1)’s “arising out of, or in connection with” test

because “the oil and other contaminants would not have entered into the State of

Louisiana’s territorial waters but for [the] drilling and exploration operation on the

OCS.” Deepwater Horizon, 745 F.3d at 163–64 (quotation omitted). In so holding, the

Deepwater Horizon panel emphasized that Section 1349(b) requires “only a ‘but-for’

connection” between the lawsuit and the OCS operation. Id. at 163 (collecting cases).

Most relevant to this allision case, the Fifth Circuit had “no difficulty” holding

that Section 1349(b)(1)’s test was met in a suit arising from a tug’s allision with an

oil-and-gas platform affixed to the OCS. See Tenn. Gas Pipeline, 87 F.3d at 154.

Applying the same but-for test described in Deepwater Horizon, Tennessee Gas

Pipeline held that OCSLA jurisdiction obtained because “there would not have been

an accident had [the platform owner] not built its platform to extract minerals from

the OCS.” Id. at 155. Importantly, the panel upheld OCSLA jurisdiction even though

“the dispute ‘arose out of’ a navigational error, and not an operation on the OCS.” Id.

And the panel rejected as “meritless” the contention that there was no OCSLA

jurisdiction because “the platform itself did nothing to cause the accident, so that the

controversy is not connected with any physical act constituting an operation.” Id.

Applying those precedents here, the Court has “no difficulty” holding that this

case comes within Section 1349(b)(1)’s “very broad” jurisdictional grant. Id. at 154,

155. As noted, this case arises from an allision between a recreational-fishing vessel

and an oil-and-gas platform owned by Sanare, permanently affixed to the OCS, and

engaged at some point in oil-and-gas drilling operations under an OCS lease.24

Tennessee Gas Pipeline controls. The but-for test is met here for essentially the same

reasons it was met there: This case and that one feature an allision with an oil-and-

gas platform affixed to the OCS. See id. at 154–155. Here, like there, the allision

would not have occurred but for the existence of an on-OCS oil-and-gas platform that

is, or at the very least was at one point, engaged in on-OCS extractive activities. See

id. at 155. It is therefore immaterial that Rijos characterizes his injuries as arising

from a “hazard to navigation” or from “recreational fishing activities” rather than

from an “operation” on the OCS.25 See id. (rejecting similar efforts to avoid OCSLA

jurisdiction by creatively recharacterizing what an allision “arose out of”). “The

undeniable fact is” that the allision between the recreational-fishing vessel and

Sanare’s on-OCS oil-and-gas platform would not have occurred had Sanare’s

platform not been built “to extract minerals from the OCS.” Id.

In sum, because the Fifth Circuit “deems [Section] 1349 to require only a but-

for connection,” In re Deepwater Horizon, 745 F.3d at 163 (quotation omitted), and

because the allision at the core of this case would not have occurred but for the

24 See ECF No. 3-2 at ¶ X (petition alleging injuries arising from the allision); ECF No. 3-3 at

¶ 4–5 (declaration attesting that the platform “is permanently affixed to the OCS”); ECF No. 10 at 2

(assertion that the platform “is engaged in oil and gas drilling operations on the OCS”). For his part,

Rijos does not dispute Sanare’s assertions that (1) Sanare owned the platform; (2) the platform was

permanently affixed to the OCS; and (3) the platform was engaged in oil-and-gas drilling operations

on the OCS under an OCS lease. See generally ECF No. 9; ECF No. 11. So Rijos has forfeited any

challenge to those assertions for purposes of his motion to remand, and the Court “accept[s] [them] as

true” in its Section 1349(b)(1) analysis. EP Operating, 26 F.3d at 570.

