McKnight v. Kingsboro

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

SONYA MCKNIGHT,

Plaintiff, CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:23-CV-01137

v.

(MEHALCHICK, J.)

FARIDA KINGSBORO, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM

Presently before the Court is a motion to dismiss filed by Defendants Anthony

Cummings (“Cummings”), Chad Showers (“Showers”), and Dominic Cristillo (“Cristillo”)

(collectively, “Defendants”). (Doc. 61). On July 10, 2023, Plaintiff Sonya McKnight

(“McKnight”) initiated this action by filing a complaint against Defendants, as well as against

Kristyne Crist (“Crist”), Kirsten Heine (“Heine”), Jerrett Ferrari (“Ferrari”), and Farida

Kingsboro1 (“Kingsboro”). (Doc. 1). McKnight filed the operative amended complaint on

September 27, 2024. (Doc. 56). On October 30, 2024, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss

(Doc. 61) and March 25, 2025, they filed a motion to dismiss for lack of prosecution. (Doc.

72). For the following reasons, Defendants’ motions to dismiss shall be GRANTED.

I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The following background is taken from McKnight’s amended complaint. (Doc. 56).

1 Kingsboro filed an answer to the amended complaint on October 31, 2024. (Doc. 63).

Defendants Crist, Heine, and Ferrari were not named as defendants in the amended

complaint and as such were terminated from this action.

McKnight is a Black woman who, at all times relevant to this matter, served as a Magisterial

District Judge in Dauphin County, Pennsylvania. (Doc. 56, ¶¶ 4, 10). On or around February

22, 2020, at 2:00 AM, McKnight’s son Kevin Baltimore (“Baltimore”) was pulled over by

Kingsboro in Harrisburg during a traffic stop. (Doc. 56, ¶¶ 9, 30). The traffic stop was recorded

on dashcam video. (Doc. 56, ¶ 31). Upon being pulled over, Baltimore called McKnight, who

arrived on the scene about ten minutes later. (Doc. 56, ¶¶ 32, 35). Around the same time,

backup officers Showers and Cummings and transport officer Cristillo, arrived on the scene.

(Doc. 56, ¶¶ 33-34).

Once she arrived at the scene, McKnight spoke with Kingsboro, who informed her

that Baltimore was being arrested on an outstanding warrant and that drugs had been found

on his person. (Doc. 56, ¶ 39). Kingsboro told McKnight that she could take possession of

Baltimore’s vehicle, so McKnight entered Baltimore’s running vehicle in the presence of all

officers, turned the vehicle off, and removed the keys. (Doc. 56, ¶¶ 38-42).

At the conclusion of the traffic stop, Kingsboro, Showers, Cummings, and Cristillo all

wrote separate incident reports which included false accusations that McKnight was agitated,

tried to find a knife in Baltimore’s vehicle, and took possession of money and belongings that

were recovered from Baltimore’s person from Cristillo. (Doc. 56, ¶¶ 47-59). Kingsboro and

Cumming’s reports also omitted the fact that Kingsboro had given McKnight permission to

enter the vehicle. (Doc. 56, ¶¶ 50, 56). Kingsboro, Showers, Cummings, and Cristillo also

informed their supervisor of McKnight’s presence at the scene. (Doc. 56, ¶ 60).

On or around March 5, 2020, the Dauphin County DOA’s Criminal Investigation

Division referred this matter to the Office of the Attorney General (“OAG”) for investigation,

where Ferrari was assigned to investigate the case. (Doc. 56, ¶¶ 64-65). Ferrari obtained a

copy of the dashcam video and interviewed Kingsboro, Showers, Cummings, and Cristillo

separately without showing them the dashcam video. (Doc, 56, ¶¶ 66-67). On November 12,

2020, Ferrari then interviewed McKnight. (Doc. 1, ¶ 88). On December 16, 2020, soon after

learning the OAG was going to criminally charge her, McKnight voluntarily surrendered with

her attorney. (Doc. 56, ¶ 91) McKnight was subsequently charged with fabricating or

tampering with evidence, obstructing with the administration of law, and official oppression

and bail was set for $30,000. (Doc. 56, ¶¶ 93-94). McKnight was formally booked and posted

bail. (Doc. 56, ¶ 95).

