Guerra v. Harris Health

Southern District of Texas

ENTERED

□ June 17, 2025

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT Nathan Ochsner, Clerk

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

HOUSTON DIVISION

RAMIRO GUERRA, §

(Inmate # 01714091), §

§

Plaintiff, § □

§

Vs. § CIVIL ACTION NO. H-24-2352

§

DR. GUTIERREZ, et al., §

§

Defendants. © §

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

GRANTING DR. GUTIERREZ’S MOTION TO DISMISS

Proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, Harris County Jail inmate Ramiro

Guerra, (Inmate # 1714091), filed an amended prisoner’s civil-rights complaint

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In that amended complaint, Guerra alleges that two jail

medical providers—Dr. Orlando Gutierrez and Dr. David Solce—violated Guerra’s

constitutional rights after he broke his foot in January 2024. (Dkt. 10). At the

Court’s request, Guerra supplemented his complaint with a More Definite Statement

of his claims. (Dkt. 12). Dr Gutierrez responded to Guerra’s amended complaint

with a motion to dismiss. (Dkt. 38). Guerra has not responded to the motion, and

his time to do so has now expired. Having reviewed the pleadings and the motion,

all matters of record, and the applicable law, the Court grants Dr. Gutierrez’s motion

to dismiss and dismisses Guerra’s claims against him with prejudice.

I. BACKGROUND

On June 20, 2024, Guerra filed a civil rights complaint under § 1983 naming

“Harris Health at Harris County Jail” as the only defendant. (Dkt. 1). Guerra alleged

that “they” had failed to treat him for a broken foot that he sustained on January 14,

2024. (id. at 4). He sought money damages to compensate him for his pain and

suffering. (/d.). The Court dismissed Guerra’s complaint because the only named

defendant did not have a capacity to sue or be sued; however, the Court granted

Guerra leave to file an amended complaint to name proper defendants if he could.

(Dkt. 9).

On August 21, 2024, Guerra filed an amended complaint, naming Dr.

Gutierrez and Dr. Solce as defendants. (Dkt. 10). Guerra alleged that Dr. Gutierrez

“didn’t give me the medical attention I needed” and that Dr. Solce “didn’t send me

to the hospital for medical treatment.” (/d. at 3). Guerra claimed that because of

these alleged failures, he was forced to keep walking on his broken foot, leading to

additional injuries and ongoing severe pain. (Jd. at 4). As relief, he asked the Court

to order the defendants to “fix my foot” and compensate him for his pain and

suffering. (/d.).

The Court ordered Guerra to provide a More Definite Statement of his claims.

(Dkt. 11). In his response, Guerra alleges that on January 11, 2024, he jumped off

his top bunk and landed wrong, causing him to break his right foot. (Dkt. 12, p. 2).

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His foot quickly turned black and blue and became extremely swollen. (/d.). One

of his fellow inmates alerted the pod officer of the incident, and the pod officer

arranged to have a wheelchair sent down. (/d. at 2-3). A detention officer then

wheeled Guerra to the medical clinic. (d. at 3).

At the clinic, Dr. Gutierrez ordered X-rays of Guerra’s foot, which were taken

immediately at the jail infirmary. (/d. at 3-4). Dr. Gutierrez immediately reviewed

the X-rays and told Guerra that he had fractured his heel. (Ud. at 4). Dr. Gutierrez

put a splint on Guerra’s foot, issued him a set of crutches, and prescribed ibuprofen

for the pain. (/d. at 4-5). When Guerra asked about going to the hospital, Dr.

Gutierrez told him that he did not need to go to the hospital, but Dr. Gutierrez said

he would schedule Guerra to be seen by an orthopedic physician “in a couple of

days.” (id. at 6). Guerra alleges that he was “never called” about this appointment.

(Id).

