Martha Stringer v. County of Bucks

PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

_____________

No. 23-1373

_____________

MARTHA STRINGER; PAUL STRINGER

v.

COUNTY OF BUCKS; MR. ANDREW KOVACH; KYLE

WYLIE; JENIFER FORMAN; CRYSTAL BIEMULLER;

CHRISTINE CUTEO; JACQUELINE TORRES; C.O.

PAGONE; C.O. HINES; C.O. STYERS; JOHN DOES 1-20;

C.O. MURDOCH; LANGSTON MASON; C.O.G.

WILLIAMS; SERGEANT MANDER; C.O. NESTER; C.O.

DUPREY; C.O. GEIBERT; C.O.A. CRUZ; C.O. SHERROD;

C.O. HUGHES; C.O. MILES; C.O. HEILMAN; SERGEANT

GILL; LT. MORRIS; C.O. MIME; C.O. MCINTYRE; C.O.

DEVLIN; C.O. SOUTH; SERGEANT LYNN;

C.O. CANTERMAN

Mr. Andrew Kovach, Kyle Wyle, Jenifer Forman, Crystal

Biemuller, Christine Cuteo, Jacquline Torres, C.O. Pagone,

C.O. Hines; C.O. Styers, C.O. Murdoch, Langston Mason,

C.O. G. Williams; Sergeant Mander, C.O. Nester; C.O.

Duprey; C.O. Geibert, C.O.A. Cruz, C.O. Sherrod, C.O.

Hughes, C.O. Miles, C.O. Heilman; Sergeant Gill, LT.

Morris, C.O. Mine, C.O. McIntyre, C.O. Devlin, C.O. South,

Sergeant Lynn, C.O. Canterman,

Appellants

_______________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. No. 2:22-cv-01525)

District Judge: Honorable Berle M. Schiller

_______________

Argued January 30, 2024

Before: KRAUSE, PORTER, and CHUNG, Circuit Judges.

(Filed: June 18, 2025)

Kerri E. Chewning [ARGUED]

Jeffrey M. Scott

Archer & Greiner

Three Logan Square

1717 Arch Street, Suite 3500

Philadelphia, PA 19103

Counsel for Appellants

Charles L. Becker [ARGUED]

David K. Inscho

Ruxandra M. Laidacker

Kline & Specter, PC

1525 Locust Street

19th Floor

Philadelphia, PA 19102

Counsel for Appellee

2

_______________

OPINION OF THE COURT

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KRAUSE, Circuit Judge.

When hauled into federal court, state actors

undoubtedly want qualified immunity at the earliest possible

stage. But how soon is too soon? We consider in this

interlocutory appeal whether to deny a motion to dismiss on

qualified immunity grounds where the complaint is sufficiently

detailed to state a claim for a constitutional violation but not

specific enough to assess whether the right was clearly

established at the time it was allegedly violated.

In spring 2020, Plaintiffs Martha and Paul Stringer

received news that any parent would dread: Their daughter,

Kimberly, who had long struggled with severe mental illness,

had been detained after an altercation with a neighbor and was

being mistreated by the staff of the Bucks County Correctional

Facility (BCCF), where she was being held. After Kimberly

was finally transferred to a mental hospital and then released,

the Stringers sued the County of Bucks and various BCCF

corrections officers on Kimberly’s behalf, 1 alleging that the

officers’ actions—which included pepper spraying Kimberly

and subjecting her to a restraint chair—violated her Fourteenth

Amendment right to be free from excessive force. The District

Court concluded the Stringers sufficiently pleaded a violation

of Kimberly’s Fourteenth Amendment rights and denied

Defendants’ motion to dismiss, reasoning that a more

1

Martha and Paul have power of attorney for Kimberly.

3

developed factual record was needed to ascertain whether the

Defendants were entitled to qualified immunity.

We agree. While the Stringers’ complaint states a claim

for a violation of a constitutional right, namely, Kimberly’s

right to be free from the use of excessive force, it is not

sufficiently detailed to enable the Court to define that right

with more specificity and then assess whether that right was

clearly established, as required for qualified immunity.

