The opinion
Cite as 2025 Ark. App. 242
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION I
No. CV-23-798
CITY OF HIGHFILL, ARKANSAS; Opinion Delivered April 23, 2025
JEFFERY BRENAMAN, IN HIS
OFFICIAL AND INDIVIDUAL APPEAL FROM THE BENTON
CAPACITIES; AND MAYOR MICHELLE COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
RIEFF, IN HER OFFICIAL AND [NO. 04CV-21-1869]
INDIVIDUAL CAPACITIES
APPELLANTS HONORABLE XOLLIE DUNCAN,
JUDGE
V.
AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED AND
SHANA SCANTLIN AND TAMMY REMANDED IN PART
RIDENHOUR
APPELLEES
RAYMOND ABRAMSON, Judge
The Benton County Circuit Court denied appellants’ motion for statutory and
qualified immunity for all claims made against them. In this interlocutory appeal, appellants
contend that the circuit court erred in denying their request for statutory and qualified
immunity. We affirm in part and reverse and remand in part.
I. Background
Shana Scantlin began working as an administrative assistant in the public works
department for the City of Highfill in January 2020; likewise, Tammy Ridenhour began
working in the same department in August 2020. Both Scantlin and Ridenhour were
employed by the City of Highfill in these positions until early March 2021, when they
tendered their resignations. Scantlin and Ridenhour attest that Jeffery Brenaman, their
direct supervisor, created “an unhealthy and hostile” work environment complete with
“intimidation, insults, humiliation, work interference, assault, threats of assault, verbal and
psychological abuse, and bullying.”
To support these claims, Scantlin and Ridenhour note in their complaint and
depositions that Brenaman, on multiple occasions, would yell at Scantlin while she was on
the phone with customers, and at least twice, customers had asked if Scantlin was okay. They
testified that Brenaman would frequently storm out and slam doors, including one instance
in which Brenaman slammed the door in Scantlin’s face. Brenaman would also frequently
“overtalk” Scantlin and tell her to “stay in her lane.” Specifically, Scantlin alleges that in
November 2020, Scantlin retrieved documents from Brenaman’s office at the request of
Mayor Rieff. Brenaman became “irate” when he found out and began screaming and
insulting Scantlin for entering his office. Scantlin made a formal complaint regarding this
incident and claims that no action was taken. Scantlin next alleges that in January 2021,
Brenaman became angry regarding a bill that was received for telephone-repair costs.
Brenaman stormed into Scantlin’s office, stood over her and yelled at her in front of the
entire office, “ripped” papers out of her hand, and stopped only when Highfill Police Chief
Blake Webb arrived and intervened. The situation came to a head on March 4, 2021, when
Brenaman became irate at Scantlin again, yelled at her to “be quiet,” and then “slammed”
the door while leaving the office before returning. Ridenhour alleges that she became
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terrified that Brenaman was going to retrieve a gun and called her husband to determine
what actions she should take.
Scantlin and Ridenhour attest that they told Mayor Rieff that this behavior was
ongoing and was not improving. Scantlin admits that on at least one occasion, Brenaman
apologized to her after Mayor Rieff had spoken to him. Noting what they deemed a lack of
response, Scantlin and Ridenhour submitted their resignations in March 2021. Ridenhour
explicitly listed Brenaman’s verbal abuse and Mayor Rieff’s subsequent failure to act on her
knowledge of his behavior as the reason for her resignation. Scantlin and Ridenhour then
sued appellants, alleging several causes of action, including (1) wrongful discharge in
violation of public policy; (2) wrongful discharge in violation of the Arkansas Whistle-Blower
Act; (3) assault and battery; and (4) intentional infliction of emotional distress (outrage).
Appellants moved for summary judgment, alleging that they are entitled to both statutory
and qualified immunity. The circuit court denied their initial motion and their motion to
reconsider, without comment. Appellants then filed this interlocutory appeal.
