Opinion

Doddie Smith v. Civil Service Commission

Court
Louisiana Court of Appeal
Filed
Nov 27, 2019
Status
Published
Author
Judge Regina Bartholomew-Woods
On the bench
Judge Edwin A. Lombard; Judge Sandra Cabrina Jenkins; Judge Regina Bartholomew-Woods
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 36.7%

The opinion

DODDIE SMITH * NO. 2019-CA-0393

VERSUS *

COURT OF APPEAL

CIVIL SERVICE *

COMMISSION FOURTH CIRCUIT

*

STATE OF LOUISIANA

*******

APPEAL FROM

CITY OF NEW ORLEANS CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

NO. 8992

******

Judge Regina Bartholomew-Woods

******

(Court composed of Judge Edwin A. Lombard, Judge Sandra Cabrina Jenkins,

Judge Regina Bartholomew-Woods)

Larry Edward Demmons

3201 Ridgelake Drive

Metairie, LA 70002

COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT

Brendan M. Greene

NEW ORLEANS CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

1340 Poydras Street, Suite 900

New Orleans, LA 70112

COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE

AFFIRMED

NOVEMBER 27, 2019

Appellant sought extraordinary pay from the Civil Service Commission

pursuant to Civil Service Commission Rule IV, § 2.7. In recognition of Appellant’s

experience and years of service, but not pursuant to Rule IV, § 2.7, the Civil

Service Commission increased Appellant’s pay, but refused to make the pay

increase retroactive. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the ruling of the Civil

Service Commission.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

For nineteen (19) of her thirty (30) year career in human resources, Plaintiff-

Appellant, Doddie Smith (“Appellant”), has worked as a personnel administrator

with the Civil Service Department for the City of New Orleans.1 On July 10, 2016,

the New Orleans Police Department hired Mr. Dwayne Pierce as a Police Human

Resources Administrator. Because of his twenty (20) years of human resources

experience,2 Mr. Pierce was provided a starting salary 25% above the minimum

1

Appellee acknowledges that Appellant has “dedicated a large portion of her professional life to

providing excellent service to City departments and employees as they navigate various

personnel issues.”

2

Mr. Pierce’s twenty (20) years of human resources experience was considered an

“extraordinary qualification” as contemplated by Civil Service Rule IV, § 2.7.

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starting salary for this position. On November 14, 2018, Appellant submitted a

request3 to Ms. Lisa Hudson, Director of Civil Service, for extraordinary pay

pursuant to Rule IV, § 2.7.4 Appellant asserted that because Mr. Pierce’s twenty

(20) years of human resources experience was considered an extraordinary

qualification that warranted increased pay, so should her twenty-eight (28) years of

professional experience (seventeen (17) of those twenty-eight (28) years were

3

On December 3, 2018, Shelly Stolp, another Personnel Administrator, made the same request.

Ultimately, Ms. Stolp was awarded the increased pay, but amended her request to forgo

retroactive pay.

4

Civil Service Commission Rule IV, § 2.7 provides:

Subject to the revocation of the Personnel Director, an appointing authority may

pay an original, temporary, provisional or regular employee a pay rate of up to the

midpoint of the pay range upon appointment, subject to the following conditions and

limitations:

(a) That the appointee possesses extraordinary or superior

qualifications/credentials above and beyond the minimum qualifications, experience,

and/or credentials required which have been verified and documented as job related, and

that the amount of additional pay shall be justified based on an objective analysis of the

additional financial advantage the increased hiring rate will provide to the city.

(b) That the duties and responsibilities of a position require the employment of a

person with qualifications/credentials that differ significantly from those normally

required for other positions in the same class, and the persons who possess such

qualifications are not readily available in the labor market at the minimum entrance rate

in the pay grade;

(c) That the pay rate is subject to review by the Civil Service Commission;

(d) The salaries of all current probationary and permanent employees who occupy

positions in the same job classification and who possess the same or equivalent

qualifications, experience, and/or credentials shall be adjusted up to but not to exceed the

rate granted to that employee provided that the qualifications, experience, and/or

credentials are also verified and documented in the same manner as that employee. Such

adjustments shall only be made on the same date that the higher pay rate is given to that

employee;

(e) The Commission shall have exclusive, final authority to validate the

qualifications, experience, and/or credentials credited for purposes of this subsection;

(f) The appointing authority must post all special rates given in a location that is

accessible to all employees. The appointing authority must assure that the posting

remains in place permanently or is replaced when appropriate.

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acquired in the Personnel Administrator position). On December 17, 2018, the

Civil Service Commission (“the CSC”) considered Appellant’s request for

increased pay. Again, on January 28, 2019, the CSC considered Appellant’s

request. Thereafter, the CSC granted Appellant’s increased pay, but declined to

make the increased pay retroactive to Mr. Pierce’s July 10, 2016 hiring date. It is

from this ruling that Appellant appeals.