Because the District Court correctly determined that

Defendants’ entitlement to qualified immunity is not clear

from the face of the complaint, we will affirm and remand for

limited discovery as needed for a fact-specific qualified

immunity analysis.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

A. Kimberly’s Detention at BCCF

Kimberly Stringer has long struggled with mental

illness, including bipolar disorder. In the spring of 2020, her

mental health deteriorated further, and her “worsening

paranoia” led her to hit and threaten a neighbor. App. 78. Falls

Township police officers arrested her and held her at BCCF to

await trial.

At BCCF, Kimberly suffered greatly. According to the

amended complaint (Complaint), even though Kimberly’s

mental illness rendered her unable to comply with prison

directives, Defendants “punished” her on multiple occasions

for her noncompliance by pepper spraying her, handcuffing

her, and placing her in a restraint chair. The Complaint asserts

that Defendants used a combination of these tactics not once,

but many times, including, at a minimum, on May 6, 10, 11,

4

20, and 29. On May 10, Defendants allegedly put Kimberly in

the restraint chair twice in the same day: once at 10:10 AM and

again at 12:25 PM. At no time, according to the Complaint,

did Kimberly pose a threat to the guards or other inmates, nor

could she have, as she allegedly deteriorated into a catatonic

state over the course of her detention. Even as her condition

became so severe that she was moved to a cell in the Women’s

Special Housing Unit for Mental Health Inmates, Defendants

allegedly continued to pepper spray and restrain her as

punishment for noncompliance with their directives. 2

At some point, according to the Complaint, other

inmates became so alarmed by Kimberly’s treatment that they

2

The Complaint alleges that Sergeants Morris, Lynn, Mason,

Kovach, Wylie, and Mander, the supervisors at the jail who

authorized the use of force against Kimberly, knew that

Kimberly was unable to comply with directives from the

guards because of her mental illness—though it is unclear

when they became aware of these facts. It does not specifically

allege knowledge on the part of the other Defendants. That,

too, will require factual development on remand because,

while excessive force claims and qualified immunity defense

are evaluated under an objective reasonableness standard,

see Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 396–97 (2015);

Ziglar v. Abbasi, 582 U.S. 120, 151 (2017), “deciding whether

a use of force was objectively reasonable demands ‘careful

attention to the facts and circumstances’ relating to the

incident, as then known to the officer,” Barnes v. Felix, 145 S.

Ct. 1353, 1358 (2025) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S.

386, 396 (1989)); see Kingsley, 576 U.S. at 397 (evaluating

alleged excessive force “from the perspective of a reasonable

officer on the scene, including what the officer knew at the

time, not with the 20/20 vision of hindsight”).

5

managed to contact the Stringers to alert them to their

daughter’s critical condition. Kimberly’s mother, Martha,

promptly emailed the Bucks County Commissioner to ask if

her daughter had faced pepper spray, but she was assured that

was not the case. Two days later, however, a news article was

published about Kimberly’s treatment, allegedly based on

firsthand accounts of inmates who had witnessed her ordeal.

Two days after that public disclosure, Kimberly was

transferred to Norristown State Mental Hospital. By that point,

however, she allegedly had suffered pain, disfigurement, and

possible brain damage and was “cat[at]onic,” “unable to

verbally communicate[,] and nearly entirely unresponsive.”

App. 84.

B. District Court Proceedings

In April 2022, Kimberly’s parents sued Bucks County

and various BCCF corrections officers in the Eastern District

of Pennsylvania, alleging violations of Kimberly’s Eighth

Amendment rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 3 Although

Plaintiffs diligently sought access to documents and videotapes

concerning Kimberly’s time at BCCF—including the

recordings of at least two “planned” uses of force that

supposedly were recorded—Defendants allegedly refused to

produce any video evidence. Plaintiffs’ initial complaint

identified certain officers by name but also included 20 John

Doe officers. In August 2022, after receiving a limited number

3

As the District Court explained, because Kimberly was a

pretrial detainee, not a post-conviction prisoner, the Fourteenth

Amendment (as opposed to the Eighth Amendment) governed

her rights while detained. Plaintiffs’ counsel acknowledged

this point in Plaintiffs’ response to Defendants’ motion to

dismiss.