On March 12, 2024, Guerra had an appointment with Dr. Solce, who is an

orthopedic physician at the jail infirmary. (/d. at 7). At that appointment, Dr. Solce

ordered additional X-rays, which were again taken at the jail infirmary. (/d.). After

reviewing the X-rays, Dr. Solce told Guerra that there were two fractures in his heel

and that the bones were not healing properly. (/d. at 7-8). Guerra still had his splint

and his crutches, and Dr. Solce renewed his prescription for ibuprofen. (ld. at 8).

Dr. Solce did not order any additional treatment for Guerra’s foot, did not send him

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to the hospital, and did not recommend surgery. (/d.).

On June 2, 2024, Guerra’s foot turned purple and became swollen. (/d. at 9).

Guerra denies that anything occurred around that time to cause the new swelling and

discoloration. (/d.). Guerra went to the jail infirmary on his crutches, and he was

taken to Memorial Hermann hospital, where he was seen by an orthopedic physician

Guerra knows only as “Dr. Mike.” (/d. at 9-10). Dr. Mike ordered X-rays, and after

he reviewed them he gave Guerra a new splint for his foot, renewed his prescription

for pain medication, and sent him back to the jail. Ud. at 10-11). Dr. Mike did not

recommend surgery for Guerra’s foot.

On July 18, 2024, Guerra saw another orthopedic physician at the jail

infirmary named Dr. Fisher. (/d. at 11-12). Dr. Fisher prescribed a compression

stocking for Guerra and told him that he needed to start putting weight on his foot.

(Id. at 12). Dr. Fisher renewed Guerra’s order for crutches and his prescription for

ibuprofen. (/d.). Dr. Fisher also scheduled Guerra for an appointment with an

orthopedic physician at Ben Taub Hospital. (Dkt. 10, p. 5).

On August 7, 2024, Guerra saw a female orthopedic physician at Ben Taub.

(Id.). This doctor, whose name Guerra does not know, took new X-rays and then

showed him where his foot was broken in two places.! (/d.). The doctor told Guerra

1Guerra alleges that this is the first time that he was told that his foot was “broken.”

oat apparently did not understand that a fracture is another term for a partial or complete

that he should have surgery on his foot but that it cannot be done until he is released

from jail. Ud.).

Guerra alleges that while Dr. Gutierrez and Dr. Solce provided him with some

treatment, they violated his constitutional rights because he was denied the treatment

he should have received. (Dkt. 12, p. 13). Guerra alleges that he should have

immediately been sent for surgery, but Dr. Gutierrez refused to refer him for surgery,

saying that he needed to see an orthopedic physician first. (U/d. at 15). Guerra alleges

that when Dr. Solce saw him in March, he told Guerra that it was “too late” to have

surgery. Ud.). Dr. Mike told Guerra that surgery would not help him. Ud.). It was

not until August 2024 when the female orthopedic physician at Ben Taub agreed that

Guerra needed surgery, but she would not perform it while Guerra was in jail because

the jail could not properly manage his recovery. (Ud.).

Guerra also alleges that Dr. Gutierrez violated his constitutional rights by

failing to schedule him to see Dr. Solce in a timely manner. (/d. at 17). Guerra

alleges that when he finally saw Dr. Solce two months later, Dr. Solce refused to

send him to the hospital for the care he needed. (/d.). Guerra believes that he should

have been sent to the hospital the day the injury occurred because “my right foot is

broken and still to this day is broken.” (/d. at 6). Guerra alleges that he is still in

meek in abone. See www.orthoinfo.aaos.org (visited June 16, 2025).

severe pain and still on crutches and that without surgery, he will be on crutches for ©

“who knows how long.” (id. at 17-18).

After the initial screening required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the Court ordered

Dr. Gutierrez and Dr. Solce to respond to Guerra’s claims against them. (Dkt. 13).

Dr. Gutierrez responded to the amended complaint with a motion to dismiss.” (Dkt.

