Opinion

Vega, Jose v. C. A. SMITH CONSTRUCTION, INC

  • 2025 TN WC 33
Court
Tennessee Court of Workers' Compensation Claims
Filed
Jun 5, 2025
Status
Published
On the bench
Tipps
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 36.7%

The opinion

FILED

Jun 05, 2025

08:05 AM(CT)

TENNESSEE COURT OF

WORKERS' COMPENSATION

CLAIMS

TENNESSEE BUREAU OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION CLAIMS

IN THE COURT OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION CLAIMS

AT MURFREESBORO

JOSE VEGA, ) Docket No. 2023-05-7310

Employee, )

v. )

) State File No. 860455-2023

C. A. SMITH CONSTRUCTION, )

INC., )

Employer. ) Judge Dale Tipps

EXPEDITED HEARING ORDER GRANTING BENEFITS

The Court held an Expedited Hearing on May 29, 2025, on whether Mr. Vega is

entitled to medical and temporary disability benefits. Mr. Vega asserted he was Smith

Construction’s employee; Smith Construction primarily contended he was an independent

contractor, as well as asserting other defenses. For the reasons below, the Court holds that

Mr. Vega is likely to prove at a hearing that he was an employee and is entitled to the

requested benefits.

History of Claim

Mr. Vega worked for Smith Construction for several months before he suffered an

injury on July 13, 2023. He was installing siding when the ladder began to slide. Mr. Vega

jumped from the falling ladder and seriously injured his left ankle.

Smith Construction presented evidence to show that Mr. Vega was intoxicated. Joe

Sullivan, who described himself as a subcontractor for Smith, testified that the accident

occurred shortly after a break, when he saw Mr. Vega drinking “what looked like a beer”

in his truck. He also said Mr. Vega smelled of alcohol when he helped him back to his

truck after the accident, and he saw a 40 oz. Bud Light bottle in the truck. Another Smith

Construction worker, Curtis Newton, also said he saw Mr. Vega in his car during the break

and smelled alcohol. He later saw Mr. Vega stumbling as he walked back to the job.

Mr. Vega denied drinking the morning of the accident. His coworker, Arturo

Contreras, also helped him to his truck and said he smelled no alcohol. Mr. Vega’s wife

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agreed he did not smell of alcohol when he came home from the jobsite.

Smith Construction also suggested that Mr. Vega was working in an unsafe manner

by standing on the next-highest rung of the ladder. Mr. Sullivan added that he should not

have jumped from the ladder but should have “ridden it down” to avoid injury.

The primary dispute during the hearing was Mr. Vega’s employment status. He

testified that Joe Sullivan controlled the work, telling him where to go, what to do, and

when to do it. There was no written contract, but Mr. Vega was hired to work for $19.00

per hour and was paid weekly. He was not free to hire helpers. Mr. Sullivan provided the

ladders and tools, and he scheduled the work hours.

Mr. Vega admitted signing a W-9 form but said Mr. Sullivan filled it out, including

falsifying a social security number.

Mr. Contreras described a similar status, saying that he was paid hourly and that

someone else provided the tools. He said Mr. Sullivan worked as a supervisor for Smith

Construction and that Mr. Sullivan and the owner, Cody Smith, scheduled his hours. Mr.

Contreras testified that Mr. Sullivan eventually fired him after a disagreement.

Cody Smith disagreed and insisted Mr. Vega was an independent contractor. He

said he offered Mr. Vega the option of being an employee, but Mr. Vega chose to be a

contractor. He did not remember how Mr. Vega was paid. Similarly, he did not know who

gave Mr. Vega the W-9 form, as his wife handles the paperwork for his business, but said

it would not have been Mr. Sullivan, who was just another of his subcontractors. He

admitted he had no workers’ compensation insurance.

Mr. Smith did not know who furnished the ladder but said it did not belong to his

company. He also denied furnishing tools. Mr. Smith did not set the working hours but

explained that the development where the houses were being built limited the hours when

tradespeople were allowed to work. He said that both he and Mr. Vega had the right to

terminate the relationship.