6

of use-of-force records, the Stringers amended their Complaint

to identify the John Does. Defendants moved to dismiss on

various grounds, including failure to state a claim and qualified

immunity—an affirmative defense that shields officials from

civil liability to the extent that their conduct did not violate

clearly established constitutional rights of which a reasonable

official would have known.

In February 2023, the District Court granted

Defendants’ motion in part and denied it in part. 4 As relevant

to qualified immunity, the only subject of this interlocutory

appeal, the District Court concluded that the Stringers had

stated a claim for a violation of Kimberly’s Fourteenth

Amendment right to be free from excessive force that amounts

to punishment. The Court then denied without prejudice the

remaining Defendants’ request for qualified immunity as

4

The Court determined that, because the Stringers’ amended

claims related back to their initial complaint, it would not

dismiss the newly named defendants for the Stringers’ failure

to file within the relevant statute of limitations. In addition, the

Court declined to dismiss the excessive force and supervisory

liability claims against all individual Defendants other than

Defendant Mander, against whom the Stringers’ supervisory

liability claim was dismissed. The Court dismissed the

municipal liability claim against Bucks County because the

Stringers did not plead facts showing either that the County had

a “custom or policy” of authorizing the use of excessive force

on mentally ill prisoners or that the County failed to adequately

train or supervise its employees. Stringer v. County of Bucks,

No. 22-1525, 2023 WL 2163871, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 22, 2023)

(quoting McTernan v. City of York, 564 F.3d 636, 658 (3d Cir.

2009)).

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“premature” because it could not, without further factual

development, “presently determine whether it would have been

clear to any of the correctional officers that their conduct was

unlawful when interacting with Stringer.” Stringer v. County

of Bucks, No. 22-1525, 2023 WL 2163871, at *5 n.7 (E.D. Pa.

Feb. 22, 2023). The Court noted that Defendants could re-raise

qualified immunity once limited discovery uncovered the facts

necessary to meaningfully assess whether they acted

reasonably in light of clearly established law. Defendants

timely appealed. 5

II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review

The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1331 and 1343. Because qualified immunity serves as an

“immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability,”

Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985), a district court’s

decision to allow discovery operates as a denial for purposes

of an interlocutory appeal, see Weimar v. County of Fayette,

972 F.3d 177, 185 (3d Cir. 2020). Thus, we have appellate

5

In the same order denying in part Defendants’ motion to

dismiss, the District Court authorized the Stringers to amend

their municipal liability claim against Bucks County and their

supervisory liability claim against Defendant Mander. After

Defendants appealed, the Stringers took advantage of that

opportunity, filing a second amended complaint. Because the

amendments did not alter the allegations against the individual

Defendants asserting qualified immunity, this appeal will

“resolve [the] disputed question” of whether they are entitled

to qualified immunity on the face of the now-operative

complaint. Roberts v. Lau, 90 F.4th 618, 623 n.1 (3d Cir. 2024)

(alteration in original) (quoting Saint-Jean v. Palisades

Interstate Park Comm’n, 49 F.4th 830, 835 (3d Cir. 2022)).

8

jurisdiction here under the collateral order doctrine based on

the District Court’s postponement of the qualified immunity

analysis. See George v. Rehiel, 738 F.3d 562, 571 (3d Cir.

2013).

We review the denial of a motion to dismiss on qualified

immunity grounds de novo, id., and we may affirm on any basis

supported by the record, TD Bank N.A. v. Hill, 928 F.3d 259,

270 (3d Cir. 2019). In conducting our review, we “accept all

plaintiff[s’] allegations as true and draw all inferences in [their]

favor,” George, 738 F.3d at 567 n.4, and we will not dismiss a

complaint “merely because it appears unlikely that the

plaintiff[s] can prove those facts or will ultimately prevail on

the merits,” Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 231

(3d Cir. 2008).

III. Discussion

Defendants contest the District Court’s denial of

qualified immunity on several different grounds. Below we

first set out the framework for analyzing qualified immunity at

the pleading stage before turning to Defendants arguments,

specifically that (1) the lack of factual details in the Complaint

entitled them to immunity, (2) the District Court erred in

denying their request for immunity as “premature” without

fully analyzing the clearly established prong, and (3) the

District Court should have made specific qualified immunity

determinations for each individual Defendant, even at the

pleading stage.

