The opinion
Cite as 2020 Ark. App. 502
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
Reason: I attest to the accuracy
and integrity of this document
Date: 2021-07-15 14:38:15
Foxit PhantomPDF Version: DIVISION I
9.7.5 No. CV-20-372
Opinion Delivered: October 28, 2020
BRADLEY SNIDER
APPELLANT APPEAL FROM THE SEBASTIAN
COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT, FORT
V. SMITH DISTRICT
[NO. 66FJV-13-527]
ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF
HUMAN SERVICES AND MINOR HONORABLE SHANNON L. BLATT,
CHILDREN JUDGE
APPELLEES
AFFIRMED; MOTION TO
WITHDRAW GRANTED
WAYMOND M. BROWN, Judge
Counsel for appellant Bradley Snider brings this no-merit appeal from the Sebastian
County Circuit Court’s order terminating appellant’s parental rights to his children, C.S.
and K.S. Pursuant to Linker-Flores v. Arkansas Department of Human Services1 and Arkansas
Supreme Court Rule 6-9(i), appellant’s counsel has filed a motion to withdraw and a no-
merit brief contending that there are no meritorious issues that would support an appeal.
The clerk of this court mailed a certified copy of counsel’s brief and motion to be relieved
to appellant, informing him of his right to file pro se points for reversal under Arkansas
Supreme Court Rule 6–9(i)(3), which he has elected to do. We affirm the termination
order and grant counsel’s motion to withdraw.
1
359 Ark. 131, 194 S.W.3d 739 (2004).
On June 22, 2016, the Arkansas Department of Human Services (“the Department”)
opened an investigation after receiving allegations that appellant was frequently drunk and
violent toward his wife, Courtney Snider,2 and their children, R.R., C.S., and K.S.3 On
July 8, Courtney reported to the Department that appellant had again been physically and
verbally abusive toward her. The following day, a protective order was issued for Courtney
and the children against appellant. The children were removed from Courtney on July 13
by the Department due to Courtney’s unstable mental state and admitted methamphetamine
use. On September 16, the children were adjudicated dependent-neglected as a result of
inadequate supervision and parental unfitness, specifically due to the parents’ domestic
violence and substance-abuse issues. The court also found that the case was subject to the
Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) based on Courtney’s membership with the Choctaw
tribe. The goal of the case was set as reunification. Appellant was ordered to obtain and
maintain stable and appropriate housing, income, and transportation; to complete domestic-
violence classes; to visit regularly; to submit to random drug screens and hair-follicle testing;
to achieve and maintain total sobriety; to submit to a psychological evaluation and comply
with the recommendations; and to attend counseling. However, during the three-year
2
Appellant and Courtney had previous history with the Department, dating back to
2009. In 2014, they completed parenting classes; appellant also completed a Domestic
Violence Intervention Program. The Department’s file reveals appellant had a history of
alcohol-related arrests and domestic-battery violence, as well as suicidal tendencies.
Courtney had a history of illegal drug use.
3
Appellant is the biological father of C.S. and K.S. Timothy Roam is the biological
father of R.R.; neither Timothy Roam nor Courtney Snider (biological mother of the
children) are parties to this appeal; therefore, this appeal pertains only to appellant’s parental
rights to C.S. and K.S.
2
pendency of the case, appellant was incarcerated multiple times and failed to comply with
the case plan and complete many of the court-ordered services. Consequently, the goal of
the case was changed to termination of parental rights and adoption.
The Department filed a petition for termination of parental rights on January 9, 2020,
alleging three grounds for termination. Following the termination hearing, the circuit court
found beyond a reasonable doubt that the Department made active efforts to provide
remedial and rehabilitative services designed to prevent the breakup of the Indian family
and that, based on qualified expert testimony, continued custody by the parent or Indian
custodian is likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage to the juveniles. The
circuit court then granted the Department’s petition to terminate appellant’s parental rights
based on all three of the grounds alleged in the petition: (1) failure to remedy;4 (2)
subsequent factors;5 and (3) aggravated circumstances.6 A termination order was entered on
March 24, 2020.
This court reviews termination-of-parental-rights cases de novo.7 Grounds for
termination of parental rights must be proved by clear and convincing evidence, which is
that degree of proof that will produce in the finder of fact a firm conviction of the allegation
sought to be established.8 The appellate inquiry is whether the circuit court’s finding that
4
Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-341(b)(3)(B)(i)(a) (Supp. 2019).
5
Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-341(b)(3)(B)(vii)(a).