Before her preliminary hearing, at which it would be determined if McKnight’s charges

would proceed to trial, McKnight and her attorney received the dashcam video. (Doc. 56, ¶

96). However, Kingsboro and Ferrari did not mention nor introduce the dashcam footage at

the preliminary hearing, which took place on February 19, 2021, before Judge Nicholas

Lippincott. (Doc. 56, ¶¶ 97-100). At the preliminary hearing, only Kingsboro and Ferrari

testified. (Doc. 56, ¶¶ 97-107). McKnight does not allege that Defendants were present at the

hearing nor that they testified or had any role in the preliminary hearing. (Doc. 56, ¶¶ 97-107).

Judge Nicholas Lippincott found enough factual allegations to bind the charges over for trial,

stating, “there is enough to proceed here, and I think a lot of it comes down to, what was –

what was in her mind?” (Doc. 56, ¶ 107). McKnight’s case continued to trial. (Doc. 56, ¶¶

107, 111). Shortly after the preliminary hearing, McKnight announced that she was running

for re-election, and on May 19, 2021, she was reelected as a Magistrate Judge. (Doc. 56, ¶¶

108, 110).

McKnight’s criminal trial took place on July 26, 2021, before Judge Stephen

Lieberman. (Doc. 56, ¶ 111). Kingsboro, Showers, Cummings, and Cristillo testified. (Doc.

56, ¶ 112). After the Commonwealth rested, McKnight moved for judgment on acquittal.

(Doc. 56, ¶ 121). Judge Stephen Lieberman heard arguments from both parties and acquitted

McKnight on all counts. (Doc. 56, ¶ 122).

McKnight filed the initial complaint on July 10, 2023. (Doc. 1). Defendants filed a

motion to dismiss McKnight’s initial complaint on September 18, 2023, and on September 6,

2024, this Court granted that motion and dismissed the claims against Defendants without

prejudice. (Doc. 18; Doc. 53). McKnight filed an amended complaint on September 27, 2024,

asserting four counts under federal and state law. (Doc. 56). Defendants filed a motion to

dismiss the amended complaint on October 30, 2024, along with a brief in support. (Doc. 61;

Doc. 62). On March 25, 2025, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss for lack of prosecution

and brief in support. (Doc. 72). McKnight has not filed a brief in opposition to Defendants’

motions to dismiss, despite several extensions of time and Court Orders requiring her to do

so. (Doc. 64; Doc. 65; Doc. 67; Doc. 68; Doc. 70). Accordingly, the motions to dismiss have

been fully briefed and are ripe for disposition.

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. MOTION TO DISMISS STANDARD

Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes a defendant to move

to dismiss for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(b)(6). To assess the sufficiency of a complaint on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court must first

take note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim, then identify mere conclusions

which are not entitled to the assumption of truth, and finally determine whether the

complaint’s factual allegations, taken as true, could plausibly satisfy the elements of the legal

claim. Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 221 (3d Cir. 2011). In deciding a Rule

12(b)(6) motion, the court may consider the facts alleged on the face of the complaint, as well

as “documents incorporated into the complaint by reference, and matters of which a court

may take judicial notice.” Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007).

After recognizing the required elements which make up the legal claim, a court should

“begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not

entitled to the assumption of truth.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). The plaintiff

must provide some factual ground for relief, which “requires more than labels and

conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). “[T]hreadbare recitals of the elements of

a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S.

at 678. Thus, courts “need not credit a complaint’s ‘bald assertions’ or ‘legal

conclusions’ . . . .” Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997) (quoting

In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1429-30 (3d Cir. 1997)). Nor need a

court assume that a plaintiff can prove facts that the plaintiff has not alleged. Associated Gen.

Contractors of Cal. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983).

