Alaidrus v. United States

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

AMR ABDELWASE ALAIDRUS,

Plaintiff,

1:25-CV-491

V. (GTS/DJS)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al.,

Defendants.

APPEARANCES:

AMR ABDELWASE ALAIDRUS

Plaintiff, Pro Se

Schenectady, New York 12308

DANIEL J. STEWART

United States Magistrate Judge

REPORT-RECOMMENDATION and ORDER

The Clerk has forwarded for review a civil complaint filed by Plaintiff. The

Complaint was filed April 21, 2025. Dkt. No. 1. Plaintiff has also filed a Motion to

Amend, Dkt. No. 4, which attached a proposed amended complaint. Dkt. No. 4-1. Under

FED. R. CIV. P. 15, Plaintiff was entitled to amend the complaint once as a matter of right.

See Siyu Yang v. Ardizzone, 540 F. Supp. 3d 372, 377 (W.D.N.Y. 2021). Leave to amend,

therefore, is not required. Plaintiff's Motion, Dkt. No. 4, is therefore denied as moot, but

the Clerk is directed to docket the proposed amended complaint as the Amended

_l-

Complaint and it will be considered as the operative pleading for purposes of the analysis

below. The filing fee in this action has not been paid, but Plaintiff has filed a motion to

proceed in forma pauperis. Dkt. No. 2. That Motion has been granted. The matter has

been referred to the undersigned for an initial review pursuant to L.R. 72.3.

Plaintiff has also filed a Motion for Permission to File Electronically in ECF. Dkt.

No. 5. Given the recommendation made below that this action be dismissed, the Motion

for Electronic Filing is denied.

I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS IN THE COMPLAINT

The factual allegations in the Amended Complaint are extensive. They are

outlined here only in brief because the recommendations made below rely largely on legal

conclusions unrelated to the specific facts alleged which renders the need for an extended

factual recitation unnecessary at this juncture.

The Amended Complaint alleges a broad conspiracy to unlawfully confine

Plaintiff for psychiatric evaluation. Plaintiff claims that this conspiracy involves officials

of the United States Government and Schenectady Police Department. Am. Compl. at p.

On January 11, 2025, Plaintiff claims he was unlawfully removed from his home by

Schenectady Police Department officials and taken to Ellis Hospital. /d. at pp. 4-5. He

further alleges that when admitted to the psychiatric ward at the hospital he was given a

roommate who was a government agent, id. at p. 5, and that medical personnel performed

unauthorized tests and administered unknown medications. Jd. at pp. 7 & 10. The

_2-

Amended Complaint also alleges that hospital officials refused to permit Plaintiff to leave

or provide him any sort of due process regarding his admission. /d. at p. 6.

Il. GOVERNING LEGAL STANDARD

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) directs that, when a plaintiff seeks to proceed in forma

pauperis, “(2) .. . the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that

—...(B) the action . . . (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which

relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune

from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).!

In reviewing a pro se complaint, the court has a duty to show liberality toward pro

se litigants, see Nance v. Kelly, 912 F.2d 605, 606 (2d Cir. 1990) (per curiam), and should

exercise “extreme caution . . . in ordering sua sponte dismissal of a pro se complaint

before the adverse party has been served and both parties (but particularly the plaintiff)

have had an opportunity to respond.” Anderson v. Coughlin, 700 F.2d 37, 41 (2d Cir.

1983) (internal citations omitted). Therefore, a court should not dismiss a complaint if

the plaintiff has stated “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”

«| Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility

when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable

' To determine whether an action is frivolous, a court must look to see whether the complaint “lacks an arguable

basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 “ 319, 325 (1989).

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556

U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).

Although a court should construe the factual allegations in the light most favorable

to the plaintiff, “the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained

in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.” Jd. “Threadbare recitals of the

elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”

Id. (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts

do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the

complaint has alleged - but it has not show[n] - that the pleader is entitled to relief.” □□□

at 679 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)). Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

“demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.”

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

Thus, a pleading that only “tenders naked assertions devoid of further factual

enhancement” will not suffice. /d. (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted).

I. DISCUSSION

A. Claims Against the United States

The Amended Complaint asserts four claims against the United States — claims

under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, 1986 and a claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act.

Am. Compl. at pp. 13-15.