6
Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-341(b)(3)(B)(ix)(a)(3).
7
Dinkins v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 344 Ark. 207, 40 S.W.3d 286 (2001).
8
Tillman v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 2015 Ark. App. 119.
3
the disputed fact was proved by clear and convincing evidence is clearly erroneous. 9 A
finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing
court on the entire evidence is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has
been made.10 In resolving the clearly erroneous question, we give due regard to the
opportunity of the circuit court to judge the credibility of witnesses.11
To terminate parental rights, a circuit court must find by clear and convincing
evidence that termination is in the best interest of the juvenile, taking into consideration (1)
the likelihood that the juvenile will be adopted if the termination petition is granted and (2)
the potential harm, specifically addressing the effect on the health and safety of the child,
caused by returning the child to the custody of the parent. 12 The circuit court must also
find by clear and convincing evidence that one or more statutory grounds for termination
exists.13 Proof of only one statutory ground is sufficient to terminate parental rights. 14
Termination of parental rights is an extreme remedy and in derogation of a parent’s natural
rights; however, parental rights will not be enforced to the detriment or destruction of the
9
Id.
10
Id.
11
Id.
12
Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-341(b)(3)(A)(i) & (ii).
13
Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-341(b)(3)(B).
14
Tillman, supra.
4
health and well-being of the child.15 The intent behind the termination-of-parental-rights
statute is to provide permanency in a child’s life when it is not possible to return the child
to the family home because it is contrary to the child’s health, safety, or welfare, and a return
to the family home cannot be accomplished in a reasonable period of time as viewed from
the child’s perspective.16
For termination proceedings subject to the ICWA, the burden of proof is beyond a
reasonable doubt.17 However, our court’s review is still de novo, and we will not reverse
the circuit court’s ruling unless its findings are clearly erroneous. 18 The ICWA also prohibits
termination of parental rights to an Indian child “in the absence of a determination,
supported by evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, including testimony of qualified expert
witnesses, that the continued custody of the child by the parent or Indian custodian is likely
to result in serious emotional or physical damage to the child.”19
Arkansas Supreme Court Rule 6-9(i) allows counsel for an appellant in a
termination-of-parental-rights case to file a no-merit petition and motion to withdraw if,
after studying the record and researching the law, counsel determines that the appellant has
no meritorious basis for appeal. The petition must include an argument section that lists all
adverse rulings to the appellant made by the circuit court on all objections, motions, and
15
Id.
16
Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-341(a)(3).
17
Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-325(h)(2)(B)(ii) (Supp. 2019).
18
Holmes v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 2016 Ark. App. 495, 505 S.W.3d 730.
19
25 U.S.C. § 1912(f).
5
requests made by the party at the hearing from which the appeal arose and explain why each
adverse ruling is not a meritorious ground for reversal.20
Counsel contends that despite the higher burden of proof required under the ICWA
when terminating parental rights to an Indian child––proof beyond a reasonable doubt––
evidence presented at the termination hearing supports the aggravated-circumstances
ground for termination and any challenge to the circuit court’s finding would be frivolous.
This case was ongoing for more than three years and despite the offer of meaningful services,
appellant failed to complete the services and/or did not benefit from those services. He
failed to maintain sobriety and demonstrate stability and was incarcerated at the time of the
termination hearing. The evidence supports the circuit court’s finding that there is little
likelihood that additional services to the family will result in successful reunification.
Counsel further explains that evidence presented at the termination hearing also
supports the circuit court’s best-interest finding. Family service worker (FSW) Mindy Tuck
Duty testified that C.S. and K.S. are adoptable and that their current placement is interested
in adoption. A caseworker’s testimony that a child is adoptable is sufficient to support an
adoptability finding.21 As for potential harm, the circuit court found that the children’s
health and safety would be at risk if returned to appellant due to his incarceration and
inability to care for the children even when not incarcerated. Throughout the pendency of
this case, appellant has been incarcerated multiple times. We have stated that failure to live
20
Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 6-9(i)(1)(A).
21
Cole v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 2018 Ark. App. 121, 543 S.W.3d 540.
