Richardson v. Board of Education Of Elgin School District U-46

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

Amica Richardson, on behalf of her )

daughter, L.R., a minor, )

)

Plaintiff, )

) No. 24-cv-8243

v. )

) Judge April M. Perry

Board of Education of Elgin School )

District U-46, School District U-46, Ellis )

Middle School, and Ms. Law, )

)

Defendants. )

OPINION AND ORDER

Amica Richardson (“Plaintiff”) alleges that in September 2023 an Ellis Middle School

teacher called her daughter a racial slur and mocked her daughter in front of other students.

Plaintiff brings this action against that teacher, Ms. Law (“Law”), as well as the Board of

Education of Elgin School District U-46 (“Board of Education”), School District U-46, and Ellis

Middle School. Counts I and II are brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and allege that defendants

violated Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Equal Educational Opportunities Act of

1974 (the “EEOA”). The remaining counts advance state law claims for alleged violations of the

Illinois Civil Rights Act, 740 ILCS 23/5 (Count III), willful and wanton conduct (Count IV),

intentional infliction of emotional distress (Count V), negligent hiring and retention (Count VI),

and violation of the Family Expense Statute, 750 ILCS 65/15 (Count VII). The Board of

Education now moves to dismiss the complaint. For the reasons that follow, the Court grants the

Board of Education’s motion.

BACKGROUND

The below facts are drawn from the allegations in Plaintiff’s amended complaint, which

the Court accepts as true, drawing all reasonable inferences in Plaintiff’s favor. See

Killingsworth v. HSBC Bank Nev., N.A., 507 F.3d 614, 618 (7th Cir. 2007).

Plaintiff is a resident of Illinois and the mother of L.R., an African American minor. Doc.

20 at 2. At all relevant times, L.R. was a sixth-grade student at Ellis Middle School with an

Individualized Education Program, a plan provided to students receiving special education and

related services. Id. At all relevant times, Law, a Caucasian woman, was a sixth-grade teacher at

the school and an “official of Defendants” with the authority to “institute corrective and

‘restorative’ measures.” Id. at 4. On September 12, 2023, in a classroom at the school, Law

called L.R. the “n word” and mocked L.R. for being “mentally ill” in front of other students. Id.

at 5. At the time, the Board of Education maintained a written anti-discrimination policy

prohibiting the use of derogatory racial slurs and name-calling against students, which Law was

obligated to follow. Id.

LEGAL STANDARD

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) challenges the sufficiency of the complaint, not

its merits. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6); Gibson v. City of Chicago, 910 F.2d 1510, 1520 (7th Cir.

1990). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the complaint must assert a facially plausible claim

and provide fair notice to the defendant of the claim’s basis. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678

(2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). A claim is facially plausible

“when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference

that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Put differently,

“factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.”

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court accepts

as true all of the well-pleaded facts in the complaint and draws all reasonable inferences in

plaintiff’s favor. Kubiak v. City of Chicago, 810 F.3d 476, 480 (7th Cir. 2016). Legal

conclusions, however, are not entitled to such treatment. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.

A complaint that satisfies the Rule 8 requirements of a short and plain statement of the

claim may still be “highly vulnerable” to dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) if the facts pled do not

constitute a legal cause of action. Kirksey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d 1039, 1041

(7th Cir. 1999). While courts are “required to consider whether a plaintiff could prevail under

any legal theory or set of facts,” they “will not invent legal arguments for litigants” who must

offer legal arguments in response to a defendant’s motion to dismiss. Cnty. of McHenry v. Ins.

Co. of the W., 438 F.3d 813, 818 (7th Cir. 2006), as amended (Apr. 11, 2006) (internal citation

omitted); Kirksey, 168 F.3d at 1041.

ANALYSIS

Before beginning with the legal analysis, the Court addresses the proper entities that can

be sued in this case. Pursuant to the Illinois School Code, 105 ILCS 5/1-1 et. seq, a board of

education is the only entity that can sue and be sued on behalf of a school district. See 105 ILCS

5/10-2 (stating that the school board “may sue and be sued in all courts and places where judicial

proceedings are held”). The Court therefore grants the Board of Education’s motion to dismiss

School District U-46 and Ellis Middle School as defendants in this action. The Court also

dismisses “Ms. Law” as a defendant in this action, as Law has never been served though the case

has been pending for more than nine months. Doc. 32. This leaves the Board of Education as the

only remaining defendant.

