The opinion
[J-43-2024] [MO:Wecht, J.]
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
MIDDLE DISTRICT
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, : No. 16 MAP 2023
:
Appellant : Appeal from the Order of the
: Cumberland County Court of
: Common Pleas, Criminal Division,
v. : at No. CP-21-CR-3121-2021
: dated January 20, 2023
:
LARRY WARDELL HUNTE, : ARGUED: May 15, 2024
:
Appellee :
CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION
JUSTICE BROBSON DECIDED: June 17, 2025
The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (Commonwealth), by the Office of the
Cumberland County District Attorney, lodged this direct appeal 1 from the
January 20, 2023 order of the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County (trial court).
In that order, the trial court, inter alia, granted the motion to suppress blood test results
filed by Appellee Larry W. Hunte (Hunte), against whom the Commonwealth had filed
criminal charges stemming from a fatal automobile crash in Cumberland County.
Consequently, the trial court granted, in part, Hunte’s motion to dismiss, thereby
dismissing the criminal charges related to the suppressed results. 2
1 See 42 Pa. C.S. § 722(7) (authorizing direct appeal to this Court from decision by court
of common pleas holding statute unconstitutional).
2 Although the trial court did not dismiss all of the charges against Hunte, the
Commonwealth pursued this interlocutory appeal as of right, invoking Rule 311(d) of the
Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure, which provides: “In a criminal case, under
the circumstances provided by law, the Commonwealth may take an appeal as of right
(continued…)
The principal rationale for the trial court’s decision to grant the suppression motion
and dismiss the related charges was its conclusion that Section 3755 of the Vehicle Code,
75 Pa. C.S. § 3755, is facially unconstitutional, as, according to the trial court, the statute
expressly authorizes warrantless searches and seizures of a person’s blood without a
warrant in violation of both the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and
Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. 3 (Trial Ct. Op. at 5.) This conclusion
was determinative of the outcome, in the trial court’s view, because the Commonwealth
advanced Section 3755 as its sole authority to conduct the warrantless blood draw,
offering no other justification for its decision to proceed without a search warrant. (Id.
at 4.) Alternatively, the trial court held that, if it erred in reaching the constitutional
question, “the seizure would be no less unconstitutional in the absence of its purported
statutory justification, such that the same result would be required.” (Id. at 6 n.12.)
I have no qualm with the trial court’s alternative reasoning—i.e., that the
warrantless seizure of Hunte’s blood by a phlebotomist at Penn State Health Holy Spirit
Medical Center (Holy Spirit) at the direction of law enforcement was unconstitutional
from an order that does not end the entire case where the Commonwealth certifies in the
notice of appeal that the order will terminate or substantially handicap the prosecution.”
3 The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution provides:
The people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
possessions from unreasonable searches and seizures, and no warrant to
search any place or to seize any person or things shall issue without
describing them as nearly as may be, nor without probable cause,
supported by oath or affirmation subscribed to by the affiant.
[J-43-2024] [MO: Wecht, J.] - 2
under both the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions. Under either organic legal
document, a seizure conducted without a warrant “is presumptively unreasonable . . .
subject to a few specifically established, well-delineated exceptions.” 4 Commonwealth v.
McCree, 924 A.2d 621, 627 (Pa. 2007) (Opinion Announcing Judgment of Court). Upon
the filing of a motion to suppress evidence, the Commonwealth bears both the burden of
production, by a preponderance of the evidence, and persuasion that the evidence in
question was not unlawfully seized by law enforcement. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 581(H);
Commonwealth v. Price, 284 A.3d 165, 168 (Pa. 2022).
Hunte moved pretrial to suppress the blood test results, focusing his attack on the
warrantless blood draw. In his motion, Hunte specifically alleged: “[Law enforcement’s]
request to have [Hunte’s] blood drawn was without a warrant and there is no indication
that an attempt to obtain a warrant ever occurred. Further, there is no indication that an
attempt to secure a warrant would have been unsuccessful.” (Reproduced Record (R.R.)
at 36.) Hunte claimed that the seizure of his blood under these circumstances violated
his rights under both the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions. (Id.) In its
prehearing responsive brief, the Commonwealth conceded the warrantless nature of the
blood draw. (See id. at 77-85.) Notwithstanding its burden of production and persuasion,
the Commonwealth did not contend that the warrantless seizure of Hunte’s blood fell
within any exception to the warrant requirement. Accordingly, on this record, the
Commonwealth failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the blood in
question was lawfully—i.e., constitutionally—seized from Hunte’s unconscious body.