II. Standard of Review
This court has jurisdiction to hear statutory- and qualified-immunity issues pursuant
to Rule 2(a)(10) of the Arkansas Rules of Appellate Procedure–Civil, which provides that
“[a]n order denying a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment based on the defense of
sovereign immunity or the immunity of a government official” is an appealable order.
However, Rule 2 does not authorize an interlocutory appeal from the denial of a motion for
summary judgment generally. Ark. R. App. P.–Civ. 2(a). In fact, the general rule is that the
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denial of a motion for summary judgment is neither reviewable nor appealable. Gentry v.
Robinson, 2009 Ark. 634, 361 S.W.3d 788. Nonetheless, we have recognized that where the
refusal to grant a summary-judgment motion has the effect of determining that the appellant
is not entitled to immunity from suit, an interlocutory appeal is permitted since the right of
immunity from suit is effectively lost if a case goes to trial. Id. As such, we lack jurisdiction
at this time to decide on appeal any issue other than whether the circuit court erred in
denying summary judgment on the issue of immunity. See City of Farmington v. Smith, 366
Ark. 473, 477, 237 S.W.3d 1, 4 (2006) (addressing only the immunity claim and not “the
merits of the numerous arguments raised”).
Summary judgment is appropriate when there are no genuine issues of material fact,
and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Martin v. Hallum, 2010 Ark.
App. 193, at 10, 374 S.W.3d 152, 159. On appellate review, we determine whether summary
judgment was appropriate by deciding whether the evidentiary items presented by the
moving party in support of the motion leave a material question of fact unanswered. City of
Farmington, 366 Ark. 473, 237 S.W.3d 1. We view the evidence in the light most favorable
to the party against whom the motion was filed, resolving all doubts and inferences against
the moving party. Id. Our review focuses not only on the pleadings but also on the affidavits
and other documents filed by the parties. Dodson v. Taylor, 346 Ark. 443, 57 S.W.3d 710
(2001). The issue of whether a party is immune from suit is reviewed de novo on appeal. City
of Fayetteville v. Romine, 373 Ark. 318, 284 S.W.3d 10 (2008). Whether summary judgment
on grounds of immunity is appropriate on a particular set of facts is purely a question of law.
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Gentry, 2009 Ark. 634, at 10, 361 S.W.3d at 794. Although the determination of whether
there is a genuine issue of material fact is a question of law under these circumstances, it is
a legal question that sits near the law-fact divide. Martin, 2010 Ark. App. 193, at 11, 374
S.W.3d at 159.
III. Statutory Immunity
Appellants’ first point on appeal is that they are entitled to statutory immunity as
provided in Arkansas Code Annotated section 21-9-301 (Repl. 2022). We have stated that
section 21-9-301 “establishes . . . an immunity defense.” W. Memphis Sch. Dist. No. 4 v. Cir.
Ct. of Crittenden Cnty., 316 Ark. 290, 295, 871 S.W.2d 368, 371 (1994). According to
appellants, the statute affords them a “broad grant of immunity” as state actors. The statute
states in pertinent part:
(a) It is declared to be the public policy of the State of Arkansas that all
counties, municipal corporations, school districts, public charter schools,
special improvement districts, law enforcement agencies for and certified law
enforcement officers employed by a public or private institution of higher
education, and all other political subdivisions of the state and any of their
boards, commissions, agencies, authorities, or other governing bodies shall be
immune from liability and from suit for damages except to the extent that they
may be covered by liability insurance.
Ark. Code. Ann. § 21-9-301(a).
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Appellants have provided evidence that the City of Highfill does not have liability
insurance. Accordingly, the City of Highfill is entitled to statutory immunity, and the circuit
court erred in denying it such immunity.1
As appellants recognize, section 21-9-301 provides immunity from civil liability for
negligent acts but not for intentional torts. Deitsch v. Tillery, 309 Ark. 401, 833 S.W.2d 760
(1992). Intentional torts involve consequences that the actor believes are substantially certain
to follow his actions. Baptist Health v. Murphy, 365 Ark. 115, 226 S.W.3d 800 (2006).
