The opinion
UNIVERSITY OF NEW * NO. 2024-CA-0472
ORLEANS RESEARCH AND
TECHNOLOGY *
FOUNDATION, INC. COURT OF APPEAL
*
VERSUS FOURTH CIRCUIT
*
NORMAN WHITE CHIEF STATE OF LOUISIANA
FINANCIAL OFFICER AND *******
DIRECTOR OF FINANCE,
CITY OF NEW ORLEANS;
ERROLL G. WILLIAMS,
ASSESSOR, ORLEANS
PARISH; AND LAWRENCE E.
CHEHARDY, CHAIRMAN,
LOUISIANA TAX
COMMISSION
CONSOLIDATED WITH: CONSOLIDATED WITH:
UNIVERSITY OF NEW ORLEANS NO. 2024-CA-0473
RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGY
FOUNDATION, INC.
VERSUS
NORMAN WHITE CHIEF FINANCIAL
OFFICER AND DIRECTOR OF FINANCE,
CITY OF NEW ORLEANS; ERROLL G.
WILLIAMS, ASSESSOR, ORLEANS
PARISH; AND LAWRENCE E.
CHEHARDY, CHAIRMAN, LOUISIANA
TAX COMMISSION
APPEAL FROM
BOARD OF TAX APPEALS
NO. L01362 C/W L01634
Judge Cade R. Cole
******
Judge Daniel L. Dysart
******
(Court composed of Judge Daniel L. Dysart, Judge Dale N. Atkins, Judge Karen K.
Herman)
ATKINS, J., DISSENTS AND ASSIGNS REASONS.
Cheryl Mollere Kornick
Robert S. Angelico
Tyler D. Trew
LISKOW & LEWIS
701 Poydras Street, Suite 5000
New Orleans, LA 70139
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE
John J. Weiler
Reese F. Williamson
WEILER & REES, L.L.C.
909 Poydras Street, Suite 1250
New Orleans, LA 70112
COUNSEL FOR DEFENTANT/APPELLANT, ERROLL G. WILLIAMS,
ASSESSOR, PARISH OF ORLEANS
James M. Roquemore
DEPUTY CITY ATTORNEY
Corwin M. St. Raymond
CHIEF DEPUTY CITY ATTORNEY
Donesia D. Turner
CITY ATTORNEY
1300 Perdido Street, Suite 5E03
New Orleans, LA 70112
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT, NORMAN WHITE IN HIS
CAPACITY AS DIRECTOR OF THE DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE,
AND CITY OF NEW ORLEANS
AFFIRMED
MARCH 6, 2025
DLD In this tax exemption case, the defendants, Erroll G. Williams, in his
KKH
capacity as Assessor for Orleans Parish (“the Assessor”), and Norman White, in
his capacity as Director of the Department of Finance for the City of New Orleans
(“the City”), appeal a judgment of the Louisiana Board of Tax Appeals rendered in
favor of the plaintiff, University of New Orleans Research and Technology
Foundation, Inc. (“UNORTF”). For the reasons that follow, we affirm the
judgment of the Board of Tax Appeals.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The property issue in this case consist of four buildings located in a research
and technology park owned by UNORTF. The land on which the buildings are
situated was acquired by the Board of Supervisors of Louisiana State University
and Agricultural and Mechanical College acting on behalf of the University of
New Orleans (“UNO”) and was conditioned upon the construction of the research
and technology park. Construction of the buildings was financed pursuant to
cooperative endeavor agreements between UNORTF, the State of Louisiana, the
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Louisiana Department of Economic Development and UNO. UNORTF issued
bonds through the Louisiana Public Facilities Authority and the legislature
appropriated general funds annually to retire the bonded indebtedness.
UNORTF was formed in 1997 as a Section 501(c)(3) nonprofit corporation.
According to UNORTF’s articles of incorporation, its purposes were to support
programs, facilities and educational and research opportunities offered by UNO; to
promote, expand and improve the university’s curricula and programs; to provide
greater educational opportunities; and to encourage teaching, research, and
scholarship. UNORTF’s mission also includes attracting new industry to the
community, encouraging the development of or retention of an industry in the
community; promoting the development of high technology industries and
research; increasing employment opportunities; promoting cooperation between
the public and private sector with respect to research and development; and to
create, develop, construct, manage and finance one or more research and
technology parks. The legislature outlines the public purpose served by research
and technology parks that support public universities in La. R.S. 17:3389(a). The
City of New Orleans Code of Ordinances, Chapter 150, Article VI, Division 3,
Section 150-538 recognizes that a research and technology park authorized by the
legislature serves a public purpose.
On January 23, 1998, UNO leased the land on which the buildings are
situated to UNORTF to construct and develop the research and technology park.
According to the ground lease, UNORTF must: (1) establish, operate and manage
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the research and technology park; (2) identify and recruit potential tenants; (3)
screen potential tenants for appropriateness in light of the research and technology
park mission, the cash sale, lessor’s guidelines for tenancy and the covenants,
conditions, and restrictions; and (4) recommend appropriate tenants to UNO for
approval. Upon termination of the lease for any reason, or upon dissolution of
UNORTF, title to the buildings automatically transfers to UNO.
