Opinion

Allen Thomas v. Director, Department of Workforce Services, and Weyerhaeuser Nr Company

  • 2019 Ark. App. 468
Court
Court of Appeals of Arkansas
Filed
Oct 23, 2019
Status
Published
Cited by
17 cases
Authority
More cited than 86.3%

The opinion

Cite as 2019 Ark. App. 468

Digitally signed by Elizabeth ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS

Perry

Date: 2022.08.04 12:07:57

DIVISION I

-05'00' No. E-19-39

Adobe Acrobat version:

2022.001.20169

Opinion Delivered: October 23, 2019

ALLEN THOMAS

APPELLANT

APPEAL FROM THE ARKANSAS

V. BOARD OF REVIEW

[NO. 2018-BR-01493]

DIRECTOR, DEPARTMENT OF

WORKFORCE SERVICES, AND

WEYERHAEUSER NR COMPANY

APPELLEES AFFIRMED

RITA W. GRUBER, Chief Judge

Appellant Allen Thomas appeals the decision of the Arkansas Board of Review

(Board), which affirmed the opinion of the Appeal Tribunal (Tribunal) denying him

unemployment benefits on the basis that he was discharged from last work for misconduct

connected with the work. Thomas alleges that there is no substantial evidence to support

the Board’s findings that he was discharged for misconduct because the employer failed to

follow its written policy for termination. We disagree and affirm.

Thomas was employed with Weyerhaeuser NR Company (Weyerhaeuser) as an

operator for a stacker-stick-layer machine. He first began working for Weyerhaeuser in 1989

and was discharged in 2018 for violating its “lock out/tag out” (LOTO) safety policy. The

LOTO policy requires operators to shut down the power to a machine and place a lock on

the power source before entering the body of the equipment to work on it. The purpose

of the policy is to prevent injury by ensuring that no bodily contact is made with any moving

machine parts. The policy was in writing and reviewed with employees once a year.

On July 24, 2018, the company sawmill lead and Thomas’s supervisor, Jason Russell,

observed video footage that showed Thomas placing his arm up to his shoulder into an area

of the machine with moving parts. The power had not been cut, and he did not follow the

LOTO procedure. Thomas was subsequently suspended pending an investigation and was

ultimately discharged. The Arkansas Department of Workforce Services denied Thomas’s

application for unemployment benefits; he appealed its decision to the Tribunal.

During the telephone hearing held by the Tribunal, Thomas admitted that he knew

about the safety policy. He could explain the policy in detail but asserted that he did not

think to employ the safety procedures because he needed to straighten a “stick” in the

machine, and it took “just a second.” In defense of his conduct, he stated that all operators

straightened sticks without cutting power and that Russell had witnessed him do that

without locking out the machine on other occasions but had never reprimanded him. When

questioned about Thomas’s allegations, Russell explained that he had witnessed operators

reach into only the first “pan” of the machine to straighten a stick but that Thomas had

reached farther than that, with his arm almost up to his shoulder into the equipment. Russell

said that if Thomas had contact with a moving part, the result would have been catastrophic,

possibly causing death.

The Tribunal found that Thomas was disqualified from receiving unemployment

benefits under Arkansas Code Annotated section 11-10-514(b)(1) (Supp. 2017), reasoning

that he had been “discharged from last work for misconduct in connection with the work

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on account of a willful violation of the employer’s written rules pertaining to the safety of

persons.” On review, the Board determined that the Tribunal was correct as to the outcome

and found that Thomas had been discharged for a “willful violation of the rules or customs

of the employer pertaining to the safety of fellow employees, persons, or company

property.” Arkansas Code Annotated section 11-10-514(b)(1) provides, in relevant part,

that an individual who has been discharged for misconduct for willfully violating an

employer’s bona fide written rules or customs—including those pertaining to the

individual’s safety or the safety of fellow employees, persons, or company property—shall

be disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits until, subsequent to the date of

disqualification, the individual has been paid wages in two quarters for insured work totaling

not less than thirty-five times his or her weekly benefit. Specifically, the Board determined

that Thomas had violated the “customs of the employer pertaining to safety.” This appeal

followed.

Board decisions are upheld if they are supported by substantial evidence. Blanton v.

Dir., 2019 Ark. App. 205, 575 S.W.3d 186. Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence

that reasonable minds might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Id. In appeals of

unemployment-compensation cases, we view the evidence and all reasonable inferences

deducible therefrom in the light most favorable to the Board’s findings. Id. Even if there is

evidence that could support a different decision, our review is limited to whether the Board

could have reasonably reached its decision as a result of the evidence presented. Id.

However, our function on appeal is not merely to rubber-stamp decisions arising from the

Board. Wilson v. Dir., 2017 Ark. App. 171, 517 S.W.3d 427.

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When an individual is discharged from employment, the employer has the burden

of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the employee engaged in misconduct.