Accordingly, it is a deliberate, knowing tort that bars application of the doctrine of qualified
immunity. See Williams v. Pate, 2015 Ark. App. 327, at 6, 463 S.W.3d 734, 737; Passmore v.
Hinchey, 2010 Ark. App. 581, 379 S.W.3d 497 (a trespass occurring deliberately and with
the knowledge is sufficient invoke the intentional-tort exception to statutory immunity).
Appellants contend, however, that the facts in appellees’ complaint amount to nothing more
than negligence claims; thus, they are entitled to statutory immunity.
A. Battery
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The appellants also argue, in part, that Ark. Code. Ann. § 21-9-301 also grants
statutory immunity to all individuals who do not have liability insurance. As support for this
claim, appellants cite Benton School District v. Greer, 2023 Ark. 160, 677 S.W.3d 700. Benton
was solely concerned with whether the Arkansas Civil Rights Act was included in the
statutory immunity afforded to those listed in section 21-9-301. Benton does not hold that
individuals themselves are immune if not covered by liability insurance. Furthermore, since
appellants are entitled to qualified immunity from appellees’ claims of wrongful discharge,
this court does not determine whether Benton’s holding extends from the Arkansas Civil
Rights Act to the Arkansas Whistle-Blower’s Act.
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A successful claim of battery would require that Scantlin and Ridenhour prove that
Brenaman intended to cause harmful or offensive contact with them or acted with the intent
to create the apprehension of some harmful or offensive contact and that this contact
resulted in and caused damages. See AMI Civ. 418 (2018); Haley v. Elkins, 2019 Ark. App.
247, at 8, 576 S.W.3d 111, 116–17. Scantlin alleges that Brenaman came into “offensive
contact” with her person when he “ripped” the papers out of her hands. Scantlin does not
allege that Brenaman physically touched her person, nor does she allege that she suffered
any physical damage because of this incident. Moreover, this incident occurred nearly three
months before Scantlin submitted her resignation; thus, even if she was constructively
terminated, this incident was not the direct cause of her termination. Damages for claims of
battery may encompass medical expenses, impaired physical and mental abilities, pain and
suffering, mental anguish, lost earnings, loss of earning capacity, and any other loss directly
attributed to the assault and battery. 1 Howard W. Brill & Christian H. Brill, Arkansas Law
of Damages § 33.6, Westlaw (database updated Oct. 2024); Haley, 2019 Ark. App. 247, at 9,
576 S.W.3d at 117. Accordingly, looking at all evidence in the light most favorable to
Scantlin, she has not pled sufficient facts to support a claim of battery against Brenaman. 2
B. Assault
2
Scantlin does not allege that Mayor Rieff committed a battery against her. Likewise,
Ridenhour does not allege that either Brenaman or Mayor Rieff committed a battery against
her.
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A claim of assault requires that Scantlin prove that Brenaman (1) “acted in such a
manner as to create a reasonable apprehension of immediate harmful or offensive contact
upon” Scantlin’s person; (2) intended to cause that apprehension; and (3) Scantlin was
actually apprehensive. AMI Civ. 417 Westlaw (Nov. 2024 update). Viewing the evidence in
the light most favorable to Scantlin, there is at least a material question of fact regarding
whether Brenaman’s “ripping” the papers from Scantlin’s hand, slamming the door in her
face, yelling while standing over Scantlin to such a degree that customers asked if she was
okay, and slamming doors and storming around upset was sufficient behavior to create a
reasonable apprehension of imminent harmful or offensive conduct and whether this was
Brenaman’s intent. Furthermore, Scantlin’s calling Chief Webb to intervene between her
and Brenaman combined with Scantlin’s testimony that she was “very intimidated” by
Brenaman creates a question of fact regarding whether there was a reasonable apprehension
on Scantlin’s part.3 Accordingly, Brenaman is not entitled to statutory immunity as to
3
The court notes that Scantlin states in her deposition that she was not afraid
Brenaman would physically harm her; however, this testimony appears to contradict her
testimony that she called Chief Webb to intervene between her and Brenaman on at least
one occasion and that she was very intimidated by Brenaman. For the purposes of the
interlocutory appeal, this court does not make factual determinations and must view all
evidence in the light most favorable to appellees as the nonmoving parties. See City of
Farmington, 366 Ark. at 477, 237 S.W.3d at 4.