38). In his motion, Dr. Gutierrez contends that Guerra’s claims against him in his

official capacity are barred by sovereign immunity and that the claims against him

in his individual capacity fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. (Id.).

Guerra did not respond to Dr. Gutierrez’s motion, and his time to do so has now

expired.?

Il. APPLICABLE LAW

A. Actions Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Guerra brings his claims against Dr. Gutierrez under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

“Section 1983 does not create any substantive rights, but instead was designed to

provide a remedy for violations of statutory and constitutional rights.” Lafleur v.

Dr. Solce responded to Guerra’s amended complaint in a separate motion to

dismiss. (Dkt. 40). That motion will be addressed in a separate order.

_3Under the Court’s local rules, Guerra’s failure to respond to the motion is

considered a representation that he does not oppose the motion. See S.D. TEX. L.R. 7.4.

However, because Guerra is proceeding pro se, the Court will address the merits of Dr.

Gutierrez’s motion.

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Texas Dep’t of Health, 126 F.3d 758, 759 (Sth Cir. 1997) (per curiam); see also

Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979). To state a valid claim under

§ 1983, the plaintiff must (1) allege a violation of rights secured by the Constitution

or laws of the United States, and (2) demonstrate that the alleged deprivation was

committed by a person acting under color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S.

42, 48 (1988); Gomez v Galman, 18 F.4th 769, 775 (Sth Cir. 2021) (per curiam).

The first element recognizes that “state tort claims are not actionable under federal

law; a plaintiff under [§] 1983 must show deprivation of a federal right.” Nesmith

v. Taylor, 715 F.2d 194, 195 (Sth Cir. 1983) (per curiam). The second element

means that generally only state actors—not private parties—can be liable for

violations of civil rights. See Frazier v. Bd. of Tr. of Nw. Miss. Reg’] Med. Ctr.,

765 F.2d 1278, 1283 (5th Cir. 1985). □

B. Motion to Dismiss

Dr. Gutierrez moves to dismiss Guerra’s amended complaint under Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). A motion to dismiss under Rule

12(b)(1) challenges the court’s jurisdiction to hear the case. See Ramming v. United

States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (Sth Cir. 2001) (per curiam). Such a motion is properly

granted when the court lacks the statutory or constitutional power to hear the case,

such as when the claims are barred by a state’s sovereign immunity. See High v.

Karbhari, 774 F. App’x 180, 182 (Sth Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (citing Little v. KPMG

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LLP, 575 F.3d 533, 540 (Sth Cir. 2009), and Meyers ex rel. Benzing v. Texas, 410

F.3d 236, 240 (Sth Cir. 2005)). Because a Rule 12(b)(1) motion challenges the

court’s jurisdiction, “[w]hen a Rule 12(b)(1) challenge is filed with other Rule 12

motions, the court should address the Rule 12(b)(1) motion ‘before addressing any

attack on the merits.”” D&G Holdings, L.L.C. v. Becerra, 22 F.4th 470, 474 (Sth

Cir. 2022) (quoting Ramming, 281 F.3d at 161).

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) is properly granted when the

plaintiff's complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. When a

court considers a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), “the factual information to which the

court addresses its inquiry is limited to the (1) the facts set forth in the complaint,

(2) documents attached to the complaint, and (3) matters of which judicial notice

may be taken under Federal Rule of Evidence 201.” Walker v. Beaumont Indep. Sch.

Dist., 938 F.3d 724, 735 (Sth Cir. 2019). The district court “construes the complaint

liberally in favor of the plaintiff,” “takes all facts pleaded in the complaint as true,”

and considers whether “with every doubt resolved on [the plaintiffs] behalf, the

complaint states any valid claim for relief.” Harrington v. State Farm Fire & Cas.

Co., 563 F.3d 141, 147 (Sth Cir. 2009) (cleaned up).

But to survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the complaint must

include specific facts, not conclusory allegations. See Powers v. Northside Indep.