I, therefore, would affirm the trial court’s order suppressing the results of the blood test
on this basis.
4 These exceptions include, inter alia, consent and exigent circumstances. See
Commonwealth v. Jones-Williams, 279 A.3d 508, 515 (Pa. 2022).
[J-43-2024] [MO: Wecht, J.] - 3
Whether Section 3755 of the Vehicle Code 5 is unconstitutional requires a separate
inquiry. As the Majority appropriately explains, legislative enactments, such as
Section 3755, “are presumed to be constitutional, and this presumption can be rebutted
only if the statute clearly, plainly and palpably” violates the Constitution. S. Newton Twp.
Electors v. S. Newton Twp. Supervisor, 838 A.2d 643, 645 (Pa. 2003). Indeed, a statute
“is facially unconstitutional only where no set of circumstances exist[s] under which [it]
would be valid.” Barris v. Stroud Twp., 310 A.3d 175, 203 (Pa. 2024) (quoting Clifton v.
Allegheny Cnty., 969 A.2d 1197, 1222 (Pa. 2009)).
5 Section 3755 of the Vehicle Code provides:
(a) General rule.--If, as a result of a motor vehicle accident, the
person who drove, operated or was in actual physical control of the
movement of any involved motor vehicle requires medical treatment in an
emergency room of a hospital and if probable cause exists to believe a
violation of section 3802 (relating to driving under influence of alcohol or
controlled substance) was involved, the emergency room physician or his
designee shall promptly take blood samples from those persons and
transmit them within 24 hours for testing to the Department of Health or a
clinical laboratory licensed and approved by the Department of Health and
specifically designated for this purpose. This section shall be applicable to
all injured occupants who were capable of motor vehicle operation if the
operator or person in actual physical control of the movement of the motor
vehicle cannot be determined. Test results shall be released upon request
of the person tested, his attorney, his physician or governmental officials or
agencies.
(b) Immunity from civil or criminal liability.--No physician, nurse or
technician or hospital employing such physician, nurse or technician and no
other employer of such physician, nurse or technician shall be civilly or
criminally liable for withdrawing blood or obtaining a urine sample and
reporting test results to the police pursuant to this section or for performing
any other duty imposed by this section. No physician, nurse or technician
or hospital employing such physician, nurse or technician may
administratively refuse to perform such tests and provide the results to the
police officer except as may be reasonably expected from unusual
circumstances that pertain at the time of admission.
75 Pa. C.S. § 3755.
[J-43-2024] [MO: Wecht, J.] - 4
The Majority’s conclusion that Section 3755 of the Vehicle Code is facially
unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and
Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution is premised entirely on its belief that
the statute itself authorizes a warrantless seizure of blood samples from a person’s body.
It is on this basic premise that the Majority and I disagree. In my opinion, the statute,
which this Court has previously referred to as the “emergency room counterpart” to
Section 1547 of the Vehicle Code, 75 Pa. C.S. § 1547, 6 is addressed not to law
enforcement but, rather, to medical professionals. In other words, the statute requires
“the emergency room physician or his designee” to comply with law enforcement’s
directives to “promptly take blood samples” from “the person who drove, operated or was
in actual physical control of the movement” of the motor vehicle involved in the subject
motor vehicle accident and provides any “physician, nurse or technician” who complies
with law enforcement’s directives with immunity from civil and criminal liability for
“withdrawing [that] blood.” See 75 Pa. C.S. § 3755.
While I admit that the way in which law enforcement and the Commonwealth
sought to apply Section 3755 of the Vehicle Code in this case—i.e., as an independent
exception to the warrant requirement—is constitutionally problematic, 7 in my view,
6 Commonwealth v. Riedel, 651 A.2d 135, 139 (Pa. 1994). Sections 3755 and 1547 of
the Vehicle Code were originally part of the same statutory provision and “comprise[d] a
statutory scheme that implie[d] the consent of a driver to undergo chemical blood testing.”