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A. The Analytical Framework for Qualified

Immunity on the Pleadings

The doctrine of qualified immunity “balances two

important interests—the need to hold public officials

accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the

need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and

liability when they perform their duties reasonably.” Pearson

v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009). Whether qualified

immunity can be invoked to shield an official from personal

liability turns on the “objective legal reasonableness” of the

official’s action, Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 819

(1982), “assessed in light of the legal rules that were ‘clearly

established’ at the time it was taken,” Anderson v. Creighton,

483 U.S. 635, 639 (1987) (quoting Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818).

An official sued under § 1983 for an alleged

constitutional violation is entitled to qualified immunity unless

he (1) violated a constitutional right that (2) was clearly

established when he acted. George, 738 F.3d at 571–72. For

a right to be “clearly established,” the contours of that right

“must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would

understand that what he is doing violates that right.” Anderson,

483 U.S. at 640. Existing case law, in other words, must give

the official “fair warning” that his conduct is unconstitutional.

Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002). Typically,

analogous precedent from the Supreme Court or this Court or

a consensus of persuasive authority in the Courts of Appeals is

required. Clark v. Coupe, 55 F.4th 167, 182 (3d Cir. 2022);

Peroza-Benitez v. Smith, 994 F.3d 157, 165 (3d Cir. 2021). Yet

broad principles of law suffice to give fair warning when an

official commits a patently “obvious” constitutional violation.

Hope, 536 U.S. at 741; Mack v. Yost, 63 F.4th 211, 233 (3d Cir.

10

2023) (quoting Schneyder v. Smith, 653 F.3d 313, 330 (3d Cir.

2011)); see, e.g., Taylor v. Riojas, 592 U.S. 7, 9 (2020).

As for timing, the Supreme Court has repeatedly

stressed the importance of resolving qualified immunity “at the

earliest possible stage in litigation.” Pearson, 555 U.S. at 232

(quoting Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227 (1991) (per

curiam)). But even though the defense may be raised either in

a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(6) or in a motion for summary judgment under Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 56, Rule 12(b)(6) is often “a

mismatch for immunity and almost always a bad ground for

dismissal.” Fogle v. Sokol, 957 F.3d 148, 162 n.14 (3d Cir.

2020) (quoting Jacobs v. City of Chicago, 215 F.3d 758, 775

(7th Cir. 2000) (Easterbrook, J., concurring in part and

concurring in the judgment)).

To be sure, the first prong of the qualified immunity

analysis—whether the facts alleged make out a violation of a

constitutional right—fits like a glove at the motion-to-dismiss

stage because it overlaps with a district court’s inquiry under

Rules 8(a) and 12(b)(6). See Kedra v. Schroeter, 876 F.3d 424,

435 (3d Cir. 2017). In other words, a well-pleaded § 1983

complaint necessarily alleges a constitutional violation for

purposes of qualified immunity, while a complaint that fails to

plausibly plead the violation of a right does not.

As we have repeatedly recognized, however, the second

prong of a qualified immunity analysis—whether the right

allegedly violated was “clearly established”—presents unique

difficulties at the pleading stage. See Curley v. Klem, 298 F.3d

271, 278 (3d Cir. 2002); Grant v. City of Pittsburgh, 98 F.3d

116, 122 (3d Cir. 1996). That is because “the right allegedly

violated must be defined at the appropriate level of specificity

11

before a court can determine if it was clearly established,”

Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 615 (1999), and defining the

right with specificity is a “fact-intensive inquiry,” Grant, 98

F.3d at 122, that “must be undertaken in light of the specific

context of the case,” Thomas v. Indep. Twp., 463 F.3d 285, 300

(3d Cir. 2006) (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201

(2001)). But “qualified immunity will be upheld on a 12(b)(6)

motion only when the immunity is established on the face of

the complaint,” id. at 291 (quoting Leveto v. Lapina, 258 F.3d

156, 161 (3d Cir. 2001)), and complaints typically lack the

case-specific details needed to conduct the clearly established

analysis. Thus, it is often the case that, without more than the

complaint to go on, a court “cannot fairly tell whether a right

is obvious or squarely governed and thus clearly established by

precedent, making qualified immunity inappropriate” on a

motion to dismiss. Myers v. City of Centerville, 41 F.4th 746,

758 (6th Cir. 2022) (cleaned up); see, e.g., Sause v. Bauer, 585

U.S. 957, 959–60 (2018) (per curiam) (reversing the grant of

qualified immunity on a 12(b)(6) motion because factual issues

precluded resolution of the question).

