The opinion
DONNA BROWN * NO. 2019-C-0447
VERSUS * COURT OF APPEAL
RALPH CHESSON, M.D. * FOURTH CIRCUIT
* STATE OF LOUISIANA
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BELSOME, J., DISSENTS WITH REASONS
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion, which finds that the trial
court erred in denying the defendant’s exceptions of insufficiency of service of
process and prescription. Given that the trial court correctly denied the exceptions,
I would deny the writ application.
In addressing the exception of insufficiency of service of process, the
defendant argues that he is a State employee; therefore, the plaintiff was required
to serve his department head, the Attorney General and the Office of Risk
Management within ninety days of the commencement of the action. He concludes
that since these entities were not timely served, the suit must be dismissed.
In the petition for damages, the plaintiff, Donna Brown, named Ralph R.
Chesson M.D. as the defendant. Significantly, she did not name the defendant in
his capacity as an employee of the State of Louisiana, the State, or any agency of
the State in her lawsuit. As a result, she had no obligation to effect service on the
State pursuant to La. R.S. 39:15381 or La. R.S. 13:5107.2 Those statutes provide
for service upon the head of the department, the Office of Risk Management, and
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La R.S. 39:1538 requires service upon the head of the department, the Office of Risk
Management, and the Attorney General when there is a claim against the State or its agencies for
negligent or wrongful acts or omissions of any employee of the agency while acting within the
scope of his office or employment.
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La. R.S. 13:5107 provides that service may be perfected upon the Attorney General or the
department head when there is a suit against the State or its agencies.
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the Attorney General when there is a claim or suit against the State or a State
agency. Since there is no claim against the State or a State agency, the service
obligations required under La. R.S. 39:1538 and La. R.S. 13:5107 were not
triggered. Accordingly, the trial court was correct in denying the defendant’s
exception of insufficiency of service of process.
Turning to the exception of prescription, the defendant argues that since the
State entities were not named in the lawsuit, prescription has tolled warranting
dismissal of the suit. Given that the State is not a named party to this suit, any
issue concerning prescription as to a non-party is premature. Significantly, the
parties do not dispute that the lawsuit was timely filed and served upon the named
Defendant, Dr. Chesson. As such, the trial court correctly denied the exception of
prescription.
Given that the trial court correctly denied the defendant’s exceptions of
insufficiency of service of process and prescription, I would deny the writ
application. For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.
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