In its motion to dismiss, the Board of Education first argues that Plaintiff’s Section 1983

claims cannot be sustained against it because Plaintiff does not meet the pleading requirements

set forth in Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). A cause of

action may be brought under Section 1983 against “[e]very person who, under color of any

statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any State ... subjects, or causes to be

subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the

deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.” 42

U.S.C. § 1983. In Monell, the Supreme Court held that municipalities are “persons” who may be

sued under Section 1983. See Monell 436 U.S. at 690. That said, the Supreme Court further held

that “a municipality cannot be held liable solely because it employs a tortfeasor – or, in other

words, a municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory.” Id. at

691. Rather,

[for] a Monell claim to survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must

plead facts that plausibly suggest that: (1) she was deprived of a

constitutional right; (2) the deprivation can be traced ‘to some

municipal action (i.e., ‘a policy or custom’), such that the

challenged conduct is properly attributable to the municipality

itself’; (3) ‘the policy or custom demonstrates municipal fault, i.e.,

deliberate indifference’; and (4) ‘the municipal action was the

moving force behind the federal-rights violation.’

Thomas v. Neenah Joint Sch. Dist., 74 F.4th 521, 524 (7th Cir. 2023) (quoting Dean v. Wexford

Health Sources, Inc., 18 F.4th 214, 235 (7th Cir. 2021)). Each of these requirements “must be

scrupulously applied to avoid a claim for municipal liability backsliding into an impermissible

claim for vicarious liability.” Id. (quoting Bohanon v. City of Indianapolis, 46 F.4th 669, 676

(7th Cir. 2022)).

In this case, Plaintiff has not alleged facts plausibly suggesting that her daughter was

deprived of a constitutional right by the Board of Education’s conduct.1 Deprivations of rights

are attributable to the municipality when the municipality brought about the deprivation through

an express policy, a widespread practice so permanent and well settled as to constitute a custom,

or through the actions of a person with final policymaking authority. See Klebanowski v.

Sheahan, 540 F.3d 633, 637 (7th Cir. 2008). In this case, the parties agree that the express policy

of the Board of Education prohibited the use of racial slurs against students, and Plaintiff has not

pled that it was a widespread practice for teachers to use racial slurs against students. Thus, the

only avenue for municipal liability would be if the person who harmed Plaintiff’s daughter had

final policymaking authority on behalf of the Board of Education.

For the purposes of Section 1983, policymaking authority is “not simply the power to

make decisions;” it is broader and must encompass the power to speak for the local government

on official policy. See Darchak v. City of Chicago Bd. of Educ., 580 F.3d 622, 630 (7th Cir.

2009). Whether an official has final policymaking authority is a question of state law. See Duda

v. Bd. of Educ. of Franklin Park Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 84, 133 F.3d 1054, 1061 (7th Cir. 1998).

Under Illinois law, even management employees of a school district such as the principal or

superintendent do not have final policymaking authority. Id. (finding that such employees were

not officials with final policy-making authority because they did not speak for the local

government on official policy but reported to the board of education); Horwitz v. Bd. of Educ. of

Avoca Sch. Dist. No. 37, 260 F.3d 602, 619 (7th Cir. 2001) (same, and adding that even president

1 Because the traceability requirement is enough on its own to decide the Section 1983 claims, the Court does not

address the Board of Education’s other argument that Plaintiff cannot use Section 1983 as a vehicle to bring claims

for other statutory violations. When deciding whether to file an amended complaint, however, Plaintiff is advised to

consider whether this hurdle can be overcome. See generally Discovery House, Inc. v. Consol. City of Indianapolis,

319 F.3d 277, 281 (7th Cir. 2003) (“When the violation is of a statutory right, a plaintiff runs the risk that a court

might decide that the statutory scheme in one way or another forecloses § 1983 relief.”).

of school board did not have final policymaking authority). Rather, only the board of education

and those who it delegates to act on its behalf have the final policymaking authority. Duda, 133

F.3d at 1061.

Here, the complaint alleges that Law was a teacher, an official, and possessed the

authority to institute corrective and restorative measures. Nothing about these allegations

indicates that Law had been authorized by the Board of Education to create official policy on its

behalf. See Horwitz, 260 F.3d at 620 (affirming dismissal of Section 1983 claims where plaintiff

provided no sound basis to conclude that individual actors were final policymakers and

reasoning that “Monell places the burden on [plaintiff] to demonstrate that an official policy or

custom of the Board’s caused her injury”).2 Nor is it a reasonable inference that a sixth-grade

teacher had policymaking authority on behalf of the Board of Education. Therefore, the Section

1983 claims against the Board of Education are dismissed.

The Court next considers whether Plaintiff has plausibly alleged a standalone violation of

Title VI. Title VI provides that no person shall “on the ground of race, color, or national origin,

be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination

under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000d. “This

law supplies a private right of action against the recipient of the assistance who has intentionally

discriminated against a covered plaintiff based on a protected category like race.” Collins v.

Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., No. 24-2557, 2025 WL 599630, at *2 (7th Cir. Feb.