A court must then determine whether the well-pleaded factual allegations give rise to

a plausible claim for relief. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual

content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for

the misconduct alleged.” Palakovic v. Wetzel, 854 F.3d 209, 219-20 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Sheridan v. NGK Metals

Corp., 609 F.3d 239, 262 n.27 (3d Cir. 2010). The court must accept as true all allegations in

the complaint, and any reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom are to be construed

in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O’Brien & Frankel, 20 F.3d

1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994). This “presumption of truth attaches only to those allegations for

which there is sufficient factual matter to render them plausible on their face.” Schuchardt v.

President of the U.S., 839 F.3d 336, 347 (3d Cir. 2016) (internal quotation and citation omitted).

The plausibility determination is context-specific and does not impose a heightened pleading

requirement. Schuchardt, 839 F.3d at 347.

B. 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Plaintiff asserts claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides a private cause

of action for violations of federal constitutional rights. The statute provides in pertinent part:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,

or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or

causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within

the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or

immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party

injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for

redress . . . .

42 U.S.C. § 1983.

42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not create substantive rights, but instead provides remedies for

rights established elsewhere. City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 816 (1985). To

succeed on a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant, acting under color

of state law, deprived the plaintiff of a right secured by the United States Constitution. Mark

v. Borough of Hatboro, 51 F.3d 1137, 1141 (3d Cir. 1995). Further, “a defendant in a civil rights

action ‘must have personal involvement in the alleged wrongs to be liable,’ and ‘cannot be

held responsible for a constitutional violation which he or she neither participated in nor

approved.’” Baraka v. M,cGreevey, 481 F.3d 187, 210 (3d Cir. 2007) (internal citations omitted).

“Personal involvement can be shown through allegations of personal direction or of actual

knowledge and acquiescence.” Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988)

III. DISCUSSION

A. MCKNIGHT IS DEEMED NOT TO OPPOSE THE MOTION TO DISMISS.

At the outset, under the Local Rules of this Court, McKnight should be deemed not

to oppose the pending motion to dismiss since she has failed to timely oppose the motion.

Local Rule 7.6 imposes an affirmative duty on a litigant to respond to motions and provides

that “[a]ny party who fails to comply with this rule shall be deemed not to oppose which

motion.” Additionally, this Court ordered McKnight to file her brief in opposition or be

deemed not to oppose the motion to dismiss on two occasions. (Doc. 68; Doc. 70). In this

case, McKnight has not complied with Local Rule 7.6 or the Court’s Orders to file opposition

briefs. These procedural defaults compel the Court to consider:

“[A] basic truth: we must remain mindful of the fact that ‘the Federal Rules are

meant to be applied in such a way as to promote justice. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 1.

Often that will mean that courts should strive to resolve cases on their merits

wherever possible. However, justice also requires that the merits of a particular

dispute be placed before the court in a timely fashion ....’”

Lease v. Fishel, 712 F. Supp. 2d 359, 371 (M.D. Pa. 2010) (quoting McCurdy v.

American Bd. of Plastic Surgery, 157 F.3d 191, 197 (3d Cir. 1998)).

A failure on the Court’s part to enforce compliance with the Rules, and impose the sanctions

mandated by those Rules when they are repeatedly breached, “would actually violate the dual

mandate which guides this court and motivates our system of justice: ‘that courts should strive

to resolve cases on their merits whenever possible [but that] justice also requires that the merits

of a particular dispute be placed before the court in a timely fashion.’” Lease, 712 F. Supp. 2d

at 371. Therefore, the Court is obligated to ensure that one party’s refusal to comply with the

Rules does not lead to an unjustified prejudice to those parties who follow the Rules.

Such basic principles of fairness apply here. In this case, McKnight failed to file a brief

in opposition to the pending motions to dismiss even after being ordered to do so twice as to

the first motion and after being warned that her failure to file a brief in opposition may be

construed as her concurring in the motion to dismiss. (Doc. 68; Doc. 70). These failures now

compel the Court to deem McKnight to not oppose Defendants’ motions to dismiss.

B. CONSIDERATION OF THE POULIS FACTORS WARRANTS A GRANT OF THE

MOTIONS TO DISMISS.