That is unsurprising given the parties’ respective burden

at the 12(b)(6) stage. Courts do not “apply a heightened

pleading standard in cases in which a defendant pleads

qualified immunity,” so a plaintiff “has no pleading burden to

anticipate or overcome a qualified immunity defense.”

Thomas, 463 F.3d at 289, 294. Instead, the “burden of pleading

a qualified immunity defense,” like any other affirmative

defense, “rests with the defendant.” Id. at 293. But because

plaintiffs are “no[t] obligat[ed] to plead a violation of clearly

established law in order to avoid dismissal on qualified

immunity grounds,” id., even well-pleaded complaints may not

include sufficient facts to allow a court to identify the right

12

with the requisite specificity, see, e.g., Russell v. Richardson,

905 F.3d 239, 253 (3d Cir. 2018). So the fact-bound nature of

the clearly established inquiry combined with the dearth of

facts at the pleading stage makes it “difficult for a defendant to

claim qualified immunity on the pleadings before discovery

and before the parties (much less the courts)” uncover the

precise contours of the official’s conduct and the context in

which it occurred. Evans-Marshall v. Bd. of Educ. of Tipp City

Exempted Vill. Sch. Dist., 428 F.3d 223, 235 (6th Cir. 2005)

(Sutton, J., concurring); see also Joanna C. Schwartz, How

Qualified Immunity Fails, 127 Yale L.J. 2, 38, 53–54 (2017)

(analyzing qualified immunity cases from five districts over a

two-year period and concluding that motions to dismiss on

qualified immunity grounds are granted less than 10% of the

time).

In such cases, the district court must deny the motion to

dismiss and seek to resolve qualified immunity at summary

judgment. That is because, when a court cannot determine on

the face of the complaint whether a “reasonable official would

have understood” that what he did violated the asserted

constitutional right, Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 11 (2015)

(per curiam) (quoting Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 664

(2012)), the plaintiff “will be entitled to some discovery,”

Thomas, 463 F.3d at 301. But “[u]ntil the Rule 12(b)(6) motion

is resolved, all discovery [related to the claims subject to the

qualified immunity defense] must be stayed.” 6 Id. at 302. So

6

This limitation on discovery does not forbid a district court

from exercising its discretion to allow discovery to proceed on

claims not subject to a qualified immunity defense while the

Rule 12(b)(6) motion is pending, even if the information

sought overlaps with claims subject to a qualified immunity

13

before ordering any discovery, a 12(b)(6) motion on qualified

immunity grounds must be denied. 7 Of course, a district court

defense. See In re Orthopedic Bone Screw Prod. Liab. Litig.,

264 F.3d 344, 365 (3d Cir. 2001); In re Fine Paper Antitrust

Litig., 685 F.2d 810, 817 (3d Cir. 1982).

7

To be sure, before ruling on the motion to dismiss, a district

court has discretion to order the plaintiff to reply to the

qualified immunity defense under Rule 7(a)(7) or grant a

defendant’s motion for a more definite statement under Rule

12(e). See Thomas v. Indep. Twp., 463 F.3d 285, 301 (3d Cir.

