The opinion
SABRINA RICHARDSON * NO. 2024-CA-0556
VERSUS * COURT OF APPEAL
NEW ORLEANS POLICE * FOURTH CIRCUIT
DEPARTMENT
* STATE OF LOUISIANA
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APPEAL FROM
CITY CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION ORLEANS
NO. 9406
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Judge Rachael D. Johnson
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(Court composed of Judge Joy Cossich Lobrano, Judge Sandra Cabrina Jenkins,
Judge Rachael D. Johnson)
Kevin Vincent Boshea
ATTORNEY AT LAW
2955 Ridgelake Drive, Suite 207
Metairie, LA 70002
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT
Donesia D. Turner
Corwin M. St. Raymond
William R. H. Goforth
CITY ATTORNEY
1300 Perdidio Street
Room 5E03
New Orleans, LA 70112
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE
AFFIRMED
March 31, 2025
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RDJ The appeal concerns a discrimination appeal brought before the New
JCL
SCJ Orleans Civil Service Commission (“Commission”). Sabrina Richardson
(“Richardson”) alleges the New Orleans Police Department (“NOPD”)
discriminated against her because of her sex when she was demoted from
probationary Police Captain to Police Lieutenant, her previous position with the
NOPD. Richardson seeks review of the Commission’s final decision issued on
July 15, 2024, in CS No. 9406, wherein the Commission denied Richardson’s
appeal of her demotion by the NOPD. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the
Commission’s judgment.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Richardson became a probationary Police Captain for NOPD on November
8, 2021, commanding the Public Integrity Bureau (“PIB”). While serving as both
Police Lieutenant and probationary Police Captain, Richardson was involved in
multiple PIB investiagtions regarding misconduct related to her secondary
employment from 2019 to 2021. Of relevance to this appeal is PIB Case #2021-
0697-P, which stemmed from a public complaint regarding Richardson’s activities
during paid secondary employment shifts (“details”) on November 22, 2021. The
invesitgation into PIB Case #2021-0697-P began on December 5, 2021, and
concluded on March 16, 2022.1 Following a pre-disciplinary hearing on August
24, 2022, NOPD issued a disciplinary letter to Richardson on October 17, 2022,
sustaining seventeen overlap violations. Richardson also had timesheets indicating
that she was working details at the same time she was reported working regular
NOPD shifts, as well as payroll violations and leaving details early without
notifying the Office of Police Secondary Employment (“OPSE”). The total
suspension for Richardson for all violations was 164 days, later reduced to 119
days as the maximum suspension penalty was 120 days.
In addition to the 119-day suspension, Richardson was demoted from her
position as probationary Police Captain back to her original position as Police
Lieutenant on October 5, 2022. NOPD based the decision to demote Richardson
on her multiple instances of police misconduct and the nature of the misconduct,
determining that her conduct was unbecoming of a probationary employee and that
she had not met the requirements to achieve permanent status as a Police Captain.
Richardson filed an appeal with the Commission on October 20, 2022
regarding her suspension. The Commission issued its initial decision on
September 13, 2023, and issued an amended decision on October 2, 2023, after
NOPD filed a motion for re-hearing on September 22, 2023. Richardson also
timely appealed her demotion on October 31, 2022. In her appeal, Richardson
alleged that her demotion was based on sex discrimination. A Civil Service
Hearing concerning Richardson’s demotion was held on February 7, 2024 and
February 27, 2024. On July 16, 2024, the Commission denied Richardson’s
appeal, determing that she failed to make a prima facie showing of sex
1 Richardson was also the subject of PIB Case #2022-0239-P and PIB Case #2022-0350-P,
investigations which resulted from public complaints; Case #2022-0239-P included an allegation
of payroll fraud.
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discrimination and that NOPD had a legitimate, non-pretextual reason for
demoting her. Richardson filed this timely appeal of that decision.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Decisions made by the Commission “shall be subject to review on any
question of law or fact upon appeal to the court of appeal wherein the commission
is located.” La. Const. art. X, § 12. “Questions of law and procedure are reviewed
de novo.” Moton v. Sewerage & Water Bd. of New Orleans, 22-0747, p. 8 (La.
App. 4 Cir. 5/10/23), 368 So.3d 151, 156 (citations omitted). Mixed questions of
law and fact “should be accorded great deference by the reviewing court under the
manifest error standard of review.” Banks v. New Orleans Police Dep’t, 01-0859,
p. 3 (La. App. 4 Cir. 9/25/02), 829 So.2d 511, 514 (citations omitted). Regarding a
question of fact, “a reviewing court should apply the clearly wrong or manifest
error rule prescribed generally for appellate review in deciding whether to affirm
the commission’s factual findings.” Walters v. Dep’t of Police of City of New
Orleans, 454 So.2d 106, 113 (La. 1984) (citations omitted). Furthermore, when
reviewing a commission’s factual findings, “the court should not reverse or modify
such a finding unless it is clearly wrong or manifestly erroneous” and “the court
should not modify the commission’s order unless it is arbitrary, capricious or
characterized by abuse of discretion.” Id. at p. 114. See also Liang v. Dep’t. of
Police, 13-1364, p. 8 (La. App. 4th Cir. 8/20/14) 147 So.3d 1221, 1225. A
commission makes an arbitrary or capricious decision if there is no rational basis
for the action. Bannister v. Dep’t of Streets, 95-0404, p. 8 (La. 1/16/96), 666 So.2d
641, 647.