Even though the Court has determined that McKnight is deemed not to oppose the

motions, McKnight’s failure to file a brief in opposition alone is not sufficient for the Court

to dismiss the case. Rather, dismissal of a case as a sanction for failure to follow a court rule

or court order is governed by the factors set forth in the seminal Poulis case. Hernandez v.

Palakovich, 293 F. App’x 890, 894 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing Poulis v. State Farm Fire and Casualty

Co., 747 F.2d 863, 868 (3d Cir. 1984)). Based on these factors, the Court finds that dismissal

is warranted. Further, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) provides that a claim or action

may be involuntarily dismissed “[i]f the plaintiff fails to prosecute or to comply with these

rules or a court order.” Further, the rule permits sua sponte dismissals by the court. Link v.

Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630–31 (1962); Hewlett v. Davis, 844 F.2d 109, 114 (3d Cir.

1988) (same). “The authority of a court to dismiss sua sponte for lack of prosecution has

generally been considered an inherent power, governed not by rule or statute but by the

control necessarily vested in courts to manage their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly

and expeditious disposition of cases.” Link, 370 U.S. at 630–31; see also Mindek v. Rigatti, 964

F.2d 1369 (3d Cir. 1992). Specifically, a plaintiff’s failure to comply with a court order

constitutes a failure to prosecute her action, and therefore her action is subject to dismissal

pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b). A court’s decision to dismiss for failure to prosecute is

committed to the court’s sound discretion and will not be disturbed absent an abuse of

discretion. See Emerson v. Thiel Coll., 296 F.3d 184, 190 (3d Cir. 2002).

In Stackhouse v. Mazurkiewicz, the Third Circuit reversed a district court’s dismissal

based on the pro se plaintiff’s failure to file a brief in accordance with a local rule of court.

Stackhouse v. Mazurkiewicz, 951 F.2d 29 (3d Cir. 1991). The Third Circuit stated that failure to

obey the local rule should not form the basis for dismissal without an analysis of the merits of

the case. Stackhouse, 951 F.2d at 30. The court noted that dismissal was not to be ruled out if

the party was represented by an attorney and in fact did not oppose the motion. Stackhouse,

951 F.2d at 30. The court also noted: “Nor do we suggest that if a party fails to comply with

the rules after a specific direction to comply from the court, the rule cannot be invoked. Thus,

our holding is not broad.” Stackhouse, 951 F.2d at 30.

Although this caveat from the Stackhouse case might suggest that the Court could grant

the pending motion to dismiss based on McKnight’s failure to file a brief in opposition after

being ordered to do so by the Court, the Third Circuit has subsequently declined “to adopt an

interpretation of Stackhouse under which a district court may dismiss a case solely because a

plaintiff misses a briefing deadline set forth in a local rule or court-ordered briefing schedule.”

Hernandez v. Palakovich, 293 F. App’x 890, 895 (3d Cir. 2008). Rather, the Third Circuit has

held that before dismissing a case as a sanction for failure to follow a court rule or court order,

a court must consider the Poulis factors. Hernandez, 293 F. App’x at 894 (citing Poulis, 747

F.2d at 868; see also Shuey v. Schwab, 350 F. App’x 630, 633 (3d Cir. 2009) (“Poulis has been

cited too often and is too deeply ingrained in the jurisdiction of this court and the direct courts

of this circuit for a court to assume that a party’s failure to respond to a motion to dismiss can

be regarded as an abandonment of the claim. Poulis governs the District Court’s decision to

dismiss the Shuey’s claim, and it was error to dismiss without first considering the Poulis

factors.”). Thus, the Court turns to a consideration of the Poulis factors.

In evaluating whether an action should be dismissed for failure to prosecute, a court

must balance six factors:

“(1) the extent of the party’s personal responsibility; (2) the prejudice to the

adversary caused by the failure to meet scheduling orders and respond to

discovery; (3) a history of dilatoriness; (4) whether the conduct of the party ...

was willful or in bad faith; (5) the effectiveness of sanctions other than

dismissal, which entails an analysis of alternative sanctions; and (6) the

meritoriousness of the claim or defense.”

Poulis, 747 F.2d at 868.