Sch. Dist., 951 F.3d 298, 305 (Sth Cir. 2020). The complaint must also allege

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“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp.

v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); Gomez, 18 F.4th at 775. A claim is plausible

on its face “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw

the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (cleaned up). If the facts alleged are

facially sufficient, “a well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if it strikes a savvy

judge that actual proof of those facts is improbable, and that a recovery is very

remote and unlikely.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 (cleaned up). But if the complaint

does not set forth “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,”

it must be dismissed. Jd. at 570.

C. Pro Se Pleadings

Because Guerra is proceeding pro se, the Court construes his filings liberally,

subjecting them to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by

lawyers[.]” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam). But even □

under this lenient standard, pro se litigants must still “abide by the rules that govern

the federal courts.” E.E.O.C. v. Simbaki, Ltd., 767 F.3d 475, 484 (Sth Cir. 2014).

“Pro se litigants must properly plead sufficient facts that, when liberally construed,

state a plausible claim to relief, serve defendants, obey discovery orders, present

summary judgment evidence, file a notice of appeal, and brief arguments on appeal.”

Id. (footnotes omitted).

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Il. DISCUSSION

Guerra’s claims against Dr. Gutierrez arise under the Eighth Amendment.

While Guerra seeks both money damages and injunctive relief, it is unclear from the

amended complaint whether he seeks relief against Dr. Gutierrez in his official

capacity, his individual capacity, or both. Therefore, the Court will address each of

Guerra’s requests for relief in turn. □

A. Claims for Money Damages

1. The Claim Against Dr. Gutierrez in his Official Capacity □

Dr. Gutierrez contends that any claim against him for money damages in his

official capacity is barred by state sovereign immunity. State sovereign immunity

bars actions against a state or state official for money damages unless Congress has

abrogated such immunity or the state has specifically waived its immunity. See Will

v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66 (1989). But Congress did not

abrogate the states’ sovereign immunity when it enacted § 1983. Id. And the State

of Texas has not waived its sovereign immunity for purposes of § 1983 actions. See

NiGen Biotech, L.L.C. v. Paxton, 804 F.3d 389, 393-94 (Sth Cir. 2015) (“Federal

courts are without jurisdiction over suits against a state, a state agency, or a state

official in his official capacity unless that state has waived its sovereign immunity

or Congress has clearly abrogated it. Texas has not consented by statute, and § 1983

does not abrogate state sovereign immunity.”) (cleaned up).

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The fact that Guerra has sued a state employee, rather than the State of Texas,

does not change this analysis. When a state employee is sued in his or her official

capacity, the employing entity is the real party in interest for the suit. See Kentucky

v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-66 (1985) (official capacity suits “generally represent

only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an

agent” and are “treated as a suit against the entity”); Nat’l Press Photographers

Ass’n v. McCraw, 90 F.4th 770, 785 (Sth Cir. 2024). Dr. Gutierrez is an employee

of the University of Houston, which contracts with Harris Health Systems to provide

health care to detainees at the Harris County Jail. (Dkt. 38, p. 1). Under Texas law,

state universities, including the University of Houston, are agencies of the state. See

TEX. Gov’T CODE § 572.002(10)(B); TEx. Epuc. CoDE § 61.003(8), (10); see also

U.S. Oil Recovery Site Potentially Responsible Parties Grp. v. R.R. Comm’n of Tex.,

898 F.3d 497, 501-02 (Sth Cir. 2018); Thomas v. Univ. of Houston, 155 F. App’x

115, 117 (Sth Cir. 2005) (per curiam). Therefore, university employees, like Dr. |

Gutierrez, are protected from claims for money damages against them in their

official capacities by state sovereign immunity.

Guerra’s claim for money damages against Dr. Gutierrez in his official

capacity is construed as a claim against the State of Texas and is barred by state

sovereign immunity. Dr. Gutierrez’s motion to dismiss this claim is granted, and

this claim is dismissed with prejudice under Rule 12(b)(1).