UNORTF filed a petition with the Louisiana Board of Tax Appeals seeking
an exemption from 2022 Orleans Parish ad valorem taxes (paid under protest) for
four buildings (2219 Lakeshore Drive, 2285 Lakeshore Drive, 2253 Lakeshore
Drive, and 2021 Lakeshore Drive) located in the UNO Research and Technology
Park. UNORTF filed a second petition seeking an exemption from the 2023 ad
valorem taxes for the same properties. The two cases were consolidated.
UNORTF argued two alternative theories as the basis for the exemption; it
contended that the subject property qualified for an exemption for the property
being used for public purposes under La. Const. Art. VII, § 21(A) or an exemption
for property owned and operated for charitable purposes under La. Const. Art. VII
§ 21(B)(1)(a)(i).
A trial on the merits took place on January 31, 2024. Following trial on the
merits, the Board of Tax Appeals issued its original order and reasons on April 11,
2024, its supplemental order and reasons on April 24, 2024, and its judgment on
the merits on June 14, 2024, finding the subject property to be exempt from
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Orleans Parish ad valorem taxes under La. Const. Art. VII, § 21(A) for tax years
2022 and 2023. It is from this judgment that the Assessor and the City now appeal.
DISCUSSION
On appeal, the Assessor and the City raise the following assignments of
error: (1) the Board of Tax Appeals erred its interpretation and application of the
constitutional test under La. Const. Art. VII, § 21(A), because it failed to correctly
interpret and apply the two-part legal test to determine whether property owned by
a private taxpayer is exempt from ad valorem taxation under Section 21(A); (2) the
Board of Tax Appeals erred in its application of the legal standards and burden of
proof on UNOTRF in this case, which is the strict construction legal standard and
heightened burden of proof applicable to all tax exemption cases; (3) the Board of
Tax Appeals was manifestly erroneous in its conclusions that the tenants’ activities
at the subject properties supported a public purpose because there is insufficient
evidence in the record to prove that the activities at subject properties were
conducted for a public purpose during the relevant time period; and (4) the Board
of Tax Appeals erred by overruling several of Assessor Williams’ objections to the
inadmissible hearsay testimony of UNORTF’s CEO as to the activities and
statements of the third-party tenants of the subject properties.
La. Const. Art. VII, § 21(A) exempts from ad valorem or property taxes any
property that serves a public purpose, where the property and its revenues are
dedicate to that public purpose. Adm’rs of Tulane Educ. Fund v. Bd. of Assessors,
38 La.Ann. 292 (1886). To qualify, the property need not have any public
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ownership. If privately-owned property and the revenue from the property are
dedicated to a legislatively recognized public purpose and public use, the property
is exempt. Id.; Warren County, Mississippi v. Hester, 219 La. 763, 54 So.2d 12, 14
(1951). Property “consecrated to public use is not taxable irrespective of the
nature of the ownership.” Holly v. Plum Creek Timber Co., 38,716, p. 8 (La. App.
2 Cir. 6/23/04), 877 So.2d 284, 290 (citing Warren County, Mississippi, 219 La.
763, 54 So.2d at 14).
The Supreme Court has made it clear that it is the legislature that defines the
“public use” underlying the §21(A) exemption:
And these illustrate another proposition, viz; that private property
which is subject to taxation becomes exempt by the change that is
made in its use. The character of taxability is not ineffaceably
stamped on property, and it may be removed by the act of its owner.
Whenever he dedicates it to public use it passes under the dominion of
the exemption that is accorded to public property. And that is what
we meant when in the earlier part of this opinion we said that the
question was whether the consecration of the plaintiffs’ revenues to a
public use did not proprio vigore operate an exemption. The
legislature cannot exempt from taxation property that is
constitutionally liable to it, but an owner of property may translate it
into the domain of constitutional exemption by dedicating it to public
use.
Tulane, 38 La. Ann. at 297-298.
Accordingly, “the legislature determines what is a public use, and when it
has declared what may be so regarded, courts will not interfere except in clear
cases of usurpation or abuse of authority.” Id. This Court reaffirmed this standard
in Board of Commissioners of the Port of New Orleans v. City of New Orleans, 15-
0768 (La. App. 4 Cir. 3/16/16), 186 So.3d 1282.
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The legislature broadly defined the public purpose and public use of the
research and technology parks as follows:
The legislature finds that development of research and development
parks in association with public or regionally accredited independent
universities in the state, with quality facilities for research and
development, manufacturing of goods resulting from and related to
research and development facilities, and related support services and
concerns, will benefit the citizens of Louisiana through improved
scientific information and technology and through improved scientific
information and technology and through improved economic
conditions and creation of jobs.
La. R.S. 17:3389(a).
A research and technology park under this legislation is an area near a public
university that can be leased to business and industry engaged in research,
technology, developing products, and related support services and concerns. The
expectation is that the park will create economic activity for the area, and that the
business and industry located there can collaborate with the nearby university.