The Poulis factors are not “a magic formula whereby the decision to dismiss or not to

dismiss a plaintiff’s complaint becomes a mechanical calculation.” Mindek, 964 F.2d at 1373.

No one factor is determinative and not all of the Poulis factors must be met to warrant

dismissal. Mindek, 964 F.2d at 1373; Hicks v. Feeney, 850 F.2d 152, 156 (3d Cir. 1988). Instead,

the decision must be made in the context of the court’s extended contact with the litigant.

Dismissal for failure to prosecute is appropriately labeled a “drastic sanction,” however,

because it is “deemed to be an adjudication on the merits, barring any further action between

the parties.” Sebrell ex rel. Sebrell v. Phila. Police Dep’t, 159 F. App’x 371, 373 (3d Cir. 2005) (not

precedential) (citing Landon v. Hunt, 977 F.2d 829, 833 (3d Cir. 1992); Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b)).

In light of this framework, the Court finds that a careful assessment of the Poulis factors in the

case at bar weighs heavily in favor of dismissing this action only insofar as McKnight asserts

her claims against Defendants.

1. McKnight’s Personal Responsibility

Looking to the first Poulis factor, the extent of the party’s personal responsibility, the

delays in adjudicating the instant motion to dismiss are entirely attributable to McKnight.

Because McKnight is a pro se litigant, she is solely responsible for prosecuting her claims. See

Hoxworth v. Blinder Robinson & Co., 980 F.2d 912, 920 (3d Cir. 1992). “As a general rule, a pro

se litigant is responsible for his failure to comply with court orders.” Lopez v. Cousins, 435 F.

App’x 113, 116 (3d Cir. 2011) (not precedential); see also Emerson, 296 F.3d at 191; Winston v.

Lindsey, Civ. No. 09-224, 2011 WL 6000991, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 30, 2011) (concluding that

a pro se litigant “bears all of the responsibility for any failure to prosecute his claims”).

McKnight has neglected to litigate her claims against Defendants and failed to file a brief in

opposition to Defendants’ pending motion to dismiss, as required by the Local Rules and as

so ordered by the Court. See Lookingbill, 2015 WL 4077999, at *4. On November 4, 2024, the

Court granted McKnight an initial extension of time to file a brief in opposition by December

13, 2024. (Doc. 65). On December 3, 2024, the Court granted McKnight a 60 day stay in

order to allow her to proceed pro se or retain new counsel after her attorney withdrew, which

she did not do. (Doc. 68). In the December 3, 2024 Order, the Court directed McKnight to

file a brief in opposition to Defendants’ motion by February 10, 2025, and notified that failure

to timely file her brief may result in the motion being deemed unopposed and granted without

a merits analysis. (Doc. 68). McKnight was again directed to file an opposition brief on

February 19, 2025. (Doc. 70). As of the date of this Memorandum Opinion, McKnight has

failed to file a brief in opposition or comply with the Court’s Orders. Accordingly, the first

Poulis factor weighs in favor of dismissal.

2. Prejudice to Defendants

As for the second Poulis factor, a finding of prejudice does not require “irremediable

harm.” Adams v. Trs. of N.J. Brewery Emps.’ Pension Tr. Fund, 29 F.3d 863, 873-74 (3d Cir.

1994). Rather, “the burden imposed by impeding a party’s ability to [effectively prepare] a full

and complete trial strategy is sufficiently prejudicial.” Ware v. Rodale Press, Inc., 322 F.3d 218,

222 (3d Cir. 2003). Examples of prejudice are “the irretrievable loss of evidence, the inevitable

dimming of witnesses’ memories, or the excessive and possibly irremediable burdens or costs

imposed on the opposing party.” Scarborough v. Eubanks, 747 F.2d 871, 876 (3d Cir. 1984).

Here, the Court finds that McKnight’s failure to engage with litigating Defendants’

motion to dismiss or comply with the Court’s Orders now wholly frustrates and delays

resolution of the claims against Defendants. Going forward, such failure to litigate would

prejudice Defendants, who without timely responses by McKnight could not seek a timely

resolution of the claims against them. See Vessio v. Saw Creek Ests. Cmty. Ass’n, Inc., No. CIV.A.

