Johnson v. Garner

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

LEE M. JOHNSON,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 3:22-cv-702-BJD-PDB

SGT. GARNER,

Defendant.

______________________________

ORDER

I. Status

Plaintiff, Lee M. Johnson, a prisoner of the Florida penal system, is

proceeding pro se on a Complaint for Violation of Civil Rights (Doc. 1) against

one corrections officer, Sergeant Garner, for deliberate indifference. In denying

Defendant Garner’s motion to dismiss, the Court concluded Plaintiff stated a

plausible claim based on the following allegations:

Defendant Garner announced to over fifty inmates that Plaintiff

was a “snitch” and a “child molester” and told one inmate in

particular (Inmate Workman) to “take care of this snitching child

molester for me.” See Doc. 1 at 6. Three days later, Inmate

Workman put a knife to Plaintiff’s throat and forced him to

“perform oral sex on him.” Id. at 7.

See Order (Doc. 42) at 1. Defendant Garner now moves for summary judgment

under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Doc. 63), arguing there

is no evidence showing he was subjectively aware that his own actions put

Plaintiff at substantial risk of serious harm, and he is entitled to qualified

immunity. See Doc. 63 at 13, 16. In support of his Motion, Defendant Garner

relies on the following, among other records: his own declaration (Doc. 63-4);

Plaintiff’s deposition transcript (Doc. 63-5); incident reports (Doc. 63-7); and

duty rosters (Doc. 63-8). Plaintiff opposes the Motion (Doc. 69), with his own

affidavit (Doc. 69-1).

II. Summary Judgment Standard

Under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “[t]he court shall

grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). An issue is genuine when the evidence

is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict in favor of the

nonmovant. Mize v. Jefferson City Bd. of Educ., 93 F.3d 739, 742 (11th Cir.

1996) (quoting Hairston v. Gainesville Sun Publ’g Co., 9 F.3d 913, 919 (11th

Cir. 1993)). “[A] mere scintilla of evidence in support of the non-moving

party’s position is insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment.”

Kesinger ex rel. Estate of Kesinger v. Herrington, 381 F.3d 1243, 1247 (11th

Cir. 2004) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986)).

The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of

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demonstrating to the court, by reference to the record, that there are no

genuine issues of material fact to be determined at trial. See Clark v. Coats &

Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir. 1991). The record to be considered on

a motion for summary judgment may include “depositions, documents,

electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations

(including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions,

interrogatory answers, or other materials.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A).

When the moving party has discharged its burden, the non-moving party

must point to evidence in the record to demonstrate a genuine dispute of

material fact. Id. Substantive law determines the materiality of facts, and

“[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the

governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.”

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. In determining whether summary judgment is

appropriate, a court “must view all evidence and make all reasonable

inferences in favor of the party opposing [the motion].” Haves v. City of Miami,

52 F.3d 918, 921 (11th Cir. 1995) (citing Dibrell Bros. Int’l, S.A. v. Banca

Nazionale Del Lavoro, 38 F.3d 1571, 1578 (11th Cir. 1994)).

III. Arguments & Conclusions

In his declaration, Defendant Garner avers that he has “never discussed

an inmate’s charges with any other inmate.” See Doc. 63-4 ¶. He concedes—

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and duty rosters show—that he worked on the day Plaintiff alleges he told

Inmate Workman to “take care of [him],” but he was not working the day of the

alleged assault. See id. ¶ 12. See also Doc. 63-8 at 1, 4. According to an incident

report and Plaintiff’s deposition testimony, Plaintiff reported the sexual

assault to Captain Teems on May 3, 2022. See Doc. 63-7 at 1; Doc. 63-5 at 72.

Captain Teems’s incident report does not reference Plaintiff’s allegations

against Defendant Garner, but a May 16, 2022 incident report prepared by

Captain Tomlin notes that Plaintiff reported Defendant Garner told all the

inmates in his dorm that Plaintiff was a child molester, and Inmate Workman

later sexually assaulted him, saying Defendant Garner told him (Workman)

“to take care of [Plaintiff’s] ass.” See Doc. 63-7 at 1, 3. Other inmates in the

dorm were interviewed but denied hearing Defendant Garner make any

threats. Id. at 3–4.

At his deposition, Plaintiff described his dorm at the time as an open

floor plan—a large room with bunks for about fifty inmates, all of whom were

on protective management for one reason or another. See Doc. 63-5 at 27–28.