Mr. Sullivan testified that he and Mr. Vega were both subcontractors. All the

materials were furnished by Smith Construction. Mr. Vega was supposed to bring his own

tools, but they often used tools found on site. However, these did not belong to Smith

Construction. He also said that everyone on the site tried to take their breaks at the same

time to keep from disrupting each other’s work. Mr. Sullivan denied being involved in

hiring decisions or filling out the W-9. Instead, Mr. Vega asked him what to do with the

form, and Mr. Sullivan just told him how to fill it out.

Regarding Mr. Vega’s injuries, Dr. Jeffrey Loveland testified by deposition that he

suffered a left calcaneal fracture and underwent a surgical reconstruction. As a result, Mr.

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Vega was unable to work until May 6, 2024. Presented with copies of his medical bills

and those of St. Thomas Highland, Dr. Loveland said the charges were reasonable and

necessary.

At the hearing, the parties agreed that Mr. Vega missed 298 days of work because

of the accident. They also agreed to a $450.81 compensation rate and medical expenses of

$55,445.45.

Mr. Vega requested payment of his medical bills and temporary disability benefits.

Smith Construction contended that Mr. Vega is not entitled to benefits because he was an

independent contractor. In the alternative, it argued that his claim is barred for intoxication

and violation of safety rules.

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

Mr. Vega must prove he is likely to prevail at a hearing on the merits. Tenn. Code

Ann. § 50-6-239(d)(1) (2024); McCord v. Advantage Human Resourcing, 2015 TN Wrk.

Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 6, at *7-8, 9 (Mar. 27, 2015).

Because the parties agree that Mr. Vega was injured at the jobsite, the threshold

issue is whether he was Smith Construction’s employee or an independent contractor at the

time. Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-102(12)(D)(i) directs courts to consider the

following factors when determining whether an individual is an employee or an

independent contractor:

(a) The right to control the conduct of the work;

(b) The right of termination;

(c) The method of payment;

(d) The freedom to select and hire helpers;

(e) The furnishing of tools and equipment;

(f) Self-scheduling of working hours; and

(g) The freedom to offer services to other entities[.]

The right to control the conduct of the work is the most significant factor when

determining whether a worker is an employee or independent contractor. Further, once it

is established that an employment relationship exists, “the burden is on the employer to

prove the worker was an independent contractor rather than an employee.” Thompson v.

Concrete Solutions, 2015 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 3, at *14, 15 (Feb. 10, 2015).

Regarding factors (a) and (e), both Mr. Vega and Mr. Contreras said that Mr.

Sullivan functioned as a sort of supervisor for Smith, telling them where, when, and how

to do the job. Mr. Sullivan and Mr. Smith contended that the hours were effectively

dictated by the housing development’s rules on when workers could get through the gates.

3

The Court is unpersuaded by this argument. Although access to the jobsite was

limited by the gate hours, Smith Construction presented no proof that, within those

limitations, Mr. Vega was free to work whenever he wanted. Further, the evidence

suggested that Smith Construction’s workers all took their breaks at the same time. While

Mr. Sullivan explained that this was a matter of courtesy, it seems more likely that the

break times were mandated by a representative of Smith Construction. Finally, Mr.

Sullivan said he told Mr. Vega on several occasions that it was unsafe to use the uppermost

rungs of the ladder. This suggests a level of supervision or control greater than that of one

subcontractor to another. The same is true of Mr. Contreras’s uncontroverted testimony

that Mr. Sullivan fired him from the job. These inconsistencies preclude a finding that Mr.

Vega controlled the conduct of the work or scheduled his own work hours.

As for the right of termination, Mr. Smith admitted he could have terminated Mr.

Vega at any time. This suggests an employee/employer relationship.

Regarding the method of payment, this factor generally supports a finding of an

employment relationship because Smith Construction paid Mr. Vega an hourly wage,

rather than a contract price.