_4-

“Neither the United States nor its agencies are persons under section 1983 and are

therefore excluded from the scope of liability under the section.” Sessoms v. Veterans

Admin. Med. Ctr., 1988 WL 47357, at *1 (W.D.N.Y. May 6, 1988); see also Muhammad

v. Suffolk Cnty. Support, 2025 WL 606560, at *9 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2025), report and

recommendation adopted, 2025 WL 603917 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 2025) (“The language of

42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not reach the actions of the federal government.”). Moreover,

“[o|ne cannot sue the United States without its consent and a court has no jurisdiction of

a suit against the United States to which it has not consented.” Smith v. U.S. Army Corps

of Eng’rs, 829 F. Supp. 2d 176, 183 (W.D.N.Y. 2011) (quoting Gnotta v. U.S., 415 F.2d

1271, 1276 (8th Cir.1969)). The United States has not waived that immunity with respect

to claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985 & 1986. McIntosh v. United States, 2018 WL

1275119, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 2018) (citing cases).

Plaintiff's claims under these three statutes, therefore, should be dismissed with

prejudice.

While the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”) provides a limited immunity from

| suit for tort claims, it has strict exhaustion requirements. Hill v. United States, 2019 WL

5694016, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 6, 2019). For example, the FTCA requires a claimant to

exhaust administrative remedies prior to initiating a FTCA action in federal court, a

“requirement [that] is jurisdictional and cannot be waived.” Celestine v. Mount Vernon

Neighborhood Health Ctr., 403 F.3d 76, 82 (2d Cir. 2005). “The burden is on the plaintiff

_5-

to both plead and prove compliance with the [FTCA’s] statutory requirements.” Jn re

Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 210, 214 (2d Cir. 1987). Here, Plaintiff has

not satisfied that burden. He alleges only that he “has satisfied or will satisfy all

administrative prerequisites required under the FTCA.” Am. Compl. at p. 15 (emphasis

added). As noted, however, the FTCA administrative requirements must be satisfied

“prior to initiating an FTCA action.” Diaz v. MDC Det. Ctr., 2018 WL 472810, at *2

(E.D.N.Y. Jan. 17, 2018). Because Plaintiff has not shown that he satisfied these

requirements prior to filing, his FTCA claim should be dismissed, though with leave to

demonstrate that he has satisfied them.

B. Claims Against the Schenectady Police Department

The Amended Complaint asserts nine causes of action against the Schenectady

Police Department. Am. Compl. at pp. 15-20. Claims one through four involve alleged

violations of constitutional rights under section 1983. /d. at pp. 15-18.? The remaining

five claims asserts state law tort claims. /d. at pp. 18-20.

The Schenectady Police Department is not a proper party to an action under section

1983. “A city police department is not an independent, suable entity separate from the

municipality in which the police department is organized.” Krug v. Cnty. of Rennselaer,

559 F. Supp. 2d 223, 247 (N.D.N.Y. 2008); see also EZ Pawn Corp. v. City of New York,

2 The second claim also asserts a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985, Am. Compl. at p. 17, a claim which is discussed in

Point III(F) below. 6.

2019 WL 2393780, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. June 5, 2019); Cooper v. Proud, 2018 WL 2729249,

at *4 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 2018), report and recommendation adopted, 2018 WL 2727873

(N.D.N.Y. June 6, 2018). As a result, Plaintiffs section 1983 claims against the

Department must be dismissed. For the same reason, Plaintiff's state law claims against

the Department must be dismissed. The Defendant “is a department of the City, and not

a separate legal entity amenable to being sued.” Brown v. City of New York, 192 A.D.3d

963, 965 (2d Dep’t 2021) (citing cases); see also Taylor v. City of Buffalo, 229 A.D.3d

1125 (4th Dep’t 2024) (city police department “cannot be independently sued”).

C. Claims Against Ellis Hospital

Plaintiff's first three causes of action against Ellis Hospital are brought under

section 1983. Am. Compl. at pp. 21-22. Claims under that statute require state action.

Tancredi v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 316 F.3d 308, 312 (2d Cir. 2003). As courts in this

district have previously recognized, Ellis Hospital is a private hospital and not a state

actor. Hilts v. Ellis Hosp., 2024 WL 4133804, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. July 25, 2024), report

and recommendation adopted, 2024 WL 3811262 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 14, 2024); Velaire v.

«| City of Schenectady, N.Y., 862 F. Supp. 774, 776 (N.D.N.Y. 1994).° Plaintiffs section

1983 claims against the hospital, therefore, should be dismissed.

the extent Plaintiff has attempted to allege a conspiracy between the hospital and the police department, it has

also been recommended that the section 1983 claim against the police department be dismissed, and so at this

juncture Plaintiff has not alleged a conspiracy with state actor.

-7J-

Plaintiff also asserts a claim against the hospital under Title II of the ADA. Am.

Comp. at p. 23. That claim should be dismissed for a related reason. “Title II does not

apply because it covers discrimination only with respect to the benefits of the services,

programs, or activities of a public entity. A private hospital is not a public entity for

purposes of Title II.” Gilot v. UR Med. Strong Mem’! Hosp., 2023 WL 2480575, at *2

(W.D.N.Y. Mar. 13, 2023) (internal quotations and citations omitted).