3:13-2068, 2014 WL 6065924, at *5 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 6, 2014) (finding the second Poulis factor

favors dismiss when a plaintiff failed to engage in litigating certain claims “other than to

repeatedly request extensions of time to respond to the instant motion to dismiss”); Azubuko

v. Bell National Organization, 243 F. App’x 728 (3d Cir. 2007) (failure to file amended

complaint prejudices defense and compels dismissal). Accordingly, the second Poulis factor

weighs in favor of dismissal.

3. History of Dilatoriness

Turning to the third Poulis factor, “[e]xtensive or repeated delay or delinquency

constitutes a history of dilatoriness, such as consistent non-response to interrogatories, or

consistent tardiness in complying with court orders.” Adams, 29 F.3d at 874; see also Emerson,

296 F.3d at 191 (per curium) (finding a history of dilatory conduct where the plaintiff

repeatedly requested stays and failed to comply with court-mandated deadlines). Conversely,

“conduct that occurs one or two times is insufficient to demonstrate a history of dilatoriness.”

Briscoe v. Klaus, 538 F.3d 252, 261 (3d Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). In deciding whether a

history of dilatory conduct exists, this Court must evaluate “a party’s problematic acts ... in

light of its behavior over the life of the case.” Adams, 29 F.3d at 875. Here, the Court has

afforded McKnight more than one extension of time to file her brief in opposition to

Defendants’ motion to dismiss. (Doc. 65; Doc. 68; Doc. 70). McKnight has failed to timely

file an opposition brief despite the fact that the Court warned her that if she failed to file a

brief, the Court may deem her to have abandoned her claims against Defendants and not

oppose the instant motion to dismiss. (Doc. 68; Doc. 70). Additionally, McKnight’s only

engagement with resolving the instant motion to dismiss has been to request extensions and

stays of the deadlines related thereto. (Doc. 64; Doc. 67). In sum, McKnight was given

multiple opportunities to file a brief in opposition, but she still failed to do so. Accordingly,

McKnight’s actions demonstrate a history of dilatoriness that weighs in favor of dismissal.

4. Willful Conduct or Bad Faith

The fourth Poulis factor requires the Court to consider whether McKnight’s conduct

reflects mere inadvertence or negligence, as opposed to “strategic,” “intentional or self-serving

behavior.” Adams, 29 F.3d at 875-76. “Under this factor, the District Court must consider

whether the conduct was the type of willful or contumacious behavior which [can be]

characterized as flagrant bad faith.” Briscoe, 538 F.3d at 262 (quotation omitted). Here,

McKnight was repeatedly ordered to file a brief in opposition to Defendants’ motion to

dismiss, but she has failed to do so. (Doc. 68; Doc. 70). Moreover, McKnight was warned of

the possible consequences of failing to file a brief in opposition. (Doc. 65; Doc. 68; Doc. 70).

At this point in the case, McKnight has failed to comply with the Court’s instructions directing

her to take specific actions in this case and advising her how to do so. The Court is thus

compelled to conclude that his actions are not accidental or inadvertent, but rather reflect an

intentional disregard for the Court’s directives and this case. See Gilyard v. Dauphin Cty. Work

Release, No. 10-1657, 2010 WL 5060236, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 6, 2010). Thus, the fourth

Poulis factor weighs in favor of dismissal.

5. Availability of Alternative Sanctions

The fifth Poulis factor examines the effectiveness of sanctions other than dismissal. 747

F.2d at 868. Generally, “sanctions less than dismissal [are] ineffective when a litigant, such

as [Shehadeh], is proceeding pro se.” See Lopez, 435 F. App’x at 116; Emerson, 296 F.3d at 191

(per curium); Nowland v. Lucas, No. 1:10-CV-1863, 2012 WL 10559, at *6 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 3,

2012) (“This case presents such a situation where the plaintiff’s status as a pro se litigant

severely limits the ability of the court to utilize lesser sanctions to ensure that this litigation

progresses in an orderly fashion.”). Under the instant circumstances where the Court is faced

with the lack of cooperation on the part of the individual who brought the claims against