As the Board of Tax Appeals recognized in the instant case, “the legislature
provided non-profit corporations, like UNORTF, with special powers” necessary to
accomplish that public purpose. As long as UNORTF uses these powers to
accomplish the public purpose, it is engaged in a “public use” for purposes of
§21(A). The legislature gave UNORTF and UNO the discretion to select tenants
that UNO believed support the public purpose underlying the research and
technology park. The legislature also gave UNORTF and UNO the discretion to
forge connections between tenants and UNO in a way that best accomplished the
public purpose of the research and technology park. Accordingly, we find no merit
regarding the first assignment of error raised by the Assessor and the City.
In their second assignment of error, the Assessor and the City argue that the
Board of Tax Appeals erred in its application of the legal standards and burden of
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proof on UNORTF in this case. The Assessor and the City argue that each of the
research and technology park’s tenant’s activities must constitute some “public
purpose,” which is never defined. However, the legislature did define the
applicable public purpose in La. R.S. 17:3389(a) and La. R.S. 17:3397.5. The
Board of Tax Appeals recognized that these statutes laid down the proper
governing standard. The legislation recognized that UNORTF, not the tenants, is
using the subject property for that purpose; the legislation delegates to UNORTF,
not the tenants, the authority to take the actions necessary to meet that public
purpose. See La. R.S. 17:3397.5. Accordingly, it is the activities of UNORTF, not
the tenants, that must be examined to determine if UNORTF complied with the
legislature’s directives.
In its order and reasons, the Board of Tax Appeals found: “Absent some
indication that the Foundation has deviated from the legislature’s directives, it is
not appropriate for the Assessor or this Board to essentially devise its own criteria
for screening and monitoring tenants. The legislature has delegated that function
to UNO and the Foundation.” In Board of Commissioners of the Port of New
Orleans v. City of New Orleans, we have a situation where the legislature had also
defined the public purpose for the Port and the Port, the party charged with
meeting the public purpose, provided testimony as to why it chose specific tenants
to meet that public purpose, and how those tenants helped the Port meet the public
purpose. 15-0768 at pp. 8-9, 186 So.3d at 1287. This Court held “that the lessees’
activities on the Port’s property further its public mission and satisfy the public
purpose requirement of La. Const. art. VII, § 21(A).” Id. at p. 9, 186 So.3d at
1287. The Court further found “the activities of the lessees are in harmony with
the Port’s legislative mission and provide a public benefit as outlined above.” Id.
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at p. 10, 186 So.3d at 1288. Accordingly, the ultimate standard was whether the
tenants’ activities were “in harmony” with the directives given by the legislature to
the Port. There was no holding that the activities of the tenants, independently,
needed to meet some unstated public purpose.
In the instant case, the Board of Tax Appeals heard testimony from Ms.
Conwell, the CEO and president of UNORTF, as to (1) how UNORTF and UNO
screened tenants to assure the tenants would be “in harmony” with UNORTF’s
legislative mission; and (2) how UNORTF monitored the activities of the tenants
to bring about as much collaboration with UNO as possible. This testimony was
uncontradicted. As the trier of fact, the Board of Tax Appeals is entitled to
deference, and the Court cannot overturn a finding by the trier of fact unless there
is no support in the record, especially where there is no contradictory testimony.
See Canter v. Koehring Co., 283 So.2d 716, 724 (La. 1973); See also Goings v.
State Through Dep’t of Pub. Safety & Corr., 94-1386, pp. 7-8 (La. 1/17/95), 648
So.2d 884, 887-88. Accordingly, the second assignment of error put forth by the
Assessor and the City is without merit.
In their third assignment of error, the Assessor and the City contend that the
Board of Tax Appeals was manifestly erroneous in its conclusion that the tenants’
activities at the subject properties supported a public purpose. However, the Board
of Tax Appeals never made such finding and that is not the standard established by
the legislature in La. R.S. 17:3389(a) and recognized by this Court in Bd. Of
Comm’s of the Port of New Orleans v. City of New Orleans, (La. App. 4 Cir.
3/16/16), 186 So.3d 1282. In any event, the Board of Tax Appeals’ findings of fact
are amply supported by the record on appeal before this Court. Accordingly, we
find no merit in this assignment of error.
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In their final assignment of error, the Assessor and the City contend that the
Board of Tax Appeals erred by overruling several of the Assessor’s objections to
what they considered inadmissible hearsay evidence on the part of UNORTF’s
CEO as to the activities and statements of the third-party tenants of the subject
properties. The Board of Tax appeals noted that it only considered testimony from
Ms. Conwell that was based on her own personal knowledge or the records of
UNORTF. That is not in any way improper hearsay evidence. An executive of an
organization is “competent to testify about basic information concerning the
company, particularly where that information is not contradicted by any other
evidence.” Schnexnaildre v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 15-0272, p. 16 (La.
App. 1 Cir. 11/9/15), 184 So.3d 108, 117. Furthermore, they should be familiar
enough to testify as to matters within the scope of their management
responsibilities. See Jones v. Foster, 41,619, p. 6 (La. App. 2 Cir. 12/13/06), 945
So.2d 262, 266. Accordingly, the final assignment of error raised by the Assessor
and the City is without merit.
CONCLUSION
For the above and foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Board of Tax
Appeals is affirmed.
AFFIRMED
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