Regarding discrimination appeals, an employee who is “discriminated
against [on the basis of sex] shall have the right of appeal to the appropriate
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commission...[t]he burden of proof on appeal, as to the facts, shall be on the
employee.” La. Const. art. X, § 8. As this appeal concerns the Commission’s
factual findings regarding Richardson’s claim of sex discrimination, we apply the
clearly wrong or manifest error standard in determining whether the Commission
made an arbitrary or capricious decision in finding that Richardson failed to make
a prima facie case of sex discrimination.
DISCUSSION
A regular employee as defined by Civil Service Rule I, §1(64) is “an
employee who has been appointed to a position in the classified service in
accordance with the Law and these Rules and who has completed the working test
period.” A probationary employee as defined by Civil Service Rule I, §1(81) is
“an employee who has been appointed to a position from an employment list, but
who has not completed the working test period.” Regarding appeals for regular
employees, Civil Service Rule II, §4.1 states that “[r]egular employees in the
classified service shall have the right to appeal disciplinary actions to the
Commission, including dismissal, involuntary retirement, demotion, suspension,
fine, reduction in pay, or letters of reprimand as defined in Rule I.” Probationary
employees are not permitted appeals unless “they have been discriminated against
because of their political or religious beliefs, sex, race, age, disability or sexual
orientation.” Civil Service Rule II, §4.5. See Moton, 22-0747, p. 10, 368 So.3d at
157. Although Richardson appealed both her suspension and her demotion, of
relevance to this appeal is solely the facts concerning her demotion, as Richardson
alleges that her demotion was the result of sex discrimination.
To establish a prima facie case of sex discrimination, Richardson needed to
show (1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she was qualified for her
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position; (3) she suffered an adverse employment decision; and (4) similarly
situated male employees were treated more favorably. Guidry v. Glazer’s Distrib.
of La., Inc., 10-218, p. 4 (La. App. 3rd Cir. 11/3/10) 49 So.3d 586, 590. While
Richardson was able to meet the first three requirements, she failed to satisfy the
fourth. It is undisputed that Richardson is a member of a protected class, as she is
a woman. She was qualified for the position of probationary Police Captain based
on her years of experience at NOPD and her previous position as Police
Lieutenant. And, she suffered an adverse employment decision when she was
demoted from Captain to Lieutenant, as this decision lowered her rank within
NOPD. However, Richardson failed to demonstrate that similarly situated male
employees were treated more favorably by NOPD.
The standard for “similarly situated” requires that Richardson “be similarly
situated to those other employees in terms of performance, qualifications, and
conduct, and that no other unique facts differentiate[] their situations.” Guidry, 10-
218, p. 5, 49 So.3d at 591 (quoting Lester v. Sec’y of Veterans Affairs, 514 F.
Supp.2d 866, 874 (W.D. La. 2007)). Importantly, the conduct of Richardson and
to whom Richardson was compared for purposes of the analysis must have been
nearly identical because “[i]f the difference between the plaintiff’s conduct and
that of those alleged to be similarly situated accounts for the difference in
treatment received from the employer, the employees are not similarly situated for
the purposes of an employment discrimination analysis.” Lee v. Kansas City S. Ry.
Co., 574 F.3d 253, 260 (5th Cir. 2009). Factors such as working for different
divisions of a company or having different work responsibilities also affect
whether situations are sufficiently similar. Id.
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Richardson offered Kendrick Allen (“Allen”) and Eric Guillard (“Guillard”)
as comparisons for purposes of a sex discrimination analysis. Both Allen and
Guillard were male employees of NOPD. Both served as probationary Police
Captains at the same time as Richardson. Like Richardson, Allen and Guillard also
had timesheets indicating they were working paid details at the same time they
reported working regular NOPD shifts. Unlike Richardson, Allen and Guillard
went on to become permanent Police Captains. Richardson argues that Allen and
Guillard were treated more favorably despite having committed the same type of
violations. However, the Commission noted key distinctions between Richardson
and the two male employees in its decision. Richardson was commanding officer
of PIB during her time as probationary Captain, therefore her job duties were
different from those of Allen and Guillard. Furthermore, Richardson left details
early without informing OPSE, a type of misconduct neither Allen nor Guillard
committed. This type of misconduct involves receiving wages from a secondary
employer for time not worked and could not be accounted for by a data entry
mistake, as could the overlap violations committed by Richardson, Allen, and
Guillard.
As a result of these significant differences, Richardson failed to make a
prima facie showing of sex discrimination. Richardson failed to establish that she
was treated differently from similarly situated male counterparts because there
were unique facts that differentiated Richardson from Allen and Guillard. The
differences in Richardson’s conduct and job duties accounted for her different
treatment, not her sex. Therefore, we find no manifest error in the Commission’s
decision to deny Richardson’s appeal.
DECREE
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For the reasons discussed above, we affirm the Commission’s decision
denying Richardson’s appeal of her demotion from probationary Police Captain to
Police Lieutenant.
AFFIRMED
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