Defendants, the only appropriate sanction is dismissal of those certain claims with which

McKnight has failed to engage. Otherwise, the case would linger indefinitely on the Court’s

docket. McKnight is proceeding pro se but not in forma pauperis. Therefore, it is possible that

monetary sanctions, including attorney’s fees and costs, would be an effective sanction in this

case. However, McKnight’s failure to comply with the Court’s Orders leads to an inference

that further orders to her would not be effective. See Vessio, 2014 WL 6065924, at *8 (finding

that the fifth Poulis factor weighs in favor of dismissal when a pro se litigant has failed to

comply with other court orders). In this case, whether alternative sanctions would be effective

is a difficult determination to make, but one that weighs slightly in favor of dismissal given

McKnight’s failure to comply with other Court orders. (Doc. 68; Doc. 70).

6. Meritoriousness of McKnight’s Claims Against Defendants

The final Poulis factor asks the Court to consider the meritoriousness of McKnight’s

claims against Defendants. 747 F.2d at 868. A claim is deemed meritorious when “the

allegations of the pleadings, if established at trial, would support recovery by plaintiff ....”

Poulis, 747 F.2d at 870. “Generally, in determining whether a plaintiff’s claim is meritorious,

[courts] use the standard for a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.”

Briscoe, 538 F.3d at 263 (citing Poulis, 747 F.2d at 869-70). Defendants have presented strong

arguments for why the Court should dismiss McKnight’s claims against them. (Doc. 62).

In her initial complaint, McKnight alleged only that Defendants created a

supplemental report describing the scene at Baltimore’s arrest, that they complained to a

supervisor about her presence at the scene of Baltimore’s arrest, and that they provided

testimony at the July 2021 criminal trial. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 59-67, 118). The Court found that such

allegations did not implicate any clearly established rights and concluded that McKnight

relied on her own legal conclusions that these actions violated her rights. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 59-67,

118; Doc. 34). The Court could not find any authority asserting that these allegations would

constitute wrongdoing or amount to a violation of McKnight’s rights, nor could the Court

conclude as much. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 59-67, 118). Thus, the undersigned dismissed the claims against

Defendants on the grounds of qualified immunity. See Kelly v. Police Officer Barry Szamboti

Warwick Twp. Police Dep’t, No. 18-CV-3094, 2018 WL 11606340, at *1 n.1 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 5,

2018) (dismissing a complaint when the court noted “we can find no allegations of

wrongdoing on [a defendant’s] part whatsoever”); see also Morrow v. Balaski, 719 F.3d 160, 165

(3d Cir. 2013) (holding that courts are “‘not compelled to accept unsupported conclusions

and unwarranted inferences’” about a party’s wrongdoing) (quoting Baraka v. McGreevey, 481

F.3d 187, 195 (3d Cir. 2007).

On September 6, 2024, when the Court previously dismissed the claims against

Defendants, the undersigned also granted McKnight leave to file an amended complaint

(Doc. 53), which she did on September 27, 2024. (Doc. 56). In the amended complaint,

McKnight largely asserts the same claims against Defendants that this Court already deemed

insufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. (Doc. 1; Doc. 53; Doc. 56). McKnight reiterates

her allegations that Defendants violated her Fourth Amendment rights when “without

probable cause, they provided false reports and testimony regarding [McKnight’s] action at

the traffic stop”; “gave false testimony leading directly to the indictment of [McKnight],” and

“provided false reports and testimony regarding [McKnight’s] action at the traffic stop, and

caused her prosecution.” (Doc. 56 ¶¶ 125, 132, 144, 162). She also includes the primary

material addition to her allegations when she avers that Defendants complained to a

supervisor about McKnight’s presence at the scene of Baltimore’s arrest “so that [McKnight]

would face criminal charges.” (Doc. 56, ¶ 61). However, these allegations, while more specific

than the barebones allegations in her initial complaint, are conclusory for both an abuse of

process claim and a malicious prosecution claim.2 McKnight provides no averments about