2006). But the more-definite-statement route is appropriate

only in the “rare case,” Schaedler v. Reading Eagle Publ’n,

Inc., 370 F.2d 795, 798 (3d Cir. 1967), such as in Thomas,

where (1) the “pleading . . . is so vague or ambiguous” that the

defendant cannot respond with his qualified immunity defense

without prejudice to himself and (2) the requested information

is both peculiarly within the plaintiff’s knowledge and tailored

to framing the defendant’s response, 463 F.3d at 301 (quoting

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e)); see also 5C Charles C. Wright & Arthur

H. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1376 (“[T]he

class of pleadings that are appropriate subjects for a motion

under Rule 12(e) is quite small” because Rule 12(e)’s purpose

“is to permit litigants to procure information needed to frame a

responsive pleading, not as a substitute for discovery.”). Post-

Iqbal, such cases are even rarer because overly vague or

ambiguous complaints will not survive a 12(b)(6) motion. See

Russell v. Richardson, 905 F.3d 239, 253 (3d Cir. 2018)

(explaining that Rule 12(e) is not appropriate when the

complaint “is not devoid of factual allegations”); Chapman v.

Yellow Cab Coop., 875 F.3d 846, 849 (7th Cir. 2017). So, as

district courts have repeatedly concluded, when the complaint

14

may “limit the timing, sequence, frequency, and extent of that

discovery under Rule 26,” id. at 301, and “should give priority

to discovery concerning issues that bear upon the qualified

immunity defense,” Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 600

(1998).

In short, “the fact-intensive nature of qualified

immunity makes it often a bad fit for Rule 12(b)(6).” Siefert v.

Hamilton County, 951 F.3d 753, 761 (6th Cir. 2020). And

“because a qualified immunity defense so closely depends on

the facts of the case, a complaint is generally not dismissed

under Rule 12(b)(6) on qualified immunity grounds,” Reed v.

Palmer, 906 F.3d 540, 548 (7th Cir. 2018) (cleaned up), but

rather at summary judgment, 8 see Fogle, 957 F.3d at 162 n.14.

is well-pleaded, Rule 12(e) has limited utility, see, e.g., Dudley

v. Smick, 751 F. Supp. 3d 514, 528–29 (W.D. Pa. 2023);

Garanin v. City of Scranton, No. 3:19-CV-1275, 2019 WL

6875541, at *6 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 17, 2019), though they have

“broad discretion to utilize these procedures in a manner that

is useful and equitable to the parties,” Thomas, 463 F.3d at 301;

Fogle v. Sokol, 957 F.3d 148, 162 n.14 (3d Cir. 2020) (“We

defer to the District Court to determine the best path.”).

8

Our sister circuits have come to the same conclusion. See,

e.g., Riddick v. Barber, 109 F.4th 639, 650 n.5 (4th Cir. 2024)

(“Qualified immunity defenses are usually not successful at

this early stage in the proceedings, where plaintiffs must

present only a claim that is plausible on its face. Instead,

qualified immunity typically is best addressed at the summary

judgment stage after the facts have been developed through

discovery.” (cleaned up)); Thompson v. Ragland, 23 F.4th

1252, 1256 (10th Cir. 2022) (“Because they turn on a fact-

15

B. Whether the District Court Erred in Denying

Qualified Immunity

The District Court correctly determined the Complaint

plausibly pleaded a violation of Kimberly’s Fourteenth

Amendment right to be free from objectively unreasonable

excessive force that amounts to punishment. See Kingsley v.

Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 397–98 (2015). So under our

analytical framework for analyzing qualified immunity at the

12(b)(6) stage, Defendants are entitled to dismissal only if they

can show, based on the pleadings alone, that this right was

neither clearly established nor obvious. 9 Leveto, 258 F.3d at

bound inquiry, ‘qualified immunity defenses are typically

resolved at the summary judgment stage’ rather than on a

motion to dismiss.” (quoting Thomas v. Kaven, 765 F.3d 1183,

1194 (10th Cir. 2014))); Reed v. Palmer, 906 F.3d 540, 549

(7th Cir. 2018); Keates v. Koile, 883 F.3d 1228, 1235 (9th Cir.

2018); Wesley v. Campbell, 779 F.3d 421, 433 (6th Cir. 2015)

(“[I]t is generally inappropriate for a district court to grant a

12(b)(6) motion to dismiss on the basis of qualified

immunity.”); Giragosian v. Bettencourt, 614 F.3d 25, 29 (1st

Cir. 2010) (“It is not always possible to determine before any

discovery has occurred whether a defendant is entitled to

qualified immunity.”); McKenna v. Wright, 386 F.3d 432, 434

(2d Cir. 2004) (concluding “that a qualified immunity defense

. . . faces a formidable hurdle when advanced on [a 12(b)(6)]

motion”).