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2. The Claim Against Dr. Gutierrez in his Individual Capacity

Dr. Gutierrez contends that Guerra’s amended complaint against him for

money damages in his individual capacity fails to state a claim upon which relief can

be granted. Guerra’s amended complaint, construed liberally, raises claims based

on both deliberate indifference and delays in care. The Court will consider each of

these claims in turn.

a. The Claim for Deliberate Indifference

The Eighth Amendment imposes a duty on prison officials to “provide

humane conditions of confinement; prison officials must ensure that inmates receive

adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care, and must take reasonable

measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825,

832 (1994) (cleaned up). A prison official violates this duty when, whether by act

or omission, he or she is deliberately indifferent to conditions that pose a substantial

risk of serious harm to the inmate. Jd. at 834.

To state a claim for a lack of adequate medical care, a prisoner seeking relief.

under § 1983 must allege facts showing that the jail medical provider acted with

deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S.

97, 105 (1976); Varnado v. Lynaugh, 920 F.2d 320, 321 (Sth Cir. 1991) (per curiam).

To establish deliberate indifference, “a plaintiff must demonstrate that the official is

aware that an inmate[ ] face[s] a substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that

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risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it.” Davis v. Lumpkin, 35 F Ath

958, 963 (Sth Cir. 2022) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837). But deliberate

indifference is an “extremely high standard” to meet. See Domino v. Tex. Dep’t of

Crim. Just., 239 F.3d 752, 756 (Sth Cir. 2001). “Unsuccessful medical treatment,

acts of negligence, or medical malpractice do not constitute deliberate indifference,

nor does a prisoner’s disagreement with his medical treatment, absent exceptional

circumstances.” Gobert v. Caldwell, 463 F.3d 339, 346 (5th Cir. 2006). Instead, the

prisoner must allege facts showing that the jail medical provider “refused to treat

him, ignored his complaints, intentionally treated him incorrectly, or engaged in any

similar conduct that would clearly evince a wanton disregard for any serious medical

needs.” Jd. (quoting Domino, 239 F.3d at 756) (cleaned up).

The facts alleged in Guerra’s amended complaint do not rise to the level of

deliberate indifference. Guerra admits that Dr. Gutierrez ordered X-rays of his foot,

reviewed those X-rays with him, diagnosed him with a fracture, provided him with

a splint and crutches, and prescribed pain medication for him. When Guerra asked

about going to the hospital for surgery, Dr. Gutierrez responded that Guerra would

need to see the orthopedic physician first, and he agreed to set up that appointment.

These facts, accepted as true at this stage of the proceedings, do not show that Dr.

Gutierrez refused to treat Guerra, ignored his complaints, intentionally treated him

incorrectly, or disregarded Guerra’s serious medical needs. Instead, at most they

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show that Guerra disagrees with the medical treatment he was provided. Even if Dr.

Gutierrez’s determination of how to treat Guerra’s foot was mistaken, this would

state a claim for negligence or medical malpractice that does not rise to the level of

deliberate indifference necessary to allege a violation of the Eighth Amendment. See □

Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106 (“Medical malpractice does not become a constitutional

violation merely because the victim is a prisoner.”).

The allegations in Guerra’s amended complaint do not state a claim for a

constitutional violation based on deliberate indifference. Therefore, Dr. Gutierrez’s

motion to dismiss is granted, and Guerra’s deliberate indifference claim is dismissed

with prejudice under Rule 12(b)(6).

b. ‘The Claim for Delays in Treatment

Guerra also appears to allege that Dr. Gutierrez violated his constitutional

rights by failing to ensure that Guerra was seen by an orthopedic physician in a

timely manner.