As to the freedom to select and hire helpers, Smith Construction offered no proof to

rebut Mr. Contreras’s and Mr. Vega’s testimony that they could not hire helpers. This

favors a finding that Mr. Vega was an employee.

As to the furnishing of tools, the testimony conflicted, but only to a point. While

Mr. Smith and Mr. Sullivan said that Smith did not provide tools, everyone agreed that Mr.

Vega did not furnish the ladder involved in the accident. Further, Mr. Sullivan testified

that workers often used tools that were found on the jobsite. The proof on this issue is

insufficient to find that Mr. Vega furnished or was expected to furnish his own tools and

equipment.

Finally, regarding the freedom to offer services to others, the parties offered little or

no evidence on whether they had any understanding as to exclusivity. At best, this factor

favors neither party.

Smith Construction has asserted an affirmative defense, which imposes the burden

of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that Mr. Vega was an independent

contractor. Pope v. Nebco of Cleveland, Inc., 585 S.W.3d 874, 888 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp.

Panel Jan. 16, 2018). It has not met that burden, as most of the factors support the existence

of an employer/employee relationship. Therefore, the Court holds that Mr. Vega would

likely prevail at a hearing on the merits on his claim that he was an employee.

Smith Construction’s other defenses are similarly unsuccessful. It suggested Mr.

4

Vega’s injuries were caused by his position near the top rung of the ladder or by his

decision to jump when it fell but offered no proof supporting this assertion. Further, the

affirmative defense of willful misconduct requires Smith Construction to prove: (1) the

employee’s actual, as opposed to constructive, notice of the rule; (2) the employee’s

understanding of the danger involved in violating the rule; (3) the employer’s bona fide

enforcement of the rule; and, (4) the employee’s lack of a valid excuse for violating the

rule. Mitchell v. Fayetteville Pub. Utilities, 368 S.W.3d 442, 453 (Tenn. 2012). Smith did

not present proof on any of these factors.

Similarly, Smith Construction contended that Mr. Vega drank beer on his break and

smelled of alcohol but failed to present any proof that he was intoxicated or impaired, or

that his accident was the result of any impairment. See Woodard v. Freeman Expositions,

LLC, 2020 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 15, at *4-5 (Apr. 3, 2020) (an employer must

present evidence that an employee’s substance use was the proximate cause of his injuries).

For these reasons, the Court holds Mr. Vega is likely to prove he was an employee

and is entitled to medical benefits, including continuing treatment with Dr. Loveland and

payment of medical expenses already incurred. He is also entitled to temporary total

disability benefits based on the agreed-upon disability period and compensation rate.

Finally, the Court considers whether Mr. Vega is eligible to apply for benefits from

the Bureau’s Uninsured Employers Fund. Under section 50-6-801(d), the Bureau has

discretion to pay limited benefits to Mr. Vega if he proves the following:

1) He worked for an employer who failed to carry workers’ compensation

insurance;

2) He suffered an injury primarily within the course and scope of

employment on or after July 1, 2015;

3) He was a Tennessee resident on the date of injury;

4) He provided notice to the Bureau of the injury and of the failure of the

employer to secure the payment of compensation within a reasonable period

of time, but in no event more than 180 days after the date of the injury.

5) He secured a judgment against the employer for the injury.

Based on the information in the Petition for Benefit Determination and the proof

presented, the Court finds Mr. Vega worked for an uninsured employer, C.A. Smith

Construction, Inc. He has secured an order that he would likely prevail at a hearing on the

merits that he suffered injuries arising in the course and scope of his employment on July

13, 2023. He was a Tennessee resident on that date and provided notice to the Bureau of

his injury and Smith’s lack of insurance within 180 days.1 Therefore, Mr. Vega satisfied

1 Mr. Vega filed his Petition for Benefit Determination on October 13, 2023, and a Request for Investigation

was filed on October 19. The Expedited Request for Investigation Report by Nicolette Sanders was

completed on October 23 and concluded that the employer had no coverage.

5

all the requirements of section 50-6-802(d)(1). He may complete the enclosed form for

consideration of a discretionary payment through the Uninsured Employers Fund.

IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED as follows:

1. C.A. Smith Construction, Inc. shall furnish all treatment made reasonably necessary

by Mr. Vega’s July 13, 2023 injury under Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-

204. Dr. Jeffrey Loveland is the authorized treating physician. C.A. Smith

Construction, Inc. shall also pay Mr. Vega’s medical bills from Dr. Loveland and

St. Thomas Highland, subject to the fee schedule.

2. C.A. Smith Construction, Inc. shall pay Mr. Vega temporary total disability benefits

of $19,191.20 for the period of July 13, 2023, through May 6, 2024.

3. Mr. Vega satisfied the requirements of Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-

801(d) and thus is eligible to request limited medical and temporary disability

benefits from the Uninsured Employers Fund at the Administrator’s discretion. To

do so, he must complete and file the attached form.

4. This case is set for a Status Hearing on August 14, 2025, at 9:00 a.m. Please call

855-874-0473 to participate. Failure to call might result in a determination of the

issues without your further participation. All conferences are set using Central

Time.

5. Unless an interlocutory appeal of the Expedited Hearing Order is filed, compliance

with this Order must occur no later than seven business days from the date of entry

of this Order as required by Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-239(d)(3). The

Employer must submit confirmation of compliance with this Order to the Bureau by

email to WCCompliance.Program@tn.gov no later than the seventh business day

after entry of this Order. Failure to submit confirmation within seven business days

may result in a penalty assessment for non-compliance. For questions regarding

compliance, contact the Workers’ Compensation Compliance Unit via email at

WCCompliance.Program@tn.gov.

ENTERED June 5, 2025.

_____________________________________

Judge Dale Tipps

Court of Workers’ Compensation Claims

6

APPENDIX

Exhibits:

1. Deposition of Dr. Jeffrey Loveland

2. Affidavit of Sandy Vega

3. Affidavit of Arturo Contreras

4. Affidavit of Jose Vega

5. Expedited Request for Investigation Report

6. Parties’ stipulations

7. IRS W-9 form signed by Jose Vega

8. Records from Tennessee Orthopedic Alliance

9. Ms. Yepes’s Rule 72 Declaration

10. Photographs of workstation (identification only)

11. Plant Work Rules

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that a copy of the Order was sent as indicated on June 5, 2025.

Name Certified Email Service sent to:

Mail

D. Russell Thomas, X russthomas@thethomaslawfirm.com

Employee Attorney

William J. Butler, X joey@farrar-hollimanlaw.com

Employer Attorney

LaShawn Pender X Lashawn.pender@tn.gov

______________________________________

PENNY SHRUM, COURT CLERK

wc.courtclerk@tn.gov

7

Right to Appeal:

If you disagree with the Court’s Order, you may appeal to the Workers’ Compensation

Appeals Board. To do so, you must:

1. Complete the enclosed form entitled “Notice of Appeal” and file it with the Clerk of the

Court of Workers’ Compensation Claims before the expiration of the deadline.

¾ If the order being appealed is “expedited” (also called “interlocutory”), or if the

order does not dispose of the case in its entirety, the notice of appeal must be filed

within seven (7) business days of the date the order was filed.

¾ If the order being appealed is a “Compensation Order,” or if it resolves all issues

in the case, the notice of appeal must be filed within thirty (30) calendar days of

the date the Compensation Order was filed.

When filing the Notice of Appeal, you must serve a copy on the opposing party (or attorney,

if represented).

2. You must pay, via check, money order, or credit card, a $75.00 filing fee within ten calendar

days after filing the Notice of Appeal. Payments can be made in-person at any Bureau office

or by U.S. mail, hand-delivery, or other delivery service. In the alternative, you may file an

Affidavit of Indigency (form available on the Bureau’s website or any Bureau office)

seeking a waiver of the filing fee. You must file the fully-completed Affidavit of Indigency

within ten calendar days of filing the Notice of Appeal. Failure to timely pay the filing

fee or file the Affidavit of Indigency will result in dismissal of your appeal.