DISCUSSION

Appellant’s sole assignment of error addresses whether the CSC erred in

denying her request for retroactive pay after granting her request for extraordinary

pay pursuant to Rule IV, § 2.7(d).

Standard of Review

“Decisions of the [Civil Service] Commission are subject to appellate review

on any questions of law or fact.” Winford v. Dep’t of Police, 2009-0770, p. 4 (La.

App. 4 Cir. 3/3/10); 33 So.3d 949, 951; La. Const. Art. X, Section 12(B); Walters

v. Dep’t of Police of New Orleans, 454 So.2d 106, 113 (La.1984). Further, on

appeal, “[t]he appellate court reviews the Commission’s findings of fact using the

clearly wrong or manifest error standard of review.” Liang v. Dept. of Police,

2013-1364, p. 8 (La. App. 4 Cir. 8/20/14), 147 So.3d 1221, 1225. Further, “[a]n

appellate court accords great deference to mixed questions of fact and law.” Orazio

v. Dep’t of Police, 2019-0230, p. 7 (La. App. 4 Cir. 6/19/19); 275 So.3d 340,

345, writ denied, 2019-01174 (La. 10/15/19), 2019 WL 557363. Here, Appellant’s

3

assignment of error presents an interpretation of fact and law governed by the

manifest error or clearly erroneous standard of review.

Discussion

Appellant acknowledges that “the only pertinent inquiry is whether positions

at issue were in the same job classification.” Appellant reasons that because the

CSC granted her request for increased pay, the CSC had “made a determination

that those two employees [Appellant and Mr. Pierce] occupied ‘positions in the

same job classification’ and ‘possess the same or equivalent qualifications,

experience, and/or credentials.’” And, for that reason, Appellant argues that she is

entitled to retroactive pay pursuant to Rule IV, § 2.7(d). In response to Appellant’s

argument, the CSC contends that Appellant focuses only on the second prong of

the Rule IV, § 2.7(d), which addresses employees “who possess the same or

equivalent qualifications, experience, and/or credentials.” The CSC argues that

Rule IV, § 2.7(d) is not triggered because Appellant does not occupy the “same job

classification” as the employee to whom she compared herself. The CSC asserts

that rather than applying Rule IV, § 2.7, it applied an exception to that rule, and

increased Appellant’s pay solely in recognition of her years of service.

Analysis

CSC Rule IV, § 2.7(d) provides:

The salaries of all current probationary and

permanent employees who occupy positions in the same

job classification and who possess the same or

equivalent qualifications, experience, and/or credentials

shall be adjusted up to but not to exceed the rate granted

to that employee provided that the qualifications,

experience, and/or credentials are also verified and

4

documented in the same manner as that employee. Such

adjustments shall only be made on the same date that the

higher pay rate is given to that employee.

The CSC provides the following:

Per the job announcement and documentation prepared

by the Civil Service Department, an employee filling the

position of “Police Human Resource Administrator”

performs the following duties:

Under general direction of the Assistant

Superintendent of Police, this position serves

as N.O.P.D.’s Human Resource Manager by

managing and directing the activities of

subordinate staff providing a wide range of

human resources support for the department,

including acting as a liaison with the civil

service, finance and law departments. Work

includes departmental recruitment and

selection activities, managing transfers and

personnel orders, employee relations, and

employee discipline and grievances. This

position participates in consent decree

activities and various committees. Work also

includes planning, organizing, directing and

evaluating the performance of assigned staff;

establishing performance requirements and

personal development targets; and related

duties as required.

Conversely, an employee occupying the classification

of Personnel Administrator is responsible for the

following:

Highly responsible administrative,

technical, professional and supervisory

work directing and coordinating the

activities of one or more comprehensive

components or functions of the City’s

central personnel/human resource

management agency; and related work as

required.

Accordingly, not only do the job titles differ, but so do the duties and

responsibilities. The CSC maintains that while Appellant did not qualify for

5

increased pay pursuant to the CSC Rule IV, § 2.7(d), it recognized Appellant was a

valued employee and, for that reason, increased Appellant’s pay as an exception to

Rule IV, § 2.7(d).

Because Appellant does not occupy the same job classification as the

employee to whom she compared herself, she is not entitled to retroactive

increased pay pursuant to the CSC Rule IV, § 2.7(d). Accordingly, the CSC’s

decision to decline Appellant’s request for retroactive pay was not clearly wrong or

manifestly erroneous. For that reason, we affirm the CSC’s ruling.

CONCLUSION

For the aforementioned reasons, we affirm the CSC’s ruling.

AFFIRMED

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This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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