See also Doc. 63-4 ¶ 6 (Defendant Garner’s description of the dorm “an open

floor plan, with bunk beds arranged throughout the room”). Inmate Workman

slept in the bunk next to Plaintiff’s. See Doc. 63-5 at 33–34. On April 28, 2022,

Plaintiff asked Defendant Garner when he would allow the inmates in the

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dorm to go to the canteen because he had not allowed them to do so for a couple

days. Id. at 47. Defendant Garner allegedly dismissed Plaintiff’s inquiry, so

Plaintiff threatened to write a grievance. Id. at 48–49. According to Plaintiff,

Defendant Garner was standing near his and Inmate Workman’s bunks and

said to Plaintiff, “[Y]ou’re a child molester and you’re a snitch,” and then

Garner told Inmate Workman to “take care of this child molester and this

snitch for me.” Id. at 49–50. Defendant Garner also allegedly said to Plaintiff,

“[N]ow, see . . . how easy it is I [sic] take care of you.” Id. at 51. Plaintiff further

testified that, after the sexual assault, Inmate Workman told him that if he

did not leave Defendant Garner alone, Workman would kill Plaintiff. Id. at 59.

In his affidavit, Plaintiff repeats that Defendant Garner told Inmate Workman

to “take care of this snitching child molester.” See Doc. 69-1 at 3. He further

swears that Inmate Workman told him, after the sexual assault, “[Sergeant]

Garner gave me the green light to keep you in line.” Id. at 4.

In his Motion, Defendant Garner argues that even if he told the entire

dorm Plaintiff was a child molester and a snitch, Plaintiff’s claim fails because

other inmates in that dorm are child molesters and snitches. See Doc. 63 at 9–

10. He claims that making such a comment is not enough to satisfy the

subjective knowledge element of a deliberate indifference claim. Id. at 11–12.

Defendant Garner wholly ignores Plaintiff’s other allegations—that Defendant

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Garner explicitly told Inmate Workman to “take care of [Plaintiff],” and Inmate

Workman told Plaintiff he was sexually assaulting him because Defendant

Garner “gave [him] the green light.” See Doc. 69-1 at 4. As the Court previously

concluded, Plaintiff’s allegations, accepted as true, “permit the reasonable

inference that Defendant Garner objectively and subjectively knew Inmate

Workman would harm Plaintiff and failed to ‘take any action to . . . mitigate[]

or monitor that substantial risk of serious harm.’” See Order (Doc. 42) at 6

(quoting Caldwell v. Warden, FCI Talladega, 748 F.3d 1090, 1102 (11th Cir.

2014)).

Upon review of the evidence, the parties dispute whether Defendant

Garner directed Inmate Workman to harm Plaintiff because Plaintiff had

requested certain privileges or threatened to write a grievance about

Defendant Garner. Such a dispute is material. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248

(“[D]isputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the

governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.”). The

parties tell conflicting stories, but the Court must accept Plaintiff’s version of

events as true. See Haves, 52 F.3d at 921 (explaining a district court

considering a motion for summary judgment “must view all evidence and make

all reasonable inferences” in the non-movant’s favor). This is so because when

two parties’ stories conflict, neither of which is blatantly contradicted by

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indisputable evidence, a district court may not make credibility determinations

in favor of one party over the other. See Sears v. Roberts, 922 F.3d 1199, 1206,

1208–09 (11th Cir. 2019) (reversing the district court’s entry of summary

judgment in favor of the officer-defendants because the officers’ documentary

evidence, including disciplinary reports and affidavits, consisted of “various

forms of their own testimony,” which directly contradicted Plaintiff’s sworn

allegations).

Accepting as true that Defendant Garner told another inmate to “take

care of [Plaintiff],” and then days later, that inmate sexually assaulted

Plaintiff, Defendant Garner cannot establish as a matter of law that he was

unaware that his own actions put Plaintiff at substantial risk of serious harm.

Defendant Garner offers no indisputable evidence, such as video footage, that

blatantly contradicts Plaintiff’s account of the incident.1 As such, the record

presents “a classic swearing match, which is the stuff of which jury trials are

made.” Id. at 1208 (quoting Feliciano v. City of Miami Beach, 707 F.3d 1244,

1253 (11th Cir. 2013)). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to

Plaintiff, Defendant Garner fails to carry his burden on summary judgment

and his Motion (Doc. 63) therefore is DENIED.

1 Plaintiff reported that Inmate Workman hung sheets between their bunks

“to block the cameras.” See Doc. 63-7 at 1; Doc. 63-5 at 56–58.

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This case is In a posture to proceed to settlement conference and, if

settlement negotiations fail, to trial. The Court finds Plaintiff is entitled to the

appointment of counsel to assist him. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1); Bass v. Perrin,

170 F.3d 1312, 1320 (11th Cir. 1999). Thus, this case is REFERRED to the

Jacksonville Division Civil Pro Bono Appointment Program so the designated

deputy clerk of the Court may seek counsel to represent Plaintiff. The Court

encourages the parties to attempt to settle the case privately in the meantime.

If settlement negotiations are successful, the parties shall immediately notify

the Court.

DONE AND ORDERED at Jacksonville, Florida, this 11th day of June

2025.

Jatall), Comm

BRIAN. DAVIS

United States District Judge

Jax-6

C:

Lee M. Johnson

Counsel of Record