25 ECF No. 11 at 2.

existence of Sanare’s on-OCS oil-and-gas platform, Tennessee Gas Pipeline compels

the Court to conclude that this case “aris[es] out of, or in connection with . . . any

operation conducted on the [OCS] which involves exploration, development, or

production of” OCS minerals. 43 U.S.C. § 1349(b)(1)(A). The Court has jurisdiction.26

Rijos’s counterarguments fail. First, he submits that Section 1349(b)(1) is not

satisfied because he “was injured on a recreational vessel in navigation by a hazard

to navigation,”27 and not by an on-OCS operation. The argument is untethered to the

statutory text and foreclosed by Fifth Circuit precedent. As for the text, the language

of Section 1349(b)(1) does not require that an on-OCS operation cause the injury

sparking the suit; it merely requires the broader “case[ ] and controvers[y]” to “aris[e]

out of, or in connection with” “any” on-OCS “operation” that “involves exploration,

development, or production of” OCS minerals. See 43 U.S.C. § 1349(b)(1)(A); accord,

e.g., EPL Oil & Gas, LLC v. Trimont Energy (NOW), LLC, 640 F. Supp. 3d 687, 693

(E.D. Tex. 2022) (explaining that OCSLA jurisdiction does not require the injury-

causing act itself to constitute an on-OCS operation). As for precedent, the Fifth

Circuit has disclaimed “a situs requirement for OCSLA jurisdiction,” which is what

Rijos’s argument would require the Court to impose. In re Deepwater Horizon, 745

F.3d at 164. And in all events, the Fifth Circuit has routinely upheld OCSLA

jurisdiction in cases that do not involve an injury caused by an on-OCS operation.

26 Rijos does not specifically dispute that an “operation” exists within the meaning of OCSLA.

See 43 U.S.C. § 1349(b)(1)(A). Nor could he. Because Sanare’s oil-and-gas drilling platform is

permanently affixed to the OCS, was used to transport minerals on the OCS, and “will eventually have

to be removed pursuant to federal regulations,” EP Operating, 26 F.3d at 567, an “operation” exists.

27 ECF No. 9-1 at 4.

See, e.g., Amoco Prod. Co. v. Sea Robin Pipeline Co., 844 F.2d 1202, 1204 (5th Cir.

1988) (contract dispute involving no on-OCS injury-causing act); United Offshore,

899 F.2d at 407 (same); EP Operating, 26 F.3d at 569–70 (partition dispute involving

no on-OCS injury-causing act). Were Rijos right, all of those cases would be wrong.28

Next, Rijos contends that OCSLA jurisdiction should not obtain because he

and others on the boat were mere “recreational fishermen” without “any relationship

whatsoever” to on-OCS operations.29 He reasons that OCSLA jurisdiction “does not

fit” because he is “not an oilfield worker injured during the course and scope of his

employment” or “a platform owner or oil company whose oil and gas related business

was impacted” by the allision.30 But nothing in the text of Section 1349(b)(1)

conditions OCSLA jurisdiction on the nature of the vessel involved, the identity or

status of the plaintiff, the sector of the plaintiff’s employment, or even the

“relationship” between the plaintiff and the on-OCS operation.31 See 43 U.S.C.

28 Deepwater Horizon notes in passing that courts “typically assess jurisdiction . . . in terms of

. . . whether the activities that cause the injury constituted an ‘operation.’” 745 F.3d at 163 (emphasis

added). But Deepwater Horizon did not purport to overrule or undermine decades of Fifth Circuit

precedent upholding OCSLA jurisdiction despite the absence of any injury-causing activity on the

OCS. See, e.g., Amoco Prod. Co., 844 F.2d at 1204; United Offshore, 899 F.2d at 407; EP Operating, 26

F.3d at 569–70; cf. EPL Oil & Gas, LLC, 640 F. Supp. 3d at 693–94 (rejecting argument that Deepwater

Horizon’s statement about how courts “typically assess jurisdiction” means that the injury-causing act

must itself be an OCS operation (quotation omitted)). Just the opposite: Deepwater Horizon

approvingly cites Tennesee Gas Pipeline and emphasizes that a but-for connection is all that is needed

to support OCSLA jurisdiction. See 745 F.3d at 157 (citing Tenn. Gas Pipeline, 87 F.3d at 155).

