Richburg v. Anne Arundel County, Maryland

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

CRAIG RICHBURG,

Plaintiff,

No. 25-cv-195-ABA

v.

ANNE ARUNDEL COUNTY, MARYLAND,

et al.,

Defendants

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff initially filed this case in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County,

Maryland, against various defendants. One of the defendants, Anne Arundel County,

removed the case to this Court on January 21, 2025. ECF No. 1. On February 6, 2025,

Defendants Anne Arundel County, Maryland, Anne Arundel Police Department, C.J.

Eslick, and Jennifer Spieth (the “County Defendants”) filed a motion to dismiss for

failure to state a claim, which has been fully briefed. ECF Nos. 11, 12-13, 29. A month

later, on March 6, 2025, Plaintiff filed motions for clerk’s entry of default as to

Defendants Heartley House, House of Ruth of Maryland, Deena Hausner, Luann

Edwards, and Kaldikan Kifle. ECF Nos. 14-18. The Clerk’s Office entered default and

mailed notices of default as to those defendants. ECF Nos. 19-28. Defendants House of

Ruth of Maryland, Deena Hausner, Luann Edwards (the “House of Ruth Defendants”)

and Heartley House have now filed motions to vacate the orders of default, arguing that

service of process was not properly effectuated. ECF Nos. 31-33, 35. Plaintiff opposes

these motions. ECF Nos. 38-40, 42.

A. Motions to vacate entries of default

The Fourth Circuit has a “strong policy that cases be decided on their merits.”

United States v. Shaffer Equip. Co., 11 F.3d 450, 453 (4th Cir. 1993). “When a party

against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise

defend, and that failure is shown by affidavit or otherwise, the clerk must enter the

party’s default.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a). A court “may set aside an entry of default for good

cause.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(c). The “good cause” standard in Rule 55(c) is relatively

“forgiving of defaulting parties because it does not implicate any interest in finality.”

Colleton Preparatory Acad., Inc. v. Hoover Universal, Inc., 616 F.3d 413, 420 (4th Cir.

2010). “[R]elief from a judgment of default should be granted where the defaulting party

acts with reasonable diligence in seeking to set aside the default and tenders a

meritorious defense.” United States v. Moradi, 673 F.2d 725, 727 (4th Cir. 1982)

(“[T]rial judges are vested with discretion, which must be liberally exercised, in entering

[default] judgments and in providing relief therefrom.”); see also Consol. Masonry &

Fireproofing, Inc. v. Wagman Constr. Corp., 383 F.2d 249, 251 (4th Cir. 1967)

(“Generally a default should be set aside where the moving party acts with reasonable

promptness and alleges a meritorious defense.”).

The Fourth Circuit has established several factors (known as the “Payne factors”)

as relevant for determining whether to set aside an entry of default, namely “whether

the moving party has a meritorious defense, whether it acts with reasonable

promptness, the personal responsibility of the defaulting party, the prejudice to the

party, whether there is a history of dilatory action, and the availability of sanctions less

drastic.” Payne ex rel. Est. of Calzada v. Brake, 439 F.3d 198, 204-05 (4th Cir. 2006).

The Court finds that the House of Ruth Defendants and Defendant Heartley

House have satisfied the standard to set aside the entries of default. The Court does not

decide at this time whether Plaintiff has stated claims on which relief can be granted

against those defendants. But these Defendants have adequately shown that Payne

factors weighs heavily in favor of vacating the entries of default and permitting the

parties to litigate this case on the merits (if Plaintiff elects to move forward with claims

against these defendants, and at least in the event Plaintiff properly serves these

defendants). See Augusta Fiberglass Coatings, Inc. v. Fodor Contracting Corp., 843

F.2d 808, 812 (4th Cir. 1988) (explaining that to establish a meritorious defense a

defaulting party must make “a proffer of evidence which would permit a finding for the

defaulting party or which would establish a valid counterclaim”). These Defendants

acted with reasonable promptness by filing motions to vacate the entries of default

within a month after default was entered; there is no history of dilatory action. Plaintiff

also has failed to show that he would suffer prejudice as a result of setting aside the

defaults, and “delay in and of itself does not constitute prejudice to the opposing party.”

Colleton, 616 F.3d at 418. Lastly, as to the personal responsibility for the default and the

availability of less drastic sanctions, the default appears to be largely attributable to

improper service of process by Plaintiff, so assessing personal responsibility and less

drastic sanctions is largely unavailing.