3. You are responsible for ensuring a complete record is presented on appeal. If no court

reporter was present at the hearing, you may request from the Court Clerk the audio

recording of the hearing for a $25.00 fee. If you choose to submit a transcript as part of your

appeal, which the Appeals Board has emphasized is important for a meaningful review of

the case, a licensed court reporter must prepare the transcript, and you must file it with the

Court Clerk. The Court Clerk will prepare the record for submission to the Appeals Board,

and you will receive notice once it has been submitted. For deadlines related to the filing of

transcripts, statements of the evidence, and briefs on appeal, see the applicable rules on the

Bureau’s website at https://www.tn.gov/wcappealsboard. (Click the “Read Rules” button.)

4. After the Workers’ Compensation Judge approves the record and the Court Clerk transmits

it to the Appeals Board, a docketing notice will be sent to the parties.

If neither party timely files an appeal with the Appeals Board, the Court Order

becomes enforceable. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-239(d)(3) (expedited/interlocutory

orders) and Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-239(c)(7) (compensation orders).

For self-represented litigants: Help from an Ombudsman is available at 800-332-2667.

NOTICE OF APPEAL

Tennessee Bureau of Workers’ Compensation

www.tn.gov/workforce/injuries-at-work/

wc.courtclerk@tn.gov | 1-800-332-2667

Docket No.: ________________________

State File No.: ______________________

Date of Injury: _____________________

___________________________________________________________________________

Employee

v.

___________________________________________________________________________

Employer

Notice is given that ____________________________________________________________________

[List name(s) of all appealing party(ies). Use separate sheet if necessary.]

appeals the following order(s) of the Tennessee Court of Workers’ Compensation Claims to the

Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board;ĐŚĞĐŬŽŶĞŽƌŵŽƌĞĂƉƉůŝĐĂďůĞďŽdžĞƐĂŶĚŝŶĐůƵĚĞƚŚĞĚĂƚĞĨŝůĞͲ

ƐƚĂŵƉĞĚŽŶƚŚĞĨŝƌƐƚƉĂŐĞŽĨƚŚĞŽƌĚĞƌ;ƐͿďĞŝŶŐĂƉƉĞĂůĞĚͿ͗

ප Expedited Hearing Order filed on _______________ ප Motion Order filed on ___________________

ප Compensation Order filed on__________________ ප Other Order filed on_____________________

issued by Judge _________________________________________________________________________.

Statement of the Issues on Appeal

Provide a short and plain statement of the issues on appeal or basis for relief on appeal:

________________________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________________________

Parties

Appellant(s) (Requesting Party): _________________________________________ ‫܆‬Employer ‫܆‬Employee

Address: ________________________________________________________ Phone: ___________________

Email: __________________________________________________________

Attorney’s Name: ______________________________________________ BPR#: _______________________

Attorney’s Email: ______________________________________________ Phone: _______________________

Attorney’s Address: _________________________________________________________________________

* Attach an additional sheet for each additional Appellant *

LB-1099 rev. 01/20 Page 1 of 2 RDA 11082

Employee Name: _______________________________________ Docket No.: _____________________ Date of Inj.: _______________

Appellee(s) (Opposing Party): ___________________________________________ ‫܆‬Employer ‫܆‬Employee

Appellee’s Address: ______________________________________________ Phone: ____________________

Email: _________________________________________________________

Attorney’s Name: _____________________________________________ BPR#: ________________________

Attorney’s Email: _____________________________________________ Phone: _______________________

Attorney’s Address: _________________________________________________________________________

* Attach an additional sheet for each additional Appellee *

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, _____________________________________________________________, certify that I have forwarded a

true and exact copy of this Notice of Appeal by First Class mail, postage prepaid, or in any manner as described

in Tennessee Compilation Rules & Regulations, Chapter 0800-02-21, to all parties and/or their attorneys in this

case on this the __________ day of ___________________________________, 20 ____.

______________________________________________

[Signature of appellant or attorney for appellant]

LB-1099 rev. 01/20 Page 2 of 2 RDA 11082

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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