29 Id. at 5.

30 Id. at 4, 7.

31 Nor does OCSLA jurisdiction require the act giving rise to the lawsuit to have directly

affected OCS production. A change in production is merely “[i]nstructive as to what types of cases”

come within Section 1349(b)(1)’s broad terms. EP Operating, 26 F.3d at 569–70. Nothing in the text of

Section 1349(b)(1) requires the lawsuit to affect production. See 43 U.S.C. § 1349(b)(1)(A); see also, e.g.,

Total E&P USA, Inc. v. Marubeni Oil & Gas (USA), 824 F. App’x 197, 203 (5th Cir. 2020) (per curiam)

(upholding OCSLA jurisdiction in contract dispute concerning the cost of abandoning oil-and-gas

assets even though the acts underlying the suit did not cause a change in OCS production).

§ 1349(b)(1); see also Reed v. Taylor, 923 F.3d 411, 415 (5th Cir. 2019) (“Text is the

alpha and the omega of the interpretive process.” (quotation omitted)). The statutory

text instead supplies a “straightforward and broad,” In re Deepwater Horizon, 745

F.3d at 163 (citation omitted), grant of jurisdiction over all “cases and controversies

arising out of, or in connection with . . . any operation conducted on the [OCS] which

involves exploration, development, or production of” OCS minerals. Id. Had Congress

intended to limit OCSLA jurisdiction in the way Rijos wants, “it could easily have

done so.” Sebelius v. Cloer, 569 U.S. 369, 376 (2013).32. The Court “take[s] Congress

at its word, presume[s] it meant what it said, and refuse[s] to revise [OCSLA] under

the guise of interpreting [it].” Reed, 923 F.3d at 415 (citation omitted).

Rijos next stresses that his claims “sound in admiralty and only admiralty.”33

That is perhaps true—but immaterial. The jurisdictional and choice-of-law questions

are “entirely independent.” Barker, 713 F.3d at 219 (quotation omitted). That Rijos’s

claims are “governed by the substantive principles of” admiralty “has nothing to do

with” OCSLA jurisdiction. Id. (quotation omitted). The application of admiralty-and-

maritime law “does not displace” OCSLA jurisdiction; the Court “retain[s] [its]

original federal question jurisdiction under OCSLA even when maritime law

eventually provides the substantive rule of decision.” Id. (citation omitted).

32 For similar reasons, Rijos’s footnoted attempt to distinguish Tennesee Gas Pipeline fails. See

ECF No. 11 at 4 n.3. Rijos essentially argues that Tennesee Gas Pipeline should not control because it

involved a different type of plaintiff (a platform owner rather than a recreational fisherman) and a

different type of injury (damage to a platform rather than personal injuries). See id. Neither distinction

makes any difference to the Section 1349(b)(1) analysis or the but-for test here. OCLSA jurisdiction

obtained in Tennesee Gas Pipeline because the allision there would not have occurred had the platform

not been built to extract minerals from the OCS. See 87 F.3d at 155. The same is true here. But for

the existence of Sanare’s on-OCS oil-and-gas drilling platform, the allision would not have occurred.

33 ECF No. 9-1 at 5.

Rijos also argues that “his legal rights arising from his purely maritime

accident should not be limited or otherwise thwarted” by the exercise of OCSLA

jurisdiction.34 But Rijos does not clearly identify those “legal rights” or explain how

he thinks they would be “limited or otherwise thwarted” if the Court correctly

exercises original jurisdiction under Section 1349(b)(1).35 If Rijos intends to argue

that the proper exercise of OCSLA jurisdiction “limit[s] or otherwise thwart[s]” his

right to a state-court forum under the Saving to Suitors Clause, he would be

mistaken. The Saving to Suitors Clause “does not guarantee plaintiffs a nonfederal

forum, or limit the right of defendants to remove such actions to federal court where

there exists some basis for federal jurisdiction other than admiralty.” Barker, 713

F.3d at 220 (quotation and alterations omitted). Because the Court has held that

“there is an independent basis for federal jurisdiction” under OCSLA, “removal of

[Rijos’s] maritime case[ ] is permissible”; it neither “limit[s]”36 nor “thwart[s]”37 any

of Rijos’s rights under the Saving to Suitors Clause. Id. (citation omitted).

