Opinion

State of Louisiana v. Orlando Brown

Court
Louisiana Court of Appeal
Filed
Sep 7, 2022
Status
Published
Author
Judge Tiffany Gautier Chase
On the bench
Judge Joy Cossich Lobrano; Judge Sandra Cabrina Jenkins; Judge Tiffany Gautier Chase
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 36.7%

The opinion

STATE OF LOUISIANA * NO. 2022-K-0542

VERSUS *

COURT OF APPEAL

ORLANDO BROWN *

FOURTH CIRCUIT

*

STATE OF LOUISIANA

*******

APPLICATION FOR WRITS DIRECTED TO

CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT ORLEANS PARISH

NO. 552786, SECTION “C”

Honorable Benedict J. Willard, Judge

******

Judge Tiffany Gautier Chase

******

(Court composed of Judge Joy Cossich Lobrano, Judge Sandra Cabrina Jenkins,

Judge Tiffany Gautier Chase)

LOBRANO, J., DISSENTS AND ASSIGNS REASONS

Rachel Lindner

ORLEANS PUBLIC DEFENDERS’ OFFICE

2601 Tulane Avenue, Suite 700

New Orleans, LA 70119

COUNSEL FOR RELATOR

Jason Williams

District Attorney

Brad Scott

Chief of Appeals

ORLEANS PARISH DISTRICT ATTORNEY’S OFFICE

619 South White Street

New Orleans, LA 70119

COUNSEL FOR RESPONDENT

WRIT GRANTED; JUDGMENT REVERSED

SEPTEMBER 7, 2022

1

TG

C

Relator, Orlando Brown, seeks review of the district court’s May 31, 2022,

SCJ

ruling denying his motion to suppress. After consideration of the record before

this Court, and the applicable law, we grant the writ and reverse the ruling of the

district court denying Mr. Brown’s motion to suppress.

Relevant Facts and Procedural History

On September 11, 2021, Relator was arrested pursuant to a warrant for

battery on a dating partner and second-degree rape. On the same date, Relator was

questioned at the police station regarding the incident for which he was arrested.

The arrest and questioning were recorded by the police officers’ body-worn

camera.

On November 9, 2021, Relator was charged with battery on a dating partner

by strangulation in violation of La. R.S. 14:34.9(L) and second-degree rape in

violation of La. R.S. 14.42.1.1 On December 7, 2021, Relator pled not guilty and

1 La. R.S. 14:34.9(A) defines battery on a dating partner as “the intentional use of force or

violence committed by one dating partner upon the person of another dating partner.”

1

filed various motions.2 On May 2, 2022, Relator filed a second motion to suppress

statements arguing that statements he gave after his arrest on September 11, 2021,

were given without the police officers first providing rights pursuant to Miranda v.

Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966); the statements were

secured in violation of his right to counsel; and his statements were involuntary.

On May 31, 2022, the district court heard Relator’s motion to suppress and

conducted a probable cause hearing. The police officer who investigated Relator’s

case was subpoenaed but failed to appear. The parties requested a continuance

which was denied by the district court. In lieu of police officer testimony, the State

submitted a copy of the arrest warrant, a copy of the police report, a copy of the

Miranda waiver form and a copy of the body-worn camera footage of the arrest

and questioning. At the conclusion of the hearing, the district court found probable

cause for both charges and denied Relator’s motion to suppress. This application

for supervisory review followed.

Discussion

The sole issue before this Court is whether the district court erred in denying

Relator’s motion to suppress statements given on September 11, 2021.

La. R.S. 14:34.9(L) provides:

Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, if the offense involves

strangulation, the offender, in addition to any other penalties imposed pursuant to

this Section, shall be imprisoned at hard labor for not more than three years.

La. R.S. 14:42.1(A) defines second degree rape as “rape committed when the anal, oral, or

vaginal sexual intercourse is deemed to be without the lawful consent of the victim because it is

committed under any one or more of the following circumstances [stated in the codal article].”

2 Relator filed motions to preserve evidence, suppress evidence, suppress statement and suppress

identification.

2

Appellate courts review a district court’s ruling under a deferential standard

with regard to factual determinations, while legal findings are subject to a de novo

standard of review. State v. Hunt, 2009-1589 (La. 12/1/09), 25 So.3d 746; State v.

Hampton, 1998-0331 (La. 4/23/99), 750 So.2d 867. Additionally, a district court’s

decision relative to the suppression of evidence is afforded great weight and will

not be set aside unless there is an abuse of discretion. State v. Wells, 2008-2262

(La. 7/6/10), 45 So.3d 577.

Relator asserts that in denying his motion to suppress statements, the district

court erred in relying on a copy of the arrest warrant, a copy of the police report, a

copy of the Miranda rights form and the body-worn camera footage of Relator’s

arrest. He maintains that statements he gave after his arrest were given without

officers fully advising Relator of his Miranda rights; he did not knowingly and

freely waive his Miranda rights; and the evidence submitted by the State lacked

authentication. It is well-settled that the State has the burden of proving that a

Relator’s statements are admissible. La. C.Cr.P. art. 703(D). “Before what

[purports] to be a confession can be introduced in evidence, it must be

affirmatively shown that it was free and voluntary, and not made under the

influence of fear, duress, intimidation, menaces, threats, inducements or promises.”

State v. Barabin, 2013-0334, pp. 4-5 (La.App. 4 Cir. 9/11/13), 124 So.3d 1121,

1124. Further, “[i]in order for a statement made by a suspect in custody to be

admissible at trial, police officers must advise the suspect of his Fifth Amendment

rights prior to interrogating him.” Id. (emphasis removed).

3

The State has failed to demonstrate that Relator was properly Mirandized

prior to questioning by the police officers. The Miranda form provides “[t]hese

[Miranda] rights should be recited to the person being advised as written.” The

investigating officer did not testify regarding the manner in which Relator was

given his Miranda rights thus, the State failed to prove that the proper procedure

was implemented. Further, the Miranda form submitted by the State does not

reflect that Relator signed the form without coercion and lacks any

acknowledgment by Relator that he understood his rights. Additionally, the record

reveals that during the hearing the State incorrectly advises the district court that

the body-worn camera footage depicts Relator being advised of his Miranda rights.

In denying the motion to suppress, the district court mistakenly relies on this

assertion. The body-worn camera footage reveals, and the State concedes, that the

police officers did not read Relator his Miranda rights prior to questioning.

Based on the record before this Court, the State has failed to demonstrate

that Relator received his rights in accordance with Miranda and the district court

erred in denying Relator’s motion to suppress. Accordingly, we grant the writ and

reverse the district court’s ruling denying Relator’s motion to suppress.

WRIT GRANTED, JUDGMENT REVERSED

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This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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