25, 2025). The Seventh Circuit has not articulated the pleading standard under Title VI but has

indicated that Title VII and Title IX are analogous. See id. at *2 (drawing on pleading standard

2 The Court is unpersuaded by Plaintiff’s reliance on Shebley v. United Cont'l Holdings, Inc., 357 F. Supp. 3d 684

(N.D. Ill. 2019), as Shebley did not involve Section 1983 claims.

under Title VII); Doe v. Galster, 768 F.3d 611, 617 (7th Cir. 2014) (“Title VI and Title IX are so

similar that a decision interpreting one generally applies to the other.”).

Under Title VII, a “plaintiff alleging race discrimination need not allege each evidentiary

element of a legal theory to survive a motion to dismiss.” Freeman v. Metro. Water Reclamation

Dist. of Greater Chicago, 927 F.3d 961, 965 (7th Cir. 2019). Rather, allegations that race

“intentionally motivated a decision suffice.” Collins, 2025 WL 599630, at *2. That said, “a

school district’s liability must be personal rather than vicarious.” Doe v. St. Francis Sch. Dist.,

694 F.3d 869, 871 (7th Cir. 2012). Therefore, allegations of discriminatory conduct disconnected

from the school district’s own conduct will not suffice. On this basis, school districts have been

found liable for teacher misconduct only where an official of the school district with the

authority to institute corrective measures had actual notice of and was deliberately indifferent to

a teacher’s misconduct. See id. (interpreting Title IX).

Plaintiff argues that her Title VI claim is adequately pled because Law was an official

with the authority to institute corrective measures, and Law had notice of and was deliberately

indifferent to Law’s own conduct. The Supreme Court, however, has foreclosed this very

argument: “Where a school district’s liability rests on actual notice principles, [] the knowledge

of the wrongdoer himself is not pertinent to the analysis.” Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist.,

524 U.S. 274, 291 (1998) (interpreting Title IX claim of teacher sexual misconduct and finding

that the premise of these cases “is an official decision by the recipient [of federal funds] not to

remedy the violation”). Because Plaintiff’s argument that the school district may be held liable

rests entirely on Law’s status as both the alleged perpetrator and the official within the school

with knowledge of that conduct, Plaintiff has failed to adequately allege facts which plausibly

suggest that the Board of Education can be held liable under Title VI. Thus, Plaintiff’s Title VI

claim is dismissed.3

The Court next considers Plaintiff’s EEOA claim. The relevant section of the EEOA

provides that “No State shall deny equal educational opportunity to an individual on account of

his or her race, color, sex, or national origin,” including by “the deliberate segregation by an

educational agency of students on the basis of race, color, or national origin among or within

schools.” 20 U.S.C. § 1703. The Board of Education argues Plaintiff has not stated a claim under

this section of the EEOA because Plaintiff’s only allegation suggesting L.R. was segregated from

other students is a conclusory statement not entitled to the presumption of truth at this stage. The

Court agrees. Plaintiff alleges Law’s treatment of L.R., specifically calling L.R. a racial slur and

mocking her for being “mentally ill” in front of other students, “deliberately segregated [L.R.]

from the rest of her classmates on the basis of race.” Doc. 20 at 12. Setting aside Plaintiff’s legal

conclusion that L.R.’s treatment amounted to segregation, the complaint does not plausibly

allege that L.R. was subjected to racial segregation as contemplated by the EEOA. No

allegations suggest L.R. was assigned to a particular school or classroom or otherwise separated

from her peers for educational purposes on the basis of her race. See Castaneda v. Pickard, 648

F.2d 989, 999 (5th Cir. 1981) (describing EEOA’s purpose as requiring that students not be

“discriminated against on the basis of race by assignment to a particular school or classroom”);

see also Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo., 413 U.S. 189, 198 (1973) (discussing student

body composition as relevant to whether a school is considered segregated). Therefore, Plaintiff

3 The Board of Education advances several other arguments for why Plaintiff’s Title VI claim is inadequate,

including because she has not pled the requisite connection between the alleged federal funding and the challenged

conduct, L.R. was not an intended beneficiary of those federal funds, and Plaintiff has not adequately pled

intentional discrimination or that L.R. faced adverse action. Because the lack of any alleged personal liability on the

Board of Education’s part resolves the motion as to Title VI, the Court does not address those arguments at this

time.

has not adequately pled a violation of the EEOA and her claim against the Board of Education

under the EEOA 1s dismissed.

Having dismissed all federal claims against the Board of Education, the Court is without

federal subject matter jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367

(providing district courts with supplemental jurisdiction only in civil actions over which district

court has original jurisdiction). The Court therefore dismisses the complaint in its entirety.

CONCLUSION

The complaint in this matter is dismissed, without prejudice. Plaintiff is given leave to

amend the complaint by July 16, 2025, if counsel can do so consistent with Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure 11(b)(2) and (b)(3).

Dated: June 18, 2025

APRIL M. PERRY

United States District Judge