6
a law-abiding life supports a finding of potential harm.22 Additionally, appellant failed to
comply with the case plan and complete court-ordered services. A parent’s failure to comply
with court orders is sufficient evidence of potential harm to a child.23
In addition to the termination of appellant’s parental rights, counsel identifies one
adverse ruling made at the termination hearing. The Court Appointed Special Advocates
(CASA) report was admitted into evidence over the objection of appellant. However,
although appellant noted an objection to the admission of the CASA report, no basis for the
objection was provided. Consequently, the adverse ruling affords no meritorious ground
for reversal.24
Counsel also identifies three other issues that had the “potential” to be adverse to
appellant. First, because there was testimony that appellant suffered from a brain injury,
counsel states that an argument could have been made that appellant was entitled to
reasonable accommodations in accordance with the Americans with Disabilities Act. While
the issue was not preserved below, counsel explains that it could be argued that it falls within
the third exception to the contemporaneous-objection requirement set forth in Wicks v.
State,25 and that the issue should therefore be addressed by this court. However, as noted
22
Blasingame v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 2019 Ark. App. 342, 582 S.W.3d 873.
23
Bell v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 2016 Ark. App. 446, 503 S.W.3d 112.
24
See Taylor v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 2020 Ark. App. 227, at 3–4 (recognizing
that, even in termination of parental rights cases, we will not consider arguments made for
the first time on appeal and that parties are bound by the scope of the arguments presented
at the trial level).
25
270 Ark. 781, 606 S.W.2d 366 (1980).
7
by counsel, we have previously declined to apply a Wicks exception in such cases.26
Furthermore, as counsel correctly states, one of the statutory grounds upon which the circuit
court terminated appellant’s parental rights––aggravated circumstances––does not require
that the Department prove that meaningful services were provided.27
Next, counsel explains that because the case involves Indian children, the circuit
court’s findings under the ICWA may be challenged. Nonetheless, counsel adequately
explains that the Indian Child Welfare Specialist, the tribal representative from the Choctaw
Nation of Oklahoma, testified that it was Choctaw Nation’s position that appellant’s parental
rights to C.S. and K.S. should be terminated and that “returning the children home to the
biological parents would result in serious physical or emotional damage to the children.”
Based on the extended history of the case and the testimony of the tribal representative, we
agree with counsel that this issue provides no basis for reversal.
Lastly, in his testimony at the termination-of-parental-rights hearing, appellant
expressed a desire to be reunited with his children, which may be construed as a request for
additional time to work toward a goal of reunification. The circuit court’s granting of the
Department’s termination petition amounted to a denial of appellant’s request for additional
time. The intent behind the termination statute is to provide permanency in a child’s life
when it is not possible to return the child to the family home because it is contrary to the
child’s health, safety, or welfare, and return to the family home cannot be accomplished in
26
See Pratt v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 2012 Ark. App. 399, 413 S.W.3d 261.
27
See Willis v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 2017 Ark. App. 559, 538 S.W.3d 842.
8
a reasonable period of time as viewed from the child’s perspective.28 Here, over a period of
more than three years, despite the offer of meaningful services, appellant failed to
demonstrate stability and prove that he is capable of effectively parenting or providing
permanency for his children. As counsel accurately provides, a child’s need for permanency
overrides a parent’s request for additional time to improve circumstances, and courts will
not enforce parental rights to the detriment of the well-being of the child.29
In his pro se points for reversal, appellant attempts to “discredit” various statements
made during the termination hearing. For example, he takes issue with the testimony of
FSW Duty in which she stated that appellant failed to complete court-ordered domestic-
violence classes. Appellant attached a letter of achievement from the Arkansas Department
of Correction indicating that he completed domestic-violence classes during his
incarceration on April 9, 2020. While we acknowledge that he has now completed the
class, it was after the termination hearing was held on March 16. The statement made by
FSW Duty was not inaccurate. Appellant also argues about the accuracy of other statements
made by FSW Duty; however, the time to challenge such statements was at the termination
hearing. Furthermore, appellant’s pro se points amount to a request for this court to reweigh
the evidence, which we will not do.30 Therefore his pro se points provide no grounds for
reversal.
28
Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-341(a)(3).
29
See Ekberg v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 2017 Ark. App. 103, 513 S.W.3d 307.
30
See Westbrook v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 2019 Ark. App. 352, 584 S.W.3d 258.
9
Having carefully examined the record and counsel’s brief, we conclude that counsel
has complied with the requirements established by the Arkansas Supreme Court for no-
merit appeals in termination cases and that the appeal is wholly without merit. Accordingly,
we affirm the termination of appellant’s parental rights to C.S. and K.S. and grant counsel’s
motion to withdraw.
Affirmed; motion to withdraw granted.
VIRDEN and VAUGHT, JJ., agree.
Jennifer Oyler Olson, Arkansas Commission for Parent Counsel, for appellant.
One brief only.
10