To be entitled to relief under § 1983 based on a delay in medical treatment,

the prisoner must show that the jail medical provider’s deliberate indifference

resulted in a delay that caused the prisoner to suffer substantial harm. See Alderson

v. Concordia Parish Corr. Facility, 848 F.3d 415, 422 (Sth Cir. 2017) (per curiam);

Easter v. Powell, 467 F.3d 459, 463 (Sth Cir. 2006); Mendoza v. Lynaugh, 989 F.2d

191, 195 (Sth Cir. 1993). This requires the prisoner to allege facts showing that the

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delay was specifically attributable to the medical provider defendant. See, e.g.,

Jackson v. Gordy, No. 2:16-cv-338, 2018 WL 1156013, at *12 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 8,

2018), report and recommendations adopted, 2018 WL 1122573 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 1,

2018), aff'd, 772 F. App’x 193 (5th Cir. 2019) (per curiam). It also requires the

prisoner to allege facts showing that the delay resulted in substantial harm. See

Easter, 467 F.3d at 463; Ramirez v. Stacks, 260 F. App’x 658, 660 (5th Cir. 2007)

(per curiam) (affirming the dismissal of a complaint that alleged that the prisoner

suffered a broken tibia and a delay in treatment, but which did not show that he

suffered substantial harm because of the delay when X-rays after the delay did not

show new acute problems). And while pain suffered during a delay in treatment can

constitute substantial harm, see Alderson, 848 F.3d at 422, the plaintiff must show

that the pain was sufficiently severe to be considered substantial. Compare Richard

v. Martin, 390 F. App’x 323, 325 (Sth Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (plaintiffs “neck pain,

which resolved within a few weeks, and chronic mild back pain” were not sufficient

to establish substantial harm resulting “from the alleged 10-day delay in seeing a

nurse and/or the 20-day delay in being taken to a doctor”), with Coleman v. Sweetin,

745 F.3d 756, 765-66 (5th Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (finding substantial harm from a

month-long delay in treatment for a broken hip during which the plaintiff “was in so

much pain that he was unable to lie down in bed or use the toilet properly,” pain □

overtook his entire body, he was “out of it” due to the pain, and doctors eventually

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inserted four pins and a plate during hip surgery). But “[t]he fact of delay in itself

is not sufficient to establish deliberate indifference.” Garcia v. Fed. Bureau of

Prisons, 459 F. App’x 458, 459 (Sth Cir. 2012) (per curiam).

Even taking Guerra’s allegations as true, he nevertheless does not allege facts

showing that any delay by Dr. Gutierrez resulted in any harm. Guerra concedes that

Dr. Gutierrez diagnosed him with a fractured foot, provided him with a splint and

crutches, and prescribed pain medication in January 2024. Dr. Gutierrez told Guerra

that any further treatment would be addressed by the orthopedic physician, and he

told Guerra he would arrange for that visit. Guerra alleges that he did not see Dr.

Solce, the orthopedic physician, until March 2024. While Guerra takes issue with

the two-month delay in seeing Dr. Solce, he does not allege facts showing that any

delay was caused by any actions or inactions of Dr. Gutierrez himself. Further,

delays in receiving follow-up care generally do “not rise to the level of deliberate

indifference.” Mathis v. Alexander, 49 F.3d 728, 1995 WL 103646, at *3 (5th Cir.

Mar. 3, 1995) (per curiam).

In addition, Guerra does not allege facts showing that he suffered substantial

harm because of any delay in seeing Dr. Solce. Guerra alleges that Dr. Gutierrez

should have immediately sent him to the hospital for surgery. But when Guerra saw

Dr. Solce in March 2024, Dr. Solce did not believe that surgery was appropriate.

When Dr. Mike saw Guerra at Memorial Hermann hospital in June 2024, Dr. Mike

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did not believe that surgery was appropriate. And when Guerra was seen by Dr.

Fisher in July 2024, he was still not recommended surgery. Guerra does not allege

facts showing that an earlier visit with Dr. Solce would have resulted in a surgery

recommendation, nor does he show that any alleged delay in healing is the result of

a delay in seeing Dr. Solce.