Rijos also protests that removal jurisdiction under OCSLA “should not be

based on Sanare’s self-serving response” to his allegations.38 But the upshot of Rijos’s

argument is that a plaintiff must invoke OCSLA in the petition or complaint to

support original jurisdiction under that statute—a proposition the Fifth Circuit

repeatedly has rejected. See, e.g., In re Deepwater Horizon, 745 F.3d at 163

34 Id.

35 Id.

36 Id.

37 Id.

38 ECF No. 11 at 6.

(“[B]ecause jurisdiction is invested in the district courts by [OCSLA], a plaintiff does

not need to expressly invoke OCSLA in order for it to apply.” (quotation omitted));

Barker, 713 F.3d at 213 (“A plaintiff does not need to expressly invoke OCSLA in

order for it to apply.” (citation omitted)); Amoco Prod. Co., 844 F.3d at 1205 (“In

determining federal court jurisdiction, we need not traverse the Serbonian Bog of the

well pleaded complaint rule because § 23 of OCSLA expressly invests jurisdiction in

the United States District Courts.” (citation omitted)). For essentially the same

reasons, Rijos’s reliance39 on well-pleaded-complaint-rule cases is misplaced: Section

1349(b)(1) is an express grant of original jurisdiction; it is not a federal defense

subject to the well-pleaded-complaint rule. See Amoco Prod. Co., 844 F.3d at 1205.

Turning from the case law to consequentialism, Rijos next contends that

exercising OCSLA jurisdiction here would “lead to an absurd result” because it

would give defendants “carte blanche to remove any case . . . by simply contending

that OCSLA applied.”40 Rijos is wrong. Nothing in this order and reasons nor in

Fifth Circuit precedent permits a removing defendant to secure OCSLA jurisdiction

“by simply contending that OCSLA applie[s].”41 The removing defendant must

instead establish that the case comes within Section 1349(b)(1)’s “straightforward

and broad” language by showing that the Fifth Circuit’s but-for test is met. In re

Deepwater Horizon, 745 F.3d at 162, 163 (citations omitted). Sanare has done so here.

39 ECF No. 9-1 at 8 (citing Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 808

(1986); and then citing Hoskins v. Bekins Van Lines, 343 F.3d 769, 772 (5th Cir. 2003)).

40 Id.

41 Id.

Finally, Rijos falls back on the proposition that any ambiguities about removal

jurisdiction must be construed against removal. See Manguno, 276 F.3d at 723

(citation omitted). That is equal parts undisputed and unhelpful. There are no

ambiguities about OCSLA jurisdiction here: Tennessee Gas Pipeline controls this

case and compels the conclusion that the but-for test is met. See 87 F.3d at 154-55.

* * *

Sanare has carried its burden to show that the Court has removal jurisdiction

under Section 1349(b)(1) of OCSLA. Applying Tennesee Gas Pipeline and the Fifth

Circuit’s but-for test, the Court holds that this case “aris[es] out of, or in connection

with . . . any operation conducted on the” OCS that “involves exploration,

development, or production of’ OCS minerals because the allision at the core of this

case would not have occurred but for the construction of Sanare’s on-OCS oil-and-gas

platform that is, or at one point was, engaged in drilling operations on the OCS. 43

U.S.C. § 1349(b)(1)(A).

III. CONCLUSION

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that Rijos’s motion” to remand is DENIED.

New Orleans, Louisiana, this 18th day of June, 2025.

ase S.A

BRANDON 8. LONG

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

42 ECF No. 9.

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