D. Claims against Mental Hygiene Legal Services

Plaintiff asserts two claims under section 1983 against Mental Hygiene Legal

Services related to its representation of Plaintiff. Am. Compl. at pp. 24-26. He also

asserts common law tort claims against MHLS. Jd. at pp. 26-27.

Section 1983 claims against MHLS are subject to dismissal on immunity grounds.

“To state a claim under Section 1983, the plaintiff must allege that a person acting under

color of state law deprived him of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United

States.” Conquistador v. Offices of Att’y Gen. of Conn., 2017 WL 11707851, at *2 (D.

Conn. Mar. 13, 2017). “The Eleventh Amendment bars such a federal court action against

mla state or its agencies absent a waiver of immunity or congressional legislation

specifically overriding immunity.” Mamot v. Bd. of Regents, 367 F. App’x 191, 192 (2d

Cir. 2010) (citing Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 99-100

(1984)). “It is well-established that New York has not consented to § 1983 suits in federal

court, and that § 1983 was not intended to override a state’s sovereign immunity.” □□□

-8-

(internal citations omitted). Thus, “state agencies do not fall within the meaning of

‘persons’ for purposes of Section 1983.” Bryant v. New York State Dep’t of Corr. Servs.

Albany, 146 F. Supp. 2d 422, 426 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). “[B]ecause Mental Hygiene Legal

Services is ‘a state funded legal services agency under the direction of the New York

State Office of Court Administration,’ Fisk v. Letterman, 401 F.Supp.2d 362, 378

(S.D.N.Y.2005), it, ... enjoys immunity from suit.” Middleton v. United States, 2011

WL 7164452, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. June 28, 2011), report and recommendation adopted, 2012

WL 394559 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 7, 2012); see also Sasscer v. Barrios-Paoli, 2008 WL

5215466, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 8, 2008) (citing cases).*

Plaintiff also asserts a claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act alleging

that MHLS failed to properly advocate for him during his period of purportedly unlawful

detention. Am. Compl. at p. 27. That claim is brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 12132

which provides:

Subject to the provisions of this subchapter, no qualified individual with a

disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in

or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public

entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.

Assuming MHLS is a “public entity” and that it is not immune from suit, see 7. W.

v. New York State Bd. of L. Examiners, 110 F.Ath 71, 77 (2d Cir. 2024), the Court

Plaintiff asserts a single state law claim against MHLS. Am. Compl. at pp. 26-27. “[B]ecause the Eleventh

Amendment is a bar addressed to federal courts, not federal causes of action, Plaintiff’s state law claims against

MHLS are similarly barred.” Sasscer v. Barrios-Paoli, 2008 WL 5215466, at *4 (internal quotations and alterations

omitted)

_9-

nonetheless recommends that this claim be dismissed because Plaintiff has failed to

properly allege a lack of accommodation actionable under the ADA. Plaintiff's

allegations include that MHLS “failed to advocate” for Plaintiff and “failed to...

challenge the discriminatory basis of Plaintiff's detention.” Am. Compl. at p. 27.

Allegations of this sort sound more in the nature of malpractice, which is a concept

distinct from discrimination. See Costin v. Glens Falls Hosp., 103 F.4th 946, 954 (2d Cir.

2024) (explaining distinction in medical context). Plaintiff has not offered any factual

allegations plausibly alleging how or why Mental Hygiene Legal Services would have

discriminated against Plaintiff based on a perceived mental illness. The Court, therefore,

recommends that this claim be dismissed with leave to amend.

E. Claims against the Schenectady County Court

There are numerous claims asserted against the Schenectady County Court — two

under section 1983, one under section 1985, and two state law claims. Am. Compl. at pp.

28-31.

“The County Court is part of the New York State Unified Court System.” Bentely

Thomas, 2022 WL 14054223, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 24, 2022) (citing N.Y. Const. Art.

VI, § 29(a)). As such, it is immune from suit in federal court by virtue of the Eleventh

Amendment. Gollomp v. Spitzer, 568 F.3d 355, 366 (2d Cir. 2009); McNair v. Utica

Police Dep’t, 2023 WL 4935993, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. June 26, 2023), report and

recommendation adopted, 2023 WL 4931609 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 1, 2023). This immunity

-10-

applies to each of Plaintiff's federal claims. Murawski v. New York State Bd. of Elections,

285 F. Supp. 3d 691, 695 (S.D.N.Y. 2018). As noted above, “it is well settled that the

Eleventh Amendment bars the adjudication of pendent state law claims against

nonconsenting state defendants in federal court.” Deadwiley v. New York State Off: of

Child. & Fam. Servs., 97 F. Supp. 3d 110, 116 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (citation and internal

alterations omitted). Accordingly, Plaintiff's claims against Schenectady County Court

should be dismissed with prejudice as barred by the immunity afforded under the Eleventh

Amendment.