9

Defendants argue they also win on “the first prong” because

the Complaint did not plead “facts which demonstrate that each

. . . Defendant violated Ms. Stringer’s clearly established

constitutional rights.” Opening Br. 25, 28 (emphasis added).

But that conflates the two prongs of qualified immunity. Prong

16

161 (“Qualified immunity will be upheld on a 12(b)(6) motion

only when the immunity is established on the face of the

complaint.” (cleaned up)). Defendants concur with the District

Court that the Complaint is not sufficiently specific to make

this fact-bound determination. Yet they offer three other

arguments for why they should prevail. None passes muster.

First, Defendants contend that “the lack of requisite

factual detail” precluding a meaningful analysis of the clearly

established prong “requires a finding of qualified immunity.”

Opening Br. 17, 24 (emphasis added). In their view, “if the

District Court could not discern whether it would have been

clear to [them] that using a restraint chair and [pepper] spray

on a[] . . . mentally ill pretrial detainee violated a clearly

established constitutional right, then qualified immunity must

be found and the motion to dismiss granted.” Id. at 16. But

this argument flips our precedent on its head.

Because “the burden of pleading qualified immunity

rests with the defendant, not the plaintiff,” Thomas, 463 F.3d

at 293, an “absence of detailed factual allegations supporting a

plaintiff’s claim for relief under § 1983 does not . . . establish

defendants’ immunity,” id. at 289. Instead, as “qualified

immunity will be upheld on a 12(b)(6) motion only when the

immunity is established on the face of the complaint,” id. at

291, a defendant cannot carry his burden where, as here, a

complaint makes out a violation of a constitutional right but is

one is satisfied whenever a plaintiff sufficiently pleads a

general constitutional violation under Rule 8(a)(2): There is no

daylight between the first prong of the qualified immunity

inquiry and a 12(b)(6) analysis. See Thomas, 463 F.3d at 295;

Kedra v. Schroeter, 876 F.3d 424, 435 (3d Cir. 2017).

17

not specific enough to assess whether the right at issue was

clearly established when the event occurred, see id. at 293.

Defendants’ second argument is simply the flip side of

the same coin. They challenge the District Court’s conclusion

that the clearly established inquiry was premature and that the

Court was “obligated” to conduct a “[f]ull,” detailed qualified

immunity analysis before denying their motion to dismiss.

Opening Br. 17, 19. That argument, however, conflates the

standard for dismissal at the pleading stage with that at

summary judgment.

We ourselves have repeatedly stated that resolution of a

qualified immunity defense is “premature when there are

unresolved disputes of historical fact relevant to the immunity

analysis.” Reilly v. City of Atl. City, 532 F.3d 216, 234 (3d Cir.

2008) (quoting Wright v. City of Philadelphia, 409 F.3d 595,

599 (3d Cir. 2005)); Phillips, 515 F.3d at 242 n.7; Curley, 298

F.3d at 278; see also Kovats v. Rutgers, 822 F.2d 1303, 1313–

14 (3d Cir. 1987) (holding that a qualified immunity

determination was “premature” when the “legal issues [were]

inextricably intertwined with the factual issues” and “there has

been no discovery on th[ose] factual issues”). And discovery

related to the claims against which qualified immunity is

asserted is not permitted “[u]ntil the Rule 12(b)(6) motion is

resolved.” Thomas, 463 F.3d at 302. So when the clearly

established inquiry “is not possible” at the pleading stage

without a more developed factual record, a district court must

reject qualified immunity as “premature,” deny the motion to

18

dismiss, and proceed with at least limited discovery. Schrob v.

Catterson, 948 F.2d 1402, 1421 (3d Cir. 1991). 10

That is precisely what occurred when the District Court

concluded Defendants’ request for qualified immunity was

“premature” because it could not, without further factual

development, “determine whether it would have been clear to

any of the [Defendants] that their conduct was unlawful when

interacting with Stringer.” Stringer, 2023 WL 2163871, at *5

n.7. Even Defendants concede that a proper analysis of the

second prong was “impossible” because the Complaint lacks

vital “facts” and “details” needed to understand the specifics of

what happened in BCCF, Opening Br. 21–22, including

whether the use of force or restraint chair was punitive or done

for the security of the prison or Kimberly’s safety, how long

she was confined to the restraint chair or pepper sprayed, and

whether she was a danger to herself.