2 Further, McKnight cannot plausibly plead a malicious prosecution violation against

Defendants for a second reason: because any such claim requires a showing that the defendant

initiated a criminal proceeding. See Johnson v. Knorr, 477 F.3d 75, 81-82 (3d Cir. 2007)

(holding that to prevail on a malicious prosecution claim asserted pursuant § 1983 and under

state law, a plaintiff “must show that: (1) the defendant initiated a criminal proceeding; (2)

the criminal proceeding ended in his favor; (3) the defendant initiated the proceeding without

probable cause; [and] (4) the defendant acted maliciously or for a purpose other than bringing

the plaintiff to justice.”) (citing Estate of Smith v. Marasco, 318 F.3d 497, 521 (3d Cir. 2003)).

McKnight does not allege that any Defendant initiated a criminal proceeding, nor can she.

(Doc. 56). In fact, according to the amended complaint, Defendants provided no testimony

whatsoever at the preliminary hearing which led to the determination that charges against

exactly how the complaint or any alleged falsehoods in their written reports3 would have

increased the likelihood that McKnight would face criminal charges. (Doc. 56, ¶¶ 47-59).

Thus, her allegation that they made false statements or complained to their supervisor so that

McKnight would face criminal charges is a “‘bald assertion[]’” that Iqbal and Twombly

prohibit a court from accepting. Morse, 132 F.3d at 906; Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. As such, the

Court finds that the sixth Poulis factor favors dismissal.

7. Balancing of Poulis Factors

To reiterate, when weighing the Poulis factors, there is no “magic formula” or

“mechanical calculation” that automatically warrants dismissal. Briscoe, 538 F.3d at 263.

Quite the contrary, the Court is guided by the Third Circuit’s warning that “no single Poulis

factor is dispositive,” and that “not all of the Poulis factors need be satisfied in order to dismiss

a complaint.” Ware, 322 F.3d at 222; see also Mindek, 964 F.2d at 1373. Here, on balance, the

Poulis factors weigh heavily in favor of dismissal of the claims against Defendants.

Accordingly, the claims against Defendants shall be DISMISSED. (Doc. 56).

IV. LEAVE TO AMEND

The Third Circuit has instructed that if a complaint is vulnerable to dismissal for failure

to state a claim, the district court must permit a curative amendment, unless an amendment

would be inequitable or futile. Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir.

McKnight should proceed to trial. (Doc. 56, ¶ 107). Accordingly, Counts I, II, and III, all

malicious prosecution claims, would fail against Defendants, as McKnight cannot show that

Defendants initiated a prosecution against her.

3 Specifically, according to the amended complaint, those falsehoods were that

McKnight took possession of her son’s belongings, such as money recovered from his person,

something that, according to Defendants’ statements, no officer opposed. (Doc. 56, ¶¶ 47-59).

2002). Further, “[a] district court has ‘substantial leeway in deciding whether to grant leave

to amend.’” In re Avandia Mktg., Sales Practices & Prod. Liab. Litig., 564 F. App’x 672, 673 (3d

Cir. 2014) (not precedential) (quoting Lake v. Arnold, 232 F.3d 360, 373 (3d Cir. 2000)). In

civil rights cases, District Courts are to follow this instruction “even [if] the plaintiff [is]

represented by experienced counsel [and] never sought leave to amend.” Shane v. Fauver, 213

F.3d 113, 116 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing Dist. Council 47 v. Bradley, 795 F.2d 310, 316 (3d Cir.

1986)). In this case, leave to amend would be futile, as the operative complaint in this matter

is McKnight’s amended complaint as asserted against Defendants, and McKnight has failed

to respond to the motions to dismiss the amended complaint and thus been deemed not to

oppose as much. Accordingly, the Court will not grant McKnight further leave to amend at

this juncture.

V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the motions to dismiss are deemed unopposed and will be

GRANTED. (Doc. 61; Doc. 72). All claims against the moving Defendants are

DISMISSED. (Doc. 56). The Clerk of Court is directed to CLOSE this action.

An appropriate Order follows.

BY THE COURT:

Dated: June 18, 2025 s/ Karoline Mehalchick

KAROLINE MEHALCHICK

United States District Judge