Id. at 139-40, 140 n.2.
7 After a failed attempt to secure consent for blood alcohol testing from an unconscious
Hunte, law enforcement requested that emergency room personnel draw Hunte’s blood
to further law enforcement’s criminal investigation of the fatal crash. There is no dispute
that law enforcement had probable cause to believe that Hunte had operated the motor
vehicle involved in the fatal crash while under the influence of alcohol, controlled
substances, or both. Although law enforcement filled out a hospital form titled
“Certification of Request for Blood or Urine Alcohol Testing,” law enforcement did not
secure a warrant for the blood draw. A trooper, however, “later testified to his
understanding that this form was predicated upon Section 3755” of the Vehicle Code.
(continued…)
[J-43-2024] [MO: Wecht, J.] - 5
circumstances exist whereby the statute can be applied in a constitutional manner.
Stated another way, nothing within the plain text of Section 3755 forecloses a situation
where either law enforcement obtains a warrant before directing emergency room
personnel to withdraw a person’s blood or the Commonwealth later establishes by a
preponderance of the evidence that the warrantless seizure of a person’s blood fell within
an exception to the warrant requirement—e.g., consent or exigent circumstances.
Section 3755(a) can be validly applied simply to require emergency room personnel to
comply with law enforcement’s directive to draw a person’s blood. Section 3755(b) then
provides protection to those cooperating emergency room personnel, who arguably
performed a medical procedure that was not medically necessary, from civil or criminal
liability, regardless of whether the seizure later passes constitutional muster. 8 Indeed, in
(Majority Op. at 7.) As noted above, a phlebotomist at Holy Spirit complied with the
request of law enforcement and withdrew blood from Hunte’s unconscious body. The
Commonwealth then secured separate search warrants—one to seize the blood samples
from Holy Spirit and the other to have those samples tested for alcohol and controlled
substances. That blood was then tested and revealed the presence of alcohol and
controlled substances.
As the Majority points out, these facts appear to demonstrate that “[t]he blood draw
at issue in this case was conducted under [what law enforcement believed to be] the
authority of Section 3755” of the Vehicle Code. (Id. at 43.) In other words, law
enforcement appears to have believed, albeit, in my mind, erroneously, that Section 3755
established an independent exception to the warrant requirement.
8 The Majority relies heavily on City of Los Angeles v. Patel, 576 U.S. 409 (2015) (Patel),
in support of its position that Section 3755 of the Vehicle Code is facially unconstitutional
under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 8 of
the Pennsylvania Constitution. The Majority criticizes my position as inconsistent with
Patel because the “purported ‘constitutional applications’” of Section 3755 that I offer “are
exactly the sort of hypotheticals that are, as the U.S. Supreme Court said in Patel,
‘irrelevant to our analysis because they do not involve actual applications of the statute.’”
(Majority Op. at 50 (quoting Patel, 576 U.S. at 419).) I reiterate, however, that I believe
Section 3755 can be applied in a constitutional manner—i.e., to require emergency room
personnel to comply with law enforcement’s directive to draw a person’s blood and to
protect those cooperating emergency room personnel from civil or criminal liability. Here,
unlike in Patel, where the statute at issue required the subject of the search to comply
(continued…)
[J-43-2024] [MO: Wecht, J.] - 6
the absence of Section 3755, it is unclear how law enforcement, even with a warrant,
could compel emergency room personnel to comply with a directive to draw a person’s
blood.
For these reasons, while I would affirm the trial court’s order suppressing the
results of the blood test based on the record before this Court because, as explained
above, the Commonwealth failed to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence
that Hunte’s blood was constitutionally seized from his person, I would further conclude
that Section 3755 of the Vehicle Code does not clearly, plainly, and palpably violate either
the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution or Article I, Section 8 of the
Pennsylvania Constitution and is, therefore, not facially unconstitutional.
Justice Mundy joins this concurring and dissenting opinion.
with law enforcement’s directive, “the group for whom for the law is a restriction” is
emergency room personnel, not the person from whom the emergency room personnel
draw the blood. Patel, 576 U.S. at 418 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey,
505 U.S. 833, 894 (1992)).
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