F. Claims under section 1985

Plaintiff asserts claims that Defendants conspired to violate his constitutional

rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1985. See, e.g, Am. Compl. at p. 24.

The elements of a claim under § 1985(3) are: “(1) a conspiracy; (2) for the purpose

of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of equal

protection of the laws, . . .; (3) an act in furtherance of the conspiracy; (4) whereby a

person is ... deprived of any right of a citizen of the United States.” Brown v. City of

«| Oneonta, N.Y., 221 F.3d 329, 341 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting Mian v. Donaldson, Lufkin &

Jenrette Sec. Corp., 7 F.3d 1085, 1087 (2d Cir. 1993)). “Furthermore, the conspiracy

must also be motivated by ‘some racial or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidious

discriminatory animus behind the conspirators’ action.’” Mian v. Donaldson, Lufkin &

Jenrette Sec. Corp., 7 F.3d at 1088 (quoting United Bhd. of Carpenters, Local 610 v.

-ll-

Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 829 (1983)). The Amended Complaint, however, makes no

allegation of any racial or class-based animus on which the alleged conspiracy is

grounded and thus his claim, as pled, does not state a claim for relief and should be

dismissed.

G. Claims Under New York State Law

The Amended Complaint asserts state law causes of action against all Defendants

except the United States. To the extent not subject to dismissal on immunity grounds as

discussed above, it 1s recommended that Plaintiffs state law claims also be dismissed.

First, this Court lacks diversity jurisdiction to hear these claims. “Diversity

jurisdiction exists where the parties are citizens of different states and the amount in

controversy exceeds $75,000.” Ceglia v. Zuckerberg, 772 F. Supp. 2d 453, 455

(W.D.N.Y. 2011). “A case falls within the federal district court’s original diversity

jurisdiction only if diversity of citizenship among the parties is complete, 7.e., only if there

is no plaintiff and no defendant who are citizens of the same State.” Wisconsin Dep’t of

Corr. v. Schacht, 524 U.S. 381, 388 (1998) (internal quotations omitted). Complete

| diversity is required — meaning if any Defendant is a resident of the same state as the

Plaintiff, diversity jurisdiction does not exist. Seemann v. Maxwell, 178 F.R.D. 23, 24

(N.D.N.Y. 1998). The Complaint specifically alleges that both Plaintiff and Defendants

are residents of New York. Am. Compl. at pp. 3-4. As a result, there is also no diversity

_12-

jurisdiction in this case and no independent jurisdictional basis for entertaining these

claims.

A district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law

claims when it “has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” 28

U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). Generally, “when the federal-law claims have dropped out of the

lawsuit in its early stages and only state-law claims remain, the federal court should

decline the exercise of jurisdiction.” Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350

n.7 (1988). Having recommended dismissal of the federal claims over which the Court

has original jurisdiction, the Court also recommends that the District Court decline to

exercise 1ts supplemental jurisdiction over any state law claims Plaintiff may be asserting.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated herein, it is hereby

ORDERED, that Plaintiff's Motion to Amend (Dkt. No. 4) is DENIED as moot;

and it is further

ORDERED, that Plaintiff's Motion for Permission to File Electronically in ECF

«| (Dkt. No. 5) is DENIED; and it is

RECOMMENDED, that Plaintiff's Complaint be DISMISSED as set forth

above; and it 1s

ORDERED, that the Clerk of the Court serve a copy of this Report-

Recommendation and Order upon the parties to this action.

-13-

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the parties have fourteen (14)° days within

which to file written objections to the foregoing report. Such objections shall be filed

with the Clerk of the Court. FAILURE TO OBJECT TO THIS REPORT WITHIN

FOURTEEN (14) DAYS WILL PRECLUDE APPELLATE REVIEW. Roldan v.

Racette, 984 F.2d 85, 89 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing Small v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs.,

892 F.2d 15 (2d Cir. 1989)); see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED. R. CIv. P. 72 & 6(a).

Dated: June 17, 2025

Albany, New York

US-Magistrate Judge

5 If you are proceeding pro se and are served with this Order by mail, three additional days will be added to the

fourteen-day period, meaning that you have seventeen days from the date the order was mailed to you to serve and

file objections. FED. R. Civ. P. 6(d). If the last day of that prescribed period falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or legal

holiday, then the deadline is extended until the end of the next day that is not a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday.

FED. R. CIV. P. 6(a)(1)(C).

-14-