Jones v. Dir., 2015 Ark. App. 479, 470 S.W.3d 277. Misconduct, for purposes of

unemployment compensation, involves (1) disregard of the employer’s interest, (2) violation

of the employer’s rules, (3) disregard of the standards of behavior the employer has a right

to expect of its employees, and (4) disregard of the employee’s duties and obligations to the

employer. Keith v. Dir., 2018 Ark. App. 541, 564 S.W.3d 296. Mere inefficiency,

unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as the result of inability or incapacity,

inadvertencies, ordinary negligence in isolated instances, or good-faith errors in judgment

or discretion do not rise to the level of misconduct. Follett v. Dir., 2017 Ark. App. 505, 530

S.W.3d 884. There must be an intentional or deliberate violation, a willful or wanton

disregard, or carelessness or negligence of such degree or recurrence as to manifest wrongful

intent or evil design. Id.

On appeal, Thomas argues that Weyerhaeuser disregarded its own disciplinary policy

because it did not consider “the circumstances surrounding the failure to utilize the

procedures” as was required. He contends that Weyerhaeuser should have considered (1)

the pressure employees were under to get product out, (2) his similar use of the machine in

the past, and (3) his long work history with the company. Thomas asserts that because it

failed to follow the first-offense discharge policy by not considering the circumstances of

the safety violation, Weyerhaeuser was not justified in terminating him under it, and as a

result, the Board’s findings were not supported by substantial evidence. We disagree.

Weyerhaeuser’s disciplinary procedures state in part:

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Because of the potential seriousness of injury for violation of the following

safety rules these disciplinary procedures shall apply:

1. First offense discharge—

Failure to properly utilize lockout/tagout procedures. Circumstances

surrounding the failure to utilize the procedures will be considered.

We have said when the employer has no written policy or fails to follow its written policy,

then the facts must be evaluated to determine whether the employee’s behavior was a willful

disregard of the employer’s interest. Hopkins v. Dir., 2019 Ark. App. 84, at 4, 571 S.W.3d

524, 527; see also Whitmer v. Dir., 2017 Ark. App. 367, at 4, 525 S.W.3d 45, 48.

Here, Weyerhaeuser’s disciplinary policy allowed for discharge after a first offense for

failure to use LOTO safety procedures following consideration of the surrounding

circumstances of the violation. The evidence is clear that Thomas failed to follow the

required safety procedure. His assertion that the Board determined that Weyerhaeuser had

failed to follow its policy for a first-offense discharge is incorrect. The Board found that it

was Weyerhaeuser’s custom to allow “reaching into the first pan [of the machine]” without

utilizing the lock-out procedure, but beyond that, a tool or the lock-out procedure was

required. Finding that Weyerhaeuser had a certain custom in addition to its written policy

is not synonymous with finding that Weyerhaeuser failed to discharge Thomas according to

that policy.

Regarding Thomas’s claim that Weyerhaeuser should have considered the pressure

he was under to get product out, it is not disputed that there was pressure on the employees.

However, Thomas admitted that there was no pressure to also disregard the safety

procedures. His next assertion—that Weyerhaeuser failed to consider similar use of the

5

machine in the past and that his supervisor witnessed similar use without prior reprimand—

is contradicted by Russell’s testimony that he had never observed Thomas with his arm that

far into the machine. Issues of witness credibility and the weight to be afforded their

testimony are matters for the Board to determine. Weinstein v. Dir., 2013 Ark. App. 374,

428 S.W.3d 560. After Thomas had been suspended, Weyerhaeuser investigated the

circumstances of his safety violation. The video of Thomas reaching into the machine was

reviewed by several people within the company, and it interviewed seven other workers

about how they would respond in the same situation, all of whom explained that they

believed they could reach into the “first pan” of the machine but needed to use a “pike

pole” or lock out the machine beyond that area. Given the testimony and the evidence in

the record, we cannot say that Weyerhaeuser failed to consider the circumstances of the

safety violation.

Thomas’s final point is that his long tenure of employment with Weyerhaeuser

supports a finding that he did not engage in intentional misconduct. However, a violation

of safety rules satisfies the element of intent required to constitute misconduct. Wilson, 2017

Ark. App. 171, at 4, 517 S.W.3d at 429–30. Even though Thomas testified that he did not

“think” to follow the safety procedures, he admitted that he had his arm in the machine,

was aware of the required safety procedures, is required to follow the LOTO safety

procedure at any point when his arm is in a machine, and understood he could have been

mangled or worse, yet he did not follow the safety procedures before putting his arm in the

machine.

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Because Weyerhaeuser conducted an extensive investigation and Thomas admitted

he was aware of and understood the company’s LOTO safety policy, the Board could have

reasonably based its decision on the evidence before it. Substantial evidence existed to

support the Board’s finding that Thomas willfully violated the rules or customs of the

employer pertaining to safety. Therefore, we affirm the Board’s denial of unemployment

benefits.

Affirmed.

WHITEAKER and VAUGHT, JJ., agree.

Humphrey Law Office, by: Marion A. Humphrey, for appellant.

Cynthia Uhrynowycz, for appellee Director, Arkansas Department of Workforce

Services.

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This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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