Such factual questions must be answered before we—

or the District Court—can define the right with appropriate

specificity and reach “the crucial question” at the core of the

qualified immunity analysis: “whether the [Defendants] acted

reasonably in the particular circumstances that [they] faced.”

Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S. 765, 779 (2014) (emphasis

added). And specificity is “especially important” in excessive-

force cases, Mullenix, 577 U.S. at 12, because the

“reasonab[leness] of force often hinges on the details of an

10

See also Al Shimari v. CACI Int’l, Inc., 679 F.3d 205, 220

(4th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (“Fundamentally, a court is entitled

to have before it a proper record, sufficiently developed

through discovery proceedings, to accurately assess any claim,

including one of immunity.”); Giragosian, 614 F.3d at 29.

19

individual case,” Jacobs v. Cumberland County, 8 F.4th 187,

196 (3d Cir. 2021). Here, for example, when Kimberly was

not responding to the directives of the guards, was she actively

resisting or merely non-compliant? See Goodwin v. City of

Painesville, 781 F.3d 314, 326 (6th Cir. 2015). Did she “pose

a threat to [her]self or others” each time she was placed in the

restraint chair? Young v. Martin, 801 F.3d 172, 173 (3d Cir.

2015). If she did, for how long was she handcuffed and

restrained, and did she remain in this state even after she no

longer posed a threat? Why was she pepper-sprayed and for

how long? What prior knowledge of her condition did each

Defendant have when they took the alleged actions? Put

simply, Defendants’ immunity defense cannot be resolved

without some discovery, so the District Court properly denied

the Defendants’ motion to dismiss and indicated it would

consider qualified immunity at summary judgment. 11

Defendants next argue that the District Court erred by

failing to conduct a qualified immunity analysis for each

individual Defendant based on his specific conduct. At the

pleading stage, however, the Stringers only needed to state a

claim as to each individual Defendant for a constitutional

violation, and the complaint alleges that all Defendants either

authorized or engaged in conduct that amounted to excessive

force—including pepper spraying Kimberly, handcuffing her,

and placing her in a restraint chair for an indeterminate amount

of time. At this stage, we must accept these allegations as true,

drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of Plaintiffs. Kedra,

876 F.3d at 434. And while discovery may allow the District

11

Defendants acknowledged at oral argument that a more

definite statement would be unhelpful in this case, and, upon

remand, that limited discovery would be the best path forward.

20

Court to differentiate between the Defendants claiming

immunity, see Grant, 98 F.3d at 122–23; Rouse v. Plantier, 182

F.3d 192, 200 (3d Cir. 1999), the Court was within its

discretion to postpone that decision until that discovery was

obtained. 12

In sum, because “resolution of the qualified immunity

of [Defendants] is not possible” until “the record is . . .

expanded,” the District Court “correctly determined that

dismissal on a 12(b)(6) motion in this case was premature and

that the case would be better decided on summary judgment.”

Schrob, 948 F.2d at 1421. We “express no opinion” on the

objective reasonableness of Defendants’ actions because the

District Court “is in a better position to resolve these issues on

a motion for summary judgment after supplementation of the

record.” Id. Instead, “[b]ecause the record before us is

insufficient for determination of [Defendants’] claim of

qualified immunity, . . . we will remand to the district court for

further development of the record” with respect to that defense.

Brown v. United States, 851 F.2d 615, 617 (3d Cir. 1988).

IV. Conclusion

For these reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s

order denying the motion to dismiss on qualified immunity

grounds without prejudice and remand with instructions for the

District Court to conduct limited discovery tailored to

uncovering those facts needed to rule on Appellants’ immunity

defense.

12

Although two video recordings of Defendants’ encounters

with Kimberly allegedly exist, the Defendants allegedly have

refused to turn over those recordings and other recordings

requested by Kimberly’s parents.

21