Finally, Guerra concedes that Dr. Gutierrez prescribed pain medication for

him on the day of the incident, and he has been prescribed pain medication

continuously since that time. Guerra therefore does not allege facts showing that he

was substantially harmed by suffering excessive pain due to any alleged delays in

treatment.

In short, the facts alleged in Guerra’s amended complaint do not show that

Dr. Gutierrez was deliberately indifferent to Guerra’s need for treatment or that any

alleged deliberate indifference caused a delay in treatment that resulted in substantial

harm. At most, the facts show that Guerra disagreed with the treatment Dr. Gutierrez

provided. This is insufficient to show a violation of Guerra’s constitutional right to

adequate care, and his amended complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief

can be granted. Dr. Gutierrez’s motion to dismiss is granted, and Guerra’s claim for

money damages based on an alleged delay in treatment is dismissed with prejudice

under Rule 12(b)(6).

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B. Claims for Injunctive Relief

1. The Claim Against Dr. Gutierrez in his Official Capacity

As with Guerra’s claim for money damages, Dr. Gutierrez contends that

Guerra’s claim against him in his official capacity for injunctive relief is barred by

state sovereign immunity.

Sovereign immunity plays a lesser role in claims for injunctive relief than it

does in claims for money damages. Sovereign immunity bars claims for injunctive

relief against a state or state actor when those claims concern a state official’s past

actions rather than an ongoing violation of federal law. See Green v. Mansour, 474

U.S. 64, 68 (1985) (citing Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908)). But sovereign

immunity does not bar an action “for an injunction to stop ongoing violations of

federal law.” McCraw, 90 F.Ath at 785 (quoting Lewis v. Scott, 28 F.4th 659, 663 □

(Sth Cir. 2022)). However, the scope of the injunctive relief available is narrow and

is limited to an injunction requiring the state official to “conform their future conduct

to the requirements of federal law.” Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 337 (1979).

Guerra’s amended complaint alleges that jail medical providers, including Dr.

Gutierrez, are continuing to violate his Eighth Amendment rights by denying him

surgery on his foot. To the extent that Guerra seeks an injunction to require Dr.

Gutierrez to stop violating his constitutional rights in connection with his need for

medical care, Guerra’s claim could fall within the purview of the Ex parte Young

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exception to state sovereign immunity.

But to be entitled to such an injunction, Guerra must allege facts showing that

injunctive relief is necessary to correct an ongoing constitutional violation. As

explained above, however, the facts alleged in Guerra’s amended complaint, taken

as true, do not show that Dr. Gutierrez either has violated or is violating Guerra’s

Eighth Amendment rights. In the absence of an ongoing constitutional violation,

Guerra is not entitled to injunctive relief. Dr. Gutierrez’s motion to dismiss is

granted, and Guerra’s claim for injunctive relief against Dr. Gutierrez in his official

capacity is dismissed with prejudice for failing to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6).

2. The Claim Against Dr. Gutierrez in his Individual Capacity

To the extent that Guerra seeks injunctive relief against Dr. Gutierrez in his

individual capacity, his claim is denied for the same reasons explained above.

Because Guerra’s amended complaint does not allege facts showing that that Dr.

Gutierrez has violated or is violating his constitutional rights in connection with

Guerra’s medical treatment, Guerra has not stated a claim upon which relief can be

granted. Dr. Gutierrez’s motion to dismiss is granted, and Guerra’s claims for

injunctive relief against Dr. Gutierrez in his individual capacity are dismissed with

prejudice under Rule 12(b)(6).

IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the above, the Court ORDERS as follows:

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1. Defendant Dr. Gutierrez’s motion to dismiss, (Dkt. 38), is GRANTED.

2. Guerra’s action against Dr. Gutierrez is DISMISSED with prejudice.

The Clerk will provide a copy of this Order to the parties.

SIGNED at Houston, Texas on Sus e 17 , 2025.

DAVID HITTNER

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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