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Scantlin’s assault claim.4 Ridenhour does not argue, nor does her complaint suggest, that
she was ever assaulted by either Mayor Rieff or Brenaman.
C. Outrage
To establish a claim of outrage, Scantlin and Ridenhour must demonstrate the
following elements: (1) the actor intended to inflict emotional distress or knew or should
have known that emotional distress was the likely result of his conduct; (2) the conduct was
“extreme and outrageous,” was “beyond all possible bounds of decency,” and was “utterly
intolerable in a civilized community”; (3) the actions of the defendant were the cause of the
plaintiff’s distress; and (4) the emotional distress sustained by the plaintiff was so severe that
no reasonable person could be expected to endure it. Crockett v. Essex, 341 Ark. 558, 564, 19
S.W.3d 585, 589 (2000) (citing Angle v. Alexander, 328 Ark. 714, 945 S.W.2d 933 (1997)).
The type of conduct that meets the standard for outrage must be determined on a
case-by-case basis. Id. This court gives a narrow view to the tort of outrage and requires clear-
cut proof to establish the elements in outrage cases. Id. Merely describing the conduct as
outrageous does not make it so. Id. We have taken a strict approach in determining the
validity of outrage claims and recognized that “the tort of outrage should not and does not
4
Liability for an assault or an assault and battery is not necessarily restricted to the
actual participants; any person who is present, encouraging, or inciting an assault and battery
by words, gestures, looks, or signs or who by any means approves the same is in law deemed
to be an aider and abettor and liable as a principal, and such person assumes the
consequences of the act to its full extent as much as the party who does the deed. Hargis v.
Horrine, 230 Ark. 502, 323 S.W.2d 917 (1959). Scantlin does not allege any facts to support
a claim that Mayor Rieff aided or abetted in any potential assault by Brenaman.
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open the doors of the courts to every slight insult or indignity one must endure in life.” Id.
at 564, 19 S.W.3d at 589. As to the final element, the Arkansas Supreme Court has
previously held that depression combined with inability to sleep or eat, lost weight, and
entering a hospital a few weeks after the incident is insufficient to support an outrage claim.
Givens v. Hixson, 275 Ark. 370, 372, 631 S.W.2d 263, 264 (1982) (plaintiff testified he “was
depressed, could not sleep or eat, lost weight, and entered a hospital a month later
(apparently owing to a heart condition)”); see also Island v. Buena Vista Resort, 352 Ark. 548,
103 S.W.3d 671 (2003) (no outrage proved when the plaintiff’s alleged emotional distress
was not severe, plaintiff did not allege any peculiar susceptibility to emotional distress, and
the effect on the plaintiff of the conduct complained of was inconsequential). Neither
Scantlin nor Ridenhour allege any mental-health treatment, let alone hospitalization;
furthermore, neither alleges any negative lingering mental-health issues stemming from her
employment with the City of Highfill. Scantlin further testified that even with Brenaman
regularly yelling at her, she was never in fear for her life or her physical safety. While the
court does not condone Brenaman’s behavior, it is not deemed outrageous as required for
the tort of outrage. Accordingly, even reading the pleadings in the light most favorable to
Scantlin and Ridenhour, they have failed to allege the severe emotional distress required to
support a claim of outrage.