B. County Defendants’ motion to dismiss

As noted, the County Defendants have filed a motion to dismiss. ECF No. 11.

Plaintiff filed two response briefs. ECF Nos. 12 & 13. The County Defendants filed a reply

brief. ECF No. 29. As an initial matter, under the Local Government Tort Claims Act

(“LGTCA”), Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. §§ 5-301 through 5-304, any notice of

intent to sue was required to be filed by April 26, 2022. Mr. Richburg alleges that he

sent notice on November 9, 2022. ECF No. 3. ¶ 14. The County Defendants contend no

notice was filed at all, but regardless, insofar as notice was filed, it was untimely, and

accordingly Counts 1, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8 and 9 are dismissed. That leaves only Count 2 against

the County Defendants, asserted under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. With respect to the defendant

identified as the “Anne Arundel County Police Department,” the County Defendants

have explained that is not a legal body capable of being sued, ECF No. 11-1 at 5–7, and

Plaintiff concedes this “is accurate.” ECF No. 13 at 3. With respect to Defendant Anne

Arundel County, Maryland (the “County”), Plaintiff has not alleged a § 1983 claim

against the County on which relief can be granted for the reasons stated in section F.1 of

the County Defendants’ brief. ECF No. 11-1 at 14–18.

That leaves the § 1983 claims against Sgt. Spieth and Cpl. Eslick (the “Officer

Defendants”). Those claims fail for two reasons. First, there is no evidence that Plaintiff

properly served the Officer Defendants. Second, those defendants contend they are

entitled to qualified immunity. ECF No. 11-1 at 10–12. Specifically, they contend that

they “are alleged to have worked with the Police Department’s Mobile Crisis Unit to get

co-Defendant Kalkidan Kifle into a domestic violence shelter to get away from Mr.

Richburg,” and “could not have reasonably believed by doing so that they were violating

the constitutional rights of Mr. Richburg.” Id. at 12. Mr. Richburg did not directly

respond to the arguments about qualified immunity. His argument for why his

allegations overcome qualified immunity is that “[t]he suit alleges that the police officers

actively filed and/or or knew that the criminal charges filed against the Plaintiff we’re

[sic] false and participated in that crime/ intentionally tortious act because of racial or

gender animus against plaintiff,” which he contends constitutes “clear violation of his

civil rights and legal right conferred unto him the US Constitution.” ECF No. 13 at 4. As

to his argument of “racial or gender animus,” the complaint does not assert such a

theory as part of Count 2, and a plaintiff may not amend a complaint through a brief in

opposition to a motion to dismiss. Sager v. Housing Com’n of Anne Arundel County,

855 F. Supp. 2d 524, 557 (D. Md. 2012). And as to his claim that the Officer Defendants

were involved in seeking “false” criminal charges against him, he was arrested pursuant

to a warrant, ECF No. 3 ¶ 99, and beyond conclusory allegations the complaint does not

plausibly allege facts that would permit the Court to conclude that the warrant lacked

probable cause. See Porterfield v. Lott, 156 F.3d 563, 568 (4th Cir. 1998). Plaintiff’s

allegations, even accepted as true, are insufficient to overcome the Officer Defendants’

assertion of qualified immunity.

C. Conclusion and Order

For these reasons, it is hereby ORDERED as follows:

1. The Motions to Vacate Entry of Default (ECF Nos. 31, 32, 33, 35) are

GRANTED.

2. The previously filed Entries of Default for Defendants Heartley House, House

of Ruth of Maryland, Deena Hausner, and Luann Edwards (ECF Nos. 21, 23,

and 25) are VACATED.

3. If Plaintiff wishes to move forward with claims against Defendants Heartley

House, House of Ruth of Maryland, Deena Hausner, Luann Edwards, he must

file proposed summonses, properly serve them upon issuance of summonses

by the Clerk, and file new Return of Service forms. Short of that, these

defendants are under no present obligation to respond to the complaint.

4. With respect to the County Defendants’ motion to dismiss (ECF No. 11), that

motion is GRANTED, and all claims against the County Defendants are

DISMISSED. The dismissal of counts 1, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8 and 9 is with prejudice.

The dismissal of count 2 is with prejudice with respect to the Anne Arundel

County Police Department and Anne Arundel County, Maryland. The

dismissal of count 2 is without prejudice with respect to Sgt. Spieth and Cpl.

Eslick.

/s/

Date: June 17, 2025 __________________________

Adam B. Abelson

United States District Judge