In sum, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Scantlin and Ridenhour,
they have not alleged sufficient facts to support claims for battery and outrage against any
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party. Scantlin, however, has pleaded sufficient facts to support a claim, for the purposes of
this interlocutory appeal only, that she was assaulted by Brenaman.
IV. Qualified Immunity
The analysis used by this court in determining whether summary judgment on the
ground of qualified immunity is appropriate is derived from the standard used for qualified-
immunity claims in federal civil-rights actions. Smith v. Brt, 363 Ark. 126, 211 S.W.3d 485
(2005). Under this analysis, summary judgment based on qualified immunity is precluded
only when the plaintiff has (1) asserted a statutory or constitutional violation, (2)
demonstrated that the statutory or constitutional right is clearly established, and (3) raised a
genuine issue of fact as to whether the official would have known that the conduct violated
that clearly established right. Id.; Robinson v. Beaumont, 291 Ark. 477, 725 S.W.2d 839 (1987).
Therefore, “[a]n official is immune from suit if his or her actions did not violate clearly
established principles of law of which a reasonable person would have knowledge.” Smith,
363 Ark. at 131, 211 S.W.3d at 489. We have noted that this objective reasonable-person
standard is a legal inquiry and that whether summary judgment on grounds of qualified
immunity is appropriate from a particular set of facts is a question of law. Id.; Sullivan v.
Coney, 2013 Ark. 222, at 6, 427 S.W.3d 682, 685–86.
In deciding whether appellants are entitled to qualified immunity, we must first
determine which statutory and/or constitutional violations appellees have alleged in their
complaint. Scantlin and Ridenhour allege that by constructively terminating them,
appellants violated the Arkansas Whistle–Blower Act, codified at Ark. Code Ann. §§ 21-1-
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601 et seq. (Repl. 2022). Scantlin and Ridenhour also argue that their claim that appellants
violated the Arkansas Whistle–Blower Act demonstrated that their termination was
wrongful and against public policy. Scantlin and Ridenhour further contend that a
termination in violation of public policy is an exception to the at-will employment doctrine
and that appellants are not entitled to qualified immunity for this claim.
A. Arkansas Whistle-Blower Act
Under the Arkansas Whistle–Blower Act, a public employer is prohibited from taking
adverse action against an employee who communicates in good faith to an appropriate
authority government waste or the violation of a rule, law, or regulation. Ark. Code Ann. §
21-1-603(a). Specifically, the Act states the following:
A public employer shall not take adverse action against a public employee
because the public employee or a person authorized to act on behalf of the
public employee communicates in good faith to an appropriate authority . . .
[a] violation of suspected violation of a law, rule, or regulation adopted under
the law of this state or a political subdivision of the state.
Ark. Code Ann. § 21-1-603(a)(1)(B). The Act further articulates that an “adverse action”
means to “discharge, threaten, or otherwise discriminate or retaliate against a public
employee in any manner that affects the employee's employment, including compensation,
job location, rights, immunities, promotions, or privileges.” Ark. Code Ann. § 21-1-602(1).
In the instant case, neither Scantlin nor Ridenhour present any facts to support the
claim that they received an adverse action for reporting Brenaman’s behavior to Mayor Rieff.
In fact, Scantlin admits that after one such occasion, she received an apology from
Brenaman. At most, Scantlin alleges that her reports fell on “deaf ears.” Again, neither
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Scantlin nor Ridenhour contend that Brenaman ever assaulted or abused them in retaliation
for reporting his behavior. Neither do they allege that Mayor Rieff ever took actions against
them in any form, let alone in retaliation for their reports against Brenaman. A lack of
obvious or implied retaliation combined with no direct adverse action taken by any party is
not sufficient to support a claim of adverse action under the Act.
Under our qualified-immunity analysis, however, we agree that even if Scantlin and
Ridenhour have asserted a violation of a clearly established right under the Act, they have
failed to raise a genuine issue of fact as to whether appellants would have known that their
conduct violated that clearly established right. Neither Scantlin nor Ridenhour has shown
that appellants would have reasonably believed that they were violating their rights under
the Arkansas Whistle–Blower Act by constructively terminating5 them under the
circumstances in this case.
B. Arkansas’s Public Policy
Finally, Scantlin and Ridenhour argue that their constructive termination went
against Arkansas’s public policy. In Arkansas, an employer may terminate an employee for
good cause, bad cause, or no reason at all under the employment-at-will doctrine. Hice v. City
of Fort Smith, 75 Ark. App. 410, 58 S.W.3d 870 (2001). The question of malice on the part
of the employer is irrelevant. Id. Under a public-policy exception, an at-will employee may
sue for termination “in violation of a well-established public policy of the state.” Sterling Drug,
5
Assuming for the sake of argument that they were constructively terminated.
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Inc. v. Oxford, 294 Ark. 239, 743 S.W.2d 380 (1988). This exception applies only when the
reason alleged to be the basis for a discharge is so repugnant to the general good as to deserve
the label “against public policy.” Tripcony v. Ark. Sch. for the Deaf, 2012 Ark. 188, at 9, 403
S.W.3d 559, 564. The limited public-policy exception does not “protect merely private or
proprietary interests.” Id. at 9, 403 S.W.3d at 563. When a wrongful-termination claim seeks
only the redress of a private wrong, the public-policy exception does not apply, and the
complaint does not state facts upon which relief can be granted. Smith v. Am. Greetings Corp.,
304 Ark. 596, 804 S.W.2d 683 (1991). To invoke the public-policy exception to the at-will
employment doctrine, a plaintiff must identify a public policy outlined in our statutes.
Tripcony, 2012 Ark. 188, 403 S.W.3d 559.
As applicable to the instant case, the exception may apply when an employee reported
a violation of state law or refused to violate a state statute. Id. However, the public-policy
exception does not apply when an employee reported practices that did not violate a state
statute, even if the practices or actions affected the public good. See Palmer v. Ark. Council on
Econ. Educ., 344 Ark. 461, 40 S.W.3d 784 (2001). Neither Scantlin nor Ridenhour claims
that she reported any behavior that violated a state statute. They do, however, allege that
appellants’ violation of the Arkansas Whistle-Blower Act is against Arkansas public policy.
As explained previously, this claim fails because the conduct alleged by both Scantlin and
Ridenhour does not constitute a violation of the Act. Thus, appellants are entitled to
qualified immunity on this claim.
C. Intentional Torts
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As for Scantlin’s remaining claim of assault against Brenaman, the Arkansas Supreme
Court has routinely held that “intentional torts overcome the immunity extended to State
officers and employees.” Fuqua v. Flowers, 341 Ark. 901, 906, 20 S.W.3d 388, 391 (2000); see
Deitsch v. Tillery, 309 Ark. 401, 833 S.W.2d 760 (1992). Accordingly, Brenaman is not
entitled to qualified immunity as to Scantlin’s assault claim.
V. Conclusion
The circuit court erred by denying the City of Highfill statutory immunity. The circuit
court also erred by denying Mayor Rieff statutory and qualified immunity as to all claims.
Finally, Brenaman is entitled to both statutory and qualified immunity for all claims alleged
by Ridenhour and all claims alleged by Scantlin, except for the claim of assault. Accordingly,
we affirm the circuit court’s denial of Brenaman’s statutory immunity for Scantlin’s claim of
assault, and we otherwise reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
Affirmed in part; reversed and remanded in part.
KLAPPENBACH, C.J., and MURPHY, J., agree.
Harrington, Miller, Kieklak, Eichmann & Brown, P.A., by: Thomas N. Kieklak, R. Justin
Eichmann, and Susan Keller Kendall; and Williams Law Firm, by: Jay Williams, for appellants.
Miller, Butler, Schneider, Pawlik & Rozzell, PLLC, by: Kristin L. Pawlik, for appellees.
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